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THE
VIVARAṆAPRAMEYASAṆGRAHA
of
BHĀRATĪTĪRTHA

Translated into English

BY
S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI
Madras University
AND
SAILESWAR SEN
Andhra University



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PREFACE

The first draft of this translation was typed over five years ago. Since it was considered solely an accompaniment to a better edition of the text, than that of the Vizianagaram Sanskrit series, it was laid by and revised by fits and starts, as the text got corrected. The latter was a rather lengthy process, because of difficulties both in getting Mss. and in printing. Partly as a result of this, and partly because Dr. Sen's ill-health prevented him from revising the draft made by Mr. Sastri, what is now offered to the public is not as uniform as may be desired. It is hoped, however, that it will prove a reliable aid to such as may require one for the understanding of the *Vivaraṇa-prameyasāṅgraha*. In looking through the draft when it was made, getting a typescript of it, looking up references, occasionally checking the proofs, and preparing the word-index, Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan of Pachaiyappa's College, Madras, has rendered invaluable service. Other willing helpers have been Dr. T. R. Chintamani and Dr. V. Raghavan of the Sanskrit Department, University of Madras. The Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, has done its work with commendable promptitude and care. To all these, we tender our grateful thanks. Words will not avail to thank Andhra University for consenting to bring out the publication in these days of high costs.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
Āp. ŚS, or Āp. Śr.	Āpastamba Śrautasūtra
Āsv. Śr or Āsv. ŚS	Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra
Bh. Gītā or Gītā	Bhagavad Gītā
Brh.	Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
Brh. Vārtika	Brhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣya-vārtika
Br. S. or Br. Su.	Brahma Sūtras
C	Ms. from Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal.
Chānd. or Chān.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Gautama	Gautama Dharmasūtra
Īśa.	Īśāvāsyopaniṣad
Kaṭha	Kāthopaniṣad
Kausītaki	Kausītakyupaniṣad
Kena.	Kena Upaniṣad
Maitri.	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad
MS	Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā
Mund.	Mundaka Upaniṣad
P	Poona Ms. from the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
PM	Purvamīmāṃsā Sūtras
PV. or PpV.	Pañcapādika-vivaraṇa
Prāśna	Prāśna Upaniṣad
Ś	Śringeri Ms.
Śab. Bh.	Śābara Bhāṣya
Śat. Br.	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
Śvet.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T	Tarkabhūṣaṇ's edition in Bengali script
Taitt. Āraṇyaka or TĀ.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt. Upa. or Taitt.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TB	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
TPH	Theosophical Publishing House
TS	Taittirīya Samhitā
V	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition

VIVARANAPRAMEYASANGRAHA.

1. That abode of beneficent bliss which, as the self of all, delighting all beings here and hereafter, through a fraction of itself, shines in the lotus of the heart, into that do ascetics enter.

2. This compendium of the topics dealt with in the 'Elucidation' (the *Vivaraṇa* of *Prakāśātman*) of the 'Gloss' (*ṭīkā* i.e. the *Pañcapādikā* of *Padmapāda*) on the 'Commentary' (i. e. the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Vedānta Sūtras*) is written to the end of obviating the difficulty due to the relationship (of each earlier work to the succeeding one) as the explanation (only) of those (particular passages) which are to be explained (thus failing to give a continuous account).

3. They, because who have studied the *Vedānta* of the injunction of obligatory study of one's own section of the *Veda* and are in doubt as to its (true) meaning, these are the persons eligible for (the study of) *Vedānta Sūtras*, the Commentary thereon and such other works.

I. The injunction of study "one's own section of the *Veda* is to be studied"¹ is obligatory since there is the dictum that "the *Veda* with its six subsidiaries (disciplines) is to be studied and known by a brahmin as a religious duty without any (ulterior) motive."² For, if the study of the

¹ *Taitt Āraṇyaka*, II, 15.

² Quoted as *Āgama* in *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, I, 1, 1, (Kielhorn, Vol. I, p. 1)

Veda be optional there would be (the fallacy of) mutual dependence in this way, that when there is the knowledge of the meaning (of the Veda) there would be desire, and when there is desire there would be knowledge of the meaning (of the Veda) for one who has launched upon the study of the Veda with its six subsidiaries. Therefore it is only on the strength of an obligatory injunction that everyone studies the Veda with its six subsidiaries and understands its meaning. When owing to the influence of the maturation of accumulated religious merit some individual desires to attain the unsurpassable (supreme) goal of man, he seeks for its means in the Veda and understands this (which follows). As it is said in the text, "For the love of the self, however everything is dear"¹, that everything else is dear only as subsidiary to the self, he who has no attachment to things other than the self is the eligible person ; (by the Upaniṣadic passage) beginning with "When the the self is seen, heard, and known, all this, indeed, becomes known,"² and concluding with "This much indeed is immortality"³, it is declared of the seeing (intuition) of the self that it is the means to immortality, the supreme human goal ; (but) as 'seeing' which is not dependent on human effort cannot be prescribed, the 'seeing' of the self is restated (in order to show its connection with what is to be enjoined) in "The self is to be seen"⁴, and as the means to it (i.e. seeing), there is enjoined, in "(It) is to be heard, reflected and meditated on"⁵, 'hearing'

¹ Brh., II, iv, 5

² Ibid., IV, v, 6

³ Ibid., IV, v, 15

⁴ Ibid., IV, v, 6

⁵ Ibid.

as the principal (means), along with its subsidiaries, reflection and meditation, which are auxiliaries in achieving the fruit.

II. Now if it be said that, since for a person learned in the Veda with its six subsidiaries though there be knowledge of the (literal) sense, there is no understanding of the purport, in the absence of inquiry, the sense understood by such cannot be what is intended by scripture, not so (we reply), for this purport alone of scripture is declared in the purāṇas. It is thus:

"By the passages of the scripture (the self is) to be heard; it is to be reflected on through (sound) reasonings; and after knowing, it is always to be meditated upon. These are the means to 'seeing' (the self).

"Of these, first, O foremost among ascetics, 'hearing' consists only in the ascertainment of the express sense and purport through marks¹ like the initial passage etc.,

"in the case of all Vedānta passages, from the beloved mouth of the preceptor. 'Reflection' is pondering over arguments which are in support of the (Vedānta) passages.

"Meditation is one-pointed attention in respect of 'hearing' and 'reflection.' What are known as 'meditation' and 'reflection' O wise ones, are both of them

"subsidiaries auxiliary to achieving the fruit. Through them, O excellent men, are destroyed, without a trace, doubt (of impossibility) and delusion (of the contrary possibility)." ²

¹The six marks determinative of purport are: the harmony of the initial and concluding passages, repetition, novelty, fruitfulness, glorification by eulogistic passages or condemnation by deprecatory passages and intelligibility in the light of reasoning.

²Mānavopapurāṇa, ch. IV.

"Hearing has priority over reflection and even meditation. It is the immediate cause, indeed, in the origination of knowledge, O wise ones.

"More remote is reflection which excludes other (views); so too is meditation (thereon); calmness, restraint of the senses etc. belong in sequence to the body of *modus operandi*.

"Then, for the one who is well-established in the study of the Veda with all its subsidiaries, there arises from the Vedic passages a certain mental psychosis, which is pure and whose sphere is the unity of the inner (self) and Brahman.

"The manifestation of intelligence which occurs on that (occasion), which is self-established and beneficent, that alone is Brahman-knowledge; that alone is the destroyer of

"Through the instrumentality of the (sacred) word there arises forcefully a mental psychosis, perfect and firm, which has the form of the identity of the inner (self) and Brahman.

"And the seer of that (psychosis) is the inner self, which is self-luminous by its own nature that is identical with pure Brahman.

"The self-manifestation (of Brahman) in its own nature, in that (psychosis), O great sages, is called Brahman-knowledge. The ignorance of that (Brahman) is revealed by intelligence,

"and is established only as an appearance; like the owl's (experience of) darkness (during day-time), it is, in truth non-real; it devours itself by itself.

"The serene self, O wise ones, (destroys) by itself necience and its effects. In its nature as the perfect Brahman it alone remains over.

"The being which thus remains is the sphere of one's own experience alone. That by which this is established, O supreme among the learned, (that) is indeed divine knowledge."¹

III. Now, even thus, an injunction in respect of 'hearing' is not intelligible. It is thus: Is that (injunction of hearing) an injunction of the novel (apūrva-vidhi) like (the one prescribing) the jyotistoma etc., or is it a restrictive injunction (niyamavidhi) like (the one prescribing) the pounding (of rice-grains in a mortar) etc., or is it an exclusive injunction (parisankhyā-vidhi) like (the one prescribing that) only five five-nailed animals may be eaten etc.? Not the first, since in respect of the perceptible fruit, Brahman-knowledge, instrumentality is established for the 'hearing' etc. of the Vedānta through co-presence and co-absence. Indeed, it is patent in the world that the 'hearing' of medical science is instrumental to the understanding of its subject-matter. Not the second, because of the absence of a ground for the assumption of an adrṣṭa consequent on the restriction. In the pounding etc., however, the final apūrva, born of the adrṣṭa consequent on the restriction, is itself the ground of the assumption (of an adrṣṭa from the restriction). Nor is Brahman-knowledge born of adrṣṭa, for there is no instance of bare co-absence. For it is not within observation that even when there is the 'hearing' etc. of the Vedānta, Brahman-knowledge does not arise (merely) because of the defect, namely, the absence of an adrṣṭa consequent on the restriction.

¹ Mānavopapurāṇa, ch. IV.

And even if knowledge were somehow born of *adr̥ṣṭa*, such an injunction would conflict with the Commentary (of Śaṅkara)¹ since in the commentary on the aphorism relating to (harmolous) synthesis (the existence of any) injunction (in respect of hearing) is refuted with great effort. Otherwise there is the contingency of sentence-split (*vākya-bheda*) in the case of the Vedāntas, as having injunction for purport and as having Brahman for purport (at the same time). Nor even the third, since, as in the relinquishment of (the eating of) other animals, when the eating of five-nailed animals as also of the other animals not having five-nails is established otherwise (e.g., natural appetite), there is not establishment through any source other than the Upaniṣads, for the intuition of the self. Therefore there is no injunction of 'hearing.'

IV. To this it is said (in reply). In respect of *adhyāyana*, though having the perceptible fruit, viz., knowledge of dharma, a restrictive injunction is certainly admitted. Now if it be thus even in the matter of the knowledge of dharma, which is a minor human goal and is remote, need it then be said that there is restrictive injunction with regard to 'hearing' as the means of Brahman-intuition, the supreme human goal? If in the study of the Veda, the (final) *apūrva* of the sacrifice, born of *niyamā-dr̥ṣṭa*, be the ground for the assumption of that (*adr̥ṣṭa*), then, even in respect of 'hearing' let Brahman-knowledge be the ground of the assumption of that; for Brahman-knowledge is born of all *adr̥ṣṭas*, since there is the *smṛti*, "All action in its entirety, O Partha, attains its consummation in knowledge."² There, indeed, the word

¹ Here as elsewhere in this work 'Commentary' means Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*.

² Bh. Gītā, IV, 33

'entirety' is employed, only in order to include 'hearing' etc., after removing the erroneous notion that the word 'all' is used only in relation to the well-known sacrifice etc.; else it would be (idle) repetition. If injunction be admitted (in respect of dharma) considering the sin that would attend on the non-performance (of such dharma) since there is the dictum "The twice-born, who exerts himself in other things without studying the Veda soon attains śūdra-hood, even while alive, along with his family"¹ let this be so even in the present context; for there is the smṛti predicating sin thus: "The sannyāsin who, relinquishing the obligatory rites, remains without 'hearing' the Vedānta, certainly perishes without doubt."²

V. Now in respect of Brahman-knowledge there is not established by co presence and co-absence the instrumentality of any other (means) except 'hearing' since the attributeless Brahman is to be known through the Vedānta alone. How then is restriction (in respect of hearing) made out? It is not so. Just as in, "He pounds the rice-grains"³ there is restriction with regard to pounding, though in respect of the rice-grains, generative of an apūrva known only from the śāstra, there is not established by any other source such means as husking with finger-nails etc., so let there be restriction in respect of 'hearing' too, even without there being any option. If restriction be (admitted) there (in the case of pounding) in view of rice-grains as such in their generic nature being secured (through other means), that (restriction) applies equally here; for there may well be

¹ Manu Smṛti, II, 168.

² Sāmbopapurāṇa, ch. I.

³ Āp. ŚS., I, xix, 2

stated (the establishment through other means of) the knowledge of a content as such in its generic nature. If then (it be said that) with regard to pounding, the injunction though certainly of the novel is in effect spoken of as a restriction, that may be so even in the case of 'hearing'.

VI. Nor is there conflict with the Commentary, since only the injunction of 'seeing' is there refuted. If indeed 'seeing' were enjoined, then since according to the rule "The root and the affix together signify primarily what the affix denotes" the injunction which is the meaning of the affix (tavya) would alone be primary, 'seeing' which is the meaning of the root would be secondary, and the adjunct thereof viz., Brahman, would also be still more secondary; then Brahman would not be established by the Vedāntas. But if 'hearing' be enjoined for the sake of what is primary as the fruit, viz., the 'seeing' of Brahman, there is no defect whatever.

VII. And (the objection of) sentence-split, is it raised by some one of us (Advaitins), or by the Mīmāṃsaka? Not the first; for even in the Vedānta, in the text "They desire to know (Brahman) through sacrifice," ¹ an injunction in respect of sacrifice etc. as a means to knowledge is admitted through sentence-split in the texts of subsidiary import. Not the second; for, in the section dealing with Pretāgnihotra, after enjoining the holding below (of the fuel) in the passage "He is to walk holding the fuel below (the handle of the sacrificial ladle)," it is said "For he holds it above for the gods;" in that case, it is determined, in the section "But it is an injunction in respect of

¹ Brh., IV, iv, 22.

holding, because of novelty,"¹ that the holding above in the case of (oblations made to) the gods is enjoined, though occurring in the middle of a different context (i.e. the Pretāgnihotra). If somehow Prabhākara does not admit this section, even thus, in the section dealing with the Darsapūrnāmāsa, he does admit an injunction with regard to a set of observances, for a woman in her courses, thus "The observance should be kept up for three nights;" therefore, let 'hearing' be enjoined even in the section that treats of Brahman; what is the loss to you? If now, you are dissatisfied, because sentence-split is had recourse to (in that case) as there is no other go, there being no possibility of the set of observances having any (appropriate) connection with the context, while here that is inappropriate, since for the tavya-suffix syntactical connection is possible at least in the sense of 'fitness', then, let the passage, "Hence the Brahmin having fully acquired learning etc."² be injunctive of 'hearing' etc.; for, as the passage occurs not after the commencement (of any specific topic), there is not the said contradiction; (and) although at first sight there is not the cognition of 'hearing' etc., on an examination of the passage, the purport of the passage (is seen to be) the injunction of 'hearing' etc.

VIII. By the aphorist³ himself in the aphorism "There is the injunction of something else auxiliary (to knowledge)"⁴, after assuming as established the injunction with regard to 'pāṇḍitya' and 'bālyā' which consist of 'hearing' and 'reflection', there is declared the injunctiveness of 'mauna' consisting in contemplation, in the remaining part of the passage 'atha

¹ PM., III, iv, 5 (15)

² Bṛh., III, v, 1.

³ Bādarāyana

⁴ Br. Śū., III, iv, 47

munih'; hence (the objection of) not conforming to tradition is thrown far off. Now, even thus, in the case of 'śrotavyaḥ (is to be heard)' which is known from one's own section of the Veda immediately after the study (of it), the unintelligibility of its being an injunction of 'hearing' continues as before¹; if this be said, no; for, the tavya-suffix is sanctioned in respect of injunction too; (and) since in parallel contexts in other śruti texts, e. g. "seek to know that"² an injunction of 'hearing' has necessarily to be admitted (even) through sentence-split, there is no room for your dissatisfaction (about sentence-split in the present case). Nor may it be said that in one and the same śākhā (unlike the above-mentioned instance of different śākhās - the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīyaka*), a two-fold injunction of 'hearing', in the form "(The self) is to be heard", and "Having accomplished pāṇḍitya (i. e., śravaṇa)", is a (pointless) repetition; for while there is injunction in one case (the earlier), in the other there is mention of specific details after restating the injunction. Or else,³ just

¹ Since the tavya-suffix may signify mere worthiness, not an injunction; and the former sense seems more probable, because of the defect of sentence-split if śruti be understood to teach both the nature of the self and the obligation to inquire into it.

² Taitt., III, 1; here, the request is for instruction about the self; the reply both states the nature of that self and prescribes inquiry into it; sentence-split is obvious but has to be ignored in such a case and the injunction recognised.

³ The reason for the alternative explanation is probably that Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on Brh., III, v, 1 treats it not as giving details of hearing, etc., but as culminating in the exposition of renunciation. The two Maitreyī-brāhmaṇas constitute II-iv and IV-v of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. The latter restates with very little variation Yajñavalkya's teaching to Maitreyī (wherein occurs the text "śrotavyaḥ"). The reason for the repetition of this teaching is thus given by Śaṅkara: "In the Madhu-kāṇḍa which predominates in scriptural statements, the truth of Brahman has been ascertained. In the chapters relating to Yajñavalkya, which predominate in reasoning, by

as the two Maitreyī-Brahmanas are non-repetitive, since one (the later) is of the nature of a concluding statement (upa-samhāra), similarly let there be two injunctions of hearing. Therefore the injunction "(The self) is to be heard" is certainly intelligible.

IX. It has been said in the words of the purāṇa that of these 'hearing' consists in the inquiry into Vedānta passages, and the ascertainment of the purport of the passages through marks like the initial passage etc. And thus the inquiry into the Vedānta passages is to be undertaken by the eligible person, who has no attachment, for the sake of that intuition of the self which is instrumental to immortality. The man who has studied his own section of the Veda, understanding this much even from the Veda, subsequently doubts in this manner: Is non-attachment alone the qualification of an eligible person? Or is there any other also? And what is the valid means of knowing the various qualifications and the eligible person qualified by them? And is the inquiry into the Vedānta passages fulfilled even with the inquiry into dharma or not? How are the Vedānta passages to be inquired into? What is the characteristic of the true nature of the self? And what is the means of valid knowledge in respect thereof? And for that means of valid knowledge is there conflict with any (other) or not? Is

setting up opposite sides, the same subject has been discussed more by way of a debate. In the fourth chapter, by means of questions and answers between the teacher and his disciple, it has again been discussed at length and brought to a conclusion. Now the present section relating to Maitreyī is being introduced as a conclusion of the proposition (?) regarding the same topic. And there is the method adopted by the authorities on logic, as stated in the following definition: 'The restatement of a proposition after stating the reason is conclusion.'" (Madhavananda's Translation, p. 771).

knowledge, whose sphere is the real, instrumental to immortality in combination with works (karma) or by itself alone? If it be instrumental by itself alone, what is the evidence? Of what nature is immortality? And what is the evidence for it? These doubts and also others of this sort are to be settled by principles of various kinds. Desiring to indicate those principles and determining, first, through (logical) principles, the injunction which is associated with the triple *anubandhas*,¹ viz., the eligible person, the content and the fruit, and is cognised from the passage “(It is) to be heard,”² the supremely compassionate and venerable Bādarāyana indicated its import—viz., the obligatoriness of inquiry, which constitutes the introduction, as being instrumental to activity in respect of the entire sacred teaching to be set forth later (in the *Vedāntasūtras*)—in the aphorism: “Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman.”³

X. In this, the meaning of the word ‘then (atha)’ is the very person cognised as eligible in the passage “For the love of the self, however,”⁴ as being possessed of the four means synecdochically indicated by non-attachment. What is said in the passage, “There is, however, no hope of immortality by wealth,”⁵ that there is no immortality through the wordly deeds and Vedic rites synecdochically indicated by the word ‘wealth’, this itself is stated as the reason, by the word

¹ *Anubandhas* are supplements which come to be discussed before any treatise is begun. At the commencement of a treatise are set forth the content of that work, the fruit to which it leads, the kind of person who is eligible therefor and the various relations that subsist among the three.

² *Brh.*, II, iv, 5

³ *Dr. Sū.*, I, i, 1.

⁴ *Brh.*, II, iv, 5.

⁵ *Brh.*, II, iv, 2.

'therefore (atah).' It is said in the passage beginning "When the self, verily, (has been seen, heard, etc.)",¹ that 'hearing' in the form of inquiry into the Vedānta passages is to be undertaken, for the sake of that intuition of the self which is instrumental to immortality; all this is to be understood by the word 'brahmajijñāsā' (desire to know brahman).

XI. Now, is this aphorism injunctive, or is it repetitive? Not the first, since the suffixes, *liṅ*, *loṭ* and *tavya* are not found. Not the other, since as not prompting to activity, there is the contingency of the non-comprehension by it of an injunction in respect of hearing. Not so; for (the word) 'kartavyaḥ (to be undertaken)' has to be supplied. If it be said that, since cognition and desire which are object-dependent are impossible of being undertaken, the word 'jijñāsā' would not relate syntactically with the supplied (word), then, because of this very unintelligibility, let inquiry, which is capable of being undertaken, be secondarily implied by the word 'jijñāsā'. And the relation of inseparability (required for the secondary significance) is easily achieved by the application of the rule of '(grasping tight as with) tongs.' Grasped tight indeed is inquiry between 'cognition' and 'desire', for when, first, there is desire, only when there is inquiry subsequently, is there the origination of cognition. Nor may it be said that in the case of (this) secondary implication there would be established only the content-anubandha, namely, inquiry, and not the fruit-anubandha, namely, Brahman-knowledge; for through non-exclusive implication² the

¹ Brh., IV, v, 6.

² In non-exclusive implication (*ajabhakṣaṇa*) an elliptical sense is completed without the exclusion of the primary sense; e. g., in "The white runs," the word "white" implies "white horse".

(express) sense of that (word, *Brahmajijñāsa*) is also admitted. As the generation of Brahman-knowledge is otherwise unintelligible, it follows that the object of inquiry is the Vedānta passage. Indeed, we do not observe Brahman-knowledge in the case of those who inquire into anything else. As its being the fruit is otherwise unintelligible, it is established that Brahman-knowledge is instrumental to release. For, the fruit is what is desired by eligible persons. And here the persons endowed with the four means desire nothing else than the destruction of misery without a trace, the attainment of unexcellable bliss and the means thereto. As it is impossible for the knowledge of the real to be of the nature of the destruction of misery or the attainment of bliss, by elimination, it (knowledge) is the means thereto. Hence the entire meaning of the śruti is epitomised in the aphorism thus: as release is not achieved by works (*karma*), inquiry into the Vedānta passages is to be undertaken by a person who is endowed with the four means,¹ for the sake of Brahman-knowledge which is instrumental to release. That the obligatoriness of inquiry is instrumental to activity in respect of the śāstra is thus established by co-presence and co-absence. When there is an injunction possessed of the triple *anubandhas*, men act, since it is so observed in *vyotistoma* etc. When, however, there is not (such an injunction) they do not act, as no activity is observed in (respect of statements of fact like) "The world consists of seven islands".

XII. And that obligatoriness of inquiry, which is the cause of activity in respect of the śāstra to be set forth

Sādhana-catuṣṭaya: discrimination between the real and the unreal, non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruits here and hereafter, the six virtues—calmness etc., and longing for release.

later, is determined by this first aphorism in this manner:—the (study of) the śāstra in question ought to be begun, for it has a possible object and fruit, like ploughing etc. Nor may it be doubted that this matter is not established by the aphorism, there being no mention of the content and the fruit in the aphorism, since although not expressly mentioned, it is indicated by implication. Indeed (such) indication is an ornament, not a defect, in the case of an aphorism. Of the Vedāntas investigated by the śāstra beginning with “That whence for this what begins with origination”¹ the content is the oneness of Brahman and the self, which is established in śruti-texts like “This self indeed is Brahman”² etc. And that oneness is indicated aphoristically in the aphorism by the word ‘Brahman’ which denotes the reality which is impartite and homogeneous. The fruit is the removal of misery and the attainment of Brahman, as established in śruti passages like “The knower of the self crosses sorrow,”³ “The knower of Brahman attains the highest”⁴. And these two are certainly indicated (aphoristically) since there is the mention (in the aphorism) of Brahman-knowledge which is instrumental thereto. Not only has the aphorist aphorised the content and the fruit but he intends also their justification thus:—the śāstra in question has a possible object and a possible fruit, since it is hostile to bondage of the nature of nescience, like waking cognition.⁵ Nor may it be said that the nescience-nature of bondage is not indicated in the aphorism; for

¹ Br. Śū. I, 1, 2

² Brh., II, v, 10

³ Chan., VII, 1, 3

⁴ Taitt. Up., II, 1.

⁵ Cp. EpV., p. 3

it is indicated even by the acceptance of the removability of bondage by knowledge. It is thus: the removability of misery without residue is admitted by the aphorist so that it may be established of Brahman-knowledge that it is the fruit. And all bondage whatever, like cognisership, agency, enjoyer-ship, is certainly misery, since it is the cause of misery.

XIII. Here it must be investigated whether this bondage is real absolutely or not absolutely. In the first case, it could not be removed by Brahman-knowledge. The few among us, however, and the others, who admit that the removal by knowledge is of the absolutely real alone, they are to be asked: does knowledge generate the excellence called removal in its content or in its locus? On the first alternative again would it remove its very content, the transmigrating self, or only the attributes present in it, or only agency etc., which are opposed to impartiteness, homogeneity etc., made known by it, or only the non-knowledge present in the content? It cannot be the first, the second or the third. For the cognition of the dark-blue part of a multi-coloured fruit like the mango does not remove either its content (the dark-blue part of the fruit) or the taste etc., inherent in it, or the (apparently) contrary attributes like yellowness. On the fourth (alternative), however, there results our own view. Even on the view that there is excellence (generated) in the locus, is it the removal of the locus, or of its qualities, or of the attributes relating to both the locus and the content? It is not the first, because of the contingency of the destruction of the self every moment. Not the second, since by the cognition of pot there is not removal of the qualities like dharma (religious merit), present in the self. Not the third, since by the cognition of one's own body there is not removal of the relation between

body and self etc. Even real bondage is removable by knowledge since there is the śruti, "Having known that alone, he transcends death¹;" if this be said, no; for śruti is neutral in respect of the reality or unreality of bondage. By us, however, the nescience-nature of bondage is assumed for the sake of the intelligibility of śruti; it is analogous to the assumption of an apurva by you for the intelligibility of the instrumentality to heaven declared by śruti in the case of the jyotiṣṭoma etc. If (it be said) there is a ground for assumption there, viz., the constancy of the pervasion that for rites which are momentary there is no instrumentality in respect of future fruit, then, here too, let the constancy of the pervasion that knowledge removes non-knowledge alone be the ground for assumption. Hence there results non-absoluteness of bondage. Thus, therefore, in the case of bondage, removable by Brahman-knowledge, its nescience-nature is indicated in the aphorism itself.

XIV. Now, if this be so, the nescience-nature of that (bondage) ought to have been stated expressly by the aphorist, since it intimates the commencement of the entire śāstra by way of establishing the content and the fruit; if not expressly stated, there is the contingency of that (the nescience-nature of bondage) not being the purport. If this be said, then this has certainly been stated expressly in the second chapter, in the aphorism, "On account of its having for its essence the qualities of that"² etc. And this is the meaning of the aphorism: if it be said that the omnipresence of the self is a contradiction, since its going out of the body, reaching the other world and return to this world are declared by śruti, no (the aphorism replies), it is on account of its having

¹ Śvet., III, 8.

² Br. S., II, iii, 29.

for its essence the qualities of the intellect ; by the reciprocal superimposition of identity between the intellect and the self, there arises for the omnipresent self mere conceit in the going out etc., which are the qualities of the intellect alone ; and this is re-stated by śruti for teaching the real nature (of the self). Then, the aphorism whose content is superimposition should have been set forth at the very outset, since it is the introduction to the commencement of the entire śāstra ; and the introduction is that which, having apprehended in the intellect, even beforehand, that which is to be taught, describes something else which is for the sake of that ; if this be said, no ; for it is impossible for the aphorist who has set out on (the task of) exposition to state initially an aphorism which is concerned with the refutation of objections. After expressly premising what is to be expounded, to exhibit later the grounds for its establishment, that is exposition. And thus, after showing in the first chapter the harmonious synthesis of the Vedāntas in Brahman, there is to be undertaken subsequently the justification thereof, viz., the refutation of objections. If the particular harmonious synthesis (of the Vedāntas in Brahman) were not shown first, the suspicion of its contradiction and the refutation thereof would be contentless. Now, if this be so, if superimposition be not stated first, there would be no activity in respect of the śāstra, since the content and the fruit would remain unestablished. It is not so, as it has been demonstrated that, though superimposition is not directly stated in the first aphorism, it is indicated by implication ; activity in respect of the śāstra is certainly established.

XV. Now, though indicated in the aphorism, superimposition cannot stand to reason. It is thus ; the self and

the not-self are devoid of the reciprocal superimposition of identity, since nowhere can the one be of the nature of the other, like darkness and light. Nor is there non-establishment of the *probans*. The two (self and not-self) in question are destitute of identity, because of having contrary natures, like darkness and light. Nor (again) is this *probans* non-established. The two in question are of contrary nature, since they are the spheres of the notions of "thou" and "I", like Devadatta and his enemy. Nor may it be said thus: for Devadatta there is the notion of "I" in respect of the assemblage of his body etc., and in respect of that alone there is for his enemy the notion of "thou", and there is no conflict here; when thus, in the case of the enemy too, the (two) notions are applied in an inverted order, the example would be devoid of the *probandum*. Indeed, the two contents of notions belonging to two different loci are not meant to be the example; what then? (The contents of two notions) having the same locus. The two forms independently are not meant to be the example; what then? The example is the combined form which is established by the cognition of Devadatta and the cognition of his enemy; so there is not the said defect.

XVI. This may be (urged). The self and the not-self well-known in the world, are these made the subject here? or those which are established by the followers of Prabhakara etc.? or those which are established by the Vedāntin? Not the first, since the first two inferences would establish what was already established, while for the third inference there would be conflict with experience. In the world, verily, the self is the assemblage of factors beginning with the body and ending with intelligence, and the not-self is stone etc. And their oneness or superimposed oneness is not acceptable to the

Vedāntin. Nor is the conflict experienced between them invariable. Not the second (alternative). For, the followers of Prabhākara etc. say that the self is something inert (non-intelligent) the locus of cognisership, agency, enjoyership, etc., and that the not-self is the entire universe (consisting) of sense-organs, body etc. Here in the view of the Vedāntin the locus of cognisership etc., is egoity, and its cause is inertness, nescience; thus both are included in "not-self" alone. And thus as the conflict due to superimposition of identity is not admitted in the single factor, the not-self, there would remain the two-aforesaid defects.¹ Not the third (alternative). For the Vedāntins say that the self is a mass of intelligence devoid of all fluctuations and that everything different from that is not-self. Here, what is meant to be the *probans*? Is it each being the sphere of both notions? or is it the self being the sphere of the notion of "I" and the not-self of the other? On the first, there would be the non-establishment of existence (of the *probans* in the subject); on the second, there would be partial non-establishment (of the *probans*); for there is not the notion of "thou" in not-selves like the body, the senses, the internal organ, the vital air etc. Although it is not present from the point of view of empirical usage, yet from the view-point of the śāstra, according to this definition, that the denotation of "thou" is what is illumined by intelligence, there is certainly the notion of "thou" in regard to that (body etc.); if this be said, even thus that defect persists, since for the Vedāntins there is not the notion of "I" in regard to the self which is self-luminous intelligence. Therefore the inference is not established.

I. a., establishment of the established
and conflict with experience.

XVII. To this it is said (in reply). As against the Vedāntin the inference is certainly established. Nor is there partial non-establishment (of the *probans*) in respect of the self; for, even of the self-luminous, it is possible to speak figuratively as the sphere of the notion of "I", since in egoity it is capable of very clear empirical usage. Nor may it be thought thus: there is inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) since there is no conflict between two intelligences, witnesses of two bodies, though reciprocally the denotations of "thou" and "I"; for intelligence cannot be the denotation of "thou", defined by the characteristic of being illumined by intelligence. That kind alone is here in view, but not the denotation of "thou" as in wordly usage. Even thus by this inference, opposition is established through the cognition (of them), but not through their own nature; if this be said, then let it be thus: the self and the not-self are of contrary nature; because of being subject and object (respectively), like the organ of sight and colour. Now, the self which is of the nature of intelligence is experienced to be helpful to the not-self which is of the nature of non-intelligence, because of being that which establishes it (not-self); therefore, in establishing (between them) an adverse relation which is either of the character of the relation between the killed and the killer, or of the character of incapacity to abide together, there is conflict with experience; and thus the example would be devoid of the *probandum*. If this be said, it is not so, for as between existence and non-existence, what is meant here by opposition is that which is characterised by the absence of the capacity for either to be identical with the other. How, then, is there the example of darkness and light in the middle inference? If it be said it is because their opposition consisting in incapacity to abide together is well

known, it is not so ; for in a dimly lit room darkness abides together with light; else, here too, as in a well-lit region, there is the contingency of seeing colours clearly. If it be said that by the words 'darkness' and 'light' are implied (synecdochically) 'shade' and 'sun-shine' which form portions of them (darkness and light), even then, the heat which is cognised in different degrees in the shade which is of one and the same nature, indicates the necessary presence of its substrate, sun-shine, too ; hence their abiding together is difficult to avoid. So too, if for the words 'darkness' and 'light', 'cold' and 'heat' which reside in 'shade' and 'sun-shine' (respectively) be adopted (as the sense) through secondary implication, (their) abiding together is still easily established. Therefore, this alone is the conflict between darkness and light, that not for them is there capacity for identity (tādātmya) as there is for the genus and the particular.

XVIII. Now, in the example of darkness and light, there is a conditioning adjunct, viz., their being of the nature of non-existence and existence (respectively); the logicians say that darkness is the absence of light; and the followers of Prabhākara say that darkness is the absence of the perception of colour. If this be said, it is not so ; for the nature of non-existence is not possible for a thing characterised by the possession of different states (of existence) like increase and decrease ; (further) as having a blue colour, it is a substance. Now, on the view that darkness is an existent, how is there the cognition of darkness, in a place where there is intense light, for a person whose eyes are closed, inasmuch as its removal by intense light is admitted? As for abiding together that was stated above only in dim light. If this be said, no; for it is intelligible that the cognition is of the darkness which resides inside the orb (of the eye). Nor is the appre-

hension of an object inside (the orb) impossible for the sense of sight; for it is observed that a person with closed ears apprehends the inner sound. Nor is there thus the contingency of apprehension even of the black pigment etc., inside the orb, by one whose eyes are closed; for there is the restriction that in the case of coloured objects other than darkness, apprehension is by the sense of sight, (only as) assisted by light. Then it may be held: if darkness be a substance, then for the darkness which has been destroyed by light there would be no origination suddenly when the light is removed, since the origination of substances which are effects is only through the stages of binary atoms etc. This is not so, because for those who maintain the view of illusory manifestation, sequence is not required. As for the cause, that is but primal nescience. Even then, darkness is not a substance possessing colour, because it is not tangible, like ether; if this be said, no; for there is parity with the fallacious argument "Air is not tangible, because it has no colour, like ether," since the conflict with perception is common (to both). The blue colour super-imposed on the non-existence of light is made the object (of perception); even if for the perception of darkness another explanation be thus stated, the *probans* is non-conclusive; for smoke which is certainly a substance with colour is not tangible in places other than the region of the eye. If it be said that there (in places other than the eye) the touch of smoke, which certainly exists, is non-apparent, then the touch of darkness also, though certainly existent, is everywhere non-apparent, so that there will be non-establishment of the *probans*. Nor is the non-apparentness everywhere, of an existent, an impossibility; for in the case of gold etc., got from the mines, the nature of brilliancy which manifests both itself and others, and (the quality of) warm touch, though

existent (as they are of the nature of fire), are observed to be non-apparent everywhere. Thus, therefore, in the view that darkness is of an existent nature there is no defect whatever. Now, it is so even on the view that darkness is non-existence, since the states (of existence) like increase are conditioned by the counter-correlate, viz., light, (and) the blue colour is superimposed; if this be said, it is not so, because of the difficulty of proof. It is thus: is darkness the absence of light in general, or of some one light or another, or of all light? On the first and the second alternatives, it is not possible to say whether darkness is the antecedent non-existence (of light), or the reciprocal non-existence or the annihilative non-existence; for in a place pervaded by the rays of the sun, whether prior to the production of a lamp or when the lamp is produced, or when the lamp is destroyed, there is no cognition of darkness. On the third (alternative), except by the proximity of all light, it (darkness) would not be removed. That darkness is the absence of the perception of colour does not also stand to reason; because for him who is in the middle of a room enshrouded by dense darkness there is even at the same time the perception of colour outside and the perception of darkness within. Therefore, darkness is not non-existence; hence, in the example there is not the said conditioning adjunct.

XIX. Now even thus your basic *probans* viz., the incapacity for reciprocal identity, is non-conclusive; for, in the case of the delusion 'This is silver,' though there is incapacity for identity between what is in front and the silver, which are distinct, their identity is clearly seen. If this be said, no; since the capacity exists there, the *probans* (viz., incapacity) does not exist. And that capacity is to be understood

from the perception of real identity between silver and what is in front, in the case of real silver. Nor may it be said that the *probans* is non-established, since there would be the possibility of that capacity even for the self and the not-self, if there be real identity (of these) somewhere; for real identity between them is difficult to establish anywhere. It is thus; is it the identification of the seer with the seen that is urged, or is it the identification of the seen with the seer? On the first (alternative), again, that (identity) cannot be natural, since in the seer who is homogeneous intelligence, (any) element of the seen is impossible; (even) otherwise on account of the relationship as the object (of cognition) to the agent, identity is unintelligible. Even if (the identity be) adventitious, does the seer of himself get transformed into the form of an element of the seen, or (does he do so) on the strength of (some) cause? Both are inadmissible, since the seer is without parts. Indeed, ether which is without parts is not seen, either by itself or on account of some other cause, to transform itself into a form with parts. On the second alternative too, viz., that there is the identity of the seen substrate with its counter-correlate, the seer, if the nature of the seer be natural (to it), the nature of being the seen would be abandoned. If it be said that there is for ourself, in part, the nature of the seen also, then there is the conflict of being (both) the object (of cognition) and the agent. Even if (the identity be) adventitious, does the seen of itself get transformed into the nature of intelligence, or does it receive within itself the intelligence that is the self? Not the first, since for an effect born of the non-intelligent, the nature of intelligence is impossible. Indeed the pot which is a transformation of the non-intelligent clay is not seen to be of the nature of intelligence. Not the second, since in the case of the all-pervading

intelligence that is the self, (any) real entry is impossible. Thus, as the *probans* is established because of the impossibility of the capacity for identity between the intelligent and the non-intelligent, whose real identity is difficult to establish at all anywhere, the middle inference is well-grounded. As the basic inference is consequently established, the non-existence of superimposition is well-grounded.

XX. Let there be no superimposition of identity as between substrates. Even then there may be relational superimposition of the attributes of the self on the not-self or of the attributes of the not-self on the self. Nor is there impossibility of attributes in the case of the self which is homogeneous intelligence, since there exist happiness, experience of objects, eternality etc.¹ Even though these constitute the very nature of the self, they are figuratively called attributes, since they appear to be distinct in the conditioning adjunct, the psychosis of the internal organ. Nor is the independent superimposition of attributes, leaving out the substrates, impossible; for in (experiences like) "The crystal is red" etc., in the proximity of the hibiscus flower, there is seen the superimposition of the attribute alone.

XXI. This is not sound, since independence is impossible in the case of attributes. Even in the crystal, redness is cognised only as located in the reflected hibiscus flower, not as independent. Therefore there is not the relational superimposition even of attributes as apart from their abodes. When the superimposition of attributes and substrates as objects is refuted, the superimposition of cognition too which is inseparable therefrom is certainly refuted. Therefore superimposition does not stand to reason.

Cf. *Pañcapādikā* p. 4: 'śnando viśayā-nubhavo nityatvam ce 'ti santi tad-dharmāḥ, aprthakṭve 'pi caitanyāt prthag ivā 'vabhāśante.

XXII. To this it is said (in reply): is it that the unreality of superimposition is deduced on the ground of its conflict with reason? or that its very existence is denied? Not the first, since to us, who uphold the theory of indeterminability, non-reality and conflict with reason are acceptable in the case of superimposition. Indeed, indeterminability is admitted only because the superimposition of the self and the not-self is in conflict with all reasoning. Otherwise, its reality alone should be acknowledged.

XXIII. Now, then, we deny superimposition itself. There is no superimposition at all of the self and the not-self because there is no causal aggregate for it. For, in ordinary experience, in "This is silver", "This is a snake" etc., the causal aggregate for superimposition is the similarity based on the attributes or parts of the substrate as well as of that which is superimposed; and this (similarity) does not exist here (in the case of the self and the not-self), since the self is without attributes and without parts. Nor may it be said that in "The crystal is red" even while there is not the said similarity, there is superimposition; for here, this being a delusion due to a conditioning adjunct, there is no need of similarity. The proximate hibiscus flower, which is the abode of redness, is the conditioning adjunct, because of its being instrumental to the appearance of redness in the crystal. Now, in this manner, making egoity, which is proximate (to the self) and the abode of agency etc., the conditioning adjunct, it is possible to superimpose agency etc., on the self; if this be said, then let there be somehow the possibility of the superimposition of agency etc.; even thus, the superimposition on the self of substrates beginning with egoity and ending with the body, which (superimposition) is not due to conditioning adjuncts, is certainly impossible, since there is no

similarity. If this be said, it is not sound, for as there is similarity through the attribute of fragrance in "The odour of the serpent is similar to the odour of the ketaki flower" etc., although odour is devoid of attributes and parts, so similarity is possible even for the self through the attribute of being 'the import of a word.' If it be said that in respect of the homogeneous intelligence no attribute whatever is in reality, possible, then, let it not be that similarity is the causal aggregate in respect of delusion not due to conditioning adjuncts; for, even without similarity there is seen delusion not due to conditioning adjuncts, in "the conch is yellow." If, in this case, there is another causal aggregate like attachment, excess of bile (and optical disorders such as) *kāca* and jaundice, then here too there is certainly the causal aggregate, called nescience. Now rather than accept as a causal aggregate nescience about which there is the dispute as to whether it is absence of knowledge or it is of the nature of an existent, it is better certainly to deny superimposition; if this be said, it is not so; for it is not possible to deny the beginningless perceptual experience, which while depending on the reality alone of the inner self is settled to obscure its intelligence and bliss. Otherwise the inner self too might be denied.

XXIV. If it be said that beginninglessness does not stand to reason in the case of a product, superimposition, not so. Superimposition is but the conjunction of agency, enjoyership, and defects like attachment, with the self. Of these, the superimposition of enjoyership requires the superimposition of agency, since there is no enjoyment for a non-agent. And agency requires the superimposition of conjunction with defects like attachment, since there is no agency for one who is devoid of attachment etc. And the conjunction with defect requires enjoyership, since attachment etc., do not

arise in respect of what has not been enjoyed or what is not of the class of that which has been enjoyed. And thus, as for the seed and sprout, there is beginninglessness for agency etc., in the form of a stream. Hereby, this too is refuted, viz., that of the world there is imposition when there is cognition and that there is cognition when there is imposition and that thus there is reciprocal dependence: for, (the process) being beginningless, the body etc., which are presented in each earlier superimposition and persist in the form of residual impressions, are the cause of each subsequent superimposition.

XXV. Nor may it be said that, because of the unreality of body etc., there is no imposition (of them); for, it being established that they are imposed even because of the (bare) cognition (of them), their reality is not a cause (of the superimposition). For in "This is silver" etc., there is superimposed the identity of the real and the non-real, the nacre and the silver. Nor may it be said that in the case of two trees at a distance (mistaken for one), identity is superimposed in respect of two reals alone; for, even there, on the substrate, the two trees, which are certainly real, there is superimposition but of the non-real, the attribute of oneness; else there is the contingency of the identity even of two reals, the quality and the possessor of the quality, being (of the nature of the) superimposed.

XXVI. Though, in case of the self and the not-self the superimpositions of identity one with another are on a par, yet for the self there is reality, since there is superimposition of it only relationally, not in respect of its own existence; for the not-self, however, there is unreality, since there is superimposition even in respect of its existence. Nor may it be objected that if there be identity between

those two, the real and the non-real, then, because of the presentation of difference *cum* non-difference as in cases like the quality and the possessor of the quality, there should be the cognition "I possess a body, organs etc." or "This body etc., are mine", like (the cognition) "The cloth possesses whiteness"; for, superimposition is acknowledged here, only as having brought about absolute oneness between the one and the other. Then, it should not be spoken of as the superimposition of identity (in-difference), but should be spoken of only as the superimposition of oneness; if this be said, no; for, as in "the whiteness of the cloth," there is seen such empirical usage of difference as "my body". Nor may it be said that when this is the case, difference being apprehended and the pervader (of superimposition), viz., non-apprehension of difference, being removed, superimposition too, which is pervaded by that, would be removed; for apprehension of difference is not acknowledged. Verily, men of the world, though indulging in the empirical usage "my body", do not, in the absence of acquaintance with the śāstra, apprehend the self as distinct from the body. Therefore, from experience, there is the superimposition of oneness alone; from empirical usage, however, it is possible to speak of it even as the superimposition of identity (in-difference); for there exist in the case of the body and the self, the empirical usage of non-difference in the form, "I", and also the empirical usage of difference in the form "my body". Nor may it be said that identity is but oneness; for the two are distinct in that identity is that which is compatible with difference *cum* non-difference and is opposed to reciprocal non-existence, while oneness is that which is opposed to difference. Even as between the jīva and Brahman, there is but oneness in reality, but it is spoken of as identity in view

of the difference posited by nescience; hence there is no conflict. Nor, like the oneness of the jīva and Brahman, is the oneness of the self and the body, though experienced, capable of being real; for real oneness¹ is impossible as between what are wholly distinct, as of the nature of the real and the non-real. Therefore, oneness is but superimposed.

XXVII. And of this superimposition the material cause is nescience which is beginningless, indeterminable, and of the nature of an existent; for when that exists, superimposition arises and when that is non-existent, it does not arise. Now, these two, the co-presence and the co-absence, are intelligible even as relating to the non-existence of true knowledge, the obstacle to superimposition; if this be said, no; for, true knowledge is devoid of the characteristic of an obstacle. For, when the cause is fully present, that which arises as opposed to the origination of the effect, is an obstacle; but true knowledge arises only in the absence of what are called defects and are the full cause of superimposition, viz., film, jaundice, etc.; hence it is devoid of the characteristic (of an obstacle). Even thus, since the knowledge is opposed to superimposition, those two (co-presence and co-absence) may be intelligible, even as relating to the non-existence of conjunction with what is opposed (to the superimposition); if this be said, no. For the effect, the requirement of a material cause arises first; subsequently (arises) the requirement of the non-existence of conjunction with what is opposed. And thus, on the principle that as between the proximate and the remote the proximate is the stronger, the relating of these two to the proximate material cause alone is legitimate.

¹As compared with superimposed oneness.

XXVIII(a). If it be said that, as for destruction, there need not be the requirement of a material cause at all, no; because of the inference "What is in dispute has a material cause, since, while being an existent, it is an effect, like a pot."

XXVIII(b). Now this *probans* is inconclusive in respect of the colour which is a quality of cloth. For a material cause thereof is not possible. Is the cloth itself its material cause or some other substance? Not the first, since the relationship of cause and effect is unintelligible as between what are originated simultaneously, like the left and the right horns. On the second (alternative), since it is present in some other substance, there is abandonment of its being the quality of the cloth.

XXVIII(c). Not so. In the view of the Logicians, since, on the principle that an originated substance remains for one instant without any quality, there is no simultaneity (of colour and cloth), material causality is possible for the cloth itself. As for the view of the Vedāntins, even if the threads be the material cause (of the colour), its being the quality of the cloth is not abandoned, because of the non-difference of effect from cause.

XXIX. Nor may it be asked, "When it is possible even for defects like *kāca* (film in the eye) to be the material cause, what (is the need) of this nescience?" For it is invariable for the superimposition and its material cause to have the same locus. Here, however, superimposition is located in the self, while defects are located in the sense-organs etc.; hence material causality does not belong to those (defects). Now, the superimposition of silver is cognised as located in the nacre, while its material cause, nescience, is located in the self;

hence, even on your view, there is not established their common location. Not so; for it will be explained that for the superimposition only as located in the self is there conjunction with nacre.

XXX. Now, then, let nescience be the material cause of the superimposition of things; for the superimposition of cognitions, however, the self or the internal organ may be the material cause; for, according to different views, (one or other of) the two is material cause in valid cognitions; if this be said, not so; for, the self is unchanging, and in the case of the internal organ, there is the requirement of sense-contact, *probans*, etc.; (sense-)contact etc., are not indeed possible here. The illusory object, which is constituted solely of cognition, being non-established prior to cognition, with what could the sense-organ be conjoined? As for the co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ they are otherwise explained as relating to the cognition of the substrate of the delusive cognition. Nor is the rise of delusive cognition established even because of sense-contact with the substrate, for, in the absence of sense-contact with the illusory object, the cognition of that (illusory object) is unintelligible. Nor is there that cognition, as brought in by residual impressions, like the element of that-ness in the recognition "This is that Devadatta"; for, even as in that case, there is the contingency of non-delusiveness. Nor is the delusiveness due to the unreality of the element of conjunction with the substrate; for, then, because of its unreality, there is the contingency of the non-existence of immediacy for what is (thus) incapable of sense-contact. Now in the case of an illusory object, the internal organ does not require sense-contact, since there is seen dream-cognition, even without that (contact); if this be said, even thus, since for the

internal organ, when transformed into the form of cognition, there is no cognisership, there would not result empirical usage in respect of an illusory object. If then it be (thought) that the internal organ itself, though non-intelligent, may transform itself into the form of the agent of cognition, or that the self may become the cogniser, even thus, since it is invariable for delusion and valid cognition, bondage and (its) removal to have the same locus, if deludedness belong to the internal organ, for that alone would result valid cognition and removal of bondage. But deludedness etc., are recognised for the self alone. And that results on the view that nescience located in the self is the material cause, not otherwise. Therefore, nescience alone is left over as the material cause.

XXXI. Nor should there be dispute in respect of (the existence of) nescience; for, the potency of nescience, which is non-intelligent in nature, is located in the self and pervades things external and internal, is experienced perceptually in "I am ignorant," "I know neither myself nor another." Now, this experience relates to the non-existence of knowledge. That is not (so), for, it is immediate experience like "I am happy," while non-existence is to be known by the sixth pramāṇa (non-cognition). On the view, however, that non-existence is perceptible, if there be cognised the substrate and the counter-correlate, viz., the self and knowledge, such perception of the non-existence of knowledge as in "There is no knowledge in me" would be contradicted. And if those two be not cognised, there is the non-origination of that perception even because of the non-existence of the cause (viz., the cognition of the substrate

and the counter-correlate.)¹ Now, in every case, empirical usage, being the fruit of knowledge, is the *probans* (for its existence); because of the non-existence of that *probans*, the absence of cognition is *inferred*; if this be said, no; for even then there is the above-mentioned defect in the case both of the cognition and the non-cognition of the substrate etc. There is this same defect even on the view of Bhaṭṭa that non-existence is to be known by the sixth pramāṇa. On our view, however, the non-existence of knowledge in general is known by the witness; as for the non-existence of a particular cognition, that is known by the sixth pramāṇa, it being admitted that "in (matters of) empirical usage, the path of Bhaṭṭa (is followed)." When, however, the category of non-existence is not admitted at all, adopting the view of the purāṇas "From the earth results potness, from the pot the sherds, from the sherds (result) powder, and fine dust, and thence (result) atoms," then there is nothing at all to consider.

XXXII(a). Now, since even in the case of nescience, that is of the nature of an existent, removability by knowledge is admitted, the perception of nescience in the form, "I am ignorant" etc., pregnant with the cognition of the locus and the object, is certainly contradicted. Not so. All the three, the locus, the object, and the nescience, are revealed by one and the same witness. And thus, this witness while establishing (i.e., revealing) the locus and the object, certainly establishes similarly nescience too. but does not remove it. What removes it, however, is only that cognition which

¹ In respect of the cognition of non-existence, the cognition of the substrate and the counter-correlate is the cause; one could not know "roses are not green", if one had no prior knowledge of "roses" and "green-ness".

is a psychosis of the internal organ. And since that is non-existent here, how is there contradiction ?

XXXII(b). Now, in "I know₁ not the pot", the pot, which defines the nescience, is not capable of being cognised by the witness which is devoid of relation (to it); for, the establishment of an external object is dependent on a *pramāṇa* related to that (object) itself; nor (can the pot be cognised) by a *pramāṇa* (i. e., a psychosis of the internal organ), since the nescience (relating to the pot) is removable by *pramāṇa*; if this be said, true. (But) though in the case of the mere pot there is non-existence of being cognised by the witness, in the case of what is qualified by the attribute of "not being known", cognition by the witness, which is related (to it) through nescience, is certainly intelligible. Nor may it be said "If to be cognised by the witness is non-existent in the case of the pure, that (being cognised) is unintelligible even in the case of the qualified, since in the case of taste etc., though qualified by a visible substance, visibility is not seen." For, though there is no mental perception of the bare primal atom, yet it is admitted by others (the Logicians) that as the qualification of the cognition "I know the primal atom" it is the object of mental perception.¹ In ordinary experience too, in the case of *Rāhu*, though of itself imperceptible, perceptibility is seen, as associated with the moon etc. Even in the view of the others, there has been stated the defect (present) in the cognition as well as in the

Perception, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, may be by the senses or by the mind; cases of associative cognition, like the immediate apprehension of fragrance in what is seen but not smelt, come under the latter class; so too does reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya-jñāna*) e. g., "I know the primal atom" which is immediate; the atom itself is but inferred; thus what is in itself not immediately cognised is yet, as associated with another, the object of such cognition.

non-cognition of the pot, which is the qualification of the non-existence of knowledge in "I know not the pot." Therefore, everything whether as known or as unknown is certainly the object of the witness-intelligence.

XXXII(c). Now, then, there would not be a difference between objects, as known and not known; similarly, there would be the futility of the functioning of *pramāṇa* (i. e., the psychosis of the internal organ) and conflict with its co-presence and co-absence; if this be said, not so. For, just as nescience acquires for its own object the attribute of unknownness and accomplishes its relation to the witness, even so, *pramāṇa* too is that which acquires for its own object the attribute of knownness and accomplishes its relation to the witness; this being acknowledged, there is the removal of the said defect. Thus, therefore, the perception "I am ignorant," in conjunction with the reasoning above stated, is the *pramāṇa* for ignorance, which is of the nature of an existent.

XXXIII(a). Similarly, in respect of him who prefers inference alone, that too is stated, in order to establish the nature of an existent, even directly, without (subsidiary) reasoning as in the case of perception. The disputed cognition due to a *pramāṇa*, should have been preceded by some thing else, which is other than its own antecedent non-existence, which obscures its own object, which is removable by itself and is present in its own locus; for it is that which manifests a thing not yet manifested, like the light of a lamp arising for the first time in darkness. If cognition in general were the subject, there would be non-establishment of the *probans* in the case of repetitive cognition; hence it is said, "due to a *pramāṇa*". Similarly, in order to exclude

(the second and subsequent cognitions of) a continuous stream of cognition, (it is said) "disputed". If it were merely said "preceded by something", there would be proving the proven in respect of its own locus, the self etc.; therefore, it is said "something else". Similarly, (the statement) excludes the causal aggregate other than its own locus, dharma (merit) etc., prior cognition, and antecedent non-existence, through the four qualifications "present in its own locus," etc., taken in the descending order.¹ And with this is established the intended particular, i.e. nescience, which is of the nature of an existent. In order to ward off inconstancy (of the *probans*) in respect of the (second and subsequent) cognitions in a continuous stream, (it is said) "not yet manifested". In order to ward off the lack of both (*probans* and *probandum*) from (the subsequent) lights existing in a continuous stream, (it is said) "for the first time". In order to ward off that (defect) in respect of the light of a lamp that arises in a place with sunlight, (it is said) "in darkness".

XXXIII(b). Because of the unintelligibility otherwise of superimposition which is indeterminable and is twofold, in the form of cognitions and of things, there is indeterminability of its material cause, nescience. Nor is there intelligibility (of nescience) even otherwise, since, if it be real, there is contingency of the reality of its product too. And

To show that 'something else' which precedes the disputed cognition is not the antecedent non-existence of the cognition, it is said 'which is other than its own antecedent non-existence'. By stating that it 'obscures its own object' there is the removal of the 'prior cognition' of the object. The clause 'which is removable by itself' indicates that it is removed by cognition and not by dharma etc. To show that nescience is present in the same locus where there is subsequent cognition, there is the phrase 'present in its own locus'; this removes 'the causal aggregate other than its own locus'.

similarly because of the unintelligibility otherwise of (its) being the primal cause, there is beginninglessness. And if it had a beginning, there being the need for a succession of material causes, a primal cause would not be established. Thus, therefore, it is established that the material cause of superimposition is nescience, which is beginningless, is indeterminable, is of the nature of an existent, is located in the self and has the self for object.

XXXIV(a). Now, does this nescience obscure the not-self too, as (it does) the self? Or does it not obscure? Not the first, because of the absence of evidence and fruit. It is thus. "This blue is obscured by nescience," in this form it should be apprehended by a pramāṇa; and that is not possible, whether there is cognition or non-cognition of blue. If then you think that though obscuration by nescience be impossible at the very time of the cognition of blue, obscuration is certainly understood at the time prior to the cognition of blue, that is not (so), since what indicates (that) is unproved. Is "being known now" the indication? Or is it "being known now alone"? Or is it the unintelligibility otherwise of the recognition "This is that same blue"? Or is it the unintelligibility otherwise of the absence of the remembrance of having been cognised, in between the (original) cognition and the recognition? Not the first; for in the (subsequent) cognitions of a continuous stream the earlier cognised alone being cognised later too, "being known now" is possible even without obscuration in the time prior. Not the second, because of reciprocal dependence in that, if earlier obscuration be established there would be the restriction "known now alone," while if the latter be established, there would be the establishment of the former. Not the third, since there is no rule that

there is recognition only for him who, having cognised, has forgotten for a time; for, recognition is seen in the form "I am he" in respect of the self, though constantly manifest. Not the fourth; for it may also be well said that of the cognitions which arose as devoid of obscuration, in between the cognition and the recognition, there is no remembrance. There is indeed no rule that whatever is experienced is certainly remembered. Nor may it be asked "Nescience is experienced as relating to an object, in the form 'I know not the thing stated by you'; and the relation of nescience, in the case of the self, is seen to be an obscuration; how can it be denied (to be such in the case of the not-self)?" for there is acknowledged experience by the witness-intelligence, in respect of what are superimposed on itself, viz., nescience, (its) objects and their relations. And the relation between nescience and the object is characterised as of the nature of cause and effect, not characterised as of the nature of obscurer and that which is obscured; for obscuration is impossible in the case of what has been superimposed. Obscuration at the time of cognition is self-contradictory; as for the time of non-cognition, that itself does not exist, since what is superimposed, like the two moons etc., is constituted of cognition alone. If the superimposed too were obscured, then there would nowhere be its presentation; for, the superimposed not being within the sphere of pramāṇas, its obscuration would not be removed. A thing, which is knowable by a pramāṇa, may, verily, because of being real, remain even uncognised; that may somehow be even obscured; that which is superimposed, however, is removable by a pramāṇa; how indeed can that be obscured? Therefore there is no evidence at all for the obscuration of the not-self. Similarly, the fruit too is difficult to establish.

For, everywhere, the fruit of obscuration is the obstruction of contingent luminosity. Here, in the not-self, is that luminosity contingent of itself, or on the strength of a *pramāṇa*, or on the strength of intelligence? Not the first, because of inertness (of the not-self). Not the second, since obscuration, removable by a *pramāṇa*, cannot be an obstacle to that (*pramāṇa* or the luminosity caused thereby). Not the third; for when this results even from the obscuration of intelligence, there is futility in assuming a distinct obscuration in respect of the not-self. Truly, at night, when the sun is hidden by Meru, an umbrella or the like is not needed to ward off the sun. It may then be said: just as even when the sun is hidden by clouds, there is need of the umbrella etc., for warding off the subtle (presence of the) sun (in what is) called heat, similarly, here too, in order to ward off even the traces of luminosity effected by intelligence, though veiled by nescience, there is a distinct obscuration; that is not sound. Is it that one and the same nescience is admitted to have its locus in the self and obscure the not-self? Or is there assumed a different nescience for every object? Not the first; for, the manifestation of the object being impossible without the destruction of the obscuration, when nescience is removed by the cognition even of a single thing, there is the contingency of immediate release (from all nescience). Not the second, since there is no ground for the assumption, inasmuch as the (presence of) traces of luminosity effected by intelligence obscured by nescience is acceptable; otherwise, there would not result the empirical usage "*This is unknown*". Therefore, the view of obscuration (of the not-self) can hardly be maintained, since it is devoid of evidence or fruit.

XXXIV(b). Nor is the second (possible, viz., that it does not obscure); for if there be no obscuration, there is the contingency of the constant cognition of the not-self.

XXXV. To this it is said (in reply): the first (viz., obscuration) is certainly not admitted. On the second, however, how is there constant cognition? Is it as known, or as unknown, or as sometimes known and unknown at other times? Not the first, since the functioning of *pramāṇa*, which brings about known-ness, is (but) occasional (not constant). Not the second, since unknown-ness is removed by being known for a time. Not the third, since it is acceptable. For, it has been said that everything whether as known or as unknown is certainly the object of the witness-intelligence. Now what is called unknown-ness is to be the object of nescience; and to be an object is to be the support of some distinction produced by the *viśayin*;¹ and there is not admitted in respect of the not-self (any distinction such as) obscuration produced by nescience; how then can there be unknownness for it? It is said (in reply): the nescience present in intelligence as defined by the this-element of nacre, gives rise to the superimposition of silver, and produces in silver the distinction called the presentation of that (silver); hence results the unknown-ness of nacre. Thus, in every case, in respect of the not-self, even if obscuration be not admitted, unknown-ness is to be understood. Now, the projection called silver does not appear when nacre is

As contrasted with *viśaya*, the object, *viśayin* would ordinarily be the subject; here, however, the reference is to nescience, which is so because it is not the object and it is that to which the object is such; in such contexts it is left untranslated, the meaning being "that to which the object is object".

cognised, since it is removable by cognition of nacre; when, however, nacre is not cognised, how is it understood that the projection is a distinction belonging to *that* (nacre)? Not so; the form of nacre is not cognised, and the form "this" is cognised; hence there is the removal of both the defects (alleged).

XXXVI(a). Now, nescience located in the self is but one; and that effects projection alone, not obscuration; even on this view, is it that, like the pot by a pestle, the projection alone is resolved into its material cause by the nacre-cognition? Or is it that the material cause too is removed? On the first (view), the projection alone being resolved, in the very same way, even by Brahman-knowledge, there is contingency of non-release. On the second (view), nescience being removed even by nacre-cognition, there is contingency of immediate release. If in the desire to remedy (the contingency of) immediate release, it be admitted that there are differences of nescience for every object or that superimposition does not have nescience as its material cause, there would result proximity of assumptions and the reality of superimposition.

XXXVI(b). Not so. On the first view, there is no defect. For there is the inference "Brahman-knowledge, that is in dispute, is what removes the material cause of projection, since, while being opposed to it, it comes into being subsequently, just as nacre-cognition is what removes its own prior non-existence and the superimposition of silver." Even on the second view there is not the alleged defect; for it is acknowledged that only the different modes of primal nescience, which are the material causes of silver etc., are removed by the cognitions of nacre etc. Thus, therefore, there is no defect whatever in not admitting obscuration in respect

of the non-intelligent. As for the statement, "which obscures its own object" in the inference establishing nescience as of the nature of an existent, that is even so, where the self is the object; where, however, the object is non-intelligent, like nacre, for different modes of nescience, which are the material causes of silver etc., there is in effect (the function of) obscuration, through the interposition of intelligence (as defined by nacre etc.), but not directly; thus there is no conflict.

XXXVII(a). Now, even in respect of the self, what is called obscuration, is it destruction of luminosity? Or is it obstruction to luminosity in the production of the effect, called manifestedness of the object? Or is it the expectancy of some other auxiliary in respect of that same (manifestedness)? Not the first, since luminosity is of the (very) nature of the eternal self. Not the second, nor the third, since in respect of the object, there is not admitted any separate manifestedness other than the luminosity of intelligence manifested by the psychosis of the internal organ. Therefore the nature of obscuration is difficult to demonstrate.

XXXVII(b). If this be said, that is true. Hence it is that for obscuration there should be admitted the nature of indeterminable nescience; but the denial thereof, merely because of the difficulty of demonstration, does not stand to reason, since it is established by inference. It is thus. Among fools there is this empirical usage "A true self which is above appetite etc., and known to the discriminating, does not exist; it is not manifest". This empirical usage should have for cause an obscuring agent, which is of the nature of an existent, in respect of the self, since when there exists fully the cause for the empirical usage "exists, is manifest",

it is an empirical usage to the contrary; what has not this (cause) is not that (in effect), e. g., the empirical usage "the pot exists, is manifest" (where there is no obscuration). Nor is the full presence of the cause non-established, since here there is no need for anything other than the eternally established self-luminous intelligence. Nor is there explanation (of the *probans*) otherwise; for, in the case of the partless omnipresent self it is difficult to imagine any obscuring agent other than this, (for example) a material substance. And thus it is proved that the capacity for the said empirical usage in respect of the self is the nature of the obscuring agent.

XXXVIII(a). Now in "ajñāna", if, for the negative particle (nañ), the sense be non-existence, then, it would be non-existence of knowledge; if the sense be an opposite, (it would be) delusive cognition; and if the sense be any other, (it would be) the residual impression of delusion. And thus non-existence of knowledge, delusive cognition and its impression, these alone would be the denotation of "ajñāna"; they alone would, after obstructing the manifestation of the true nature of Brahman, generate the said empirical usage; what (is the need) of this assumption of an obscuring agent, which is of the nature of an existent?

XXXVIII(b). If this be asked, not so; for the non-manifestation of the true nature of Brahman, in sleep etc., is not explained otherwise (than by this assumption). It is thus. For the true nature of Brahman here, is there non-manifestation, because of itself (Brahman's own nature)? Or is it because of the difference of the true nature of Brahman from the cognising jīva in the same way as the consciousness of another person? Or is it under the influence

of an obstruction? Not the first, because of the self-luminosity of Brahman. Not the second, because of the śruti declaration of oneness in "that thou art" ¹ On the third (alternative), is the obstruction caused by delusive cognition, or its residual impression, or the non-existence of knowledge, or the influence of karma? Not the first, since in sleep etc., even illusory cognition is lost. Not the second, since in the case of the residual impression of the siver-delusion there is not seen capacity to obstruct the manifestation of the true nature of nacre. As for the third (possibility), for that knowledge, which is one's own nature and eternal, non-existence is impossible. As for the non-existence of other cognitions, that is not capable of obstructing the manifestation of the true nature of the self-luminous Brahman, as, otherwise, there is the contingency of obstruction even in release. Even on the fourth (possibility), is it that karmas obstruct the whole of intelligence or only to the exclusion of that part which manifests themselves? On the first, karmas would not be established at all, because of the absence of what can establish (them, i. e., intelligence). Not the second, because of the contingency of (a policy of using) half the gourd, which is not supported by any evidence. Nor may it be said that the two defects analysed are common even to the (view of an) obscuring agent, which is of the nature of an existent; for there is assumed the leaving out (of the obscuration) of the part that manifests (the obscuring agent) itself, even if it be (the policy of using) half the gourd, because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the immediate experience "I am ignorant". Nor are karmas immediately experienced in that way. Though there the mediate

experience itself may be a ground of assumption, yet karmas are not obstacles, since they are of the form of residual impressions like the residual impression of the silver-delusion. Now, because of the *smṛti*,¹ "But, *tamas*, obscuring knowledge, generates delusion", the constituent (*guṇa*), *tamas*, may itself be the obstacle; if this be said, no; for if it be not removed by Brahman-knowledge, there is continuance of non-release. If, however, it be removed, since that itself is the obscuring agent, which is of the nature of an existent, the dispute would be as to the name alone. Therefore, even by him who maintains difference *cum* non-difference the foolish obstinacy that in sleep non-existence of knowledge is alone the cause of the non-manifestation of the true nature of Brahman should be abandoned, and nescience, which is of the nature of an existent, should alone be acknowledged.

XXXIX(a). And as for the other foolish obstinacy of his, that, in waking and dreaming, the delusion "I am a man" is alone the cause of the non-manifestation of the true nature of Brahman, that too is unsound; for in his view, this delusion is difficult to explain. Just as, in "The cow is a *khanda*, the cow is a *munḍa*",² because of the two appositional relations, it is admitted that the two relations of difference *cum* non-difference between one and the same class, cowness, and the two particulars are certainly valid, in the very same way in "I am a man, I am Brahman", why is it not admitted that the two relations of difference *cum* non-difference of the one *jīva* with both the body and Brahman are certainly valid? And thus, even the cognition of non-difference between

Bh. Gītā, XIV, 9.

Khanda and *munḍa* denote two varieties of cow; a cow may be one or the other, but one cannot be the other.

the body and the self in "I am a man" would certainly be valid, not a delusion. Even the negation consequent on the śāstra, viz., "I am not a man, but Brahman" is intelligible in the same way as "This cow is not a khaṇḍa, but a munda". Then it may be said: "Just as in the locus of the cognised thinsness there is the negation 'this is not silver', similarly, in the locus of the cognised self there is the negation of being-a-human-being in the form 'I am not a man'; hence the cognition of being-a-human-being in respect of the self is a delusion"; that is not (so); for in that case since in the locus of cowness cognised as of the form of khaṇḍa in "the cow is khaṇḍa" there is subsequently the negation 'this is not khaṇḍa' there is the contingency of the khaṇḍa-cognition too being delusive. Nor may it be that khaṇḍa is denied in respect of munda, but not in respect of the locus of cow-ness; for in the munda there is no contingency of the khaṇḍa (so as to call for a negation). Now, cow-ness as defined by the khaṇḍa particular, is the locus that is cognised; and not in respect of that is khaṇḍa denied, but in respect of cow-ness as defined by the munda particular; if this be said, then in the present case too the self as defined by being-a-human-being is the locus cognised; and not in respect of that is being-a-human-being denied, but in respect of the self as defined by Brahman-hood. This being the case, like the particulars khaṇḍa and munda to the recurrent cow-ness, the body and Brahman are related to the recurrent self; therefore, as for the cognition 'the cow is a khaṇḍa,' (so) for the cognition 'I am a man' validity would be difficult to avoid. If, then there be validity there because of the non-destruction of the empirical usage, that for you is common to the present case too; for, on your view, even in the state of release, the jīva. which is non-

different from the omniscient Brahman, the material cause of all, being (thus) the self of everything, there is non-destruction of the empirical usage due to conceit in the bodies, organs etc., of all.

XXXIX(b). If it be said that because of the non-existence of all the five determinants of difference *cum* non-difference,—viz., the relations of the class and the particular, the effect and the cause, the quality and its possessor, the qualification and the substrate, the member and the whole,—the non-difference of the body and the self is a delusion, not so. It does not stand to reason that all the five together are the determinants, since there is seen inconstancy. If, however, each one is the determinant, since a proximity involved in a plurality of determinants is admitted even by yourself, why should not the relation of the body and the embodied be also a determinant? Since, if this be not a determinant, that (consequence) may be deduced in the very same way even for the others, difference *cum* non-difference could not be established anywhere. If, then, because of the fear of undue extension there be restriction to five alone, then let there be the relation of effect and cause as between the body and the self; for it is possible figuratively to attribute to the self the causality present in Brahman because of their similarity in respect of being intelligent. Now, the relation (of cause and effect) only in its principal (not figurative) sense is the determinant; even because of the non-existence of this, the cognition "I am a man" is a delusion; if this, be said, even thus, if what is called delusion be a transformation of the internal organ, nescience would not be located in the self. If it be said that this very transformation of the internal organ is imposed on the self, even thus, since on

the view of you who maintain (illusion to be) cognition otherwise,¹ the relation between the substrate and the superimposed is a nullity, there would be no relation between the self and nescience. If, then it be said that delusion is a transformation of the self, no, since the self is immutable. If it be said "The self's immutability is not established for us," true; even thus, the self is admitted by you to have the quality of eternal cognition; and thus, even while that cognition remains, there has to be predicated the transformation (of the self) in the form of a delusion. And that does not stand to reason; for, the simultaneous inherence in one and the same substance of two particular qualities of the same class, neither of which is in the state of perishing, is impossible; truly, two whitenesses are not seen to be inherent simultaneously in a cloth.

XXXIX(c). Therefore, even in waking and dreaming, it is only the beginningless, indeterminable nescience that should be admitted as obscuring Brahman. Now, if there be relation to nescience, the self's unattachedness would be destroyed; if this be said, no; for even a beginningless relation, which, like nescience, is assumptive, does not, any more than its product (i.e., the world), destroy the unattachedness (of the self). Thus, therefore, nescience, which is of the nature of an existent, does even without obscuring the not-self, generate projection alone therein; the self, however, it obscures and also generates therein superimpositions such as are capable of the empirical usage "I", "This", "This is mine".

Anyatā-khyāti:—When nacre is cognised as silver, silver is not located in what is in front. The cognition is of the silver existing somewhere else, e.g., in the treasury. Silver present elsewhere and at another time is imposed on the nacre which is in front. What is delusive is the relating of nacre and silver.

XL. Now, the partless intelligent self is cognised in the form "I", but not in a form associated with two elements, like "This is silver"; therefore, this is not a superimposition. Similarly, the body too is cognised as "this"; and for this, superimposedness is not possible, since it is apprehended by the sense organs, which are of the nature of *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge). And if superimposed, there should be, as for nescience, capacity to be cognised by the bare witness-perception. Though in "I am a man", as in "This is silver" there is cognised the relation of substrate and superimposition as possessing two elements, yet this is not invariable; for, when the soul departs, the body is cognised even separately. The superimposed silver is not, indeed, cognised separately from the substrate. If, then, you consider that the *pramāṇa* which cognises the body is only empirical, not such as makes known the truth, even thus, if it be superimposed on the self, there should be declared resolution even therein. And it is not so declared (by *śruti*), but resolution in the earth alone is declared in the words "The body in the earth".¹ Therefore, this is not superimposed on the self. Similarly, even the host of things is cognised in the form "This is mine", as distinct from the body, incapable of cognition as "I", and related to the agent of egoity; and here there is not even a suspicion of superimposition.

XLI. It is said (in reply). We shall explain (later) the inclusion of a non-intelligent element in (the cognition) "I". Therefore this is certainly a superimposition. Of the body too, superimposedness is to be established, since like the internal organ and the (other) organs, it is an object of

¹ Brh., III. 4. 18.

cognition. And in the case of the internal organ and the (other) organs, superimposition is established, since, there being no cognition of their reality as separate from the self, they, like nescience, are immediately experienced by the bare witness. Nor may it be doubted that in their case, the superimposition is only in respect of relation, not in respect of existence; since in "His prāṇas¹ do not depart, they are resolved even here"² there is śruti declaration of resolution even in the self, when there is realisation of the true nature of the self, superimposition in respect of existence too is established. In the case of the body too, it should be understood that the resolution is in the self alone, through the channel of the earth (into which the body is primarily resolved). When the enjoyer, qualified by the body, organs etc., is superimposed, need it, then, be said that its accessory, the host of external objects of enjoyment, is superimposed? Truly, in the case of a king magically created in a dream, the accessories of kingship are not real. Therefore, all the three—"I", "This", and "This is mine"—are certainly superimposed.

XLII. Nor should there be any dispute even as to the superimposition of the attribute alone; for, in "I am deaf", there is seen the superimposition of deafness alone, the attribute of the sense (of hearing), on the self. As for the superimposition of cognition, since that is inseparable from the superimposition of things, it has not to be established separately. Therefore it is established that it is impossible to deny superimposition, which is thus rooted in experience.

¹ Meaning "senses".

² Nṛsimhottarātāpanīya, 6.

XLIII. The preceptor and the pupil or (two) disputants, these are the inquirers into the truth of the sūtra. Of these first, the preceptor has told the pupil about superimposition. Then, in respect of those who dispute about superimposition, there are stated the definition, the possibility and the evidence, in order that superimposition may be established.

XLIV. Now, by the definition in every case, what is defined is distinguished from everything else; and by the possibility, there is refuted the cognition of its impossibility in its own spatial and temporal locus; and by evidence is established its existence; and thus, the very evidences which are to be mentioned here for establishing superimposition—namely, perception, inference, the unintelligibility otherwise of empirical usage, and revelation—culminate by implication in distinguishing superimposition from everything else and in refuting (its) impossibility; for it is impossible to have a valid cognition of superimposition which is not (thus) distinguished and which is impossible. Therefore, the definition and the possibility do not have to be stated separately from the evidence.

XLV. If this be said, not so. Two-fold indeed is the form of superimposition here, viz., one being of the nature of another, and illusoriness. Of these it is not possible to experience illusoriness by the perception etc., which are to be mentioned as establishing one being of the nature of another; for illusoriness in the case of "this is silver" is to be understood from the unintelligibility (other-wise) of the sublation (of that cognition), while here there is no sublation. Now, there is certainly sublation here too, since in the absence of reciprocal discrimination, which is the cause of sublation, it is impossible to understand that this is the pre-

sentation of one as of the nature of another; if this be said, not so; for though there be sublation by reason, there is not the immediately experienced sublation that destroys the delusive presentation and hence the determination of illusoriness is not clear. Therefore in order to make that clear it is the definition that must be stated. Similarly, since in the world, in respect of portents like the hole in the sun, though known by cognition free from any cause of invalidity, there is seen the (cognition of) impossibility, here too, since in the self there are seen attributes opposed to superimposition, such as not being an object, not being attached, non-existence of similarity (to any other) etc., there arises the cognition of impossibility. Nor may it be said "If in respect of the self, the nature of not being an object etc., be not known, there is not the cognition of impossibility; if known, however, there remains no superimposition at all"; for mediate presentation is the cause of the cognition of impossibility, since with this much there is not removed superimposition which is immediate. Therefore, in order to refute impossibility, the possibility too has certainly to be stated, as distinct from the evidence. And thus even by others (here, the Logicians), there is stated the antecedence of the definition and the possibility to the evidence: "The establishment of the object of knowledge is dependent on evidence; and the establishment of evidence results from the definition; and that cannot be prevented even by the gods, when there are evidences like perception. That statement for which, in the premising, there is a possibility, may be established by means of *probans*; but that which is killed even while it originates cannot be saved by *probans*". Of these too, possibility is preceded by definition. For when the distinctive form has been presented by the definition, the subsequent enquiry as to whether this

is possible or not stands to reason. Otherwise, the enquiry would have no content. Therefore, it is the definition that should be stated first.

XLVI. That is stated. Superimposition is of two kinds, a thing qualified by a cognition and a cognition qualified by a thing. Of these, the definition of the thing (superimposed) is "superimposition is that thing which is similar to what is remembered and appears as of the nature of a different thing". Of the cognition, however, (the definition is) "superimposition is that (cognition) similar to memory, which is the presentation of one (thing) as of the nature of another."

XLVII(a). Now, since in "this is silver" there are no evidences like the sense of sight, the silver, by elimination, is only the remembered, not that which is similar to that which is remembered; thus say those who maintain *akhyati* (non-apprehension).¹

XLVII(b). If this be said, not so; for that (silver) is presented as existing in front. Nor may it be thought that the presentation in that way is for the this-element alone, not for the silver; for, just as in cases of right (cognition), such as "this is silver", "this is a pot", the general and the particular are immediately presented as in reciprocal relation, there is a similar presentation here too. Then, it may be thought that such empirical usage is because of the presentation of the general and the particular without any interval (between the two), not because of the existence of a cognition of relation. That is not (so); for, there is not seen the slightest inferiority

Ākhyāti:—Error is not due to defective cognition. There is perceptual cognition of naore, and there is memory of silver. Somehow the memory-ness of silver is lost, and because of *aviveka*, what is perceived is confounded with what is remembered.

(of these cognitions) to cases of real (cognition). If it be said that the non-existence of silver in front is itself the inferiority, no. Is it that because of the non-existence of immediate cognition there is the certitude of the non-existence of silver? Or is it because of the sublating cognition "this is not silver"? Not the first; for the non-existence of the cognition is itself not admitted. If the non-existence of cognition be ascertained even through the non-existence of the object, there would be reciprocal dependence. Therefore even because of the existence of immediate cognition, the existence of silver in front should be admitted. Nor may it be said in the reverse way that the ascertainment of the existence of the cognition is dependent on the ascertainment of the existence of the object; for, in that case, the ascertainment of the object too being similarly dependent on some other ascertainment, there is the contingency of infinite regress. Therefore the ascertainment of cognition comes from itself. On that is dependent the existence of the object. Nor the second, since the subsequent cognition, which is in conflict with the earlier cognition "this is silver" is not capable of sublating. What, then, is the explanation of the subsequent cognition? If this be asked, the explanation of the earlier cognition, in your view, that itself will apply (to the subsequent cognition). Just as in "this is silver" there is assumed non-discrimination by you between the form of "this" and the form of "silver", similarly, why should it not be assumed that in the denial too there is but non-discrimination, not the cognition of a (reciprocal) relation? If it be said that because of the cognition of accord with empirical usage, it is ascertained that in the denial there is cognition of (reciprocal) relation, then the self-luminosity of cognition would be abandoned. If it be said "since this is established only in respect of him who

disputes there is no acceptance of what is repugnant to my final position", even thus, infinite regress is difficult to remedy. Nor may it be said that the non-existence of silver in front is admitted by all; for there is admitted by us, quite in conformity with the presentation, an illusory silver, capable of being removed by the cognition of nacre.

XLVII(c). The admission of even illusory silver conflicts with the negation in all three times 'this is not silver'; if this be said, no; for, that negation has for content the silver known to the world as real. Nor may there be doubted thus the denial of what is not contingent; for, activity being seen in respect of the illusory silver for him who is in search of real silver, there is acknowledged the contingency of real silver-ness in the locus of the generality (of silver-ness). Otherwise even the denial of a pot on the ground would be difficult to state. If the pot exists, the denial would be contradicted, while if the pot do not exist, there would be the denial of what is not contingent. Therefore, the contingency of the pot is through the adjunct of space in general or time in general, but not directly. Let it be the very same even for real silver. And this being the case, there are intelligible both these—that the subsequent cognition 'there is no silver here' has real silver for content, and that the cognition 'the illusory silver alone appeared' has illusory silver for content. Otherwise one cognition would be denied.

XLVII(d). Now, because of the unintelligibility of the immediacy of silver, the presentation of the related is assumed, and for the intelligibility of that there is taken the trouble of assuming an illusory silver; but the immediacy of silver is intelligible even because of non-discrimination from the immediate nacre-cognition, certainly without the presentation

of the related ; if this be said, no. In that case, non-discrimination alone would be reflected on even at the time of discriminative knowledge, in the form 'for so much time that silver was not discriminated from this'. And not thus is it reflected on. But because of the recognition in the form 'for so much time this appeared as silver', it is certainly the presentation of the related that is reflected on. Therefore there should be admitted an illusory silver existing in front. Otherwise, since having seen nacre, one is active in respect of silver, which would fit in and with what? Therefore this silver is not what is remembered, but only what is similar to the remembered. And that similarity is intelligible, because of being known by cognition dependent on prior experience. Indeed, there is not seen the delusion of silver for him who has not experienced silver. For the same reason, because of being generated by residual impressions, there is to be understood the similarity to memory, even of the superimposition of cognition.

XLVII(e). If it be said that what is in dispute is not produced by residual impression, since it is cognition other than memory, like perception, (we say) no; for there is the conditioning adjunct (in the pervasion as it obtains in the example), viz., being generated by sense-contact alone. Nor may there be suspected non-pervasion of *probandum* by the adjunct, in the case of such cognitions as those from inference and revelation; for, in the case of those (cognitions) which, as dependent on the cognition of pervasion etc., are produced by residual impressions, the *probandum* (non-generation by *saṃskāra*) is non-existent (and hence the alleged adjunct stands).¹

¹ The argument seeks to show that the delusive cognition, not being a case of memory, is not generated by residual impressions; the example adduced

XLVII(f). This may be (urged): The cognitions in dispute are true, since they are cognitions, like those (others) which are admitted; by this reasoning there is only a two-fold classification of cognition into valid cognition and memory. And thus, even the silver-cognition is not a superimposition, but a memory; for, it is produced by residual impression alone, like what is admitted (to be so generated and consequently to be memory-cognition). Nor may it be asked 'If it be memory, then why should not another piece of nacre itself be remembered because of greater similarity?'; for, even such defects as desire present in the agent (of cognition) are causes, and these do not exist in respect of another piece of nacre. Because of the conceit of memory, through those same defects, the that-element does not figure in the memory of silver. Similarly the presentation of the particularities (of the 'this') being obstructed by the same (defects), even in the apprehension of nacre, its having a dark exterior and so on are not presented. And thus both the apprehension and the memory come to be non-discriminated. Therefore, he who seeks silver is active in respect of what is in front.

is perception. But here we have a case of cognition which, while being other than memory, is generated solely by sense-contact. This quality is, therefore, the adjunct conditioning the pervasion between memory and non-generation by residual impression; that is to say, non-generation by residual impression can be inferred in the case of only such non-memory cognitions as are generated solely by sense-contact, just as generation of smoke by fire can be inferred only in those cases where the fuel is wet. Now, if an alleged adjunct is really such, there should be pervasion as between that and the *probandum*. If the *probandum* existed in the absence of the adjunct, the latter would fail to be such. The objector claims that in the case of inference and revelation we have such non-pervasion. The reply is that while in these cases the adjunct—generation by sense-contact alone—is non-existent, the *probandum* too is non-existent, since they are generated by residual impressions,

XLVII(g). Now, are apprehension and memory both the cause of activity, or each by itself? On the first (alternative) too, do they cause activity together or in sequence? Not the first, since there is not simultaneity for apprehension and memory. It does not stand to reason that the causing of activity belongs to two which are qualified by sequence, for, the prior cognition, which is at a distance in respect of activity, is not a cause (of that). Nor does the causing of activity belong to each by itself, since empirical usage has for content the (one as) qualified (by the other). Therefore, for the sake of activity in respect of the qualified, there should be recognised the cognition of the related.

XLVII(h). If this be said, no; for, the origination of apprehension and memory without any interval is the cause of activity. If it be said that the cognition of (reciprocal) relation is recognised in the form 'This appeared as silver', no; for, there is only empirical usage of that kind. As for the presentation of bitterness in respect of what is sweet, to the newly born infant, as inferred from its spitting out etc., that too is but the memory of the bitterness experienced in another life and so on, but not a delusive cognition of (reciprocal) relation. But the particular sweetness and the that-ness, which are elements of the apprehension and the memory respectively, do not figure (in the mind), because of the defect of bile. The statement of the commentator, "And what was experienced in a former life is not remembered" is in view of the majority (of cases). Otherwise there being no memory of instrumentality to the desired, even in respect of suckling etc., there would be no activity. Even on the view of delusion, experience in another life has to be acknowledged as a cause. Otherwise, because of non-distinction in respect of not having been experienced, even a seventh

taste might be presented in delusion. If it be said that the presentation of (reciprocal) relation has been shown to be delusion even by the author of the śāstra who says "(it is) the cognition as that in respect of what is not that" (we say) no; for that (statement) is made in view of empirical usage. In cases of right (cognition), there is pervasion of the causing of activity by cognition of (reciprocal) relation; why is that abandoned here? If this be asked, we reply it is because of prolixity. Even by him who maintains delusion, there should necessarily be acknowledged as its cause non-discrimination between apprehension and memory. And thus, when activity results even from this, which is established for both, what (is the need) of a further cognition of (reciprocal) relation? Therefore, non-apprehension (akhyāti) alone stands to reason.

XLVIII. To this it is said (in reply). What is this which is called non-apprehension? Is it mere absence of cognition? Or is it a cognition which, in the case of him who wants one thing, is the cause of activity in respect of another? Or is it the cognition of many non-discriminated things? On the first (alternative), there should be delusion in sleep, not in waking and dreaming. On the second, where there is no activity because of quick sublation or because of laziness, there should be no delusion. On the third too, what is discriminatedness, which is the counter-correlate of non-discriminatedness? Is it apprehension of difference, or non-apprehension of non-difference, or cognition qualified by reciprocal non-existence, difference, or number from two onwards? Not the first; for non-discrimination is impossible, when there is apprehension of difference between the general and the particular, as caused by the memory of two non-

repetitive terms 'this' and 'silver'. Not the second; for when even because of difference having been apprehended in the said manner, its opposite, non-difference, is not apprehended, non-discriminatedness, which is the negation of that non-apprehension, is difficult to achieve. Even on the third, is the cognition of two-ness etc., needed only explicitly? Or is even that which is derivative sufficient? On the first, in 'Bring the cow with a stick', non-discrimination would be contingent even between 'cow' and 'stick', since two-ness etc., are not directly apprehended. On the second, since derivative cognition of two-ness etc., is possible even for that which is in front and silver, there would be non-discrimination. Now, though non-discrimination be not demonstrated in dependence on its counter-correlate, let us demonstrate it through its substrate: if this be said, that too is unsound. Non-discrimination is impossible between two apprehended substrates, since they are presented clearly as being non-repetitive. If the non-discrimination be as between what are not apprehended, there is contingency of delusion even in sleep.

XLIX. Now, what is called non-discrimination is non-apprehension of non-relation; and that is possible between the cognised 'this' and 'silver', since there is not seen the cognition 'this and the silver are not related'; if this be said, even then, is there intended non-apprehension of non-relation, only as between apprehension and memory, or as between any two whatsoever, or as between two devoid of the cognition of relation? On the first, there would not be the delusion 'I am a man'; for, both are apprehensions (as distinguished from memory). On the second, even 'The cow is a *khaṇḍa*', 'The cloth is white' would be delusions, because of

the non-existence of the cognition of non-relation. On the third too, there is the same defect. Cognition of relation is not, indeed, possible there, because of the non-existence of its content, viz., oneness. And that oneness is its content is known from recognition. If it be said that only such relation as that between quality and its possessor is its content, not oneness, then, since it is possible to say that even in 'This is silver' the relation of similarity is the content of that (*sāmsarga*), the cognition of relation would be difficult to avoid. If then (it be said) because of sublation there by the cognition of non-relation in the form 'This is not silver', relation and the cognition thereof are not possible, then, since in your system, even in such cases as that of the quality and its possessor, there is certainly the cognition of non-relation called the cognition of reciprocal non-existence, relation and the cognition thereof are impossible; hence the contingency of delusiveness continues all the same. Therefore, non-discrimination is not even non-apprehension of non-relation.

L. Now, by him who criticises non-discrimination, there should be proved something that discriminates; apprehension does not discriminate its own object from what is remembered, since (its) presentation of particularities is obstructed by defects; nor is memory capable of discriminating its own object from what is apprehended, since the conceit of remembrance is lost; if this be said, not so; for the capacity to discriminate is easy to show in the case of both. It is thus. Is it that difference is admitted by you as between the form of 'this' and the form of 'silver' only as qualified by the respective generality and particularity, or even as between the two barely (without such qualification)? Not the first; for, in the case of the form of 'this' and form of 'silver' of the

present context, which are not qualified by generality etc., there being oneness because of the non-existence of difference, there is the contingency of the cognition of relation having those (two) as its sphere. On the second (alternative) too, is it that the thing is apprehended by the first cognition, that the relation of substrate and counter-correlate is known by a second cognition, and that subsequently difference is apprehended by a third cognition? Or is there apprehension of difference even with the things? On the first, since the cognitions of all things would, prior to the apprehension of difference, have non-discriminated contents, there is the contingency of (their) delusiveness. And on the second, since difference too is apprehended even from the apprehension of this-ness, even the particularity needed for difference is certainly presented; hence the capacity to discriminate has to be admitted in the case of apprehension.

L1(a). Similarly, memory too is certainly that which discriminates. Indeed the conceit of remembrance, because of the loss of which there is (alleged) incapacity to discriminate on the part of memory, is not capable of being demonstrated. It is thus. Is memory itself the conceit of remembrance? Or is it other than memory, or an attribute present in memory, or the apprehension of a thing as qualified by prior experience, or some particularity of memory present in (the memory) itself, or a particularity which is the cause of an object of knowledge distinguished from the sphere of prior experience, or the generation of a different fruit, or the experience 'I remember'? Not the first, since on the loss of memory there is the contingency of the non-existence even of the cognition of silver. Not the second; for, there is the contingency of the absence of common ground, in that for memory

there would be incapacity to discriminate, because of the loss of something else (other than memory). Not the third, since no such attribute is cognised. Not the fourth; for in the delusive recognition 'This is the same Devadatta who was formerly seen', even while there is the apprehension of relation to prior experience, without the loss of that (relation) there is seen non-discrimination. If then it be said that that (interpretation of the conceit of remembrance) was stated with mere memory in view, and that with recognition it is not like that, even thus, this position is not possible at all. It is thus. Does the prior experience have itself too as object or only the thing (experienced)? Not the first, because of the contradiction of activity (of itself in respect of itself). On the second, however, the thing alone would be manifested by memory, but not the prior cognition, since that was not experienced. Now, in 'the pot is known' there is seen the memory of the thing as qualified by the cognition; if this be said, no; for, this is another memory. This memory which has been generated by the reflective cognition or by inference whose sphere is (the existence of) the (first) cognition, is different from the memory which is generated by the determinative cognition and has for its sphere the pot alone. Nor even by this (memory) is its own generator, the prior experience called reflective cognition, made an object. What then? It is only what was experienced in the reflective cognition, viz., the pot qualified by the determinative cognition. Therefore this is established: the memory in dispute does not apprehend a thing as qualified by the cognition that is its own cause, since it is memory, like the memory of a word-sense. Words indeed generate memory in respect of the things associated with them.

LI(b). Now, the Bauddha does not tolerate this. It is thus. Since relations like conjunction are impossible as between words and things, it does not stand to reason that, (for words) there is the capacity to recall things related (to themselves). If it be said that the relation is the capacity to generate cognition, is it the capacity to generate experience, or the capacity to generate memory? Not the first; for though for words in the form of a sentence there is the capacity to generate the experience of the sentence-sense, that is impossible in respect of their own senses; for, at the time of learning the meaning, word-senses having been apprehended by other means of knowledge (such as perception), they do not have a sense that is novel. That has been said: 'A word, since there is nothing fresh, is not distinguished from that which recalls to memory.'¹ On the second too, that capacity does not generate memory, while being (itself) uncognised, since (memory) has a cognised instrument. Nor (does it do so) as cognised; for, capacity having to be known from the product alone, there is reciprocal dependence between the generation of memory and the cognition of capacity. (If) then it be said 'after inferring, through the activity of the intermediate elder, the cognition which is the cause of activity, and ascertaining of the word that it is the generator of that (cognition) because of its immediate succession to the word, the capacity is ascertained even at the time of learning the meaning, through insertion and elimination of (other) words, and therefore there is no reciprocal dependence,' even then, is the capacity ascertained in respect of words in general, or only in respect of these related to particular things? Not the first, because of the contingency of the non-establishment of a restriction as to such and such

¹ Śloka-vārtika, śabdaprakaraṇa, v. 107.

being the meaning of such and such a word. On the second too, since there has to be acknowledged another relation that regulates the relation to capacity, there would be infinite regress. If it be said that capacity can account for both itself and another (i.e., the relation), even thus, at the time of remembrance, is it that from the perception of the word in general the thing is remembered, or from the perception of the word possessing a capacity whose sphere is the thing, or from the residual impression generated by the cognition of capacity and the perception of the word? Not the first, because of the contingency of non-restriction. Not the second; for, the thing too being perceived even at the time of the perception of the word, there is futility of the memory generated by the word. Not the third, since with that much memory is impossible; for elsewhere, the recaller and the recalled are regulated by some other relation such as similarity, opposition, effect and cause, while that is non-existent as between the word and the thing. Therefore it is but a dogma of those who maintain (the authoritative nature of) the Vedas (to say) that words are recallers and that the sentence is a means of valid knowledge.

LI(c). To this it is said (in reply): there is no defect in the memory of the thing (resulting) from the perception of the word and the residual impression of (the cognition of) the capacity. As for what was said in the words 'for elsewhere' etc.,¹ that is unsound. Is it said that in the case of the word too as elsewhere similarity etc., should be admitted, or that even elsewhere than in the case of the word there may be capacity alone and that there need not be similarity etc., or that, because of the non-existence of a basic relation like

similarity, in the case of the word there is no generation of memory even though there be capacity? Not the first; for in the word no similarity is seen (to the sense) and there is prolixity in assuming what is not seen; elsewhere, however, it has not to be assumed, since it is seen. Not the second; for, it is impossible to deny what is experienced. Not the third; for, there is contingency of contradiction in what is capable not generating its effect. Therefore, words possessing capacity do certainly generate memory in respect of their senses. Truly, here, the prior experiences are not recalled together with the things. Otherwise, there would be the contingency of the experiences too, like pot etc., being the senses of the respective words.

LII. Nor (is) the fifth (sense of 'conceit of remembrance' possible); for nowhere is there seen a distinction in the nature of cognitions, in the absence of adjuncts like the cause, the content &c. Nor the sixth and the seventh; for in memory there do not exist an object of the knowledge and a fruit, over and above the object of knowledge and fruit present in the experience (cognition). Nor the eighth; if for the experience 'I remember' the capacity to discriminate were established elsewhere, it might, perhaps, be possible to say that because of its loss somehow elsewhere (i.e., here) there is non-discrimination; (but) that itself to start with, is not established. This experience arises indeed abandoning the word signifying apprehension and as associated with the word signifying remembrance. How could this be possible at the first, when there is no discrimination between apprehension and memory? And thus there would be reciprocal dependence in that when there is discrimination there is experience and when there is experience there is discrimina-

tion. Thus, in this manner, the conceit of remembrance, which is to be lost, being difficult to state (clearly), there certainly results the capacity to discriminate, in the case of memory.

LIII. Now, because of the contingency of the non-existence of difference if both apprehension and memory had but the thing for content, by you too must necessarily be accepted as content for memory, a thing qualified by prior experience; let that itself be the conceit of remembrance; if this be said, no, since difference results even because of distinction in the causes (of apprehension and of memory). Otherwise, on your view too, what would be the difference of memory from the inferential cognition whose sphere is prior experience, the content being the same? Now, memory, because of its form as 'that', is different from the inference of cognition; if this be said, what is this form 'that'? Is it being qualified by a remote place, time etc., or being associated with prior experience, or being generated by residual impressions? Not the first; for, there is the contingency of the nature of memory even in the case of inference etc. Not the second, because of (its) contingency even in the inference of cognition. As for the third, the distinction in the cause would itself (thus) be the cause of difference. Let it then be that in the present case too the memory of silver is generated by residual impressions alone; if this be said, no, since the reply has been given, that the silver is presented as existing in front. Nor is it possible to say that existence in front is effected by non-discrimination; for, non-discrimination is non-effective in respect of delusion. It is thus. Is the non-discrimination between two things apprehended, or between the apprehended and the remembered, or between the remembered? Not the

first; for nothing other than the self being apprehended in the dream-state, there do not exist two apprehended things, and because of the consequent non-existence of their non-discrimination too, the cause of delusion, there is the contingency of the non-existence of delusion. Not the second; for in dream itself, when there is non-discrimination of the remembered blue etc., from the apprehended self, there is the contingency of the presentation 'I am blue.' On the third, however, everything would be presented only as mediate in delusion, since everything whatsoever is (only) remembered. And this being the case, in the inference of the nature of memory in respect of the cognition of the silver existing in front, there should be understood the (presence of a) conditioning adjunct viz., presentation as mediate. And for the inference of the truth (of all cognitions) this is this counter-syllogism: the cognitions in dispute are not true, because of being sublated, like the empirical usage due to delusion. Therefore, abandoning the foolish obstinacy about the twofoldness of cognition, there should be acknowledged a third (class), delusive cognition.

LIV. Now, then, let it not be non-apprehension. Let it be apprehension otherwise. It is silver which is present at another place and time that is apprehended as the nature of nacre by the sense-organ that is in contact with nacre and affected by a defect. Nor thus is there the contingency of the apprehension of even the non-experienced, since similarity etc., are regulative (of the apprehension).

LV. This is unsound. Is the otherwiseness in respect of the cognition, or in respect of the fruit, or in respect of the thing? Not the first. For, other-wise-ness in respect of the cognition should be stated in the form 'the cognition with

the form of silver has the nacre for basis'. Here, what is called nacre being the basis, is it the supplying of its own form to the cognition, or being the object of empirical usage prompted by the cognition? Not the first; for in respect of the cognition possessed of the form of silver, the supplying of the form of nacre is impossible. Not the second; for there is the contingency of the sword, spear, bow etc., the object of the empirical usage prompted by the perception of tiger etc., being the basis of the cognition of tiger etc. Nor is the otherwise-ness in respect of the fruit; for in delusion and in valid cognition there is seen no difference in respect of the nature of the fruit, viz., manifestation. In respect of the thing too, how is there other-wise-ness? Is it the identity of nacre with silver, or the transformation (of it) in the form of silver? On the first too, is it absolute difference between nacre and silver, or difference *cum* non-difference? Not the first; for, real identity is impossible between what are absolutely distinct, while indeterminability (of the identity) is not admitted by you. If the cognition be of identity which is a nullity, such (cognition) being possible even in respect of quality and its possessor and so on, delusiveness (of the cognition of these too) would be difficult to avoid; for, inherence, which is established merely as a matter of nomenclature, is not different from identity. As for the view of difference *cum* non-difference, there would be non-delusion, as in 'The cow is a khaṇḍa.' Even on the view of transformation (into silver), there would be no sublation: the silver-cognition in dispute is non-sublatable, since it is a cognition of transformation, like the cognition of curds, a transformation of milk. Therefore, even like milk, nacre (too) would not be seen again. Now, on the departure of sun-light, the cause of the transformation of the lotus in the form of blossoming forth, there

is again the condition of a bud; similarly, on the removal of the defect, which is the cause of transformation into silver, let there be again the condition of nacre. Not so; for like (the cognition) 'The blossom itself was (in the condition of) a bud,' there is not the cognition 'Silver itself was nacre.' Even if this should somehow exist, the view of transformation does not stand to reason; for, there is the contingency of the silver-cognition even for him who has no defect. It is verily not in the sphere of observation that the same milk is transformed as curds in respect of one person, (but) not in respect of another. Therefore the (view of delusion as) cognition otherwise cannot well be demonstrated.

LVI. Let it then be self-apprehension¹. The silver in dispute is of the nature of cognition, since it is immediately experienced without sense-contact, like cognition. Now it is the doctrine of the Saugatas that the intellect (*citta*) and its products (*caitya*) originate in dependence on four kinds of causes². Of these, the rise of the form of silver is not possible from light etc., which are called auxiliary causes (*sahakāri-pratyaya*); for, this is the cause of clearness alone. Nor (is it possible) from the sense of sight etc., called the *adhipati-pratyaya*; for that is the cause only of the restriction of the content (to a particular class, as visible, audible etc). Nor

¹ *Ātma-khyāti*. In the cognition of nacre-silver delusiveness consists in the cognition of silver as existing outside. Silver exists in us as cognition; and it does not exist outside. Sublation refers only to externality; it makes known that silver is not something external.

² *Pratītya-samutpāda* is the Buddhist formula of causation. It eschews both chance and a supernatural element like God. The law is that given certain co-operating factors, production takes place. Hence it is called the law of 'dependent origination'. See further Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 816-818.

from the prior cognition, which is called the immediately antecedent cause (*samanantara-pratyaya*); for immediately after the cognition of a pot which belongs to one class there is seen the rise of the delusion of silver which belongs to a different class. Nor from the external (thing) called the substrate cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*); for, that is not acknowledged by the *Vijñāna-vādins*. Therefore, how can there be the form of silver for the cognition? If this be asked, we reply that it is because of the capacity of *samskāra*. Now, even in the case of *samskāra*, if it be permanent, there is abandonment of the final position that 'everything is momentary'; even if it be momentary, because of its being an object of knowledge, there is abandonment of the doctrine that there exist cognitions alone; if this be said, no; for, when in the beginninglessly established stream of cognition, at some time some cognition of silver has arisen, that itself is acknowledged to be the *samskāra*. Though the *samskāra* is separated by many cognitions of a different class, yet at some time it originates another cognition of silver, belonging to the same class (as itself). This is just as the paddy seed, being separated by several products such as the shoot, again gives rise to another paddy seed, of the same class (as itself). If then, you think that the origination of the later seed is not from the earlier seed, but from the succession of shoot etc., generated by the earlier seed, then, here too, let the *samskāra* be but the succession generated by the earlier cognition of silver. Thus even the earlier silver-cognition arises from an (yet) earlier silver-cognition. Therefore this silver which is brought about by beginningless *vāsanā*, being real as a form of cognition alone, delusively appears as if outside.

LVII. To this it is said (in reply): is that silver devoid of origination because of being super-normal? Or is it originated even like the silver of ordinary experience? On the first, it could not be of the nature of cognition, which is originated. Even on the second, is it originated from an external thing or from a cognition? Not the first; for, no external thing is acknowledged by you. Cognition too, as pure, is not a generator; for, pure cognition is the form of release. If, then, the origination of silver be from cognition generated by a defective cause, even thus, does the generating cognition itself apprehend silver? Or is it some other (cognition)? Not the first; for, since the generated and the generator, which are momentary, belong to different times, there is the contingency of the non-existence of the immediate cognition of silver. Any other cognition too could not, as generated by a non-defective cause, be the apprehender of silver, because of undue extension. Even that which is generated by a defective cause, if it be generated by silver, then, silver being real as practically efficient, an external thing would have been acknowledged. But if it be not generated by silver, silver would not be its content; for, it is admitted that the content is that cause which contributes the form to the cognition. Therefore, on the view of self-apprehension, silver itself would not be cognised.

LVIII. Now, even for you, if the silver-cognition be a memory, there would be non-apprehension; if it be apprehension, there would be apprehension otherwise or self-apprehension; truly, for cognition no mode is possible other than memory or apprehension; if this be said, not so. Is this impossibility due to the non-demonstration of a different causal aggregate, or due to the non-demonstration of the

existence of a different cognition, or due to the non-demonstration of a different content? Not the first; for, sense-contact, residual impression and defect are the causal aggregate. Nor may it be said that defect, being an obstacle, is the cause only of the non-origination of an earlier established effect, not of the origination of a novel effect; for non-origination, which is of the form of antecedent non-existence, being beginningless, is not generated by defect; and in the case of defects like wind, bile etc., there is seen the origination of novel effects. Nor is defect otherwise explained as calling up the residual impression, since that calling up is an intermediary operation. Truly the axe effecting (its own) rise and fall does not become not a cause in respect of the act of cutting. Now, since sense-contact is exhausted with the cognition of this-ness alone, since, though residual impression produces memory, memory is not acknowledged by you here, and since independent causation of cognition is not seen in the case of defect, how is there the presentation of silver? If this be asked, it is said (in reply). First, through the sense-organ associated with a defect, there is generated a psychosis of the internal organ having this-ness alone for content. Thence, in the this-ness and in the psychosis that apprehends it, intelligence is manifested. And the nescience present in that intelligence is agitated because of defect. Then, the nescience present in intelligence defined by the this-element, being agitated, is transformed in the form of silver, because of association with the residual impression of silver, which is called up through similarity. But the nescience present in intelligence defined by the psychosis, is transformed into the form of a psychosis, being associated with the residual impression of the psychosis apprehending silver. And those two, the transformation into silver and the transformation into the

psychosis, are manifested by the substrate of each, viz., the witness-intelligence; thus there is the presentation of silver. Though there are two cognitions here, the psychosis of the internal organ and the psychosis of nescience, yet their content comes to have oneness because of the real and the unreal, the this and the silver, each being of the nature of the other; therefore, the fruit defined by the content being also one, the oneness of the cognition too is figuratively spoken of.

LIX. Nor (do) the second and the third (grounds of impossibility hold good): for illusory cognition and illusory content have been demonstrated. Though here sense-contact and residual impression have even independently the capacity to generate valid cognition and memory, yet since activity (in respect of the delusive silver) is not possible merely with the origination of valid cognition and memory without an interval, there has to be assumed a single illusory cognition generated by both the sense-contact and the residual impression. This is just as even in respect of the letter-cognitions originated without an interval, simultaneity being impossible, there is made by you, because of the untelligibility otherwise of the knowledge of the word-sense, the assumption that the cause is but a single cognition of the final letter, as associated with the residual impressions of each earlier letter.

LX. Now, the cognition in dispute is not single, because of being generated by different causes, like the cognitions of colour and taste; if this be said, no; because of inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in the case of inference and recognition. In both cases, there is admitted but a single valid cognition in each, pregnant with memory. And the causes of inference are residual impression of the pervasion and the perception

of the *probans* ; for recognition, however, they are sense-contact and residual impression. Nor may it be said that for inference the causes are memory of pervasion and the perception of the *probans*, not residual impression, because of the impossibility of simultaneity for two cognitions. Though there is not this defect in memory being a cause of recognition, yet the calling up of residual impression has necessarily to be mentioned as the cause of memory. And thus that (recognition) being originated even by that (calling up of residual impressions), there is no instance of mere co-absence of memory (and its alleged effect) ; therefore and also because of prolixity, there is no causality for memory. Now the silver-cognition is not generated by many independent causes, since it is a cognition, like the cognition of pot ; if this be said, no ; for it may also be well said ' The silver-cognition is generated by the above-mentioned (causes), since it is different from valid cognition and memory, like recognition.' Nor may it be said that the silver-cognition is valid, since it is generated by a cause associated with a residual impression, like inference ; for there is the conditioning adjunct, namely, being an experience not generated by a defect. Now though there be no unintelligibility in respect of the cognition, illusoriness in the case of the silver which is experienced as real is self-contradictory ; if this be said, not so ; for as in the case of the this-ness of nacre, it is of the reality of nacre alone that relation with silver is acknowledged. Then, in the case of that same relation, which is experienced as real, illusoriness is self-contradictory ; if this be said, thus then, let there be three kinds of reality—the absolute reality of Brahman, the empirical reality conditioned by *māya* in the case of ether etc., and the merely apparent reality conditioned by nescience in the case of nacre-silver etc. Of these, in the case of the two

which are not absolutely real, illusoriness is not self-contradictory. Nor is the assumption of illusoriness devoid of evidence; for, there is recognition of illusoriness in respect of silver and its cognition, in the form 'The silver appeared only as illusory.'

LXI. Therefore, on our view, there is not, as on other views, conflict with experience or baseless assumption. On (the view of) non-apprehension, however, the nature of what is remembered, in respect of what is presented immediately, is self-contradictory. There have to be assumed many unseen things, such as two cognitions, the nature of memory in respect of immediate cognition of silver, and the loss of the conceit of remembrance. This (presence of defect) is to be similarly reasoned out suitably in the case of other views too. Therefore our view alone is to be supported, viz., that the silver is but the product of māyā.

LXII. Now, silver, since it is removable by true cognition, is the product of nescience, but not the product of māyā. Nor is nescience but māyā, since their difference is understood both from the definition and from what is well established. That which does not delude its locus and conforms to the desire of the agent is māyā; that, however, which is the reverse of this is nescience. Indeed, in ordinary experience, in respect of the elephant, horse, chariot etc., produced by māyā, the word 'māyā' alone is well established, not the word 'nescience (avidyā).'

LXIII. It is said (in reply). While being indeterminable, to be the cause (a) of obstruction to the presentation of the true and (b) of the presentation of the erroneous, that is (present) without distinction in both. Nor may it be said that only a real thing like spells, drugs etc., is māyā; for,

there is not the application of the word 'māyā' in respect of that. Indeed, spectators call as 'māyā' only the magical feat which is seen, not the spell etc., which are unseen. As for the co-presence and co-absence of the spell, they are intelligible as efficient cause, like (the defects of) film in the eye etc. Truly, the indeterminable magical feat denoted by the word 'māyā', cannot have for material cause a real spell etc. Therefore there is to be assumed some beginningless, indeterminable material cause, since if it had a beginning there is the contingency of infinite regress. And its being denoted by the word 'māyā', is intelligible because of the non-difference between the material cause and its effect.

LXIV. And thus, the same māyā that is assumed as the material cause of the magical feat, may itself be the material cause of super-impositions like silver; let there not be a separate nescience; for in 'Know māyā to be the primal cause'¹ there is śruti declaration of its being the material cause of all. Therefore, because of parsimony, nescience is but māyā. Nor in the case of māyā is non-delusion of the locus invariable; for Viṣṇu, in his incarnation as Rāmā, was deluded by the very māyā located in himself. Nor in the case of nescience is there the invariability of deluding its own locus; for he who sees the uprightness, even in the trees superimposed upside down in the midst of water, is not deluded. Now, here, because of the discrimination generated by the perception of the trees on the bank, there is non-delusion; the nature of nescience, however, is to delude; if this be said, then, even for him who performs the magic feat, there is non-delusion, because of his knowledge of the remedy (for the spell, drug etc., used by him); but māyā, by its own nature,

¹ Śvet., IV, 10.

is certainly what deludes, since delusion is seen in the spectators of the magical feat; if, however, they had knowledge of the remedy, they too would certainly not be deluded; hence not being the locus is not the determinant of delusion (by māyā). Nor does māyā conform to the desire of the agent; for there is independence for the agent only in respect of efficient causes, such as spells and drugs. And that kind of conformity to desire is seen even in nescience, since through placing the finger on the eye-ball, there is the origination of the delusion of two moons. If it be said that with respect to the existence of nescience the agent does not function, that is common to the other too. And what is well established in the śāstra also makes known their non-difference alone; for in śruti texts like 'Again, at the end, there is the removal of universal māyā'² the word 'māyā' is applied to nescience that is removable by right knowledge; in the smṛti 'That, on whose entry into the heart, the yogin crosses over the extensive nescience, māyā, obeisance to that immeasurable one who is of the nature of knowledge,' the oneness of māyā and nescience is mentioned expressly. As for what is well established in ordinary experience, that is intelligible because of difference due to adjuncts, even in respect of one and the same thing. In the form in which it generates projections or in the form in which it conforms to desire, there is empirical usage as 'māyā'; in the form in which it obscures or in the form in which it is independent there is empirical usage as 'nescience'. Therefore, silver being a product of māyā is intelligible.

LXV. Now, why this trouble? Let the silver even as it appears be but absolutely real. If this be said, no. In that

² Śvet, I, 10.

case, like the pot, it would be apprehended even by those free from defect. If defect be a cause even in respect of the apprehension of the absolutely real, nothing would be cognised by those without defect; if (it be) the product of māya, that defect itself would regulate (the cognition). What is in dispute is the object of apprehension for all, since it is present in the this-element of nacre, like whiteness; if this be said, no; because there is the conditioning adjunct, viz., presence in the this-element alone. The illusory silver, however, is superimposed on intelligence which is manifested by defect-generated cognition and defined by the this-element of nacre; therefore it is not apprehended by those without defect. Truly, the cognition of one is not perceived by another person. If, then again, he who maintains absolute reality, somehow mentions a seen regulative principle, even thus, how can we get over the sublating perception 'This is not silver,' which makes known the non-existence of silver in all three times, in the locus where it was cognised? On the view of illusoriness, however, this (sublating cognition) is but helpful; for the definition of illusoriness is only to be the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence in the locus where it has been cognised. That this negation does not have illusory silver for its sphere has been explained even higher up¹, on the basis of the recognitive cognition 'It appeared only as illusory.' On the views of apprehension otherwise and self-apprehension, there would be the reflection in the form 'This is not silver, but that' or 'cognition (is silver)', not in the form 'only as illusory.' Therefore, because of non-apprehension by those without defect and because of the sublation and (consequent) reflection, the illusoriness alone of silver stands to reason, not its reality.

¹ Para XLIX.

LXVI. Now, what is this which is called sublation, on the strength of which there is the ascertainment of the illusoriness? Is it (1) in the case of him who seeks one thing the arrest of his appetite in respect of another, or (2) the destruction of the capacity for that appetite, or (3) the discrimination of what has been cognised as non-discriminated, or (4) the cognition of reciprocal non-existence in respect of what has been cognised in a relation of identity, or (5) the destruction of erroneous cognition, or (6) the destruction of its content, or (7) the destruction of defect etc.? (1) Not the first; for, there being no appetite for him who is non-attached, there is the contingency of the non-existence of sublation (for him). If then sublation be the arrest of only such appetite as is preceded by desire, even then, when, for him, who, having seen the water of the mirage at a distance, is appetent (towards it), there is desistence through seeing snakes, thieves, etc., on the way, there is the contingency of sublation. Nor does sublation exist there, since the cognition of water is not removed. (2) Not the second; for, the capacity is not destroyed, delusive appetite in respect of that same nacre being possible at some other time. (3) Even on the third, is it that when things are apprehended, difference, being an attribute, is apprehended later, or is it apprehended even then, being of the very nature of the thing? On the first, in every case of cognition of things whose content is undiscriminated, the cognition of difference would be a sublator. On the second, when the thing is apprehended, there would be no non-discrimination anywhere. (4) On the fourth too, whether in the view of absolute difference or difference *cum* non-difference, the cognition of difference in 'whiteness of the pot' coming after first cognising identity in 'the pot is white' would be a sublation. (5) Not the fifth; for, cognition, which is momen-

tary, is destroyed of itself. (6, 7) Nor the sixth, nor the seventh, for, in the case of content and defect, which are things, destruction by knowledge is impossible. Nor can sublation itself be denied, since it is well established in ordinary experience. Therefore we do not see (what) sublation (is).

LXVII. It is said (in reply). Sublation is the removal of nescience, together with its own product present or past, by true knowledge; for sublation is well established in that kind of removal of non-knowledge. Now, this being the case, the nacre-cognition itself, being that which removes the illusory silver and its material cause, would be the sublator. It is truly so; this is the secret; yet, since in the case of him who is appetent through the cognition of the silver as real, it destroys the appetite through the knowledge of its (the thing's) non-existence, even the cognition 'this is not silver' is spoken of as the sublator. Therefore, because of sublation, there is the ascertainment of illusoriness.

LXVIII. Now let it thus be that the cognition of illusory silver is a delusion. The cognition of dream objects, however, is not valid, because of being sublated; nor is it memory, because of being immediate; nor is it a delusion, because of the non-existence of its characteristic. For, of delusion, being generated by the three (above said) causes is the external characteristic¹. That, indeed does not exist in dream; for, though there exist the defect called sleep and the residual impression called up by unseen potency, there is non-existence of the third (cause), sense-contact. Nor is the

¹ *Tatāstha-lakṣaṇa*, is distinct from the essential constitution of the thing known, but is yet the means of knowing it: it is thus external; it is contrasted with *svartūpa-lakṣaṇa*, the characteristic of the essential constitution of the thing; thus creating the world etc., is the *tatāstha-lakṣaṇa* of God, while reality, knowledge, bliss are his *svartūpa-lakṣaṇa*.

essential contracteristic, of the form of the appearance of something somewhere else, possible here; because of the non-existence of the substrate mentioned as 'somewhere else.' Therefore, on your view, what is the explanation of dream cognition?

LXIX. It is said (in reply). Sense-contact, indeed, is that which in waking originates the psychosis of the internal organ whose sphere is the this-element of external nacre etc.; for, the internal organ has no independence outside the body; in dream, however, the internal organ, since it is independent within the body, may be active of itself; hence there is no need for sense-contact. Therefore both in waking and in dream the psychosis of the internal organ is alone the third cause. And the substrate too in every case is but intelligence defined by the psychosis. As for the this-element of nacre etc., that is the generator only of the contact with the sense of sight etc.; for, otherwise there is non-origination of sense-contact for the contentless. The designation of that (this-element) as substrate is, however, figurative; for it is the adjunct defining the substrate-intelligence. Therefore, just as in waking, nescience, which is present in intelligence manifested by the psychosis generated by sense-contact and defined by the this-element of nacre, is transformed in the form of silver, similarly, in dream too, nescience, which is present in intelligence manifested in the psychosis of the internal organ within the body when affected by defects like sleep, and is defined by the psychosis, may, as associated with the residual impressions with diverse contents called up by unseen potency, transform itself into the (dream) world.

LXX. Now, if for the dream-delusion the intelligence of the self be the substrate, then, through apposition with

the superimposed, as in 'This is silver', 'This is a snake,' it would be cognised in the form 'I am blue,' 'I am yellow'; but not (in the form) 'This is blue' etc., through relation to the space in front. If, then, that space too be superimposed on intelligence, then, even within (the body) there would be also the presentation 'I am space'. If then you think 'This which is said is very trivial; since even in waking, intelligence alone is substrate, why do you not question in regard to that?', then, let there be the question with regard to that too.

LXXI. To this we say: is the cognition within deduced through apposition with egoity defined by the body, or through apposition with intelligence? Not the first; for, egoity is not the substrate. Not the second, since that is a contingency of the acceptable. Otherwise there would be no manifestation of what are superimposed, which are of themselves non-intelligent. Since the designation as 'I' is, however, caused by egoity, that does not arise here, in bare intelligence. Now, even pot etc., appear like nacre-silver, only as in apposition with manifestation. If this is so, they too may be superimposed even on intelligence. Nor may it be said that the manifestation of pot etc., is generated by a *pramāṇa* (i. e., a psychosis) and is not of the nature of the self. The object-defined-intelligence which is in dispute is not in reality different from egoity-defined-intelligence, since the difference is such as cannot be distinguished without reference to external adjuncts, just like pot-ether from ether at large. And this being the case, when, having made a distinction of within and without in relation to the body, there is the empirical usage of self and not-self as 'I' and 'not-I' it is to be understood to have egoity for adjunct. And the pervasion of within and without even by one and

the same intelligence is intelligible because of infinitude. Intelligence indeed is not of the size of an atom, since it is cognized as pervading the body. Nor, in the case of the partless, is a medium size intelligible, except through an adjunct. Therefore, the empirical usage of waking, though imagined to be absolutely real, is superimposed on the omni-present intelligence as substrate; what need then to say that dream is superimposed thereon?

LXXII. Now in 'Contemplate the name as Brahman'¹ etc., the superimposition of the imagination of Brahman on name etc., is enjoined; how is there delusion here without a defect in the cause? If this be asked, not so. There indeed only an act of the mind is enjoined, not delusive cognition; for, what is not dependent on a person (i. e. cognition) cannot be enjoined. Nor may it be said that since remembering gods and forgetting naked women are under the control of desire, cognition is certainly dependent on the person; for, there too, it must be acknowledged that the person's freedom is in respect of bringing about mental concentration, the cause of memory, and in respect of engaging in some other object, the cause of forgetfulness, not (directly) in respect of the remembrance and the forgetfulness. Otherwise, without ever fresh repetition, a person would sometimes recollect quickly at will the Veda etc., once studied; and he would forget even immediately the death of a son etc. Therefore, since delusion cannot be enjoined, the generation of delusion by the three causes is not inconstant.

LXXIII. As for its form of being 'the appearance of the nature of something somewhere else,' there is no dispute for any one; for, even by him who maintains non-apprehen-

¹Chānd., VII, 1, 5.

sion, in order that there may result the empirical usage of relatedness, there must necessarily be acknowledged a mental cognition of relation or a conceit of relation. As for the others, though they dispute about the nature, and the particular spatial and temporal properties of the substrate and the superimposed, they do not dispute about the aforesaid nature of delusion.

LXXIV. Now, he who maintains nullity, saying that in the nullity itself there is the delusion of silver etc., on the strength of error (*samvrti*), does not tolerate the real substrate mentioned as 'somewhere else.' Nor is there the impossibility of substrateless delusion; for, even on your view, there is this nature for delusions like *keśaṇḍraka*¹ and the *fata morgana*. Nor is limitless sublation impossible; for, there is that nature for such a sublating statement of a trustworthy person, as 'not snake.'

LXXV(a). This is not sound; for the rays of light from the eyes which are massed up when the finger tip is pressed on the corner of the eye are the substrate of the *keśaṇḍraka*; and ether is the substrate of the *fata morgana*; otherwise there is the contingency of even the knowledge of nullity being delusive; and if that be so, nullity would not be established; and if the delusions of cognition and object of cognition be each the substrate of the other, there is reciprocal dependence since the substrate is what exists earlier; even if, on the analogy of the seed and the sprout, a succession be admitted between particular cognitions and objects of cognition, there should be admitted something permanent persisting though the succession of cognitions and objects of cognition,

¹ *Keśaṇḍraka* is the appearance of a bright woolly mass when the closed eye is pressed with the finger tip.

like the soil persistent in the succession of seed and sprout; or if that be not admitted, there is in the assumption of the unseen, the contingency of a blind succession (a chain of blind leading the blind); even such a sublating statement of a trustworthy person, as 'not snake' has a limit as leading up to (the cognition) 'but a rope'; even in sublation of the form 'There is nothing at all here; in vain do you fear,' the space in front mentioned as 'here' is itself the limit; even in such sublation as 'The pradhāna said by others (the opponents) to be the cause of the world does not exist' the limit is that which is accepted (by both), viz., the cause in general of the world. Even where, as in the māyā-produced elephant, horse, chariot etc., or elsewhere, you suspect substrateless delusion and limitless sublation, there too, the witness-intelligence, which establishes the delusion and the sublation, may itself be the substrate and the limit. Nor is that too sublated; for, there is nothing to establish that sublation, everything else being non-intelligent.

LXXV(b). Nor is nullity the substrate; for, there is no persistence (of it), among the superimposed. Or if there were, it would be cognised at the time of delusion, as 'Nullity is silver,' not as 'This is silver.' If it be said that what is cognised as 'this' is itself nullity, then the dispute is as to the name alone.

LXXV(c). Nor can nullity be the limit, since that is not cognised in any sublation. Or if it be cognised, intelligence alone would be called by the name 'nullity.'

LXXV(d). Nor can nullity be the superimposed; for, if that be the case, there is the contingency of the non-existence of immediacy for the superimposed. If then this be certainly acceptable to him who maintains nullity (and) desires to

refute all appearance, then, that refutation too would not appear. Now, by you too is held the nullity of the superimposed; if this be said, no; for, in order that there may be established counter-correlateness of sublation, there is admitted, at the time of its cognition, difference from the real and the unreal. Subsequent to sublation, however, there is certainly nullity; for in respect of the nullity of what has perished there is no dispute for anyone.

LXXVI. As for those who acknowledge reality elsewhere for the sublated silver etc., for them, is it the sublating cognition itself that indicates that (reality), or is it the unintelligibility of sublation here? Not the first; for it is not cognised by the sense of sight that 'This is not silver, but (what is) in another place or in the cognition.' Even by the statement of a trustworthy person, it is only the (above) mentioned non-existence of silver that is understood, not the reality elsewhere mentioned by you. And the unintelligibility of sublation here is not established for the disputants; because, for relation in the (view of) apprehension otherwise, and externality in the (view of) self-apprehension, there is acknowledged sublation here, even without their reality elsewhere. Even by him who maintains non-apprehension, in respect of the illusory cognition whose object is silver in nacre and which is established for the opponent, denial is made here even without acknowledging the reality elsewhere. Nor is it established in ordinary experience; for in the case of a pot broken here, there is negation even without (its) reality elsewhere. Then, even as in the case of the pot, let there be reality there, through difference in the time; if this be said, no; for, negation does not exist here as conditioned by a particular time, as in 'Formerly there was a pot here, but

not now.' And the unconditioned negation here is intelligible, because of the nullity of absolutely real silver here in all three times. And that nullity is understood from the subsequent reflection, 'The illusory silver alone appeared'; otherwise it would be reflected on in the form 'The real alone appeared.' As for the cognition at the time of delusion, that is certainly intelligible even with illusory silver alone. And that illusory silver together with its material cause is sublated by true knowledge of nacre. Nor is it possible even to suspect for this sublating cognition the capacity to establish the reality of silver elsewhere. Therefore, though subsequent to sublation there be but nullity of the superimposed, prior (to that), there must be admitted, even by him who maintains nullity, the presentation of an illusory object on a real substrate.

LXXVII(a). Now, in 'This is silver, There are two moons' etc., let there be delusion, defined by the external characteristic of being generated by the three-fold cause—the cognition of the substrate, residual impression, defect, and by the essential characteristic—the presentation of an illusory nature in the case of a real substrate; in the case of the self, however, how can delusion of the form of egoity etc., or delusion of difference in the form of the jīva and Brahman and in the form of many jīvas, fit in, the characteristic being impossible? It is thus. Defect is of three kinds: similarity etc., present in the object, obscuring film etc., present in the instrument, and attachment etc., present in the seer. And here, the self itself is in the position of (all) the three called object, instrument and seer, since everything else belongs to the side of the superimposed. Nor in the case of the non-dual self of undefiled nature, are the

said defects possible, whether *ab extra* or intrinsically. Even if somehow there be the possibility of the non-real defect called nescience, the superimposed presentation of egoity etc., is *not generated* by the three-fold cause; for, it is of the nature of the eternal intelligence of the self. Though even the manifestation of nacre-silver etc., is but intelligence, yet for that, which is adjunct-conditioned, a figurative origination is possible; here, however, even the (conditioning) adjunct is only on the side of the superimposed; then, how can there be origination for the unconditioned? Therefore the external characteristic does not exist.

LXXVII(b). Similarly, the other too certainly does not exist; for, though real, it is not possible (for the self) to be the substrate. The substrate indeed is that which is apprehended in its generality, (but) not apprehended in its particularity; the self, however, which has neither generality nor particularity, how can it be the substrate? The self is the substrate, since it is real, like nacre etc.; if this be said, no; for being manifested by another is the adjunct. Then let us, even in conformity with the secret (truth) of the final position, infer thus¹: the self is the substrate, since it is of the nature of intelligence, like the nacre-defined intelligence. Not so; though apprehension in its generality and non-apprehension in its particularity are possible in the case of that intelligence which has parts as defined by the this-element and the nacre-element, that is not possible in the case of the partless self. Even the partless, like ether, is not manifest in its entirety; if this be said, no; for, of the self-luminous, there is manifestation to the full

¹Thibaut takes *Sūhānī-rahasya* to be the name of a work.

extent of its reality. And self-luminosity is established by such śruti texts as 'Here this self is self-luminous'¹ 'The self alone is its light' etc.²

LXXVII(c). Now, here, by the word 'light' is the quality of luminosity alone denoted, or the substance that is its locus? Not the first; for there is the contingency of the nature of a quality for the self, denoted by the word 'light'; on the second, even if cognition, called the quality of luminosity, be generated, the śruti declaration of luminosity in the case of the self would not be contradicted; therefore there is not manifestation of the self to the full extent of its reality. If this be said, not so; for, this alone is intended by the śruti that the word 'light' denotes mere intelligence and that the self is of that nature; for otherwise there is the futility of the qualification 'self' and of the word 'alone'. It is thus. Is it that there being the contingency of the difference of the apprehending cognition from the apprehended, in the self too, as in pot etc., there are the two qualifications in the two texts, in order to exclude that (contingence)? Or is it to exclude for the generator of cognition (its) difference (from the self)? On the former, śruti culminates in the oneness of apprehender and apprehended, the self and the cognition thereof. If it be said that in this case, there would result attribute-ness for the self and substance-ness for cognition, indeed let that result; for the nomenclature of substance etc., adopted by the Logicians, does not produce conflict in respect of things. Not the second; for there is the contingency of the abandonment of what is expressly stated and the assumption of

¹ Brh., IV, iii, 9 & 14

² Brh., IV, iii, 6

what is not stated. The assumption is indeed made by you in the form 'It itself originates cognition, the self itself originates cognition, there is no other generator'; and it is declared not thus but as 'self-luminous', 'the self itself is light.' Therefore it is only seen that there is no other light. Nor may it be said that because of its being required, even the generator has certainly to be set out; for eternal knowledge has no need of that (generator). The knowledge in dispute is originated, since it is cognition, like the cognition of pot etc.; if it be said that it (origination) is thus inferred, no; for the example is non-established in the system of the Vedāntins; for, even in the cognition of pot etc., the element of manifestation is of the nature of eternal intelligence, while the element of psychosis of the internal organ is (of the nature of) nescience, and the usage of 'cognition' in respect of that is figurative. Nor is this an inference from co-absence (alone), since there exist subjects of the same class. Though in other systems (than that of the Vedāntins), the pot-cognition is an (established) example, even then it is not intelligible. It is thus. This cognition located in the self, is it acknowledged to be some substance possessing the quality of brightness, or merely the quality of brightness? On the first, since the substance, cognition, is itself luminous through possessing the quality of brightness, there would not exist for the self the śruti-declared luminosity. Even on the second, is it that there is origination of the quality, cognition, together with the substance that is 'the substrate, or of the cognition alone? Not the first, since the self-substance is eternal. Not the second; the cognition in dispute does not arise in the locus of its substance, in the absence of the origination of the substance, since it is the quality of brightness, like the brightness of a lamp. For in that

(example), the brightness of the lamp arises only together with the substance, lamp, but not in its absence; hence there is no lack of *probandum* (in the example). And in the case of the mirror etc., it is of the brightness already existent that there is manifestation, not origination, by rubbing; hence there is no inconclusiveness (of the *probans*). Nor may inconstancy be suspected in respect of the brightness of the internal organ; for on the view of transformation (of cause into effect), it is of the substance itself, the internal organ possessing brightness, that there is origination in the form of the pot-cognition etc. As for the view of (absolute) creation (of the effect), brightness is not a quality of the internal organ (on that view). Therefore, an originator not being required for cognition which is not originated, the self itself is light, but there is no light other than the self; this alone is the intention of the śruti. And the luminosity intended here is but of the nature of intelligence, not of the nature of illumining the inert; this is understood from other śruti texts like 'Brahman is consciousness (*prajñāna*)'.¹ If it be said that by the word *prajñāna* here, cognisership is mentioned, no; for there is conflict with the well-known sense of the abstract noun. If it be said that cognisership results on the analysis (of the supposed compound word, *prajñāna*) into 'his is superior knowledge', even thus there is prolixity, in assuming the origination of cognition for the self at every instant; and when that is not assumed, the self would not be manifest and the self is manifest constantly. Therefore, in the case of the self, which is of the nature of self-luminous intelligence, there should certainly be admitted manifestation to the full extent of its reality.

¹ Alt. Up., III, 8

LXXVII(d). Now the self's possession of unapprehended particularity is established in experience, since the Brahman-form (of the self) is not apprehended; if this be said, no. Is the *jīva* different or non-different from Brahman? If different, non-manifestation and error would exist only in Brahman, the substrate, not in the *jīva*. And non-difference is devoid of evidence. If then this be the evidence, viz., (this inference) "Texts like 'This self is Brahman'¹ refer to an impartite sense, since while referring to bare substance devoid of the relation of cause and effect, there is an appositional relation, like the sentence 'This is that Devadatta,'" then, because of conflict with the luminosity of knowledge and because of the non-existence of difference between locus and content, there is no non-cognisedness for Brahman. Thus, therefore, on that which is not the substrate, i. e., the flawless self, there is no superimposition of egoity etc.

LXXVIII. To this it is said (in reply). Even in the non-dual, flawless self, there exists the defect which is called nescience and is of the nature of the non-real; this is understood from *śruti* and through presumption from what is heard (in *śruti*). *Śruti*, in the words 'Just as those who do not know the land, though repeatedly passing over the hidden treasure of gold, do not attain it, even so all these people go to Brahma-loka day after day, but do not attain it, being obstructed by the non-real (nescience)'² shows that for all people at the time of sleep there is non-manifestation of Brahman-intelligence, because of (their) being veiled by nescience which is of the nature of the non-real. And it has been established in the discussion of obscuration that

¹ Brh., II, 5, 9

² Chand., VIII, 8, 2

that veil of nescience is other than illusory cognition, its residual impression, non-existence of cognition, or karma, and is of an illusory nature. And even presumption from what is heard postulates that because of the śruti declaration of the removal of bondage through Brahman-knowledge, there is in (respect of) Brahman earlier non-knowledge, the defect that causes the bondage of superimposition. Nor may it be said that nescience being thus known through a pramāṇa, there should be reality (for it); for the pramāṇa is mentioned only to refute the position of those who contend that there is nothing called nescience, which is indeterminable and of the nature of an existent. As for the existence of nescience that is established only by the witness-intelligence.

LXXIX(a). As for what was said, that on the view of non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, there is no non-cognisedness for Brahman, what is it that is intended here? (1) Is it that nescience, which requires the difference of locus and content, does not relate to one (alone)? (2) Or is it that while so relating it conflicts with oneness of its own locus? (3) Or is it that in the case of what is of the nature of luminosity, its being the locus of nescience is self-contradictory? (4) Or is it that if Brahman be the locus of nescience there is abandonment of omniscience etc.?

LXXIX(b). Not the first; the nescience in dispute does not require the difference of locus from content, since it is not of the nature of an act, like pot etc.; similarly, what is in dispute resides in one thing alone and obscures it too, since it is an abscuring agent, like the darkness present in a room; thus, even without depending on (the alleged) difference, there is establishment of the two-fold relation even in respect of one and the same. Now, like knowledge,

nescience too certainly requires the difference of locus from content; for, like '*I know this*' there is empirical usage of the form '*I do not know this*'. Not so; for, it is cognised so, merely in dependence on the word '*ajñāna*' which denotes the exclusion of knowledge dependent on the two (locus and content); for in the empirical usage of words like '*māya*' this (implied difference) is non-existent. This is just like the '*being at rest*', which though not dependent on an object (i. e., intransitive), yet when signified by the word '*agamana* (non-moving)', comes to depend on an object (be transitive), as it were, in the form '*whose non-moving and towards what object*'.

LXXIX(c). Not the second; what is in dispute does not conflict with the oneness of its own locus, since it is an obscuring agent, like darkness.

LXXIX(d). Not the third. The conflict in what is of the nature of luminosity being the locus of nescience, is it (a) experienced, or (b) inferred? (a) Not the first; for, in the witness intelligence that establishes nescience, there is experienced in the form '*I am ignorant*', only its being the locus of nescience. (b) How is there inference either? (i) Is it (in the form) '*the self is not the locus of nescience, since it is manifest, like the pot existing in front*'? (ii) Or is it (in the form) '*The self is of a nature opposed to nescience, because of luminosity, like a psychosis of the internal organ*'? (iii) Or else, is it (of the form) '*The self is opposed to conjunction with nescience, since it is self-luminous, like the consciousness (samvedana) recognised by Prābhākaras*'? (i) Not the first, since its content is sublated. For even by others (the opponents) it has to be admitted that, even when the self is being manifested by originated cognitions,

it is the locus of nescience; for, otherwise there is contingency of omniscience at the instant the self is manifested. (ii) Not the second: for there is inconstancy in respect of the manifestation that manifests nescience. Nor may it be said that this itself is non-established; for, even for others (the opponents), in the absence of cognition of what is acceptable to themselves as nescience, empirical usage in respect of that would be impossible. (iii) Not the third; for, there is no example, the self-luminous consciousness being itself the self.

LXXIX(e). Nor is the fourth view(possible) that there is abandonment of Brahman's omniscience etc.; for it is possible to say that just as though there is oneness between the prototype and the reflection, there is not, through the darkness etc., superimposed on the reflection in an impure mirror, the abandonment of the fairness of the prototype, similarly, though the jīva be the locus of nescience, there is no abandonment of Brahman's omniscience etc.

LXXIX(f). Further, whatever is cited in order to deny nescience, whether it be oneness of the jīva and Brahman or self-luminosity or omniscience, every one of these will refute of nescience the nature of non-existence of apprehension and will establish its nature as that of an existent; for, in the absence of a veil of the nature of an existent, the non-manifestation of the existent omniscience etc., and of Brahman associated with these is unintelligible. Through the mere non-existence of apprehension, however, the non-manifestation only of what is different from the jīva, is non-intelligent and non-omniscient, viz., pot etc., is intelligible, (but) not of Brahman which is the reverse (of these).

LXXX(a). Now by you who state that to the jīva belongs being the locus of nescience and to Brahman omniscience, there should certainly be stated distinction between the jīva and Brahman; if this be said, is real distinction deduced or one produced by nescience? In the first (case) too, is the distinction due to the definition made by the internal organ, or due to a natural difference, or else due to a natural relation of part and whole?

LXXX(b). Not the first; for, it is not possible for the internal organ which has a beginning to be that which defines what is beginningless. Nor is the internal organ too beginningless, because of its non-existence in sleep etc. If it be said to be present there too in a subtle state, what is it that is called the subtle condition? Is it (1) the attainment of partlessness, or (2) merely the decrease of parts, or (3) persistence in the causal condition, or (4) being left over as a residual impression? (1) Not the first; since for that which has parts, when there are no parts, existence (itself) is destroyed. (2) Not the second; for, because of the contingency of non-effectedness for the whole that is left over (on the decrease of the other parts), this (residuary internal organ) would not be destroyed at any time whatsoever; or if (this residuary whole be) what is effected by the (original) whole, there is the contingency of empirical usage (in sleep) as in waking. (3) On the third (alternative) too, is it that the cause alone remains or the effect as well? On the first there is the contingency of the non-existence of the internal organ. On the second, there is the contingency of empirical usage (as in waking). (4) Nor the fourth; for residual impression not being the material cause of definition, there is the contingency of release for the jīva that is non-defined in

sleep. If, then, it be said that what is defined is itself the material cause of definition, like the faggot (which is the material cause of the splitting), while the internal organ, like the hatchet, is but the efficient cause, then definition is not established; for it is not possible for the partless intelligence to be really the material cause of a split, like a faggot. For us, however, nescience itself is the material cause of definition. Even the splitting into two, while being present in nescience alone, is merely super-imposed on the self. Even to the internal organ, the product of nescience, the property of defining the self belongs only through the channel of nescience, (but) not directly. Therefore there is no defect whatever.

LXXX(c). Nor is the second view (possible, that the distinction is) due to difference; for when the distinction between the jīva and Brahman results even from the ascertained capacity of nescience, there is no room for assuming difference. Nor may it be said that since nescience has to be demonstrated as belonging to the jīva and having Brahman for content, nescience, which is (thus) dependent on the distinction, is not the cause of the distinction; for it is seen of the relation of substrate and counter-correlate that, though dependent on difference, it is yet the cause of difference. Otherwise, for you too, how can difference, which is dependent on distinction in the form 'Brahman's difference from the jīva,' be the cause of the distinction? Further, it has been explained higher up that nescience does not depend on distinction of locus and content.

LXXX(d). Nor (is) the third (view possible); for, in the case of the partless, the relation of part and whole is not of itself possible. Therefore, what has to be deduced is only

a distinction produced by nescience; and that is certainly acceptable.

LXXXI. Though this nescience, while being related to intelligence as a whole, distinguishes between jīva and Brahman, yet, neglecting the nature of Brahman and leaning to the side of the jīva alone, it originates transmigration; this is just as a mirror etc., related to face in general, distinguish between the prototype and the reflection, and produce something distinctive only on the side of the reflection. Now in the form 'I am ignorant' nescience appears as located in the self as qualified by egoity, but not as located in intelligence in general; if this be said, not so. Just as in 'Iron burns', there is the appearance of reciprocal relation because of the relation of combustion and iron to the single fire, similarly, there is the presentation of apposition, merely because of the relation of nescience and the internal organ to the single self, but not because of the internal organ being the locus of nescience. Otherwise there would be reciprocal dependence, in that when there is relation to nescience there is establishment of the internal organ, and when there is qualification by the internal organ, there is relation to nescience. Nor is it that in the absence of the internal organ, the relation to nescience has not been seen, since this (relation) is admitted in sleep. If then it be said that, because of the unintelligibility of the unattached intelligence being a locus, location in the qualified is assumed, even then, if the qualified be but the internal organ, intelligence and their relation, location in intelligence is difficult to avoid. If it be said that the qualified is certainly other than these, even thus, it does not belong to this, which is inert, to be the locus of ignorance; for, otherwise,

there is the contingency of even delusion, right knowledge and release being located in the inert, because of the rule of (their) having the same locus as ignorance. Nor does the real unattachedness of intelligence conflict with its assumptive property of being the locus. Therefore, nescience which is located in intelligence in general, is said to be located in the jīva, because of its leaning to the side of the jīva.

LXXXII. As for Bhāskara who holds that the internal organ alone is the locus of ignorance, for him constant omniscience of the self (if admitted by him) is opposed to experience. And if it is non-omniscient, then since at some time it does not know something, nescience has certainly to be admitted in the self. If then you think that though non-apprehension and illusory cognition be located in the self, nescience, which is of the nature of an existent, is located in the internal organ, even then, if nescience be (merely) what is other than knowledge, that would be but the film (in the eye), jaundice etc. If then (nescience be) what is opposed to knowledge, that is not (so); for in the case of nescience located in the internal organ, opposition by knowledge located in the self is not possible; for, in respect of one and the same content, ignorance present in Yajñadatta is not removed by knowledge present in Devadatta. If it be said that though elsewhere there is no conflict between those which have different loci, ignorance present in the instrument conflicts with knowledge present in the agent, no (we reply); for by the knowledge present in Devadatta who makes the inference "This Yajñadatta is one who has an unseen potency (adr̥ṣṭa) the cause of the resolution of the internal organ, since his internal organ has been merged in sleep," the nescience present in the instrument of

the inference, viz., the sleeping Yajñadatta's internal organ, is not removed. If it be said that there is certainly removal of what is present in the internal organ that is related to the cogniser, no; for there is no evidence of nescience being present in the internal organ. If it be said (that the evidence is the inference) 'what is in dispute is present in the instrument, since it is a defect causing delusion, like the film (in the eye) etc.,' then there is the contingency (of nescience) in the sense of sight etc. If it be said that because of these having a beginning, there is unintelligibility of their being the locus of beginningless nescience, that holds equally of the internal organ too. If it be said that because of the resort to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect, the internal organ has no beginning, that holds equally even of the sense of sight etc. Therefore nescience is not located in the internal organ, but is located in the self. That has been stated by Viśvarūpācārya, as preceded by (the statement of) the objection :

'Now, how can nescience affect the self which is self-luminous, immutable and non-dual, any more than darkness (can affect) the sun? Since nescience is well established, it cannot be denied; and that (veiling by nescience) does not stand to reason in respect of the not-self; for without that (nescience) the not-self is not.'¹ And of that nescience, causality in respect of the distinction of jīva from Brahman is declared in the (Viṣṇu) purāṇa: 'When ignorance which generates distinction is completely destroyed, what will produce the non-real difference between the self and Brahman?'²

¹ See *Iṣṭa-Siddhi* Ch. I, p. 207. Of Vimuktātman, the author, the chronological limits are fixed between 850 and 1050 A.D.

² Viṣṇu-purāṇa, VI, 7, 94

LXXXIII. Even because of the beginninglessness of nescience, its causality in respect of the beginningless distinction is uncontradicted. And the beginninglessness of nescience is declared in the smṛti: 'Know both prakṛti and puruṣa to be beginningless'.¹ What is called prakṛti is māyā, because of the śruti '(Know) māyā to be prakṛti'.² And we have stated the oneness of māyā and nescience.

LXXXIV. Now, though thus the self-luminous be the locus of nescience, its being the content of nescience is not possible, because of its being manifest constantly; truly, in the case of a pot that is manifest, they do not speak of it as the content of ignorance in the form 'I do not know the pot'; if it be said that in 'I do not know the sense stated by you', it is only in the case of a sense which is manifest that there is the empirical usage of being the content of nescience as defining it, no; for, even there, it is only the unknown special feature present in the thing, that is the content; if it be said that of what is unknown a cognition as what defines (nescience) does not stand to reason, thus then, even in 'I do not know the sense stated by you' an explanation has to be given by you yourself.

LXXXV. It is said (in reply): Truly, a thing that is revealed by a pramāṇa is not a content of ignorance, since a pramāṇa is that which removes nescience. As for that, however, which is known by the witness-perception, whether it be pot etc., or intelligence itself, in that being the content of nescience, there is no harm whatever. Truly, the witness-intelligence is not that which removes nescience, but on the contrary it is only what establishes that (nescience); otherwise

¹Bh. Gītā, XIII, 19

²Śvet., IV, 10,

how could this nescience, which is opposed to all evidences and reasonings, be established? That has been said: 'This here is a delusion, supportless and opposed to all reasoning; it does not brook inquiry, just as darkness does not brook the sun'.¹ And not brooking inquiry is but an ornament to nescience. That too has been said: 'This itself is the nescience-nature of nescience; the characteristic thereof is the incapacity to brook inquiry; else it would be reality'. Nor in the case of that whose beauty consists in not being (fit to be) inquired into, may there be suspected incapacity to obscure the self; for it has been said 'Lo, nothing can surpass the impudence of nescience; paying no heed to the validly known and the real, it remains like the Supreme Self'.¹ Even by him, who resorts to reasoning alone, experience cannot be denied; for reasoning rests on experience; otherwise, reasoning would be but baseless. It is indeed experienced even in the case of the self-luminous enjoyer, that his difference from the aggregate of body etc., is certainly obscured by nescience.

LXXXVI. Now in the cognition of the self as 'I' the difference therefrom is also certainly cognised, since difference is of the nature of the thing. Nor may it be said that the difference is obscured by the illusory conceit of identity with the body, in the form 'I am a man'; for the conceit of oneness being intelligible secondarily even in conformity with the cognition of difference, it is not possible to assume illusoriness that is opposed to the cognition of difference. If because of being in apposition with the body, the cognition 'I' could not apprehend the difference of the self from the body, then that (difference) would not be established at all, because of the absence of evidence; for, even for revelation

¹ Naiskarmyasiddhi, III, 66

and inference, validity is impossible when there is conflict with that (perception). Nor may it be said that there is no conflict, because of the illusoriness of the cognition 'I', as of the cognition of two moons etc.; for there is reciprocal dependence, in that when the validity of revelation and of inference is established there is the illusoriness of that (cognition), and that when there is the illusoriness of that, there is validity of the other (two). In the case of the cognition of the two moons etc., there is the establishment of illusoriness, because of the quick sublation even prior to the consideration of the relative strength of the *pramāṇas*; here, however, because of no opposite (cognition) having arisen at the (time of the) consideration of the relative strength of the *pramāṇas*, the cognition 'I' is alone stronger; hence difference from the body would not be established through revelation and inference opposed thereto. Therefore, difference from the body being established even by the cognition 'I', the conceit of being (endowed with a) human (body) is secondary, not illusory.

LXXXVII(a). This is not sound. Does the cognition 'I' have for content the self as in reality different from the body, or as (different) in manifestation? Not the first, for, the existence of difference in reality is not a cause (of secondary usage). Indeed in 'Devadatta is a lion' etc., it is but the manifestation of difference that is seen to be the cause of secondary usage. Otherwise, even in 'This is silver', since there is difference in reality, the empirical usage would be but secondary, not delusive. Even on the second (alternative), is it that the cognition 'I' makes manifest the difference even prior to inquiry or subsequently? Not the first, because of

¹ *Naishkarmyasiddhi*, III, 111

the futility of the śāstra which conducts the inquiry. Not the second, for, by analysis of what is established or non-established (it follows that) inquiry itself is that which makes the difference known. Now what is called inquiry is consideration of arguments; argument indeed is not what independently generates knowledge; but while being what favours a pramāṇa, it helps to discriminate the self distinct (from the body etc.) as the content of the pramāṇa, the cognition 'I'. Not so. Is it that argument controls a pramāṇa in respect of a particular content in the form 'So much alone should be apprehended by you, neither more nor less'? Or is it that, in the case of a pramāṇa which has set out to apprehend a self-established content, it removes any obstacle that is contingent? Not the first; for, arguments being unsettled, owing to diversities of the human intellect, there is the contingency of pramāṇas having unsettled contents. Now, that is a contingency of the acceptable, since if pramāṇas had invariable contents, difference of views among authors of śāstras would be impossible; if this be said, no; for, where there is conflict it is admitted by all that one's own view is alone authoritative, not another; and if (pramāṇas) had no settled contents, even the views of others would have to be respected as authoritative. Nor may it be said that there is control of pramāṇas by numerous weighty arguments (not by reasonings varying with each individual). Truly, not even a thousand arguments, though arising from the intellects of those versed in all śāstras, would bring about sound as the content for the sense of sight or prevent its having colour as the content.

LXXXVII(b). As for the second (alternative), is it that the difference of the self with the body etc., as counter-correlate is also the self-established content of the cognition

'I'? Or (is it) the self alone? On the first, there is the contingency of discriminative knowledge for the materialist and the worldly people. If then for them there is non-discrimination, because of the non-removal of obstacles through arguments found in the śāstras, even thus, by you who know the śāstra, it will never be possible to cognise or to say 'I am different from the body etc.:' for, difference having been stated even with 'I' there is the contingency of 'am different from the body etc.' being a repetition. If then the self alone is the content, then, let arguments remove with ease the obstacle contingent in the apprehension of the self by the cognition 'I'; but with this it is not possible to deny what is experienced, viz., that the cognition 'I' has the body etc., for content.

LXXXVII(c). Now, thus, the cognition 'I am a man' would not be a delusion, since it apprehends its own content alone. Not so. Our distinction is not indeed that that which apprehends its own content is valid, while that which apprehends the content of another is invalid, but that that which apprehends the real is valid, while that which apprehends the real and the unreal (together) is invalid. And since the cognition 'I' apprehends together as one the real self and the unreal body etc., it is certainly a delusion. Nor may it be said that it is not a delusion, since, in respect of the self-luminous, partless self, there is no possibility of an aspect of unapprehended particularity. In respect of letters like 'A', which are partless and manifested in their entirety, the shortness, length etc., present in the audible sound (which manifests the letters), are superimposed; nor are shortness etc., attributes of the letters, since by such recognition as 'This is that same letter A' the omnipresence of letters is understood; even for those who know the omnipresence of

letters, the delusion of shortness etc. does certainly persist, through the non-recollection of that argument (in support of omnipresence); similarly, even in the self, who can prevent the delusion of identity with the body etc., which is established in the experience (of all) from the infant to the learned man, and which is devoid of sublation in the absence of the śāstra-generated intuition of the truth, that Brahman is the self? And the secondariness of the cognition 'I am a man' will be refuted later under the aphorism on harmonious synthesis. Thus, therefore, since the self though self-luminous and partless is yet obscured by illusory conceit and not apprehended in its true nature as Brahman, there is, through difference of aspects, the possibility of apprehension of the general and non-apprehension of the particular; hence its being the substrate (of nescience) is not contradicted.

LXXXVII(d). Therefore, there certainly does exist the essential characteristic, in that for the real substrate there is presentation of unity with an illusory object. Even the external characteristic of being generated by the three-fold cause can easily be shown, since in the self, which occupies the place of the three, the content, the instrument and the seer, the defect of nescience has been established, since the intelligence of the self is itself the pramāṇa which apprehends the substrate, and since in the (stream of) beginningless transmigration the existence of residual impressions of prior superimpositions is easy (to admit). Though here the intelligence which manifests together the substrate and the super-imposed, the self and the not-self, is not originated in respect of its own nature, yet in the form in which it is associated with particular contents its origination is not contradicted. And this being the case, in the definition formerly stated, by the words 'like memory', origination by

the three-fold cause is intended to be stated. And the words 'the presentation of one as of the nature of another' should be explained as 'the presentation of the real as in unity with the illusory.' Therefore it is established that in respect of the self the delusion of individuation etc., or the delusion of difference due to adjuncts, is certainly defined by the (stated) definition.

LXXXVIII. Now how is superimposition possible in respect of the inner self? Everywhere indeed it is seen of the substrate that it is the content of cognition by the same sense as what is superimposed. And that does not exist in the case of the self which is turned away from the cognition 'Thou'.

LXXXIX. It is said (in reply). What is required in superimposition is only the presentation of the substrate and the superimposed as in union in a single cognition, (but) not that the substrate should be a content, since there is no instance of bare co-absence. And here there does exist the single cognition 'I' which presents as a unity the self and the not-self. Though the self, because of not having parts and not being a content, is not the content of this cognition whether in part or in its own (full) nature, yet, like the mirror pregnant with the reflection of ether, the internal organ, superimposed on the self and pregnant with the reflection of the self, appears in the form of the cognition 'I'. And as in 'This is silver' there is duality of form in the superimposition 'I'; for, just as in 'The iron burns' there is the presentation of the dual form of fire and iron in respect of what is qualified by capacity to burn, similarly even in 'I cognise', there is presentation of the dual form of the self and the internal organ in respect of what is qualified by cognisership. Of these, the aspect which is experienced as

suffering, changing, inert or as different from the object, organs etc., is the internal organ; the aspect which is experienced as the object of love, as immutable, as the witness, and as of the nature of the intelligence that recurs in the object, organs etc., is the self. Therefore the cognition 'I' is of the nature of the 'this' and 'not-this'.

XC(a). Now, the follower of Prabhākara does not suffer this. It is thus. In 'I know the pot' the cognition, which is self-luminous, manifests pot etc., as content and the self as the locus. Therefore in the form 'I' the self alone appears; there is no element of 'this' in it. Nor may it be said that just like the difference of capacity to burn from the iron-ball in (the cognition) 'The iron burns', there may be the difference of egoity from the cogniser in 'I know'; for, just as the cold iron ball and an incendiary, of the nature of the flame of a lamp etc., are somewhere cognised as distinct, not thus is there cognised anywhere the distinction of egoity and the cogniser. Therefore egoity alone is the self; and that is immediately experienced as the locus of cognition.

XC(b). As for the follower of the Sāṅkhya who infers the self, in the form 'The reflection of intelligence in the inert internal organ must be preceded by a prototype of that nature, since it is a reflection, like the reflection of the face' and as for the others who similarly make inferences (of the self) in conformity with their own respective teachings, the self's character, according to these, of always having to be inferred conflicts with the immediate presentation in the form 'I'. If then the inferences be for the enlightenment of others, then, let them be so (they do not affect the Prabhākara's position).

XC(c). As for what is said by the Logicians about the self being mentally perceived, that is unsound, since there is

no evidence; for the co-presence and co-absence of mind are otherwise accounted for even by the experience of the object; and, when the self is established even by the relation of being the locus in respect of the experience of the object, there is prolixity in assuming another (mode of) cognition in respect of the self.

XC(d). Now, let there then be (admitted) this view of the Bhāttas, that the self is the object of cognition, since it is perceived, like a pot; nor is there conflict between objectness and agency; for, there is made the distinction that to the substance-element belongs cognisedness and to the knowledge-element belongs cognisership; nor is there conflict between the status of subsidiary and principal, for, it may easily be said that the cognised-element is the principal and the cogniser-element is the subsidiary. This does not stand to reason; for, the substance-element which is non-intelligent cannot be of the nature of the self; if the knowledge-element itself be the object, the two afore-said conflicts are not surmounted. Nor is knowledge capable of transforming itself simultaneously into the cognised and the cogniser, since it has no parts; even if somehow it be transformed like the *pradhāna* etc., if the cogniser-part be not cognised as self-luminous and as the locus of cognition, there is the contingency of a contrary conclusion; if cognised as an object, there is the contingency of non-self-hood as for a pot. Therefore the self is perceived only as the locus of cognition; but pot etc., are perceived as objects of cognition.

XC(e). As for the Sautrāntika who infers pot etc., (in this way) 'The presentation of the reflections of objects in cognitions is preceded by prototypes of that kind, since they are the presentation of something in what is not that, like

the reflection of the face in the mirror', he is to be asked (this); in this inferential cognition do objects appear directly as objects, without being (presented as) reflections, or do they not? On the first (alternative) the *probans* is inconclusive even in respect of this (inferential cognition). On the second, since there does not appear (in the inference) the thing premised, viz., the antecedence of the prototype, the inference does not arise at all. Therefore the experienced immediacy of objects is not to be denied.

XC(f). As for what is declared by the Vijñānavādins, viz., the immediacy of objects, only as being of the nature of cognitions, that is unsound; for, the immediacy is seen even of externality, which is not of the nature of cognition. If, that too were of the nature of cognition, there would be no sublation of it any more than of silver (on their view). Therefore, objects cognised, like the pot, are immediately experienced through being objects; the cognition, however is immediately experienced through being self-luminous.

XC(g). As for what the Logicians say, that cognition, which is inherent in the self conjoined to mind, is immediately experienced by another cognition (the *anuvyavasāya*) through the relation of inherence in the conjoined, and as for what the Bhaṭṭas say, that the cognition, which abides in the object and is called manifestedness (*prakāṣya*), is known by another through the relation of identity with the conjoined, both of these are unsound; for, in acknowledging of one cognition another cognition which has that for its sphere, there is the contingency of the simultaneous existence of two fruits.¹ If it be said that the simultaneity of two fruits,

The Vizianagaram text reads 'kāladvaya, two times' and is translated as it stands by Thibaut.

perishing and imperishable, is certainly acceptable, even thus, if inherence in or identity with a thing in (sense) contact be the cause of (immediate) apprehension, then even for the transformation, taste etc., present in the locus of the cognition, there is the contingency of immediacy by the very cognition that apprehends the (first) cognition. If then it be said that in the case of the transformation etc., present in the self, and the taste etc., present in the pot etc., there is no capacity for immediacy through the cognition, that makes known the (first) cognition, even thus, since for cognition in respect of its own existence there is not seen any separation from luminosity, its being known by another, in the same way as pot etc., is not possible. Nor may it be said that for the manifestedness (*prākāṣya*), which arises in respect of pot etc., from the self's activity called *pramāṇa*, there is the being known by another, as for the colour etc., present in the pot. What is this activity of the self, a motion or a transformation? Not the first, since that is impossible in the case of the omnipresent. As for the second, like clay for the pot which is a transformation of clay, for the manifestedness which is the fruit of transformation of the self, the self alone would be the locus (not the object as stated by the *Bhāṭṭas*). If it be said that like old age (resulting) for the *body* through the transformation whose fruit is greying in the *hair*, there is manifestedness in the *object* resulting from the transformation of the *self*, even thus, does intelligence consist in being the locus of manifestedness, or in being the generator of manifestedness, or in being the support of the activity called cognition, which generates that (*prākāṣya*)? On the first, pot etc., would be intelligent beings. On the second again, the sense of sight etc., would similarly be intelligent beings. Not the third. The self being the

support of cognition should indeed be inferred by you in the form 'The self possesses the activity of cognition, since it is related to the fruit generated by that (activity), just as Devadatta who is related to the satisfaction generated by eating possesses the activity of eating'; here the *probans* would be non-established, since for the self there is no relation to the fruit. If it be said that relation to fruit is cognised in the form 'The pot is experienced by me', then in the view of you who say that the fruit is in the object alone, not in the self, conflict with cognition would have been brought about even by yourself. Therefore, neglecting the extremely defective views of the Logicians and the Bhāṭṭas, there should be supported the self-luminosity of cognition, which is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, the activity of the cogniser.

XC(h). As for what is said by the Sāṅgata that cognition itself is *pramāṇa* and that itself is its fruit, there the conflict of activity in respect of itself is certainly clear. Though for the cognising self there is no activity whatever, yet the mere conjunction of the four, the self, the mind, the sense of sight and the object, while being of the form of the *pramāṇa*, is figuratively spoken of as the activity of the cogniser. Nor when there is cognition which is non-inconstant, is it intelligible for abandonment, acceptance and indifference, which are inconstant, to be (spoken of as) the fruit of *pramāṇa*.

XC(i). Nor can the Vedānta view that the self is self-luminous stand to reason; for when empirical usage results even with the self-luminosity of cognition, which is established for both disputants, there is prolixity in assuming that in respect of the self too. Therefore that which is held by the Prābhākara who maintains the immediate experience of the three aspects (*tripuṭi*), viz., that in 'I know the jar'

etc., the egoity, which shines as the locus of the self-luminous cognition of the object, like the wick as the locus of the flame, is but the self, but is not of the nature of the this-not-this, that alone is to be respected.

XCI. To this it is said (in reply). When there is inquiry it culminates but in the non-self-hood of egoity, since the self is of the nature of experience. It is thus. This you have to be asked; is the self alone the light of intelligence, or is experience too (that light), or experience alone? On the first, this experience which is an inert illuminant, does it manifest the universe while (itself) unmanifest, in the same way as the sense of sight etc.? Or is it a manifestor of objects while being itself manifest, like light, without depending on some other light of the same class? Not the first, for the sense of sight generates experience which is other than itself, while experience is not thus. On the second, since there exists the characteristic of the light of intelligence, viz., manifestation without depending on an experience other than itself, experience would certainly be the light of intelligence. Though the manifesting of pot etc., is common to experience, the sense of sight and light, yet since experience is opposed to ignorance of the object, it is the light of intelligence; light, since it is opposed to the darkness present in the object, is the inert illuminant; and the sense of sight, since it is directly instrumental to immediate experience, is the uncognised instrument; thus the disparity (among them) is certainly possible.

XCII(a). Now, it does not stand to reason (to say) that to experience belongs, as to light, non-dependence on others of the same class, since light is manifested by the sense of sight which is of the same class; if this be said, no. In

respect of light does the sense of sight remove darkness, or generate experience? Not the first, since light is free from darkness. Even on the second, light is manifested only by what is of a different class, viz., experience generated by the sense of sight. Therefore, in the case of experience, which like light is not dependent on others of the same class, its being the light of intelligence stands to reason, because of the contingency of the blindness (unconsciousness) of the world, if that (experience) be an inert illuminant. If it be said that the cognising intelligence itself makes manifest everything on the strength of inert experience, no. If inert experience be merely the cause of the relation of the self's intelligence to objects, then this would be but a transformation of the intellect; thence, there is entry into the view of the Vedāntins. If then it be the cause even of the luminosity of the self, that is unsound; for, in the case of what is of the nature of intelligence, manifestation in dependence on the inert is unintelligible. Let it then be a manifester of the object alone; nor is there the contingency of the Vedānta view, since for the manifestation of the object, there is admitted as certainly separate from the self's intelligence, another experience generated by the inert experience; if this be said, then, there being a need for another experience even for this second experience, as that is also similarly inert, there would be infinite regress.

XCII(b). Nor is the second alternative (possible) that both the self and experience are the light of intelligence, because of the contingency of their being established without the dependence of either on the other. And if that be the case with those two, whereby is there known the relation between cognition and the self? Neither of these knowing

the language of the other, the capacity to apprehend the relation is not possible for either. If then you think that the self does not shine of itself, since it is of the nature of intelligence, like another person's consciousness, and that therefore the establishment of the self is dependent on experience, that is not (so); for there is the similar contingency in respect of experience too. If it be said that because of non-remoteness experience is self-luminous, then that is common to the self too. Therefore it follows that the self shines of itself, since, while being of the nature of intelligence, it is non-remote, like experience.

XCII(c). Nor is the third alternative (possible) that experience alone is the light of intelligence; for it has necessarily to be admitted that the self alone is the light of intelligence; because there is non-difference of the self and experience. It is thus. The Logicians and the Prābhākaras say that this experience is a quality of the self. Since it is of the nature of the self, the Sāṅkhyas by presumption call it a substance. Similarly, since it is the fruit of an act of transformation, the Bhāṭṭas (call it) an act, with a view to declare the oneness of act and fruit. Of these (alternatives), if it be an act, like the act of going etc., luminosity and being the fruit would not stand to reason. Even if it be a substance, if it be of atomic size, it would, like a glowworm, manifest only a limited part of the thing. If it be extensive in size, there is the contingency of the manifestation everywhere even of the self, which is of the nature of that (experience). If then the self be the locus of that, even thus, there is that same defect. If it be of medium size, then being dependent on the parts because of having parts, there would not be dependence on the self. If then (it be said that) there

may be dependence on the self like the pot's dependence on the surface of the ground, even thus, just as between the lamp-light and luminosity, non-difference alone should be acknowledged between the self and intelligence; for like 'It is illumined by the lamp-light' there is seen the empirical usage 'It is known by me.' If there were difference between the self and intelligence, this empirical usage would be figurative as in 'It is illumined by a faggot.' On the view of its being a quality, since as in the case of the brightness present in the lamp-light, origination is impossible in the absence of the origination of the locus, it is eternal; consequently on the strength of its being non-inconstant in respect of the self, by presumption the self itself would be experience. How can the self whose establishment is dependent on experience be (itself) experience? If this be asked, no; for, if it be so, there is the contingency of non-self-hood (for the self) as for a pot. Nor may it be said that because of the diversity of the experiences of blue, yellow etc., they cannot be of the nature of the self; for difference is not cognised in the experiences in their own nature; and for the assumption of difference, there is no evidence. Nor are origination and destruction grounds for the assumption of difference; for these being preceded by the establishment of difference, there is reciprocal dependence. Now, in order that instruments like the sense of sight may be purposeful, there should be admitted the origination of a subsequent cognition; and similarly, in order to exclude simultaneity, the destruction of the earlier cognition has to be admitted; if this be said, no; for this being established even through the origination and destruction of the relation of one consciousness with several objects, there is prolixity (in the assumption) of the origination and destruction of consciousness too. As for what the Saugatas

assume—that difference, even while existing in consciousness, is not manifested in the absence of an external cause, because of (the) similarity (of the cognitions) as of the (different successive) flames,—that does not stand to reason; for though that be so in the case of the flames, as being cognised by another, there is no possibility of the non-manifestation of difference present in the self-luminous consciousness. Nor may there be cited as an example the non-manifestation of the true nature of the self-luminous Brahman; for obscuration there by nescience has been established by evidences. Therefore consciousness is one alone and beginningless. And its beginninglessness is because of its being devoid of prior non-existence. That has been said in the *Sureśvara-vārtika*; 'For the reason that an effect is perceived by all to be preceded by prior non-existence, (consciousness is not an effect); since that (non-existence) too has consciousness for its witness, there is no prior non-existence for consciousness.'¹

XCI. Thus, therefore, because of the eternality of self-luminous experience, its being of the nature of the self is uncontradicted. And thus the self itself as conditioned by objects is spoken of as experience; and when the adjuncts are not intended, (it is called) the self. This is just as for the trees themselves there is forest-ness through the condition of their existing in one place and tree-ness when this condition is not intended. And this being the case, how can he, who maintains the perception of the three aspects, declare the presentation of the self as the locus of experience? Or how can he bring about self-hood for inert egoity?

¹ Brh. Vārtika, 228.

XCIV. Now, in 'I see the jar' egoity is reflected on as the seer ; and the seer is but the self ; if this be said, no, because of the contingency of the presentation of the self only as 'I' even in sleep. Nor is it thus. Therefore, egoity is not the self, because of its non-presentation in sleep. (If then (it be said) in sleep there is non-presentation of egoity though existent, because of the non-existence of the experience of objects, that is not (so). Is it that experience itself is non-existent there? Or is there non-existence of association with objects? Not the first, because of the eternality of experience. Nor the second; for, association with objects is not a determinant in respect of the cognition of the self. If it be said that the seer-form of the self is egoity and that in the cognition of this (form) association with objects is a determinant, what is it that is called seer-ship? Is it the manifestation of the seen, or is it being other than the seen, or is it being intelligence alone? Of these, since the first and the second have to be established in dependence on the seen, and since in the case of seer-ship which is (thus) adventitious self-hood is impossible, egoity could not be the self. On the third, since objects are not required, egoity should be figured (even) in sleep. If it be said that there does exist the figuring of 'I' there, no. In that case, by him who has woken up, the egoity of sleep would also be remembered like the egoity of the previous day. Though there is no rule that whatever is experienced is certainly remembered, yet here too, when the self is remembered, how can egoity, which is of the nature of intelligence, not be remembered? If it be said that eternal intelligence, which has the egoity of sleep for its sphere, being imperishable, there is no origination of residual impressions, and consequently no remembrance, then, in the same way, the

egoity of the previous day would not be remembered. On our view, however, because of the non-eternality of the egoity-defined intelligence originated on the previous day, residual impressions being originated (therefrom), the remembrance thereof is uncontradicted.

XCV. Now, even thus, the egoity of sleep too may be remembered by him who has woken up, since there is seen the reflection 'I slept happily'; if this be said, thus, then, let the pitiable Logician himself revile you whose contentions are unsettled. It is thus. Neither the self at the time of sleep nor its happiness is reflected on here; what then? The self manifest at the time of waking is made the subject, and the non-existence of misery, that is implied by 'happiness', is inferred, in the form, 'In the interval between dream and waking, I was devoid of misery, since the misery of that time, like the pot (of that time) is invariably non-remembered'. Though implication is well known in verbal usage alone, not in perception, inference etc, yet since here happiness in the principal sense is impossible, non-existence of misery is alone to be admitted, but not the usage of happiness in the principal sense. Nor is it possible, even because of the 'reflective cognition, to assume happiness in the principal sense; for, if that be the case, there is the contingency of remembrance in the form 'the happiness of food, the happiness of drink' as related to particular objects. If then there be assumed non-stimulation of residual impressions in respect of the object-element, even thus, the reflective cognition of the absence of intelligence in 'I slept happily, I know nothing', because of its being a hindrance to the experience of happiness, reinforces the (view of) non-existence of

misery. If it be said that the buoyancy of limbs, clarity of face etc., of one, who has just woken up from sleep, may cause the inference of the experience of happiness in the time prior to that (waking), no; for remembrance being possible in the instant immediately subsequent to experience, there is futility of the inference. If it be said that buoyancy of the limbs etc., which are seen in different degrees, would not exist in the absence of (degrees of) excitable happiness of sleep, since non-existence of misery is of a single nature, no; for this (difference of degrees) is cognised even for the non-existence (of misery), because of difference of degrees in the quiescence of that functioning of the organs, which is the generator of the counter-correlate, misery.

XCVI(a). Now, let be the system of the Logicians: what is the final position (of the advaitin)? If this be asked, let it be heard with a concentrated mind. There does exist bliss which is the very nature of the self-luminous witness-intelligence. Though constantly manifested, it is yet not clearly manifest in waking and dream, being disturbed by illusory cognitions like 'I am a man', in the same way as the light of a lamp disturbed by a strong wind; in sleep, however, because of the non-existence of this (disturbance), it is manifest quite clearly. As for the nescience which obscures, though it veils the true nature of Brahman, it does not obscure the form of the witness-intelligence which manifests that (nescience) itself. If not, nescience itself being devoid of a witness, would not be established. And thus, all the three experienced in sleep, viz., bliss, the self, and nescience having the nature of an existent, are reflected on by him, who has woken up, in 'I slept happily, I knew nothing'.

XCVI(b). Now, in sleep, these three are not experienced through psychoses of the internal organ, since these (psychoses) are non-existent there; if experienced through intelligence, since this which is imperishable does not originate residual impressions, reflective cognitions would not result; if this be said, not so. Nescience itself is transformed in sleep in the form of the three psychoses that apprehend the said three. The semblances of intelligence, defined by these psychoses, experience the said three, and perish at the time of waking. Why should there not be remembrance generated by the residual impressions of those (semblances of intelligence)? If it be said that there is (the defect of) absence of common ground in that being an experient belongs to the self qualified by nescience, while being the rememberer belongs to the (self) qualified by the internal organ, no; for it is admitted that even on waking, being the rememberer belongs only to what is qualified by nescience. As for the internal organ, that brings about, for the object remembered, usage accompanied by words. Nor may it be said that by 'happiness' and by 'I knew not' there is reflective cognition only of the non-existence of misery and of the non-existence of cognition; for there is no experience of those two (non-existences), in sleep, even if present, since their counter-correlates—misery and cognition—are not remembered at that time. How then is there the knowledge of the non-existence of misery and the non-existence of cognition, which belong to (the period of) sleep and are not experienced? We say it is by presumption. Having in the said manner remembered the undisturbed happiness of the period of sleep, because of the non-intelligibility of this otherwise, there is validly cognised the non-existence of its opposite, viz, misery. Similarly, because of the non-

intelligibility otherwise of what is reflected on, i. e., nescience having the nature of an existent, there is understood the non-existence of its opposite, viz. cognition.

XCVI(c). Now, nescience having the nature of an existent does not conflict with cognition, because of their co-existence in waking; if this be said, no; for though for nescience in general there is no conflict with cognitions of the world, there is conflict with these for nescience which has been transformed into particular forms. Nescience which has been transformed in the form of a pot-cognition does indeed conflict with cognitions of cloth etc. Otherwise even at the time of the pot-cognition, the whole world of cloth etc., would be presented. This being the case, even for nescience transformed into the form of the state of sleep, there will be conflict with all particular cognitions without exception. Therefore the presumption (of the non-existence of cognition) does certainly stand to reason.

XCVI(d). Then, let it be inferred that 'in sleep cognition was not, since it is not remembered;' where is the need for this presumption? If this be asked, no; because of inconclusiveness (of the *probans*), where the grass by the wayside is not remembered. How, then, is it inferred in the afternoon 'in the morning there was no elephant in the house, since it is not remembered'? It is not thus inferred. What then? Having experienced in the morning the granary etc., which existed as filling up the house-space, and remembering them in the afternoon, because of the non-intelligibility of this otherwise, even the non-existence of the elephant in the morning is validly cognised (by presumption). Thus, therefore, the non-existence of misery and the non-existence of cognition, in sleep, are cognised through presumption;

nescience having the nature of an existent, bliss, and the self are, however, remembered; this is the position in the final view.

XCVI(e). Now, with this, what results for egoity? This results, viz., that egoity is not experienced in sleep; nor is it reflected on by him who has woken up.

XCVI(f). What then is the explanation of the designation 'I' present in the reflective cognition 'I (slept) happily'? This is the explanation: egoity which was merged in sleep is again originated on waking; and this, which is originated, qualifies *per accidens* as determinate the self that is reflected on, for the sake of clear empirical usage; for, that is the sole fruit of the egoity-psychosis. For that very reason the self is not referred to in experience at any time through other psychoses of the internal organ. That has been said in the *Naïṣkarmyasiddhi*¹: 'Because of being internal (as compared with all other things, which are not-self), exceedingly subtle (being devoid of touch etc.), and because of conforming to the vision that is the self (i. e. because of the qualities of egoity being found in the self, or because of being constantly related to the vision that is the self, through the origination of reflections of that vision), this (egoity) is qualified *per accidens* by the psychosis *I*, to the exclusion of all other psychoses (of the internal organ). (This egoity) is inseparably related to the existence of the self, else it would attain destruction; but there is no other possibility (of its existence); therefore, it is denoted by the (word which causes the) cognition *I*.'

XCVII. Therefore, this inert egoity, though appearing as the self in waking and in dream, yet because of its

absence from sleep, is not the nature of the self-luminous self; this has to be admitted by those versed in śruti and smṛti. And thus śruti, after having declared of Brahman called the bhūmā that it is the self of all, in the words 'That alone is below, that above'¹ etc., and declaring of egoity too that it is the self of all, in the words 'Now, therefore, the teaching of egoity; I alone am below'² etc., designates the self as different from egoity, in the words 'Now, therefore, the teaching of the self; the self alone is below,'³ etc. Now just as the mention of (both) jīva and Brahman as being the self of all is for the sake of establishing their oneness, even so the mention of egoity too may be for the sake of establishing its oneness with the self. Not so. In the case of the jīva and Brahman formerly cognised as different, the mention for the sake of establishing oneness stands to reason; for, it is impossible for both to be the self of all. But in the case of egoity, which even formerly has been cognised as one with the self, it is understood that the mention separately is for the sake of establishing difference. Nor thus is the teaching of egoity, as the self of all, futile; for it is for the purpose of stating about Brahman, that is remote, its identity with egoity that is non-remote. Then, on the principle of the toll gate (reached) at day-break⁴, egoity itself would be the self; if this be said, no; for, again, by the exclusion of egoity, it is taught that Brahman is the self in the principal sense. Further in another śruti text, it (egoity) is expressly mentioned in the midst of the continuous narration of objects and organs, in

¹ Chāṇḍ, VII, 25, 1

² Chāṇḍ, VII, 25, 1

³ Chāṇḍ., VII, 25, 2

⁴ By him who wandered away from the highway at night in order to avoid paying toll.

the words 'egoity and what is to be done by egoity'¹. And *smṛti* enumerates it as in the midst of the world of products in the words 'the gross elements, egoity'² etc. Then, for egoity, what is the material cause? What is its efficient cause? What is its nature? What is the evidence for it? What is its effect? Why is it absent from sleep? If these be asked, it is said (in reply), for egoity, the beginningless, indeterminable nescience is the material cause; the control of nescience by *Parameśvara* is the efficient cause; cognitive capacity and conative capacity, these two constitute its nature; the immutable intelligence is the evidence; agency, enjoyership etc., are its effects; since sleep is of the nature of the merger of the internal organ, there is non-existence there (of egoity). Though vital air, which is of the nature of conative capacity, exists in sleep, yet if the vital air be (taken as) other than egoity, the merger of this (latter) is not contradicted; and if it be not (taken as) other, there may be assumed the merger of the rest (of egoity) to the exclusion of the vital air aspect. On the adoption, however, of the view that perception is creation, there is established the merger of all even in the principal sense, in respect of the sleeping person.

XCVIII. As for what the *Sāṅkhyas* think, that *pradhāna*, which is independent, non-intelligent, absolutely real, is alone the material cause of the whole universe, beginning with *mahat* and *abhaṅkāra*, but not nescience, controlled by *Parameśvara*, that is unsound. If that were the case, egoity and the agency, enjoyership etc., present therein would appear only as 'this', in the form 'This is agent, this is enjoyer'; but the appearance as superimposed on the

¹ *Prāśna*, IV, 8

² *Bh. Gīta*, XIII. 5

self, in the form 'I am agent, I am enjoyer' would not result; for (the doctrine of) error as indeterminable is not accepted by Sāṅkhyas, while other views of error have been refuted.

XCIX. And this is what the Naiyāyikas think, viz., 'There is a sense-organ called the mind, which is atomic in size and is the efficient cause of pleasure, pain, desire, cognition etc.; if this did not exist, there would not be established the occasional nature of cognition, that is seen even when the self, the sense-organ and the objects are together; but over and above this mind, there is nothing called the internal organ, which is of medium size and is transformed into pleasure, pain etc., as a particular psychosis of which internal organ, egoity is described by the Vedāntins, as similar to the iron ball, the mirror and the water vessel: "just as by the iron ball the form present in itself, such as short, long, round, is superimposed on fire, and by the mirror the face which is but one is divided into prototype and reflection, and by the water-vessel motion to and fro is superimposed on the reflection of the moon, even so, by egoity, agency etc., present in itself are superimposed on the self; and the self, which is but one is divided into the form of jīva and Brahman; on the jīva alone are superimposed the departure to another world etc.;" nor may it be said that the intellect itself is the internal organ; for, there is no intellect other than cognition which is a quality of the self; therefore there is no internal organ as held by the Vedāntin.'

C. That too is unsound; for in śruti texts like 'By the quality of the buddhi'¹ there is repeatedly established the internal organ, which undergoes transformation, which is of the nature of cognitive and conative capacities, which

¹ Śvet., V, 8.

brings about all transmigration for the self, and which is denoted by the words *manas*, *buddhi* etc. If not, transmigration would not be established for the self which is unattached. If, however, the internal organ exists, then by that there is superimposed illusory transmigration on the self, like the illusory redness (imposed) on the crystal by the hibiscus flower.

CI. As for him who does not put up with (the view of) illusory redness, he is to be asked: is it that the rays from the eyes, which set out towards the crystal, are reflected by the crystal and approach the hibiscus flower? Or is it that the colour alone present in the flower is reflected in the crystal and appears as of the nature of the crystal? Or is it that the crystal, because of being pervaded by the radiance of the flower as by the radiance of gems like the *padmarāga*, appears as if red? Or else, is it that the radiance itself, which pervades there, appears red? Or is it that by that radiance a novel redness is originated in the crystal? On the first, even the flower which is in front of the eyes, should be cognised. If on the strength of a defect in that member (the eye), there is no contact with the flower, then, the redness too should not appear, because of the non-existence of the relation of inherence-in-what-is-in-contact. Not the second; for, in no place is there seen the reflection of colour alone, leaving out the substance. On the third, however, it would certainly have been admitted by you that the relation between crystal and redness is illusory, because of the use of the words 'as if'. On the fourth, the whiteness of the crystal should also be cognised, there being no cause of non-cognition. Nor is it that by that radiance associated with an opposed quality the whiteness is driven away; for, in that case, there is the contingency of non-visibility for the crystal which is

colourless. Nor is the whiteness obstructed, because of the contingency of obstruction in respect of the crystal too. Truly, visibility is not possible for the substance alone leaving out colour, because of the contingency of that (visibility) in respect of air too. On the fifth (alternative) too, if the radiance be the efficient cause, then, even on the removal of the radiance, the redness should remain in the crystal. If it be said that the radiance is the material cause, no; for, there is not seen any radiance at all in the flower, as (there is) in the crystal: (as for) the criticisms stated above (they) are arguments based on the assumption (of radiance). Thus, therefore, it should be acknowledged that the illusory redness in the crystal has the flower for efficient cause.

CII. Similarly, on the self there is imposed agency etc., which have egoity as efficient cause. Now, is it that on the self there is imposition of the very agency present in egoity? Or is there originated in the self another agency of an illusory nature? On the first there would be disparity from the example of redness. On the second, however, there is the contingency of two agents, egoity being the real agent and the self the illusory agent. Not so. The first alternative is not defective. The example (of redness) was mentioned in respect of this aspect (alone), viz., that in the self appears agency which certainly does not really exist (therein). Nor thus does there result the (view of error as) cognition otherwise; for, illusoriness is admitted, in that egoity together with the attribute of agency is superimposed on the self, while in (the view of error as) cognition otherwise, the imposed silver etc., are real. Nor is there a defect in the second (alternative); for through the resulting of oneness

for the self and egoity, there is no contingency of two agents. Now, egoity is not the cause of agency and other such evils, since, in 'The knot of the heart is cut'¹ etc., the knot of the heart is scripturally declared to be such (*i. e.*, the cause of evil); if this be said, no; for it is only egoity in conjunction with its substrate, the self, which is of the form of both the intelligent and inert in union, that is figuratively spoken of as the knot.

CIII. Then it may be thought; 'if egoity etc., be superimposed, there would be no cognition (of them); the self does not cognise what is superimposed on itself, since it is the substrate, like the crystal'. That is not (so); for inertness is the conditioning adjunct (in the said inference). The self, however, is intelligent. If it be said 'even thus, it is in effect but inert, since it is devoid of the cognising activity whose sphere is the superimposed,' no; for, when even by association with intelligence without interposition there results manifestation, the cognising activity is ineffective. Then, egoity would not have a this-element,² because of its being manifest without the inter-position of the cognising activity, like the nature of the witness; if this be said, no; for in the witness, which is of the nature of intelligence, there is not the characteristic of the this-element, *viz.*, being an object of intelligence. In egoity (however) that characteristic is established by experience.

CIV. Again, Prābhākaras and others, not knowing the secret of the śāstra and thinking, in accordance with ordinary empirical usage, that the characteristic of the this-element is only objectness in respect of cognition and

¹ Mund., II, ii, 8.

² Not 'be the this-element'; for this is not claimed by the advaitin inasmuch as *ahankāra* equals this-not-this.

conation, vainly delude themselves that egoity which is devoid of that (characteristic) is the self. Though egoity too is known by a cognitive psychosis, as otherwise remembrance would be impossible in respect of the egoity of the previous day, yet since that cognitive psychosis is an aspect of egoity and consequently there is no absolute difference, cognisedness (in respect of egoity) is not patent, as in the case of the body, objects etc.; it is patent, however, to those of subtle vision; if this be said, even thus the characteristic of being cognised by psychoses does not pervade nescience which is removable by psychoses; therefore, the characteristic of the this-element is but objectness in respect of intelligence. Whence is it then that, when the characteristic is common, the ordinary empirical usage 'this' is only in respect of the the body, objects etc., not in respect of egoity? Because of lack of knowledge of that, we say. This is just as, though among the anthill, stone, tree, etc., there is parity in respect of being products of the earth, those devoid of discrimination speak of the anthill alone as thus (produced), not the tree etc. Those, however, who know, speak, in accordance with the characteristics, of the intelligence-aspect as the not-this and the inert aspect as the this. Therefore, egoity pregnant with the reflection of intelligence, though referred to by the critical as of the nature of the this and not-this, is experienced by the vulgar as blended into one, in the form of the cognition 'I'; this is established.

CV(a). Now if the jīva be a reflection present in egoity, there would be difference from the prototype, as for the facial reflection present in the mirror; for, there, difference is experienced between what is present on the neck and what is present in the mirror, as facing each other. Not so; for the experience of difference is sublated by the recollection of

oneness in the form 'This face is mine'. Nor may it be said that the recollection itself is sublatable by the other (experience); for if there were difference, reflection would be impossible. What is called a reflection, is it a seal imposed by the face? Or is it that the very parts of the mirror are transformed thus, because of the proximity of the prototype? Not the first, since the face in the mirror is smaller than the other. When, however, a full size face is cognised in a big mirror, even there, that is not a seal, since there is no conjunction between the mirror and the face. Not the second, for, there is the contingency of the continuance of that (reflection), even on the removal of the efficient cause, the prototype; it does not indeed continue thus; for, when the mirror is looked at slantwise by that same person, or properly by another person, *that* (reflected) face is not cognised. Nor may it be thought that, in some cases, the effect too is removed on the removal of the efficient cause, since the spread-out-ness of the mat, which is produced by conjunction with the hand, is seen to be removed on the removal of the conjunction with the hand. There the removal of the effect is not due to the removal of the efficient cause, but is due to the origination of an opposite effect of the nature of rolling up, by the residual impressions produced by having been rolled up for a long time; otherwise, even when, by having been spread out for a long time, the residual impression of having been rolled up is destroyed, the spread-out-ness would be removed on the removal of the hand; and it is not so removed. Here, however, even after the long continued proximity of the prototype, when at the end the prototype is removed, the reflection too certainly goes; hence, the prototype is not the efficient cause of the (alleged) transformation. If then you think that the opened-out condition of the lotu₂,

though long continued, departs on the removal of its efficient cause, the sun's rays, that is not (so); for, there too, the opened out condition departs when there is again generated at night a contrary effect, the condition of closedness (of the petals), by the earthy and watery parts of the lotus which were the causes of the first condition of closedness; otherwise, even in the case of a faded lotus devoid of such parts, the opened out condition would depart at night. If the mirror, however, has been transformed into the form of the face, by what cause could there be the transformation again into an even surface, since its parts can achieve nothing (of themselves) in the absence of the activity of an artificer? For the same reason, the parts of the mirror would not be transformed into the form of the face, merely because of the proximity of the prototype; otherwise, when the face of an image has to be constructed out of mirror material, men of the world would only bring the prototype into (its) proximity, but would not require an artificer. If it be said that though there be dependence on the work of an artificer in the transformation of the mirror material into other forms, there is not that dependence in the case of the transformation into a reflection or in re-transformation into its own form, even thus, the transformation in the form of a facial reflection does not bear reasoning; for there is not cognised by touch the condition of having depressions and prominences like the eyes, the nose etc.; it is only an even surface that is felt through touch by the hand. If it be said that the (reflected) face is separated (from the hand) by the even surface, then it would not be even visible. Therefore this is established—that the mirror in dispute is devoid of another face, since it is devoid of the causes for its production, like the head of a hare which, being devoid of the causes for the production of horns, is devoid of horns.

CV(b). Now, then, because of the contingency of illusoriness as for nacre-silver, there is not established oneness with the prototype; as for recollection, that is inconstant, since that is seen in the form 'Mine is this silver' even in the case of the illusory silver; if this be said, the example is not on a par. There indeed, the cognition of silver being delusive because of the sublation of the existence of silver in 'This is not silver', the delusiveness of its recognition too (as silver) is appropriate; here, however, there is not thus the sublation of existence in the form 'This is not the face'; but there is the recognition 'The face is certainly mine' arising on the sublation of a certain spatial relation alone in the form 'The face is not there'; how can this (recognition) be a delusion? Nor may it be asked how there can be recognition, that is perceptual, of (some) parts of the face since they are not visible; for, even from the sight of certain parts like the tip of the nose, the visibility of the whole is intelligible, as in the case of pot etc. Again, as for the removal of the reflection on the removal of the mirror, this is not sublation of existence, because of the contingency of this (sublation) in respect of the mirror too. Now by the text 'That thou art'¹ there is sublated the reflection which is of the nature of the jīva, because of apposition on sublation, as in 'That which was (thought to be) a post is a man', and because, if the transmigrator does not perish (as such), release is unintelligible. Not so; because apposition is possible even as having oneness for purport, as in 'This is that Devadatta', because release is intelligible with the sublation of contrary elements alone, and because if the entire jīva were sublated, release would not be a human goal.

CV(c). As for him who thinks that there is no reflection at all and that the rays from the eyes reflected by the mirror

¹ Chānd., VI, viii, 7

turn back and apprehend the prototype itself as non-discriminated from the mirror, he is to be refuted even by the patent experience of (the reflection) facing oneself etc. How, then, for the single material substance, the face, is there existence in entirety simultaneously in two different places? We say it is because the existence in the locality of the mirror is effected by māyā. Truly, for māyā, there is nothing impossible at all; māyā exhibits in dreams even the cutting off of one's own head.

CV(d). Now, even thus, there being oneness of the reflection upside down of a tree in water with the tree on the bank, it should be said that the tree on the bank is the substrate and that presence in the water and being upside down are superimposed thereon by māyā; and here the cause of superimposition does not exist, because of the substrate being fully cognised; then, how is this a superimposition? It is said (in reply). Is it that there is no superimposition here (1) because of the absence of obscuration of the tree, or (2) because of the absence of defect, or (3) because of the absence of the material cause, or (4) because of the existence of what is opposed to superimposition, viz., true knowledge of the substrate? Not the first; for the obscuration of intelligence being itself the material cause of superimposition, a separate obscuration in respect of the inert is of no utility. By this the third (possibility) too is refuted. Not the second, for, in delusions due to adjuncts (as in reflections) the adjunct itself is a defect. Not the fourth, for, only in the case of delusion not due to adjuncts is there opposition to true knowledge of the substrate. Then, for agency etc., which are delusions due to adjuncts, there is removal not by the true knowledge of the self, but by the removal of the adjunct, egoity; if this be said, assuredly; though of a real adjunct like the mirror

and of the delusion produced by it there is no removal by knowledge, yet when there is removal by true knowledge of the self in the case of egoity, the nescience-generated adjunct, which is (itself) of the nature of a delusion not due to an adjunct, the removal of agency etc., by knowledge is established by presumption.

CVI. Now, how is there true knowledge for you? The jīva does not know its identity with the self, since it is a reflection, like reflection present in the mirror. If this be said, no, for, being non-intelligent is the conditioning adjunct (of the *probans*).

CVII. As for the materialist who thinks that intelligence belongs to the body itself, in respect of him, the non-intelligence of the reflection may easily be made out because of (the supposed intelligence of the prototype body) being obstructed by the inertness present in the mirror; if, however, that (reflection) were intelligent, it would be active even without the activity of the prototype; in the case of the jīva, however, though a reflection, it is established from experience that there is no obstruction by the inertness of the adjunct. Though in ordinary experience, only the substrate, Devadatta, is seen to be the locus of the true knowledge that removes delusion, yet what is determinative there is not being the prototype, but being the locus of delusion; and the jīva is the locus of delusion; for though nescience is located in intelligence in general, it originates delusion as leaning to the side of jīva. Now if Brahman does not know its own oneness with the self, it would be non-omniscient; if it does know, then, it should perceive the delusion present in the jīva as present in itself; if this be said, no; for, by Devadatta, though knowing the oneness of his own face and its reflection

there is not seen in his own face the smallness, impurity etc., present in the reflection. Nor is it that there is no evidence for the *jīva* being a reflection, since it is established by *śruti*, *smṛti* and the (Vedānta) aphorism. 'It became the reflection of each form'¹, says *śruti*; 'It is seen as one and as many, like the moon in water' says *smṛti*; 'For the same reason there is the comparison to the reflection of the sun etc.,'² says the aphorism.

CVIII. Nor is it that for the non-corporeal Brahman, a reflection is impossible; for, in the case of even the non-corporeal ether, as qualified by the clouds, stars etc., located in itself, there is seen the condition of being reflected in water. If it be said that only the ether in the water is the support of reflections like that of the clouds, no; for, distant and expansive ether is seen (as reflected) even in water which is only knee-deep. If it be said that the *jīva*, like pot-ether, is defined by an adjunct (and) is not a reflection, no. In that case, if Brahman too existed in the midst of the adjunct of the *jīva*, intelligence would be duplicated there; and the duplication thus of ether in the pot is not seen. And if Brahman be non-existent, then there would be abandonment of omnipresence, controllership of all etc. If it be said that omnipresence, controllership of all etc., belong only to that form of intelligence which is recurrent in both, not to Brahman, no; for, by the *śruti* text 'He who controls the self from within', existence as the controller in the midst of the *jīva* is declared only of Brahman, that is understood from the context. Therefore everywhere in the *śāstra* the example of pot-ether is instrumental to establishing non-attachedness,

¹ Brh., II, v, 19

² Br., Sa., III, ii, 18

not to establishing the jīva-hood (of the defined). On the view of (the jīva as a) reflection, however, duplicated existence is not a (cause of) defect; for in the midst of water there exist both the natural ether which is but knee-deep and the reflected expansive ether. Therefore the jīva is a reflection of Brahman, produced by the adjunct, egoity.

CIX. Though it was said earlier that nescience is the adjunct that defines the jīva, yet, in the case of the jīva who is defined by nescience alone in sleep, there is admitted the internal organ as the adjunct, for the sake of the slightly clear empirical usage in the stage of dream; similarly, for the sake of the clear empirical usage in waking, the gross body is the adjunct. Nor thus because of difference of adjuncts is there the contingency of difference of the jīvas, since it is only in the case of him who has been defined by each earlier adjunct there is (further) definition by each subsequent one.

CX. Now this definition of the jīva, is it present in the delusion? Or is it present in intelligence? On the first (alternative) it would not exist in sleep, swoon, etc., since delusion does not exist there; and therefore for nescience and for its products the states of swoon etc., there would be no leaning to the side of the jīva. Even on the second (alternative), if that (definition) be a product, there is that same defect, because of the non-existence of that (definition) in sleep etc. And if it be not a product, there would not be dependence on nescience. It is said (in reply): since the definition of the jīva effected by the bodies, gross and subtle, in the states of waking and dreaming, is of the nature of a delusion, it is a product of nescience; in sleep etc., however, the definition of the jīva, present in intelligence, is, though beginningless, dependent on nescience, like the relation

between the self and nescience. Though the definition is not, like the relation, located in nescience, yet because of being located in intelligence qualified by nescience, the dependence on nescience is not contradicted. This is just as the difference between prototype and reflection, which, located in the face qualified by (the proximity of) the mirror, is dependent on the mirror; and the indeterminability of definition as the jīva is intelligible, because of dependence on nescience, like the relation (of the self) to that (nescience).

CXI. Now since by you the unreality of reflection is admitted, the character of being a reflection does not belong to the jīva; if this be said, not so. We do not indeed declare illusoriness whether of the face or the intelligence, which constitutes the very essence of the reflection. What then? We declare the illusoriness of the character of being a reflection, and of the difference, error (e. g., transposition of right and left) etc., which bring about that (character). And of the reflection, we declare its being of the nature of the real prototype, because of recognition and because of the text 'That thou art'.¹ In spite of the illusoriness of the character of being reflected, since the substrate (of that character) is bound and is released, there is not the impossibility of bondage and release, nor the contingency of those two in the prototype, Brahman. Now, thus, even though there exist the superimposition of difference between prototype and reflection, as conditioned by adjuncts like egoity, how can there be established the superimposition of egoity etc., which are devoid of adjuncts? We say that it is as in the rope-snake. If then (it be said that) though there an independent thing, as an adjunct, is non-existent, the mere residual impression

¹Chand., VI, viii. 7

of snake is the adjunct, then, in the present context too why should not the residual impression of egoity be the adjunct? There is indeed no restrictive rule that the residual impression generated by a *pramāṇa* is an adjunct, but not one generated by delusion. Thus, therefore, the self though of the one consistency of intelligence and of the nature of the not-this, is (yet), as reflected in the egoity superimposed on itself, capable of the empirical usage 'I', and, being presented as in union with the superimposed egoity, in this cognition 'I', is figuratively spoken of as the object of the cognition 'I'; hence superimposition thereon is certainly possible.

CXII. Now, on intelligence which appears as non-determinate, the superimposition of the determinate egoity etc., is not possible; for, that kind (of superimposition) is not in the scope of what has been seen. Nor is there the possibility of that on that which appears as qualified by the distinction of cognisership etc., for, cognisership etc., are preceded by egoity. Nor is there determinateness for intelligence through the residual impressions of cognisership etc., as produced by earlier (superimposition of) egoity, since the empirical usage of cogniser, means of cognition etc., can hardly be justified by any disputant. It is thus. In the systems of the Vedāntins and the Sāṅkhyas, which is the cogniser, egoity or the self? Not the first, because of its inertness. Even on the second, cognisership consists in being transformed in the form of the act called *pramāṇa*; and that is difficult to achieve in the unchanging self. If even without cognisership objects be manifested by intelligence, (then) because of the omnipresence of this, everything would be manifest simultaneously; hence there would not result the

restriction (of cognition) to particular objects. Even in the systems of Logicians etc., the cognition that is originated in the omnipresent self, is it inherent in the entire self, or inherent in that part of the self which is defined by the body? Not the first, since, there being no controller, there is the contingency of the simultaneous manifestation of all. If it be said that merit and demerit are the controllers, no; for though they be such in respect of objects which generate happiness and misery, they are not controllers in respect of everything which is to be treated with indifference, such as a blade of grass. If it be said that there is the restrictive rule that when there is a generator of a cognition, the former is manifested by the latter, no; for, even in the case of the sense of sight etc., there is the contingency of being cognised by the cognition generated by the sense of sight. If it be said that what is cognised is that which, while being an object, is the generator (of the cognition), no; for, 'being an object' has not been demonstrated up to now. Even if it be demonstrated by its being well known in the world, there is not established for cognition, whether it be a quality or an act, the restrictive rule that it apprehends only the object which generates it; for there is seen in the case of the luminosity which is a quality of the lamp, manifestation even of what does not generate it, *e. g.*, a pot; and in the case of the activities of arrows etc., there is seen the causation of some new result in an object that is in conjunction with their (the arrows') own loci though that (object) be not the one aimed at. If then (it be said) 'since the self too, which is the locus of cognition, is partless, there is non-conjunction with all and hence there is not the contingency of the simultaneous manifestation of all,' then, nothing at all would be manifest; for, in the case of cognition,

whether of the nature of an act or a quality, passing beyond its own locus and entering into conjunction elsewhere is impossible; and if it apprehend what is not in contact, there would be undue extension. Even on the view that cognition is inherent in that part of the self which is defined by the body, if the part is natural (to the self), there is the contingency of the self having parts. Even if it be due to adjuncts, if cognition be that which apprehends what is conjoined to that part, then, pot etc., which are outside the body, would not be manifest. If it apprehend what is conjoined to the part of the self outside (the body), then, everything outside would be manifest. Now, even in respect of an unrelated thing, the cognitive act produces a new result, only under restrictions; this is just as by a rite in the nature of an evil spell, the person aimed at is alone killed though he be separated by a distance of a thousand *yojanas* (the persons in the intervening space being unaffected). That is not (sound); for even there, a controller, conjoined to the two persons, the killer and the killed, and of the nature of the deity (of the rite), is inferred, whether it be *Iśvara* or an evil spirit (*kṛitya*) etc.; the evil spell in dispute produces a distinctive result in what is related to itself, since it is an act, like the act (of flight) of the arrow etc. Then let it be thus: with the self which is the support of cognition, the mind is conjoined, with the mind the sense-organ (is conjoined), and with this the object; and this succession of conjunction is the controller. That too is unsound; for that succession is exhausted, prior to the cognition, even in the origination of the cognition. If, even subsequent to the cognition, the object be manifest by the succession of conjunctions, the whole world, which exists in the form of what is conjoined with the object and what is conjoined therewith and so on, would

be manifest. Similarly, defects are to be inferred even on the views of the self as atomic in size or of the size of the body. Therefore for all disputants there is no possibility of the empirical usage of *pramāṇa* etc.

CXIII(a). To this it is said (in reply): true, it is thus elsewhere; in the system of the Vedāntins, however, it is somehow possible. It is thus: nescience, which stands obscuring the omnipresent intelligent self, and is of the nature of an existent, is transformed in the form of the world of diverse kinds. Of these, that transformation of nescience, which resides in the body and is called the internal organ, being prompted by merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), goes out through the channel of the eyes etc., pervades suitable objects like the pot, and becomes of their respective forms. This is just as in the world, the water present in a full tank goes out through the opening in the bund, enters the fields in the form of the flow in channels, and remains rectangular, triangular or circular, in conformity with the respective fields. The internal organ does not indeed like water flow gradually, in which case the quick reaching to the moon, stars, the pole star etc., which are at a great distance, would not result. What then? Because of being of the nature of light, like the rays of the sun, it is transformed in the form of a long ray. For the same reason the immediate contraction too, as of a ray, is intelligible. And transformation of the internal organ is intelligible, since it has parts, like milk etc. And this transformed internal organ pervades fully the inside of the body as well as pot etc., and abides continuously without break even in the space between the body and the pot. Here the part of the internal organ which is defined by the body and is called egoity, is said to be the agent; that part which is continuous between the

body and the object and is called cognitive psychosis, is said to be the act; that which pervades the object and brings about for the object object-ness in respect of cognition, is said to be fitness for manifestation. And because of the excessive clarity of this internal organ with three parts, intelligence is manifested therein. In spite of the oneness of that manifested intelligence, there is verbal designation in three forms, because of the difference of parts of the manifestor, the internal organ. The aspect of intelligence defined by the agent-element is the cogniser; the aspect of intelligence defined by the act-element is the means of cognition; the aspect of intelligence defined by the fitness-element present in the object is the cognition (pramiti); thus there is non-confusion of cogniser, means of cognition and the cognition. Since it is only that form of the internal organ, which is recurrent in all the three parts, that is of the form of the relation between the cogniser and the object cognised, even the empirical usage of the (one as) qualified (by the other) in the form 'This is known by me' is intelligible. Because of the superimposition of oneness as between the manifested and the manifestor, intelligence and the internal organ, the empirical usage of the attributes of each in respect of the other is not contradicted.

CXIII(b). Now, if what is called the manifestation of intelligence by the internal organ be the destruction of obscuration, there would be release even by the pot-cognition; if it be a distinctive result present in the self, there would be mutability for the self; if this be said, no; for manifestation is the overpowering (not the destruction) of obscuration.

CXIII(c). As for what was said, that because of the inertness of egoity and the unchanging nature of the self, no

cogniser is established, that is unsound; for it has been shown that the internal organ, subject to transformation, is, as qualified by the manifestation of intelligence, the cogniser.

CXIII(d). And as for (the statement) that since intelligence is omnipresent there is no restriction (of cognition) to particular objects, there is not this defect. Is it deduced that the happiness, misery etc., experienced by one person should be experienced by all, because of the oneness of the intelligence in all persons? Or that when a pot is experienced by Devadatta, then the whole world should be experienced by him, since his intelligence is omnipresent? Not the first. We do not indeed declare of bare intelligence that it is the cause of the experience of objects, since that (intelligence) is obscured by nescience. What then? That (character we declare) of what is manifested by the internal organ. And those internal organs are distinct for each individual. How then is there confusion of the enjoyments of all persons? Not the second. The internal organ of Devadatta, which is finite through restriction (to a particular object), does not indeed relate simultaneously to the entire world, in which case, he would experience all on the strength of the intelligence manifested by that (finite internal organ). If it be said that even of the finite, as of the sun's rays, there may be an all-pervasive transformation, no; for, the causal aggregates of the transformation of the internal organ, which are of the form of merit, demerit, the eye, the ear etc., being restricted to particular objects, there is established the restriction of the transformation too. He, however, who having practised yoga obtains the causal aggregates for an all-pervasive transformation (psychosis), would certainly cognise everything simultaneously; and thence there is no loss (to us) whatsoever.

...CXIV(a). Now is it that, because for intelligence as non-attached there is no association directly with objects, the internal organ is assumed as the adjunct, for the sake of establishing that (association)? Or (is it assumed), in spite of the existence of that association, for the establishment of the manifestation of the object? Not the first; for in the case of what remains only as non-attached, there is the contingency of its non-association even when there is the adjunct—the internal organ. Not the second; for, when manifestation results even from the relation to intelligence there is futility of the adjunct. When therefore the adjunct is abandoned, by what can be prevented the simultaneity of the manifestation of all things conjoined to the omnipresent intelligence?

...CXIV(b). If then you think (thus) 'Do you deduce simultaneous manifestation in the case of the jīva-intelligence, which is a reflection, or in the case of the Brahman-intelligence which is the prototype? Not the first, since it is finite. Not the second, since it is acceptable. Though there is no difference between the jīva and Brahman, parviscience and omniscience are not confused, like the fairness and the darkness of the prototype and reflected faces', that is not sound. If that were so, experience of the object being (always) of the nature of Brahman-intelligence, and there being no association (with the object) for the jīva defined by egoity, like omniscience, parviscience too would not exist for the jīva. If it be said that the jīva's cognisership of objects is consistent because of the relation of the internal organ, that defines the jīva, with the objects, through the channel of the sense of sight etc., no. For, if there be cognisership of things associated with the internal organ, the jīva would

cognise Brahman's nature too constantly; for the omnipresent Brahman is associated with the internal organ too.

CXIV(c). (If) then it be thought (thus) 'The jīva, because of having nescience as adjunct, is omnipresent; and he is not capable of manifesting the entire world, since, as obscured by nescience, he is not himself manifest. In the case of nescience though known as finite in the form "I am ignorant", the capacity even to conceal omnipresent intelligence is certainly intelligible; for by the mere finger held near the eye there is seen the concealment even of the big sun etc. And this being the case, where by association with the internal organ the obscuration is overpowered, by the intelligence manifested there alone is something alone manifested, not everything,' that too does not stand to reason: for, by the internal organ, which is a product, the overpowering of its own material cause, ignorance, is impossible. Therefore in no mode is there the establishment of the restriction.

CXV(a). To this it is said (in reply): though the jīva-intelligence being non-attached does not associate with anything else, it does associate with the internal organ, since it is of such a nature. This is just as the generality, cowness etc., though omnipresent, associates with the particular that has a dewlap etc, not with anything else. (If) then (it be) said that the omnipresent generality associates with (its) particulars alone, then, let there be the example of the radiance of the lamp. That (radiance) indeed though pervasive of the spaces of colour, taste, odour, musical instruments etc., manifests colour alone, not anything else. And thus the internal organ as adjunct comes to be for the establishment of the association of intelligence with objects.

And when there is no association the light of intelligence is not capable of manifesting objects, since like the light of a lamp it manifests (only) what is in conjunction. Brahman, indeed, because of being the material cause of all, manifests the world that is non-different from itself like its own nature, even without the association due to an adjunct. But not so is the jīva, because of not being the material cause. Nor may it be objected that for the jīva which is not of itself a manifestor, there is not, as for pot etc., the capacity to manifest, even through relation to another; for though in mere fire there is not the capacity to burn grass etc., the capacity to burn that is seen in that (fire) as associated with an iron ball. Thus, therefore, though the character of jīva belongs to the unattached witness-intelligence unobscured by nescience, there could certainly be restriction, in dependence on the internal organ. When however, the reflection in the internal organ is (considered) the jīva, then too, because of (its) being finite, the restriction would be more easily established. Though the experience of the object is of the nature of Brahman-intelligence, yet because of being manifested in a transformation pervasive of the object, in the internal organ, the jīva's adjunct, its being of the nature of the jīva-intelligence too is not contradicted. Though Brahman is associated with the internal organ, since there is no psychosis of the internal organ which has taken on the form of Brahman, there is not the contingency of the jīva's constant cognition of Brahman. For not the bare existence of the internal organ is the manifestor of a thing, but the transformation in the form of that (thing); otherwise there is the contingency of the manifestation even of merit (dharma) etc., which are present within the internal organ. The jīva too is manifested in that internal organ which has

been transformed into the psychosis 'I' with the form of the jīva, not in the bare internal organ; for when the psychosis 'I' is non-existent in sleep, the jīva is not cognised. Therefore, in this way, though the character of jīva belong to the reflection in the internal organ, there is no hindrance whatever to the restriction (of cognition) to particular objects.

CXV(b). And when the jīva (is considered to be he who) has nescience for adjunct and is omnipresent, then too, the restriction would be established by the internal organ which conceals the obscuration. It is indeed possible even for the product to conceal its material cause, since it is seen of products like the scorpion and the tree that they conceal the nature of their (material) cause—cowdung, earth etc. Indeed in the body of the scorpion the cowdung is not recognised or the nature of earth in trees etc. Thus, therefore, in the system of the Vedāntin, the empirical usage of cogniser etc., being established in all possible modes, the superimposition of determinate egoity etc., is certainly possible on intelligence that has been made determinate by the residual impressions of cognisership etc., produced by earlier (superimpositions of) egoity.

CXVI. Nor may it be said that if all objects cognised be illusory modifications of intelligence, then, because of their being unreal independently of intelligence, there is the entry into the system of the Vijñānavādin; for if because of some similarity there be entry into another system, the confusion of all systems could hardly be refuted. As for complete similarity, that does not exist even in the present context. For, the Vijñānavādin says that there are many momentary cognitions and that objects are non-different therefrom; but he who sees the truth says that knowledge is eternal and non-dual,

that objects superimposed thereon are independently practically efficient, and that for these there is unsublated permanence. Consciousness is indeed non-dual because of being recognised (as one) everywhere. The presentation of difference as in 'pot-cognition, cloth-cognition' is due to the object as an adjunct, not natural. Even because of being non-dual there is eternity too for consciousness. Nor are consciousness and the object non-different; for, they are of wholly different natures, as internal and non-internal and as recurrent and varying. And the independent practical efficiency of objects is established in experience. And permanence is to be understood from recognition. Therefore, though egoity etc., are superimposed on intelligence, it is established that there is no confusion of systems.

GXVII. Now, the Vijñānavādin thinks thus: 'Because of the invariability in blue and its cognition being perceived together, there is non-difference (between those two); if blue were other than the cognition (of it), that (colour) would not be manifest in the cognition. If it be said that it is (somehow) manifest, why is it that everything is not manifest in a single cognition? We do not see any restrictive relation as between blue and its cognition.' If it be said that the generation of cognition is itself the restrictive relation, no; for there is the contingency of the sense-organ too, which is its generator, being (its) content. Therefore there is but non-difference between blue and its cognition. If it be said that in 'I know this' the cogniser, the object cognised and the cognition are experienced as of distinct natures and as reciprocally related, no; for, relation is unintelligible among the momentary. It is indeed if the cogniser and the cognised be permanent that relation would be possible through the channel of the cognitive activity arising immediately after the

desire to know. How can this be between the momentary? Therefore it should be assumed thus; first there are originated in sequence three cognitions 'I', 'this' and 'know' associated with the respective forms. Thence from the third cognition coloured by the *vāsanās* called the first and second cognitions, there is originated another cognition which is of a nature similar to that and is associated with the three forms. This being the case, the momentary cognition itself should be admitted to be of the form of the object; otherwise the relation between the cogniser and object of cognition not having been demonstrated (i. e., being indemonstrable), the object of cognition would not be cognised. Nor about the momentariness of cognition should there be dispute. Just as the cognition of blue makes known also the exclusion of yellow etc., by blue, similarly the cognition which appears as present would make known also the exclusion of its own relation to the two times, past and future. Therefore, the momentariness of cognition is established by perception.

CXVIII. To this it is said (in reply): cognition is not momentary, since there is not manifested difference of nature at each instant. If it be said that the non-manifestation of difference is because of great similarity, no; for, it does not stand analysis. Is difference an attribute of cognition, to be known by another cognition? Or is it of the very nature of the cognition, to be known by that same cognition? On the first too, if the cognitions which are the substrate and the counter-correlate be not the contents of another cognition, the apprehension of their difference would not be established. Or if they be contents, then all the three, which are called substrate, counter-correlate and difference, would be posited in the cognition of difference and non-different therefrom

(since for this school of Buddhism the content is non-different from the cognition) On the second (alternative), when it is said that difference which is of the nature of cognition is not manifested because of similarity, it would have been said that the cognition itself is not manifested; thence the contingency of the blindness (unconsciousness) of the world. Even if it be said that, in order to maintain similarity among cognitions, difference (among them) is acknowledged, no; for, (this) similarity is devoid of evidence and is in conflict with the presentation of oneness. Nor may it be said that since the presentation of oneness is a delusion there is no conflict with similarity, but that, on the contrary, the delusion of oneness among differents, being itself unintelligible in the absence of similarity, is the postulator of that (similarity); for there is reciprocal dependence, in that if the difference and similarity of cognitions be established, there would be establishment of the delusiveness of the presentation of oneness, and that if the latter be established there would be the establishment of the other. (If) then it be thought (thus) 'if it be established of similarity that it is devoid of evidence and in conflict with evidence, there would be establishment of the authoritative-ness of the cognition of oneness, and if the latter be established, there would be the establishment of the other; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence is common to you too', that is not (so); for in the case of the recognition that makes known oneness, intrinsic validity is acknowledged by me.

CKIX. Now what is this which is called recognition? Recognition is not that perceptual cognition whose content is the relation of one to two items, past and present; for, perceptual cognition apprehends present things alone. If it be said that that character (of recognition) belongs to that

which originates from the means of cognition of a present thing in conjunction with the residual impression of prior experience, even thus, the recognition 'I am he' would not result in respect of the self; for in respect of that (self) which is eternal and self-luminous, residual impression and originated cognition are impossible. Nor is the knowledge of existence itself recognition; for in the case of that which, like the radiance of a lamp, illuminates the present, the nature of relating to the earlier and the later is impossible. On our view, however, this which is associated with two forms 'He' and 'I' is a two-fold cognition, not recognition. Therefore, how can there be the establishment of oneness by this indemonstrable recognition? It is said (in reply): though originated cognition and its residual impression are impossible in respect of the pure intelligent self, yet since they are possible in respect of what is qualified by the internal organ, why should there not be the said recognition? Nor may it be objected that if the qualified be the content of recognition, then, since recognisership too belongs to that alone, there is the conflict of (the same) being object and agent; for it is admitted by all disputants that as the content of inferences like that about being different from the body, there is in the self both objectness and agency.

CXX. (If) then it be thought 'in inference etc., the content is not the object-causal-correlate, since in the inference of past things etc., the non-existent content cannot be what originates the cognition; content-ness, however, is somehow possible even in the case of the non-existent, since the cognition is of the form of that; therefore, in inference etc., there is agency alone for the self; in perception, however, the content, as the generator of the cognition, is the object

causal-correlate; therefore the conflict remains as before', not so; recognisanship belongs to the self only as qualified by the internal organ; and as qualified by the times, earlier and later, there belongs to it being-the-object-of-recognition; thus through difference in the adjuncts, there is no conflict. Why so much trouble? Let it be that there is no recognition at all? If this be said, no; for, the recognition 'I am he' is established in one's own experience; and it cannot be delusive since it is not subject to dispute. As for what was said that what is associated with the two forms 'He' and 'I' is a two-fold cognition, that is unsound; for, if that were so, even in 'cognition is momentary' there is the contingency of a two-fold cognition and the (consequent) contingency of the non-establishment of the momentariness of cognition. If it be said that for those who maintain cognitions alone, attributes like momentariness are certainly unreal, then, let there be admitted only such unreal attributes as permanence, since they conform to experiences like 'I am he'.

CXXI. And as for what the Prābhākaras think—'This self is not established as the content of the recognition "I am he"; what then? (It is established) as the locus of recognitions like "This is that pot"'—that does not stand to reason; for in the case of what is qualified by time, earlier and later, being the locus of a recognition which exists but for an instant is impossible; hence there is the contingency of the non-establishment of permanence on the basis of recognition.

CXXII. (If) then it be thought (thus)—'The cognition of pot etc., which belongs to a prior time, and is now remembered as "in me a cognition arose" establishes its own locus, the self of that time; and memory establishes its own

locus, the self of the present time; and thence is established the permanent self; and the unevidenced recognition "I am he" with the self as content need not be assumed', this is not sound. For though memory and prior experience, like two cognitions, establish the self as belonging to their respective times, yet the relation of one self to two times would not be established by anything. If it be said that the two cognitions are themselves what establish the relation too, then, in the very same way, permanence being established even in respect of pot etc., by two cognitions, recognition would not be needed for its establishment. If it be said that the recognition there is for strengthening that (cognition of permanence), even thus, in the present context, do the two cognitions establish the relation directly or through originating recognition? Even on the first, each by itself is not the means of establishing that; for each, by itself, is not located in the self qualified by both times. Nor together are they the means of establishing it; for, simultaneity is impossible as between a past experience and a present memory. On the second (alternative), there would be acknowledged by you yourself the recognition 'I am he' with the permanent self as content. Nor may it be said 'Nowhere is the self the content of cognition; how then can it be the content of recognition?'; for it is the content of memory-cognition in 'In me cognition was originated'. Though by this memory-cognition the self belonging to the time of the origination of that (cognition) itself, is manifested only as the locus of (the cognition) itself, not as the content, yet the self, that is the locus of the remembered cognition and belongs to the time of that cognition, is certainly made the content. (If) then it be said 'By the memory the cognition alone is made the content; and that cognition, being

remembered, causes the cognition of its locus, the self, as locus alone', that is unsound; for the cognition that is non-existent at the time of memory cannot (then) be the means of establishing its own locus. It is indeed self-luminous cognition that establishes the locus, but not that which, as the content of memory, is manifested by another; otherwise there is the contingency even of merit (dharma) etc., which are other-established, being the means for establishing their own locus, the self. Therefore, it should be admitted that the self of the past time is certainly the content of memory. And thus, even the recognition 'I am he' may make the self the content; hence even by the Prabhākaras, momentariness of the self has to be refuted only by the recognitive cognition whose content is the self.

CXXIII. (If) then, momentariness in respect of pot etc., be established thus 'What are in dispute, viz., the penultimate and other (earlier) instants of the existence of the pot are pervaded by the destruction of the pot that comes into being after each (of these instants), since they are instants of the existence of the pot, like the final instant,' that is not (sound); for there is parity of fallaciousness with (the reasoning) 'What is in dispute, viz., the instant of the destruction of the pot, possesses the existence of the pot, since it is time, like what is admitted (e. g., the present time when the pot exists).' If it be said that there is conflict here with the experience of the non-existence of the pot, then, even in the inference of momentariness, there certainly exists conflict with the recognition 'This is that pot'.

CXXIV(a). Now, all existents are momentary, since they are practically efficient, like the negative example, the

horn of a hare. On the contrary view the sublatter is the unintelligibility of practical efficiency in the case of the permanent. Nor may it be said that it is only for the permanent thing, which because of conjunction with an efficient cause has become otherwise, that there is capacity to produce an effect as preceded by efficient activity, and not for the momentary. Does this permanent thing produce one effect alone, or many simultaneously, or many in sequence? Of these, on the first and second (alternative), permanence is irrelevant, since the production of an effect once for all results even through the momentary. Not the third, since delay (in effectiveness) is impossible for that which has capacity. Therefore, reality consisting in practical efficiency belongs to existents in one instant alone.

CXXIV(b). This does not stand to reason; for in your system practical efficiency can hardly be demonstrated. What is it that is called practical efficiency? Is it the generation by cognitions of (other) cognitions having the (former) themselves as their sphere? Or is it the origination of another instant (by them)? On the first too, is the generation in the succession that is one-self, or in the succession that is another person, or in the succession that is omniscience? Not the first, since cognition being self-luminous, that (generation) is impossible. Let it then be the second; for, Devadatta's cognition though self-luminous may yet be the generator of Yajñadatta's cognition, being the content of the latter. That is unsound. It is not possible to say that it is the generator as the content of a perceptual cognition; for, one person's cognition has nowhere been seen to be perceived by another person. Nor is it the generator as the content of inferential cognition, since it is acknowledged by

you that perceptual cognition alone is generated by the content. Now, then, let it be the third (possibility); for, the perceptual cognition of the omniscient, having for its content the cognitions present in all persons, is generated by them. Not so; if that were so, through the infected doubtful cognitions of the transmigrators, the Lord's cognition too would be infected (with doubt), since in your system there is non-difference between cognition and the cognised. If then it be said that the Lord's cognition though infected (with doubt), does not suffer from the defect of infection, since the infection is sublated by true knowledge, not so. The same cognition does not sublimate the infection (of doubt) in respect of itself, since for infection there is no possibility of both establishment and sublation in one and the same instant. Nor is another cognition capable of restating the infection and sublating it, since the infection in respect of the prior cognition is not the content of the other cognition; and if it be the content, then, how could the other cognition being infected (with doubt) even like the prior cognition, be a sublater? Nor is the cognition-aspect alone, to the exclusion of the infection-aspect, the generator of the Lord's cognition, as its content; if that were so, how could the Lord, ignorant of the infection (of doubts), teach?

CXXIV(c). Nor is the second alternative (possible), that practical efficiency is the origination of another instant, for, according to your teaching there is the contingency of unreality for the final instant. It is thus: cognitions are infected with defects like attachment and (associated) with objects, through the assumption of permanence and through the assumption of substance, attribute etc.; each succeeding

one arises from residual impressions consisting of earlier cognitions of the same class. Here, by the meditation 'All this is momentary' the assumption of permanence is removed; by the meditation '(Everything is) its own existence (alone)' the assumption of substance, attribute etc., perishes; by the meditation '(Everything is) misery', the infections, *viz.*, defects like attachment, activity, happiness, and misery, are destroyed; by the meditation '(Everything is) void' there is the departure of the association with an object (other than the cognition). And thence, when by the four different forms of meditation which are opposed to residual impressions, the four kinds of infection are in sequence made dull, then, from the penultimate cognition which is the final stage of excellence of meditation, there arises cognition free from all infections; and that, since it is the end of the succession of transmigration, is called the final instant; and there being for this the contingency of unreality, because of the non-existence of any effect, in the very same way, unreality would result for the earlier cognitions too, in sequence. If it be said that the final instant is the generator of the Lord's cognition, because of being the content of that, then, the final instant and the cognition of the omniscient, being of the same nature through being pure, would belong to the same succession; for the (definitive) characteristic of belonging to a single succession is the relation of effect and cause as between what are of the same nature. Therefore, because of non-interruption of the succession, there would be non-release. If it be said that the entry into the succession of the omniscient is itself release, even thus, since the final instant being the content of the Lord's cognition is difficult to demonstrate, (its) generatorship is thrown off to a greater distance. For, it is when there is difference

between cognitions that there is the relation of object and subject; and no difference exists here. Cognition does not differ from another cognition, through the form of cognition; for, if that be so, in order that difference of nature may be established, there is contingency of the nature of non-cognition for the counter-correlate (cognition). Nor (does it differ) through the form of non-cognition because of the contingency of the nature of non-cognition for the substrate (cognition). Therefore, it is difficult to achieve reality for the final instant, through efficient activity consisting in originating the cognition of the omniscient. If its efficient activity be assumed, even then, does that achieve the reality of the cause or its cognition? Not the first, because of the reality of the cause even prior to the effect, (its) causality being impossible otherwise. On the second (alternative) too, that effect, being manifested by its own effect, brings about the cognition of its own cause; that (other effect) too is like that; thus there would be infinite regress. If it be said that there is no infinite regress, since cognition of itself manifests itself, then, the position that practical efficient activity is the cause of cognition (of the cause) would be abandoned. For him who says that it is itself its own efficient act (the defect of) self-dependence is difficult to avoid. Thus, therefore, what is called reality is not practical efficiency, but a certain natural attribute. And thus there is not contradicted the reality even of the permanent, which having achieved an efficient act in one instant, subsequently remains quiescent.

CXXIV(d). As for what was said that for the permanent there is not the capacity to originate many effects in sequence, since delay is impossible for what has capacity,

that is unsound. Even in the case of what is capable, sequence of effects is intelligible, through dependence on the particular sequence of the proximity of auxiliaries, since it is only thus experienced in the world.

CXXIV(e). (If) then it be thought thus 'Since for the capable, even dependence on auxiliaries does not stand to reason, all things, being (themselves) certainly, incapable, generate a causal aggregate through reciprocal dependence; and that, being capable, originates the effect,' this too does not stand to reason. Even in respect of the causal aggregate, if the things are capable, their reciprocal dependence does not stand to reason; and if they are not capable, because of not generating that (aggregate), the reciprocal dependence is fruitless; thus throughout there would certainly be non-dependence. If it be said 'Then, let there not be dependence on auxiliaries for any (thing)', no, because of conflict with experience. Nor is the experience delusive, because of the non-existence of sublation. Though it has been said that the dependence either of the capable or of the incapable does not stand to reason, yet there may be dependence on auxiliaries for the thing in general which is free from (the qualification of) being capable or incapable; for the principle of this has to be acknowledged even by you. It is thus: if the effect be existent, there is abandonment of the final position (that the cause produces it); and if it be non-existent, the relation of a particular effect with a particular cause being indemonstrable, everything could originate from everything else; when thus objected to by the other (adversary), it has to be demonstrated by you leaving aside the particularities of existence and non-existence, relatedness and non-relatedness, that the invariable antecedent

is the cause and the invariable consequent the effect. If it be said that here co-presence and co-absence exist as proofs, they certainly exist in respect of auxiliaries too. Therefore there certainly exists dependence on auxiliaries. As for the particular (mode of) help rendered by them, let us consider it.

CXXIV(f). As for what the follower of a particular section (of *kṣāṇikavāda*) thinks here, viz., 'The auxiliaries, earth, water etc., established by co-presence and co-absence produce a speciality viz., swelling, in the cause which is called the seed; thence that seed becomes capable in respect of the effect called shoot; otherwise, the earth etc., being useless, would not be required by the seed', that is unsound. Is the seed capable or not in the origination of the speciality present in itself? If not, then, even in the proximity of a thousand auxiliaries, it would not generate that (speciality); thence it would not be capable even in respect of the origination of the shoot. If then it be capable, even then, if it be capable in respect of the swelling, after having attained some other speciality effected by the auxiliaries, then, there would be infinite regress. If then it be capable in respect of that, even without attaining that (other speciality), then, in respect of the shoot too it would be capable even without a speciality (i.e., swelling). (If) then it be thought 'The origination of the shoot is preceded by the generation of swelling; the origination of swelling, however, is accomplished by the mere proximity of the auxiliaries, since it is seen to be only thus', that is not (so). If that were so, since by the cause which is capable an auxiliary is required though rendering no help to itself, the contradiction of your view would have been brought about by yourself. Therefore,

the position of the follower of this particular section (of *kṣāṇikavāda*) cannot bear reasoning.

CXXIV(g). Now (says the *kṣāṇikavādin* proper), for that same reason our view is to be supported. We do not, like that (view above), declare the utility of the auxiliary (to be) in respect of the existence of the cause. What then? The effect, originated from the momentary primal cause, requires the auxiliary causes, since the effect has to be accomplished by many causes: this we say. Though this much is common even to the view of a permanent cause, yet, on your view, so long as the cause exists, the unremitting origination of the effect is difficult to avoid, since there is nothing to restrict (the origination). Nor is the relation to the auxiliary that which restricts, since the relation too should exist so long as the *relatum* exists. Nor is there another relation which restricts that (relation), because of infinite regress. Nor may it be said that even on the view of momentariness the effect does not originate in the instant in which the cause exists, because of the contingency of their simultaneity, and that, even if origination be admitted at another time, there is the contingency of non-restriction; for the instant immediately succeeding the cause is that which restricts the effect. Therefore the view of momentariness is alone superior.

CXXIV(h). Not so. Everywhere indeed the relation of effect and cause has to be ascertained on the strength of pervasion. Then on your view, what is the pervasion that is the relation of effect and cause? Is it between the particular smoke and fire or between their successions? Not the first; for, it is not possible for the momentary to continue during the two periods of the cognition of co-presence and

of co-absence. On the second (alternative), smoke should originate from fire even in the condition of embers, there being no distinction in respect of (embers) being included in the succession of that (fire). If it be said that there is no origination (of smoke) because of the absence of fuel, no; for that too exists in its own succession. Nor is relation non-existent between the fire and the fuel; for the two successions being eternal, that (relation) too cannot be helped. If it be said that that relation, because of being preceded by another relation, is not constantly present, no, because of the contingency of infinite regress. If it be said that, because of the admission of a stoppage at the third or fourth stage, there is no defect, then, since even on the view of a permanent cause infinite regress may easily be remedied in the very same way, there is not the said defect. Now, if on the admission of the helpfulness of the auxiliary, he who maintains permanence can justify his own position too, let us not admit that; if this be said, no; for, the relation of the helped and the helper, established by co-presence and co-absence between smoke and fuel, the effect and the auxiliary, cannot be got rid of. And the capacity of co-presence and co-absence to establish the relation of the helped and the helper is seen in respect of the primal cause and its effect, the fire and the smoke. Therefore, the need for the helper, the auxiliary, is equal even in both views. And thus, just as on the view of the momentary (cause) there is admitted of the single fire the simultaneous generation of many effects because of difference of auxiliaries and differences of place—*e. g.*, fire generates another fire alone in its own place, smoke above, ashes below, and cognition in the person—similarly, even on the view of a permanent (cause) there is for a single cause the generation of many effects, because of differences

in time and difference of auxiliaries. Therefore, why should there not be effectiveness in sequence? Nor with this much may there be suspected confusion of the views of those who maintain the momentary and the permanent; for, the former has been refuted at the close of the discussion on the restriction (of cognition) to particular objects. Thus, therefore, neglecting the extremely defective view of him who maintains (the sole reality of) momentary cognitions, the Vedānta view that everything is cognised as superimposed on the immutable, eternal intelligence, is alone to be supported, since it is supremely free from defect.

CXXV. Now this view too is certainly defective. It is thus: if by the immutable intelligence are manifested as immediate the things superimposed on itself, then, even objects of inference etc., would be immediate. If intelligence be not the generator of immediate cognition, then even pot etc., would not be immediate, because of the non-existence of what restricts. Nor is it possible to say that the sense-organ is what restricts immediacy; for, if the organ of external sense be such, there is the contingency of the absence of immediacy for happiness, misery etc.; if, however, the internal organ be such, immediacy in the case of the object of inference etc., is difficult to avoid.

CXXVI. There is not this defect; for, being-the-causal-correlate and being-the-manifester are what restrict. The modification of the internal organ, which, going out through the eye etc., pervades the pot etc., for that the pot etc., which are objects, are the causal correlates; for, in the absence of pot etc., a modification pervading them would be unintelligible. And since intelligence is manifested when the modification is originated by pot etc., manifestership belongs to pot etc.,

Therefore, their immediacy stands to reason. And in the case of the objects of inference etc., the two-fold attribute, being-the-causal-correlate and being-the-manifester, is not possible invariably; for even the past and the future are sometimes objects of inference and these cannot intelligibly be the loci of the two-fold present attribute. Now, when it is inferred that there was rain, then rain exists in the form of what is past; therefore, there may be (for it) the capacity to be the locus of a present attribute; if this be said, it does not stand to reason. Is there declared, at the time of the inference, the presence of rain or of (its) attribute of having been in the past? On the first, the simultaneous pastness and presentness of the rain would be self-contradictory. Not the second. What is called past-ness is being associated with a past time that is other than present time. And thence, just as in respect of pot etc., the present time is the determinant, while being recurrent, not thus is the attribute of past-ness; but like the pot in respect of the non-existence of the pot, the present time is merely an indicator (nirupakaḥ), in respect of the attribute of past-ness; hence, for the attribute of past-ness there is no possibility of present-ness, as for the pot. Now if this attribute be in no way capable of the empirical usage of present-ness, it would then be but unreal like a human horn; therefore this attribute is certainly present; if this be said, even thus, being-the-causal-correlate and being-the-manifester are not possible in the case of the rain qualified by that attribute (of past-ness). Verily, the dead Devadatta does not make a pot; nor does a lamp which has gone out manifest that (pot).

CXXVII. Now if, in inference etc., the contents be neither causal correlates nor manifesters, how is it that the

cognition generated by inference etc., has the form of their content? If this be asked, we say that the *probans*, the word etc., supply to cognition the forms of the respective contents, on the strength of particular relations, like inseparability and the (significant) capacity (of the word). Nor may it be said 'If, in the case of the past and the future just as there is admitted the attribute of content-ness, if there be also admitted the attributes of being-the-causal-correlate and being-the-manifester, then, even in inference etc., as in perception, there may be the supplying of the form to cognition (by the content) even as content (instead of through some other relation)'. For, there is not in the object of inference any attribute of a positive nature called content-ness, in which case that would be an example (for the inference). What then? The state in which the object of inference was prior to the setting out of the inference, the removal of that state is alone stated by the word 'content-ness'. Nor may that state itself be suspected to be an example, for, that too is of the nature of the prior non-existence of the said removal. Therefore, in objects of inference, like what is past, causal correlate-ness of a positive nature is difficult to establish. If objects of inference like what is past be not object-causal-correlates, how is there the use of a transitive (verb-) root in respect of it, in the form 'He knows the rain'? We say that it is because of a figure of speech. Just as in perceptual cognition having an object there is fruit, similarly that (fruit) exists in inference etc., as well; merely because of the existence of that, its having an object is figuratively spoken of. If an object in the principal sense be admitted here, (then) even in the inference of the past etc., as in perception, immediacy would be difficult to avoid. And this being the case, even where present fire

etc., are inferred, because of similarity in being an object of inference, it should be understood of the fire etc., in order to avoid their (possible) immediacy, that they are not object-causal-correlate. In perception, however, because of the non-existence of relations like inseparability, in order to supply form to the cognition, there should be admitted of the content, object-causal-correlateness alone. And there, causal correlateness is invariably possible, since the presence of the content of perception is invariable. Therefore, though the superimposedness of all things on the immutable intelligence is common, there is established restriction of immediacy to the contents of perception alone, because of their being causal correlates and manifesters.

CXXVIII. Nor may it be objected how on the indeterminate intelligence there is the superimposition of determinate things; for, this has been answered in the discussion on the restriction (of cognition) to particular objects, that the substrate of the superimposition of egoity etc., is but that intelligence which is determinate through the residual impression of earlier (superimpositions of) cognisership etc.

CXXIX. Now, even thus, primal nescience, the material cause of the whole universe of residual impressions etc., should be superimposed on the indeterminate intelligence alone; for, all other things that bring about determinateness are established in dependence on the superimposition of nescience; nor is the substrate-ness of the indeterminate intelligible; for everywhere substrate-ness is seen only in the case of the determinate; how, then, is there the superimposition of nescience? There is not this defect; for substrate-ness being intelligible with the mere manifestation of immediacy, determinateness is not a determinant (of substrateness).

And this is to be understood, because of the non-existence of any instance of mere co-absence. If it be said that, because of the self being ever-an-object-of-inference, there is no immediacy (for it), no; for this has been answered in the discussion of egoity, on the ground of conflict with immediate experience as 'I'. The experience 'I' is but generated by inference; yet because of the facility due to repeated practice, that (cognition) being quickly originated without the formulation of the pervasion and the presence (of the *probans*) in the subject, there is for creatures the delusion of immediacy in respect of that; if this be said, no. If that were so, for Devadatta cognising pot etc., there would not be cognition of the relation in the form 'This is known by me'. Just as in respect of the pot cognised by another, the relation to oneself is not cognised, similarly (would it be) even in respect of what is cognised by oneself; for, there is no distinction between the two in respect of being ever-objects-of-inference. If it be said that there is a distinction in oneself being the locus of the cognition, on the occasion of cognition by oneself, no; for, when one's own self is not cognised, its being the locus of cognition is difficult to know. Nor can being the locus of cognition be inferred from the relation to fruit, since the relation (of the self) to the fruit has up to now not been established. Therefore, the self is immediate as self-luminous, not ever-an-object-of-inference.

CXXX. As for him who disputes self-luminousness, he is to be asked: is the self immediate as the locus of cognition, or merely because of the existence of a relation to cognition, or because of being an adjunct (of cognition), or because of being the content of cognition? Not the first. The self is not immediate as the locus of cognition, since

it is immediate without being an object of cognition, like cognition. Not the second, because of undue extension. On the third too, what is called being an adjunct of cognition is not being the locus of cognition; for, in the case of a content, which is not the locus, there is the contingency of the non-existence of immediacy. Nor is it (the adjunct) to be one of the two—the locus or the content, since the content is difficult to demonstrate. If it be said that the content is what is capable of the empirical usage prompted by the cognition, the self too would then be a content. To be that which determines cognition while being other than (its) locus, (this) is over-pervasive of the sense of sight. And to be capable of empirical usage prompted by the cognition while being other than (its) locus, (this) is over-pervasive of the relation between cognition and the self. Nor is the content-ness of the relation acceptable, because of the contingency of its immediacy. Inherence is indeed acknowledged by you to be ever-an-object-of-inference. On the fourth too, the cognition, whose content is the self, does not belong to a different time from the cognition whose content is pot etc. If that were so, the relation to the object cognised in the form 'This is known by me' would not be known. Nor is there simultaneity of those too; for it is not possible for two cognitions to arise simultaneously apprehending contrary contents. There is not indeed seen in the case of Devadatta the simultaneous entering on two forms of motion, which pervade objects situated both in front and behind. If it be said that though two contrary forms of motion be simultaneously unintelligible, there is no non-intelligibility in the case of two modifications, no; for two modifications through (different) parts are unintelligible in the case of the partless. Nor can there be two modifications

of the whole; for in the case of the contrary modifications, infancy and youth, present in the entire body, simultaneity is not seen. Therefore, by elimination, the immediacy of the self is only through its being self-luminous. Nor may it be said 'In the absence of the substrate being apprehended by the same sense-organ as the superimposed, superimposition is nowhere seen, merely on the basis of immediacy'; for in respect of the ether, perceived by the witness or by the mind alone, there is seen immediacy of visible impurity etc. If it be said that the visibility of ether is accepted by the Jainas and the Bhāttas, no; because, if that were so, there is the contingency of its possessing colour and touch. As for the co-presence and co-absence of the sense of sight, they are otherwise explained as relating to that non-existence of corporeal substance, which is the ground for inferring ether.

CXXXI. As for those disputants, who in conformity with their respective teachings, admit the ether as ever-an object-of-inference, for them, this (ether) is certainly an example, since there is no apprehension (of it) by the same sense-organ as the superimposed. The self too, which is the substrate of this superimposition, that is removable by knowledge and is of the form of nescience and its products, is not affected by the defects present in that (superimposition), since it is not the material cause. Thus, therefore, since the remedying of all defects is easily accomplished in the Vedānta system, the superimposition of the not-self even on the inner self is certainly possible.

CXXXII. Now, the superimposition of the not-self on the self, though associated with (the statement of) the characteristic and the possibility, is not capable of being established in the absence of evidence, since everywhere the

establishment of the object of knowledge is dependent on evidence; if this be said, then, here perception, inference, presumption and revelation are to be understood as the evidence. The whole world accomplishes empirical usage of the form of cogniser, cognised etc., only after superimposing the identity of oneself, of the nature of intelligence, on the assemblage of body, organs etc., qualified by class, in the form 'I am a man', 'I am a god', 'I am a beast'; this is perception. Though, because of the inclusion of the senses among the objects of knowledge, there is impossibility of the causal aggregate of perception, yet the eternal witness-perception will be possible. Where immediacy is seen even in the absence of the causal aggregate, there exists witness-perception by the witness; this indeed is the Vedānta usage. Similarly there is inference too: what are in dispute, viz., Devadatta's periods of waking and dream possess the empirical usage of cognisership etc., as preceded by his own superimpositions like 'I am a man'; for they are periods other than his own period of sleep etc.; what is not thus (possessed of the empirical usage of cognisership etc.) is not thus (a period other than that of sleep), like his own period of sleep etc. There is presumption too: the empirical usage of cognisership etc., is not intelligible in the absence of the superimposition of identity with the body etc., since in sleep etc., when there is no superimposition, the (said) empirical usage is not cognised. As for revelation, that is to be understood from such (texts) as 'A brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice'.

CXXXIII. Now, the empirical usage of cognisership etc., requires merely a relation between the body and the self, not identity; if this be said, what is this relation? If it be said to be the relation of property to the owner, then, there

should be the empirical usage of cognisership etc., even through the bodies of servants etc. Let the relation then be that of conforming to one's *wishes* alone; as for the body of servants etc., since it conforms to one's *utterances*, there is undue extension; if this be said, not so. If what is intended be only the capacity to conform to wishes, then, since that exists even in sleep, the empirical usage (even at that time) would be difficult to avoid. If then it be (actual) conformity to wishes, then, because of its non-existence in the ailing, there would be no empirical usage of cognisership etc. (in that case). If it be said that conformity to wishes being at the root of empirical usage is established by experience, is this universal or occasional? Not the first, for even without conformity to wishes, there is seen the cognisership of evil odours etc. Not the second; for desire too having superimposition at its root, superimposition itself is the cause of empirical usage. Indeed, in the absence of the superimposition of identity with the internal organ, the modification in the form of desire is not possible for the unchanging self. Nor is the cause of empirical usage the relation of conjunction or inherence between the self and the not-self; for, since they exist even in sleep, there is the contingency of empirical usage (then). In the case of relations like the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed, being produced by one's own activity (karma), and being the abode of one's own organ (of sense and action), they are not the root of empirical usage, since superimposition is at their root, and since they obtain in respect of the body of servants etc. If then, to exclude servants etc., it be said that the relation is that of being the object of enjoyment without any mediation, even then, if it be only the capacity to be enjoyed, that exists even in sleep. If then it be the being enjoyed, even thus, since non-mediation

for the self is common in all bodies, places and times, there would be required a regulative primary relation in respect of a particular body alone being the object of enjoyment and only at particular places and times. Therefore, only the superimposition of identity is the cause of empirical usage.

CXXXIV. Even on this view, what is the regulator of superimposition in respect of a particular body? If this be asked, we reply that it is the particular subtle body. Nor is the relation between the subtle body and the self one with a beginning, in which case another regulator should be sought in respect of that too. Nor may it be said that if the empirical usage of cognisership etc., had as its root the superimposition of identity with the body etc., there would result invalidity for perception etc., because of defect in (their) instruments. The loss here of such validity as makes known the truth, in the case of those (pramāṇas) other than the Vedānta, is certainly admitted (by us). Empirical validity however, is not lost, since there is no sublation in empirical usage; for, by the acceptance of their sublation only in the stage of release, there is accepted their being of the nature of superimposition. Nor may it be said that the two, viz., being of the nature of superimposition and being subsidiary to unfailing empirical usage, are contradictory, since both are established by evidence. Of these, the evidences for being of the nature of superimposition have been stated; and the other is established by experience. If it be said that non-failure cannot be ascertained, the non-failure of the apparent empirical usage generated by perception etc., is established by the witness; as for the absolute (non-failure) that is not admitted. And in the case of the Vedāntas, since they have for content the absolutely

unsublatable, validity such as makes known the truth is appropriate. Though themselves illusory they certainly make known the unsublatable, since, in such cases as the dream perception of a damsel, though illusory by nature, there is seen the capacity to indicate (relatively) real prosperity.

CXXXV. Now, perception etc. are empirically valid means of knowledge, since they have for content things capable of practical efficiency in empirical usage; it is in this way indeed that their validity has to be established by you; and thus there is the contingency of the validity being extrinsic; if this be said, no, since there is parity (of this defect) for you too who establish (validity thus): 'These which are in dispute are valid means of knowledge, since they have contents corresponding to the things.' If then, since the truth of the content results only from the cognition which is the subject (*viṣayin*), and not from another cognition, there is no extrinsicality, then, this is common to our view too, that the capacity in the content for practical efficiency in empirical usage results only from the cognition which is the *viṣayin*.

CXXXVI. If it be said 'Even then, if Brahman-knowledge have superimposition for the material cause, there is the contingency of illusoriness as for knowledge of the world,' no; for the illusoriness (of that cognition) in its own nature (as cognition) is acceptable. If then the *probandum* be illusoriness of the content (i. e., Brahman), then apprehension of the perishable is the conditioning adjunct, in the case of the knowledge of the world. If it be said 'Then Brahman-knowledge too is what apprehends the perishable, since it is generated by a defective cause, like the cognition of rope-snake,' no; for, the *probans* is non-established.

Brahman-knowledge, indeed, is not generated by the defects like film in the eye and jaundice. If it be said that nescience itself, the material cause of Brahman-knowledge, is the defect, no; for, though nescience is a defect in respect of intelligence, as obstructing the presentation of the non-duality of intelligence and generating the presentation of duality, yet, in respect of Brahman-knowledge, this, being helpful to it as the material cause, is an excellence. If it be said that in the case of one and the same, the natures of excellence and defect are contradictory, no; for it is seen in the case of the film in the eye etc., that though they are defects in respect of the presentation of the true nature of rope etc., as being opposed thereto, yet through being *probans* in the inference of the sin that is their own cause, they are excellences (in respect of that inference). Therefore when there exist all the causes of valid knowledge, the film in the eye or the like which comes in as opposed to that, such a cause of invalidity alone is a defect. In ordinary experience, however, in respect of hunger, thirst etc., though opposed (to one's state of equilibrium), there is not seen the cognition of their being defects, merely because of their being natural; need it then be said that nescience, which is both natural and helpful, is not a defect? Therefore, even for perception etc., which are of the nature of superimposition, there is no invalidity; hence superimposition is the material cause of empirical usage.

CXXXVII. The superimposition in dispute is the efficient cause of the empirical usage of cogniser etc., since it is superimposition, like the superimposition of nacre-silver; if this be said, no; for not being the basis of empirical usage

is the conditioning adjunct (in the latter case). Since the empirical usage of cogniser etc., is seen in the self, even in the absence of the silver-superimposition, the silver-superimposition is not the basis of that (usage); but the superimposition of the body on the self is the basis of that (usage), since empirical usage is not cognised in sleep, devoid of the superimposition of the body on the self.

CXXXVIII. (If) then it be thought (thus) 'Empirical usage abides in the cogniser, and cognisership results for the self, even without superimposition, because of its being intelligent,' that is not (so); for in the absence of superimposition, since the self that is non-attached and non-active does not generate valid knowledge, cognisership, consisting in the prompting of the causal correlates, is unintelligible. Therefore, the empirical usage of cognisership etc., has certainly superimposition for material cause. If it be said that the empirical usage of the non-discriminating alone is thus, not the empirical usage of the discriminating, no. The empirical usage even of the discriminating, in so far as it is worldly, since it is on a par with the empirical usage of beasts etc., is certainly the product of superimposition. And in the case of beasts etc., the empirical usage consisting in the cognition (as distinguished from the appellation) 'I', in respect of the assemblage of body etc., is of the nature of superimposition; for, it is a cognition of oneness in respect of two whose difference has not been apprehended, like the cognition of nacre-silver. Truly, not even by the discriminating is the difference between the body and the self apprehended in the period of worldly empirical usage, in which case there would be no similarity to beasts etc. And if difference were apprehended, then, in respect of food, drink etc., helpful to

the body, and beating etc., injurious (to it), the activity towards or away from (these objects), as in the case of beasts etc., because of the cognition 'This is helpful to me or injurious' would not be intelligible. The difference between the body and the self is understood even by ordinary perception, since even in the vulgar, such as women and śūdras, there is seen activity like bathing in the Gaṅgā for the sake of the other world; if this be said, no; for difference is there understood merely through the tradition of the statements of the trustworthy. If not, the śāstra would not set out for the sake of knowledge of the self. Therefore, the worldly empirical usage, even of the discriminating, is certainly of the nature of superimposition.

CXXXIX(a). Now for the discriminating, empirical usage due to the śāstra is not of the nature of superimposition, since only after cognising through trustworthy testimony the self as related to another world (too), does one engage in Vedic rites. It may be (asked) thus: is it the injunction of the fruit, as in 'With the citra he is to sacrifice, who desires cattle', 'With the jyotiṣṭoma he is to sacrifice, who desires heaven', that postulates the self which is different from the body and belongs to the other world (too)? Or is it the injunction of the obligatory as in 'So long as one is alive, one is to offer the agnihotra oblation'? Or is it an injunction of the (specially) occasioned as in 'He, whose house has been burnt down, is to sacrifice'? Or is it the injunction of an expiatory rite? Even on the first, what is unintelligible in the absence of a self different from the body? Is it the fruit of cattle etc., or the fruit of heaven?

CXXXIX(b). Not the first; for cattle etc., are capable of being obtained even in this life. Nor may it be objected

that if the citrā etc., bore fruit even here, there would be no difference from the kāriri etc., which invariably bear fruit in immediate succession (to the rite); for in this life itself, it is intelligible that the citrā etc., do not bear fruit in an invariable manner, even because of differences of the periods like youth and old age (when the fruit may be admitted). In the case, however, of the kāriri etc., since they are enjoined when crops are perishing for want of rain, there is the invariable production of fruit in immediate succession. Nor the second: for, on the principle “‘Hell and heaven are here alone’ says he to the mother, ‘what is pleasing to the mind is heaven; the reverse of that is hell,’” the happiness generated by (possession of) cattle etc., which is denoted by the word heaven and is the fruit of the jyotiṣṭoma etc., is possible even here. That happiness, indeed, is not the fruit of the citrā etc., since this (latter) is enjoined for him who desires cattle etc., alone. Though heaven be unsurpassed pleasure, its belonging to this life is uncontradicted, since that too is possible even here, through the attainment of universal empery etc. If it be said that in the śāstras, heavenly enjoyment is understood to exist on the other side of (Mount) Meru, that too is easy to accomplish with this same body by him who is an adept in spells, drugs, etc. If that be not seen to be so, then some defect in the subsidiaries is to be assumed there too, as in the kāriri etc., when rain is not generated.

CXXXIX(c). Nor are the second and third (alternatives possible); for in the system of the Guru (Prabhākara), the injunctions of the obligatory and the occasioned are devoid of fruit; on the view of Bhaṭṭa too, the fruit of those is capable of being enjoyed even here.

CXXXIX(d). Nor the fourth (alternative); for, the expiatory rite has the sole fruit of removing sin. If it be said that, in order to experience the fruit of brahmanicide etc., for which expiation has not been performed, the self goes to hell, no; for, like heaven, it is possible to experience hell too in this same life. If it be said that in the śāstra there is cognised the enjoyment of the fruit of sin in the bodies of dogs, swine etc., no; for what is intended there is only the attainment of misery equal to that of swine etc. Therefore there is no ground for the assumption of a self other than the body.

CXL. This is not so (says the purvapaksin). For, when, on the principle of the section¹ about deities (having forms), through mantras and eulogistic (or condemnatory) passages, which are authoritative, there is known the fruit of heaven etc., to be enjoyed at particular times and places, in particular bodies and so on, there is established a self other than body. Though this sense is established by the principle of that section about deities, which occurs in the Vedānta, Jaimini does not acknowledge it; if this be said, no; though the true nature of the self as different from the body is not expressly stated as an aphorism by Jaimini, since that is not required by injunctions, it is aphoristically stated by presumption in the aphorism relating to the authoritativeness, consisting in non-dependence, of the entire Veda whose content is both what is established and what is to be done. Otherwise, how is it that, by his commentator, the self other than the body is inquired into, on the basis of the authoritativeness of the mantras, eulogistic passages etc.? Nor may it be said that, in that section² about deities which occurs in the earlier

¹ Br. Śū. I, III, 26-27.

² PM., IX-1-6-10.

tantra, the authoritativeness of mantras etc., has been refuted by the aphorist and the commentator. There, indeed the purport is not the refutation of the authoritativeness of mantras etc., in general, but only of those which conflict; if on the strength of mantras like 'The great Indra has adamantine arms' deities (be admitted to) have forms, there would result their being auxiliary by being (physically) present like the officiating priests etc., and since that is opposed to experience, there is refuted (the authoritativeness of such mantras). In the case, however, of mantras etc., which do not conflict, authoritativeness is certainly admitted; for even the characteristic marks (līṅgas) present in eulogistic passages are cited as authoritative here and there in the Twelve-chaptered work (i. e., the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras*). Thus, therefore, knowing on the strength of mantras etc., the self different from the body, the discriminating ones set out in respect of rites prescribed by śāstra; hence that empirical usage is not of the nature of superimposition.

CXLI. There is not this defect. Do these who perform rites know on the strength of mantras, eulogistic passages etc., the self that is different from the body and is of a single impartite consistency, or the self that goes to another world? Not the first; for, that is to be known through the Vedānta alone. On the second too, when there is knowledge of the self that goes to another world, is it your view that superimposition in general is removed or that the superimposition of the gross body is removed? Not the first; for owing to the unintelligibility of the omnipresent going to another world, it should be admitted that the superimposition of the internal organ is not removed. Not the second; for, the removal of an immediate superimpo-

sition by mere mediate cognition is impossible. Therefore, in the case of the discriminating ones, even the empirical usage relating the śāstra is certainly due to superimposition.

CXLII. If all empirical usage have superimposition at its root, then, it must be specifically demonstrated as between the self and the not-self, where there is superimposition and of which; if this be said, then, listen attentively. First, on the witness-intelligence are imposed in sequence the internal organ, the organs (of sense and action), the body, the objects external to that and the attributes of (all) these. Here too the intelligence qualified by each earlier superimposition is to be understood to be the substrate of each subsequent superimposition. Nor is the superimposition of external objects on the self to be disputed; for when son, wife etc., are imperfect or hale, there is seen the empirical usage 'I myself am imperfect or hale.' Now this usage is not in the principal sense, since it is not universal; for when the son has lost his wife, there is not seen the usage 'I have lost my wife'; if this be said, not so; for merely because of not being seen in some places, the use in the principal sense in the places where this is seen cannot be avoided. Indeed, since in some place there is not seen the empirical usage of silver in respect of nacre the empirical usage of silver even elsewhere, where nacre appears in the form of silver, does not become figurative. Let it be that because of the cognition of identity, there is, as between nacre and silver, superimposition in the principal sense; but since difference is cognised as between one's own body and a son, the empirical usage of oneness is but figurative like 'Devadatta is a lion'; if this be said, no, because of disparity (between the example and what is illustrated).

Truly, by the happiness and misery of the lion, Devadatta is not affected; hence in the case of those who resort to the empirical usage of their oneness (i. e., speak of the two as one), the cognition is figurative. Here, however, the father has through the happiness and misery of the son the conceit 'I am myself affected'. If then you think that the conceit is due to great affection, not due to superimposition, that is not (so); for affection too is due to superimposition. Otherwise, for that same father who has attained renunciation, when there is discriminative knowledge, how is it that there is not seen affection as before, for the same son etc.? Truly, for affection, which is real, removal merely by discriminative knowledge is not possible; for, there is seen the pervasion that knowledge is the cause of removal of nescience alone. Now if the empirical usage 'I' produced by affection in respect of son etc., be due to superimposition, how, then, is the empirical usage of the king, in the form 'Bhadrāsena is myself', in respect of a very loving servant who accomplishes all things (for the master), cited as figurative by the commentator (Śaṅkara), in the section on desiring?¹ The citation is of what is disparate; for there, the king's affection is not prompted by the existence of Bhadrāsena, since aversion is seen for that same person when doing the reverse (of what is desired). What then? The affection is only for those deeds performed by him which are helpful and required by the king. In the case of sons, however, the father's affection is certainly unconditioned; for the affection does not cease in respect of him who cannot do anything or him who does the reverse (of what is desired). Even then, affection is not due to superimposition, since in respect of objects of affection like clothes and ornaments there is not

¹ Br. Śc., I, 1, 5

the cognition 'I'; if this be said, no; for, there too does exist superimposition, consisting in the cognition 'mine.' Of superimposition two forms as 'I' and 'mine' are intelligible, because of gradations of affection. And that gradation has been shown by Viśvarūpācārya, while commenting on the śruti text 'This is dearer than the son¹': 'The son is dearer than wealth, the body than the son, the organs than the body; the vital air is dearer than the organs; the self is much dearer than the vital air²'. Therefore, in respect of riches etc., which are merely dear, there is invariably the superimposition of relation alone in the form 'mine'; in respect of the son, who is dearer, sometimes oneness too is superimposed; in respect of the body, which is dearer still, there is superimposition of oneness to a great extent; in respect of the internal organ, however, which is dearer even than that, the superimposition of oneness is invariable. Now if the cognition of oneness in respect of the son be due to superimposition, how, then, is it that, in the commentary at the conclusion of the catus-sūtri, in the words 'If the secondary and illusory selves be unreal, then, because of the sublation of son, body etc.', the son is cited as a secondary (i. e. figurative) self? This is not a defect. What is intended there is only that there is not superimposition of oneness to the same large extent as in respect of the body, not that superimposition of oneness with the self does not exist in any case in respect of the son. Otherwise, how would the śruti 'Thou thyself art under the name of the son'³ be intelligible? This text, indeed, restates what is established in ordinary experience, the superimposition of identity with

¹ Brh., I, iv, 8

² Brh. Vārtika, v. 1081, p. 640

³ Kauṣītaki, II, 11

the son Therefore, in respect of objects like son and wife, there does exist superimposition.

CXLIII. Now, even if somehow you dispute the superimposition of identity in respect of the son etc., yet the superimposition of their attributes has certainly to be acknowledged, for, when the infant son is adored with clothes, ornaments etc., there is seen in the father the conceit 'I myself am adored'. Similarly, the verbal usage 'This is I' made while the finger indicates one's own body, makes known in the case of the self the superimposition of identity with the body. The superimposition of bodily attributes, like leanness, on the self is well known in the empirical usage 'I am lean, I am dark'. In 'I am dumb, I am a speaker, I am blind, I am a seer,' only the attributes of the organs are superimposed on the self. For, here, the superimposition of the substrates, the organs, is not possible, since in the case of these, which are ever-objects-of-inference, there is no capacity for superimposition, which is immediate. In 'I am desirous, angry' the attributes of the internal organ are superimposed on the self. Nor may it be said that desire etc., are attributes of the self alone, not of the internal organ; for they exist only when the internal organ exists. Though the self is the material cause of desire etc., yet since the internal organ is the efficient cause, there is its co-presence and co-absence; if this be said, no; for the departure of desire etc., in sleep, is unintelligible, with the departure of the internal organ, which is efficient cause alone (according to you). If it be said that their departure is due to the departure of the non-inherent cause, viz., the conjunction between the internal organ and the self, even thus, material causality alone is to be assumed in the case of the internal organ, since that

(causality) is the most proximate (to the mind making the assumption). If it be said that efficient causality too is certainly proximate, since in its absence, the effect is not originated, no; for since other efficient causes like the sense of sight exist there, it has not to be assumed. Nor does some other material cause exist here, in which case material causality too would not have to be assumed. If, however, the self were the material cause, there would be the appositional cognition 'I am desire', not the relational cognition 'I am desirous' like 'Devadatta has a staff'. But the apposition of the internal organ with desire etc., is established by the śruti 'Desire, resolve'¹ etc. Therefore, desire etc., which are certainly attributes of the internal organ, are imposed on the self; and the internal organ is superimposed on its own witness, the self, as one with it. Otherwise, there would not be for the bare witness the cognition 'I', as qualified by conceit (in respect of the body etc.).

OXLIV. Now, the internal organ is not cognised by the witness; but it is known because of the unintelligibility otherwise of sequence in cognition that is seen (even) when the self, the organs and the objects are together; if this be said, no, because of the intelligibility (of the sequence) even otherwise. That sequence is intelligible even on the assumption that for the self itself there is the capacity to generate cognition in sequence. Nor may it be said that when some regulator has necessarily to be assumed, the mind itself may be assumed; for the assumption of capacity alone in the case of the self which is certainly established is more consistent with parsimony than the assumption of another substance endowed with the capacity. Now, then, let the mind be

¹ Brh., I, v, 8; Mait., VI, 80

known by this inference: the sequence in dispute, in the case of the agent, requires a common cause that produces sequences, since it is a sequence in the origination of the effect in the case of an agent who is in the proximity of several objects, like the sequence in the act of cutting, which needs a hatchet, in the case of Devadatta who is in the proximity of arms (to cut with) and what is to be cut. This is not sound; for (the *probans* is) inconclusive in respect of the sequence which exists in the conjunctions of each organ with the mind as agent. Indeed, when of the mind there is conjunction with the organs in sequence, there is not any common cause. If it be said that unseen potency itself may be that (cause), thus there is inconclusiveness in respect of the sequence of the conjunction with (different) parts of the ether, in the case of the fruit falling from the tree. If it be said that even there heaviness is the common cause, thus then there is inconclusiveness in respect of the sequence present in the conjunctions of the sense of sight with each object. Nor may it be said that here too unseen potency is common; for what is intended as the *probandum* is only a common cause other than unseen potency. And this being the case, even the first-mentioned instance of inconclusiveness is not defective.

CXLV. Then it may be thought thus: what is in dispute, viz., the origination of specific qualities like cognition, requires a non-inherent cause consisting in the conjunction of some other substance with its own locus, since it is the origination of a specific quality belonging to an eternal substance, like, the origination of redness in the primal atoms, as dependent on conjunction with fire; and thus that which is the other is mind. This too is not intelligible; for, the

self's conjunction even with the body and the organs being a non-inherent cause of cognition, in respect of this it is proving the proved. If it be said that when dream-cognition is made the subject, the mind is established (as the other substance required), no; for, even with body (being the other substance) there is proving the proven. Indeed, even in dreams, the self's relation to the body does not depart. Then let the mind be an object of perception; if this be said, no; for if the mind be of atomic size, like the primal atom, it could not be known by the senses; if it be of infinite size, there is the contingency of the simultaneous presentation of the whole world; even if it be of intermediate size, it could not be known by the senses, since the mind is seen in the state of dreams, though there are no organs of sense. Nor may it be said that there is no cognition of the mind at all; for there is the experience 'My mind is elsewhere.' Therefore, by elimination, it is established of the mind that it is cognised by the witness.

CXLVI(a). And this witness, the inner self, is superimposed on the not-selfs, the internal organ etc., as one with them, since, in egoity etc., intelligence is cognised.

CXLVI(b). Now if the self and the not-self be superimposed each on the other, there would be illusoriness for both because of being super-imposed; similarly, because of both being substrates, there would be general manifestation alone, and no specific manifestation even of one; if this be said, not so. For, it is the specific manifestation of the two as of the nature of intelligence and inertness that makes known the reciprocal superimposition; for, in superimposition, specific presentation is determined by being the superimposed. And in the superimposition of one (alone

on the other), there would be specific manifestation of one alone. Nor is there the contingency of the illusoriness of both, for of intelligence there is no superimposition of existence on the non-intelligent since it is superimposed only as related (to that latter). Nor because of specific manifestation is there conflict with being the substrate; for, the particularity is not cognised as an attribute of the substrate; for it is cognised only in this transposed manner that for the body there is intelligence and for the self inertness. Nor may it be said that, if there be specific manifestation of both, superimposition is not possible, and that, if there is apposition (of the two), that comes to be figurative. For, men of the world do not have the conceit that the cognition of the self in the internal organ etc., is figurative, but only that it is in the principal sense. In respect of the seen, indeed, there is nothing called non-intelligibility.

CXLVI(c). Now the word 'etcetera' (in 'internal organ etc.') is unintelligible, since there is superimposition of the pure self on the internal organ alone; in respect of the organs etc., however, it is only the internal organ qualified by the superimposed self that relates (to them); if this be said, true it is thus. Yet, since it is intelligence alone that shines as defined by the organs etc., and not the internal organs, the word 'etcetera' is used with manifestation in view. It is only because of the continuous manifestation of intelligence in the body, organs etc., that for the Lokāyatas etc., there is the delusion of self-hood in respect of them. Otherwise, for all disputants, there would be the delusion of self-hood in respect of the internal organ alone, whereon intelligence is superimposed, but not in respect of the body etc. Thus therefore, the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the

not-self having been justified by the statement of the definition, the possibility and the evidences for its existence, it is established that it cannot be disputed by any one.

CXLVII. Now, in order to infer that the śāstra in dispute has a possible content and fruit, since it is the enemy of bondage having the nature of superimposition, like waking cognition, superimposition was established by you. Here, what is called fruit, is it the removal of such evil as agency, enjoyership etc., or the removal of the cause of evil, i. e., nescience, and its product, superimposition? Not the first, since when the cause exists, there is origination again of the evil that has been removed. Not the second, since of beginningless superimposition removal is impossible. If it be said that there is removal, because of the authoritativeness of the śāstra, no, because of conflict with perception. Indeed even in respect of the self, discriminated through reasoning from the body etc., we do not see the removal of superimposition.

CXLVIII. It is said (in reply). Like the removal of the beginningless prior non-existence, which is established in your system as the cause of transmigration, why should there not be removal of superimposition too? Superimposition is not removed, since it is beginningless and of the nature of an existent, like the self; if this be said, no. What is called being of the nature of an existent, is it reality, or difference of nature from the non-existent? On the first (alternative), there is non-establishment of *probans*, for those who maintain indeterminability. Not the second. What is in dispute is removable by knowledge, since it is of the nature of nescience, like the superimposition of silver etc. Nor is there sublation by the earlier inference, since that itself is sublated by this.

Just as a general śāstra¹ is sublated by a specific one, similarly why should not a general inference be sublated by a specific inference? Now, what is called removal is a subsequent state occurring in one's own material cause, since in the case of a pot, removal is the attainment of the form of potsherds, occurring in the clay; and this indeed, is not possible in the case of the superimposition of nescience, which has no material cause; if this be said, no; for, removal is the subsequent state occurring in one's own locus (not in one's material cause); else there is the contingency of non-removal in respect of the beginningless blackness etc., present in the primal atoms. Though when the self distinct from the body etc., is cognised through reasoning, the removal of superimposition is not seen (to result) with that alone, yet, when from texts like 'That thou art'² being of the nature of Brahman is realised, the removal of what is opposed—nescience and its product, superimposition—stands to reason. Nescience 'obscuring Brahman, and its product (superimposition) are indeed opposed to Brahman-knowledge. But to the knowledge of the self distinct from the body there is opposed the self-hood of the body; hence of the latter alone there is removal by

¹There is a general teaching 'Do not injure any being'; and there is a special injunction in the context of the agniṣomiya, 'cut the animal belonging to the agniṣomiya'. These two passages conflict with each other; and both of them cannot be valid. Were the general teaching to sublate the particular injunction, then there would be no purport for the latter which is also an injunction of the Veda. To maintain that both the passages are purportful it is determined that the general teaching holds good in all cases where there is not any special injunction to the contrary. The special injunction which enjoins the sacrifice of an animal is in connection with a sacrificial rite. So it is an exception to the general rule of non-violence to all beings; and it sublates the latter only in this particular case, viz., the agniṣomiya, leaving its purport intact in all other cases.

²Chand., VI, viii, 7

the former. Though the intelligent self manifested in the cognition 'I' is but Brahman, yet since it is not manifest in the form of Brahman, the cognition 'I' is not Brahman-knowledge. Though knowledge through reasoning may somehow have Brahman for its sphere, to it does not belong the capacity to remove immediate superimposition, either because it is not authoritative (in respect of Brahman knowable by the Vedānta alone) or because it is mediate. Therefore, the removal of superimposition results only from the Vedānta-generated realisation of Brahman.

OXLIX. Now, the removal of superimposition is not the only fruit of the śāstra, but also the attainment of bliss; if this be said, true. Yet when there is mentioned the content, consisting in the oneness of the jīva and Brahman, the jīva's attainment of bliss too is directly obtained as included in the content; for, by the śruti text 'Bliss is Brahman'¹ the nature of bliss belongs to Brahman alone. And that the attainment of bliss is a fruit is well established even because of its being the object of human desire. Therefore this has not to be mentioned separately as a fruit.

CL. Then, even the removal of superimposition need not be mentioned separately, since it is the content of the śāstra, like the attainment of bliss; if this be said, not so. This removal of superimposition, is it independently the content of the śāstra? Or is it included in the content, consisting in the oneness of Brahman and the self? Not the first; for, it is only the oneness of Brahman and the self that is declared by the śāstra. By such texts declaring fruit as 'Again, at the end, there is the removal of all māya'²

¹Taitt., III, vi. 1

²Śvet., I, 10

and 'The knot of the heart is cut'¹, there is restated the removal of superimposition, only as resulting through presumption from the realisation of the oneness of oneself and Brahman. Not the second; for, by texts like 'That thou art'² which declare the oneness of Brahman and the self, the removal of superimposition is not made the content.

CLI. In the absence of the removal of the relation to the world present in Brahman, and of nescience and its product present in the *jīva*, even the oneness stated in texts like 'That thou art'³ is not intelligible; if this be said, then there results (only) what is stated by us, that the removal of nescience results (presumptively) from the capacity (of what is scripturally declared).

CLII. Though in the major texts like 'That thou art'⁴ the removal of superimposition has to be derived presumptively, in minor texts like 'not gross, not subtle'⁵ that is declared; if this be said, not so. For here, the meaning of the words 'not gross' etc., is not the removal of the bondage that is to result in the stage of release through the intuition of Brahman as the self. What then? In the case of Brahman that is itself non-attached, what is natural in all three times, *i. e.*, the nature of not being related to the universe, that alone is declared by words like 'not gross'. For when that is declared, the *jīva* will be able subsequently to intuit the self-hood of Brahman through the

¹ *Mund.*, II, 11, 8

² *Chānd.*, VI, viii, 7

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Bṛh.*, III, viii, 8

major text; but not otherwise, since the meaning of the word 'Brahman' is beyond ordinary experience.

CLIII. Nor is there conflict of the evidence which apprehends Brahman's relation to the universe with the declaration of (its) non-relation to the universe; for there is no such evidence at all; though perception etc. have the world for their sphere, yet, since they do not apprehend Brahman, they do not make known any relation between those two. And texts like 'All that is this is the self'¹ do not declare of Brahman self-hood in respect of the whole universe, since that (self-hood) is established even through its being the material cause of all. What then? They restate that (self-hood) which is certainly established otherwise, and, as intimating the object of negation needed by the texts declaring non-relation to the universe, attain syntactical unity of a sentence (with another sentence).² Otherwise, how could they declare relation to the universe, which is not a human goal and is opposed to non-relation to the universe, which is a human goal? That non-relationship to the universe is a human goal and that relationship

¹ Nṛsimbhottara, 5

² Where one statement has to be construed with another, making one syntactical unit with the latter, the former may either be complete in itself, but for the expectancy of fruit, or it may be more incomplete, occupying only the place of a word in the latter statement. In the first case we have *vākyaikavākyaṭā*, the syntactical unity of a sentence, and in the latter, *padāikavākyaṭā*, the syntactical unity of a word. It is generally held that eulogistic and condemnatory statements, like 'Vāyu is the swiftest deity' occupy only the place of words in the final syntactical unit, their purport being that of a single-word-sense, e. g., praise-of-Vāyu; thus they enjoy only *padāikavākyaṭā*. The author of the *Vivaraṇa*, however, holds that even such statements enjoy *vākyaikavākyaṭā*, there being an intermediate purport in respect of their sentence-senses; see his *Nyāyanirṇaya*, pp. 26, 27, (Madras University edition) and *SLB*, chapter II, para 281.

to the universe is not a human goal are seen in the states of sleep and waking and are (also) established by śruti. Nor is the valid cognition of non-relationship to the universe sublated by the restatement of relation to the universe; for the restatement, because of being a restatement, and because of being for the sake of the valid cognition of non-relationship to the universe, is weak in this respect.

CLIV. Now, to establish in Brahman, through texts about relationship to the universe, the universe that is not (otherwise) established (in it), and to deny it again would be fruitless, on the principle 'rather than wash off mire it is better to be at a distance untouched by it'. There is not this defect. For the world is established even from the capacity of the material causality mentioned by the text whose purport is the declaration of non-duality; if this were not restated and denied, then the non-duality of Brahman would not be established. And this capacity of what is expressly declared only establishes relation to the universe (but) does not bring about (its) validity; for when there is conflict with expressly negative texts, the capacity of what is expressly declared is weaker. And, in the case of even what is weak, the capacity to establish until sublation is uncontradicted, as with the cognition of nacre-silver etc.; for otherwise sublation is unintelligible. Everywhere, it is indeed the established alone that is sublated by stronger evidence, not the non-established nor the validly cognised. Nor do such texts as 'All this, verily, is Brahman'¹ occurring in the context relating to meditation, make Brahman validly known as related to the universe; for, these (texts) which have a different purport (i. e., meditation), are sublated by

purportful texts about non-relationship to the universe; for meditation is intelligible even through an imposed form. If it be said that even imposition is impossible in the case of what is absolutely non-established, no; for it is established by texts about creation, which for the sake of comprehending non-duality, intimate what is to be negated. Therefore, in the valid knowledge of Brahman non-related to the universe, there is no conflict.

CLV. Even thus, how can Brahman of this nature be the self of the jīva associated with the universe of agency etc.? It is said (in reply): in the jīva, the universe of agency etc., is known to exist, not through inference etc., because of (their) immediacy. Nor is it known by the sense of sight etc.; for the jīva not being an object of the external senses, the agency etc., present in him are also such. Nor is it known by the mind, since there is no evidence (for this). As for the co-presence and co-absence of the mind, they are intelligible even through (its) being the material cause of agency etc. Even if material causality, in respect of agency etc., be assumed of the self alone, the mind's making known agency etc., is not established by co-presence and co-absence, since the co-absence is subject to doubt. The co-absence should indeed be stated in the form 'where the mind is not, there is not the manifestation of agency etc., as in sleep'; and this is subject to doubt; for it is not determined whether the non-manifestation of agency etc., in sleep is because of the non-existence of the mind or because of their own non-existence. Nor thus may there be suspected the non-existence of an agent to make known agency etc., since the witness has the character of making known. As for what the Bauddhas and the older

Prābhākaras¹ assume, that in the self even agency, enjoyership, attainment, aversion, happiness and misery are self-luminous, that does not stand to reason. If for agency etc., there be the character of substance, then, rather than assume a separate quality of luminosity, it is more consistent with parsimony to assume in the case of the self's luminosity itself that it makes them known. And if for them there be the character of quality, for them a quality of luminosity is not possible at all, since for a quality there is not another quality. If it be said that agency etc., are themselves the quality of luminosity, then, for them, as for the luminosity of the sun, there could be no origination in the place that is their locus. Nor is it possible to assume self-luminosity for agency etc., because of their being not other than luminosity in respect of their own existence; for this (being-not-other-than-luminosity) is intelligible even because of the conjunction with the eternal luminosity of the self. Let it then be that agency etc., are cognised by the witness alone; yet they are real; if this be said, no; for the witness, which is common to what is valid and what is invalid, is neutral in respect of the reality or illusoriness of the content; and in assuming the reality of those (agency etc.) there is conflict with the scriptural declaration of being non-attached; (further) illusoriness is declared of all attributes of

¹It is not quite clear who these older Prābhākaras (referred to as *Jarāt-prābhākaras* and *Cirantana-prābhākaras*) were. They seem to have been prior even to Śālikanātha. Besides the doctrine here attributed to them, viz., self-luminosity of happiness, misery etc., they seem to have held also such views as that the knower and the knowing are not known simultaneously with the object (i.e., no *tripuṭi-bhāna*), and that while all cognition due to specific *karāṇas*, like the senses, should be considered valid, cognition due to the *manas*, which is a *sādhāraṇa* *karāṇa*, may be invalid. See further *Prābhākaras, Old and New*, by M. Hiriyanna: *JORM*, IV, 99-108.

transmigration by (the text) 'Indra through māyās (takes on many forms)'.¹

CLVI. Thus, therefore, minor texts like 'Not gross, not subtle',² 'It is not born, it dies not',³ intimate the denotations of the words 'That' and 'thou' which (denotations) are required by the major texts, are in reality non-related to the universe and are of the nature of bare intelligence; but they do not declare the removal of superimposition.

CLVII. Now, then, oneness is declared by the major text in dependence solely on the denotations of the words 'That' and 'thou', which are intimated by the minor texts and are by nature devoid of (relation to) the universe; hence, even in the absence of the removal of superimposition there is no unintelligibility; hence, for that removal of superimposition and for the appearance of that, how can there be even the character of being presumptive? If this be asked, it is said (in reply): knowledge of the true nature, whose sphere is oneness, arises only as removing (its) opposite, nescience and its product, superimposition, since it is seen thus in the knowledge of the true nature of nacre. If it be said that here what removes the superimposition is the negative cognition 'This is not silver', not so; for it is said in the view of (error as) non-cognition that the negation has real silver for its sphere. And this denial of silver, while obstructing the appetency in him who seeks real silver, is figuratively spoken of as the sublatter of silver.

¹Brh., II, v, 19

²Ibid., III, viii, 8

³Kaṭha, II, 18

The direct sublation of superimposition, however, is only through the nacre-cognition : this was stated in the inquiry into sublation on the view of (error as) the cognition of the indeterminable. Nor may it be said that the nacre-cognition functions only in making known the true nature of nacre, not in the removal of superimposition ; for a thing that follows presumptively does not depend on effort. It is thus : in ordinary experience, the hand of the goldsmith who weighs gold, exerts itself only in lifting the balance ; here the going down of one part (i.e., scale-pan) is an inevitable intermediary ; but the hand makes no effort in respect of that. And everywhere in the śāstras it is well established that things which result as inevitable intermediaries do not depend on effort. Now, where the sublation is by a statement, there since the statement 'This is not silver' relates to real silver and since the statement 'This is nacre' has no capacity to declare the removal of superimposition, let it be that the appearance of its removal is an inevitable intermediary ; where, however, perception is the sublater, there, how can the appearance of the removal of superimposition be an inevitable intermediary ? If this be asked, it is said (in reply) : the non-existence of the imposed silver is not known by non-cognition, because of the immediacy (of that cognition). Nor (is it) known by the senses, since there is no (sense-) contact. The imposed silver and its non-existence are not, indeed, capable of (sense-)contact ; for, imposed silver, which is constituted of cognition alone, does not exist prior to the cognition, in which case, the sense could have contact (with it). Even because of non-existence of sense-contact for the counter-correlate, the silver, its non-existence too is not related to the senses. Therefore, as in sublation by a statement, even in sublation by perception, when the

true nature of nacre is known by the sense-organ, the removal of superimposition is cognised only as an inevitable intermediary. And thus, when the oneness of the jīva and Brahman is known through texts or through experience, since the presumptive removal of nescience and its product is not included in what is expressly declared by the śāstra, the mention of it as a fruit, independently of the content, stands eminently to reason. Though of the śāstra of inquiry the direct fruit is only the removal of doubts present in the Vedānta, and the fruit of the commencement of the Vedānta (-study) is the attainment of Brahman-knowledge, yet, it is intelligible that even the removal of superimposition is indirectly the fruit of the śāstra teaching, through its being the fruit of knowledge and through its being the object of human desire.

CLVIII. Now, what is this which is called attainment of Brahman-knowledge and is described as the fruit of the commencement of the Vedānta? Everywhere, indeed, there is attainment of what is unattained but has come into being, as of cow etc., but not of that which is eternally attained nor of that which has not come into being, as of the human horn etc.; knowledge, however, arises only as located in the knower and as revealing the known, and it is cognised only as such; hence both in its own nature and in cognition, it is eternally attained; how, then, can there be the attainment thereof?

CLIX. It is said (in reply): knowledge is a psychosis of the internal organ, generated by evidence. The ascertainment of the content thereby is what is intended by the word 'attainment'. Here, though the cognitions of pot etc., are causes of the ascertainment of their contents by their mere origination, Brahman-knowledge is not thus the cause of

immediate ascertainment; for its content is overwhelmed by (notions of) impossibility and notions of the contrary (being true). Of these, under the name of impossibility there is stated the incapacity of the mind for concentration, which (concentration) is the cause of a plenitude of contemplation of the oneness of the self and Brahman; and (under the name of) notions of the contrary (there is stated) the plenitude of residual impressions of the superimposition of the body etc. Nor may it be said that in respect of a thing apprehended by evidence that is the cause of immediate manifestation, the non-existence of the certitude of immediate manifestation because of the (above-mentioned) two kinds of mental defect is not in the scope of the seen; for in places like Benares, in respect of bunches of green pepper etc., which have never been seen before, and have been brought from a distance, though they are seen by perception, yet because of lack of faith it is seen that certitude does not arise immediately. Therefore, Brahman-knowledge though originating from the evidence of the śāstra (yet) being obstructed by mental defect, depends on tarka (reasoning) as an auxiliary and subsequently ascertains the content. Since if reasoning be evidentiary it is independent, and if not evidentiary it is of no help, it is not possible for it to be an auxiliary to evidence; if this be said, not so; though reasoning which is not evidentiary is not independently the cause of the ascertainment of a thing, it is not wholly of no help; for in respect of the nature of evidence, its capacity (i. e., validity), and the objects of knowledge, it is of the nature of the cognition of possibility or impossibility. Hence it is that those who know reasoning say that reasoning is helpful to evidence.

CLX(a). Now, if evidence be the cause of ascertainment, in dependence on reasoning, there is the contingency of what

is not consistent with the final position. It is thus. That the validity and invalidity of cognitions are (both) intrinsic, say the Sāṅkhyas. That both are extrinsic say the Tārkikas. That invalidity alone is intrinsic say the Bauddhas. That validity alone is intrinsic say the Vedāntins.

CLX(b). The view of the Sāṅkhyas does not stand to reason. Here, is it considered that in one and the same individual cognition there enter both validity and invalidity? Or is there a distinction between them through difference in the particular (cognitions)? Not the first, because of contradiction. Not the second, for there is nothing to effect the distinction 'For this cognition there is validity and for this (other) invalidity', as the nature of being cognition is common to both; and anything else that effects the distinction is not admitted by him who maintains the intrinsic nature (of both). Nor are both extrinsic. For, then the cognition that has barely arisen would rest for a time devoid of validity or invalidity; and this is not known in ordinary experience. Let there then be (accepted) the view of the Bauddhas, that invalidity alone is intrinsic, and validity extrinsic. This too is unintelligible. Here, is the extrinsic nature of validity in respect of its origination or cognition? Not in respect of origination is this possible; for in the case of momentary cognition arising from causes like the senses of sight, continuance till the rise in it of the attribute of validity is impossible. Now when cognition has arisen from the cause of cognition, subsequently from the excellence present in that cause, there is the rise of validity in that cognition; this is the extrinsic nature in respect of origination; if this were not possible, how, then, is there for validity the co-presence and co-absence of excellence? If this be said, no; for, those

two are intelligible as existing even in relation to the non-existence of the defect that is an obstacle to validity. Nor may there be suspected the (defect of) absence of common ground, if the co-presence and co-absence of excellence be taken to relate to the non-existence of defect ; for, the non-existence of defect is itself excellence. Indeed, in the case of the organs etc., no excellence is seen as distinct from the non-existence of defect. If then, there be something (else) which is an excellence, even then, for that excellence, which is the cause of the removal of defect, co-presence and co-absence result directly only with the non-existence of defect ; when, however, defect is removed, since validity results unobstructed, there are cognised co-presence and co-absence of the excellence too with validity, through the channel of non-existence of defect ; but those two do not directly exist there. Let it then be that the non-existence of the defect, which is an obstacle, is itself the cause of validity, because of possessing co-presence and co-absence directly ; if this be said, no ; for, if that were so, it would not be possible for the defect to be an obstacle. For that is an obstacle, which is established as opposed to the origination of the effect, only when the full cause is present. Indeed, when there is non-existence of defect, defect is not established. Therefore, not in respect of *origination* is there extrinsic nature (for validity).

CLX(c). Even the *cognition* of validity, how can it be extrinsic ? What is called validity is the capacity of cognition to determine a thing. Is this known through the cognition of being originated by an excellence or from the cognition of accord with practical efficiency ? Not the first ; for even when the pot is cognised, so long as there is not cognised the generation of that cognition by an excellence, the capacity

to determine the pot not being cognised, there is the contingency of the non-origination of empirical usage relating to the pot. Let it be that when there is cognition of being generated by an excellence, there is empirical usage subsequently; if this be said, no; for even in the case of the cognition of origination by an excellence, as in the case of the cognition of the pot, there being capacity to do little prior to another cognition that ascertains its own validity, there is the contingency of infinite regress. On the second (alternative) too, this argument applies equally. If then it be thought (thus) 'In the case of the cognitions of food etc., which are instrumental, there is the knowledge of validity from the cognition of their accord with practical efficiency, such as satisfaction (of hunger); in the case of the cognitions of satisfaction etc., which are the fruit, that knowledge is certainly intrinsic, since there is no other practical efficiency; therefore, there is no infinite regress' that is unsound. The disputed cognition of the instrument is valid even intrinsically, because it is a cognition, like the cognition of the fruit. And on the contrary view, there is as sublater, the contingency of reciprocal dependence, in that for the active the ascertainment of validity is from the cognition of accord with practical efficiency, and that there is activity when there is ascertainment of validity. Even when validity is unascertained, since activity is intelligible for its ascertainment, there is no reciprocal dependence; if this be said, let this be so when there is doubt. In the case of things which are not doubted, repeated cognitions of contents like pot, how can there be activity for the ascertainment of validity? Now in the testing of gold, the ascertainment of the object is through the four-fold cognition¹ of the nature of seeing, rubbing, burning and cutting, not merely from the initial cognition;

therefore, validity being extrinsic cannot be helped; if this be said, no. For, there, the second and subsequent cognitions refute the doubt etc., that obstruct the validity of the first cognition, but are not the causes of the ascertainment of the validity of that (first cognition). Therefore in respect of both the origination and cognition of validity, there should be admitted intrinsic nature, consisting in the non-requirement of anything other than that which originates or reveals cognition.

CLX(d). In the case of invalidity, however, there is extrinsic nature, since the origination is by a defect present in the cause of cognition, and the cognition (of it) is by sublation. Invalidity is not originated extrinsically, since it is of the nature of non-existence of validity, like the prior non-existence of validity; if this be said, no, because of non-establishment of the *probans*. Ignorance, doubt and error are what are called invalidity. That has been said by Bhaṭṭapāda: 'Invalidity is divided into three kinds, as illusoriness, ignorance and doubt.' By the word 'ignorance' the cognition of some other thing is intended, since it is said by himself 'or cognition in respect of some other thing'. Therefore, to none of these three belongs the character of non-existence. Invalidity on the strength of a defect is uncontradicted even in the case of what is intrinsically valid; for, in the case of fire though of itself hot, cold is seen when it is obstructed by spells etc. If you suspect that somehow invalidity is intrinsic, then, how could you justify the empirical usage arising even from invalid cognition, until there arises knowledge of the defect? Therefore, it is settled that validity alone is intrinsic. And this being the case, if Brahman-knowledge stand in need of reasoning, how can there not be what is opposed to the final position (about validity)?

CLXI. There is not this defect; for, reasoning is the cause of the removal of obstacles alone. Though Brahman is self-luminous and verbal testimony is capable in respect of the immediate knowledge thereof, yet obstruction is possible through contrary activity and (the notion of) impossibility, and by notions of the contrary, i.e., (the self-hood of) the body, organs etc., all created in the mind by (prior) sins. Therefore, there does not arise unshakable immediate experience. This being the case, by the practice of the duties of one's order, there is the removal of sin. By the acquisition of calmness etc., contrary activities of the mind are arrested. By reasoning of the nature of reflection, the impossibility of the content, consisting in the oneness of the jīva and Brahman, is refuted. By contemplation is obtained that concentration of the mental psychosis, which, while refuting the notions of the contrary, is capable of ascertaining the subtle object. Thence, the immediate cognition generated by verbal testimony is established unshakably.

CLXII. And that the testimony of the Vedānta is the cause of immediate knowledge of Brahman is shown by the *taddhita* suffix¹ in 'I ask you about the aupaniṣada-puruṣa (the person propounded in the Upaniṣads)'². The meaning of the *taddhita* suffix is 'that person who is properly known through the Upaniṣads alone'. Indeed, in respect of Brahman

¹The *taddhita* suffixes are added to those words which are already complete in sense (samārtha or pariniṣṭhita). Sūtra VI, ii, 92 of Pāṇini teaches the suffixes *an* etc., which have senses other than those already taught in the previous sūtras. One of these senses is that in which the *an* suffix is used in the word 'aupaniṣadaḥ' 'propounded in the Upaniṣads'. The sense which the suffix has here is 'that of being known' (avagatyartha).

that is immediate, 'mediate' cognition is not possible. Therefore, the immediate cognition, which has arisen even from the first from verbal testimony, becomes unshakable later, on the departure of the obstacle. Or else, just as sense-contact, having produced cognition, again produces recognition in dependence on the residual impression of prior experience, similarly, verbal testimony itself, having first given rise to mediate cognition in respect of Brahman, again gives rise to a second immediate cognition in dependence on the above-mentioned destruction of the obstacles. Nor, in respect of the self-luminous Brahman is mediate cognition delusive, for, inference, which is mediate, is seen, in respect of another person's consciousness, though it is self-luminous. This being the case, even if from verbal testimony there arises at first Brahman-cognition whether immediate or mediate, yet since with that much there is not establishment in the form of unshakable, immediate experience, it comes to be non-attained, as it were. When reflection and contemplation have been performed, since it is established in the form of fruit, Brahman-knowledge is spoken of as having been attained.

CLXIII. Now, if this be the case, since the rise of the fruit is seen in immediate succession to contemplation alone, the character of being principal is for that alone; but as auxiliary to that, for hearing and reflection there results subsidiariness; if this be said, not so, for contemplation cannot be the distinctive cause (karana) in the origination of experience. What is called contemplation is not, indeed, a means of valid knowledge, in which case, it could itself be the distinctive cause in the generation of experience. Hearing, however, being of the nature of the determination of

of purport that is the capacity of the word, is the cause of excellence in the word that is the distinctive cause; hence assuming that it is (itself) the distinctive cause, the character of being the principal belongs appropriately to hearing alone. In the case of reflection and contemplation, that remove mighty obstacles, since they are causes of excellence in the mind that is an auxiliary, there is such subsidiariness as is helpful in respect of (the production of) the fruit. Reflection, indeed, refuting the (notion of) impossibility that occurs in respect of the content, removes doubt from the mind. And contemplation, refuting the notion of the contrary, generates the concentration of the mental psychosis. Since calmness etc., and sacrifice etc., are remote auxiliaries, to them belongs the character of *modus operandi*; of these too, calmness etc., are proximate, since they remove the obstacle to eligibility for hearing, viz., the visible defect called contrary activity present in the mind, the organs etc.; and sacrifice etc., as removing unseen defects, are remote. Therefore, hearing alone, which is the principal as aided by the *modus operandi* and by the subsidiaries helpful to the fruit, is the generator of unshakable, immediate experience. As for that superficial hearing which generates mediate cognition or non-established immediate cognition, there is nothing lost to us, even if it be subsidiary to contemplation; for the character of being principal is acknowledged of that hearing alone, which is the generator of such immediate Brahman-knowledge as removes transmigration.

CLXIV. Brahman-knowledge does not remove transmigration, since transmigration is seen even when that is present; if this be said, no; for, the removal of superimposition together with its cause, by the immediacy of the truth, is

established by the śāstra, through co-presence and co-absence. Like the knowledge of difference from the body, which is opposed to superimposition, the knowledge of the truth (too) though opposed to superimposition, would not remove it; if this be said, no, because of disparity. Knowledge of the truth is indeed opposed to primal ignorance; but not thus is the knowledge of difference from the body.

CLXV. Then, when by knowledge of the truth primal nescience is removed, there should be immediate decease of the body; if this be said, no; for, the continuance of the body etc., is possible even because of the residual impressions of nescience and its product. If it be said that residual impression is well known in the case of acts, like the rotation of the (potter's) wheel and in the case of cognition, not elsewhere, no; for residual impression is seen in the case of smell etc. If it be said that in a vessel containing flowers, from which the flowers have been removed, only the subtle parts of flowers that (still) remain there give rise to the cognition of smell, not a residual impression, even thus, at the stage of dissolution, there should certainly be admitted residual impressions of all products. As for those who do not admit (these), in respect of them, this inference should be made: the destruction of the product, which is in dispute, is pervaded by residual impression, since, while not being a destruction of residual impression, it is (still) a destruction, like the destruction of cognition. If it be said that there is sublation (of the inference) since it is well known that there are residual impressions of acts and cognitions alone, then, since even nescience and its product are of the form of delusive cognitions, let there be (for them) causality in respect of residual impressions. Though the intelligence, which is

the witness of nescience etc., is eternal, (yet) because of the non-eternality of what defines it, viz., the psychosis which is of the nature of a semblance of intelligence, residual impression may result; even thus, from residual impression, which is the cause of memory alone, how can there be the immediate presentation of duality? If this be asked, we say that it is because residual impression is a defect located in the intelligence which is the cause of the immediacy of the universe; for, to defects like the film present in the eye etc., the causes of immediacy, belongs causality in respect of perceptual delusions. Nor may it be said that it is not possible for bare intelligence to be the locus of residual impressions, for that is intelligible in the same way as being the locus of nescience. Though the residual impression is a product, it does not any more than destruction require a material cause, since generation by a material cause belongs only to those products of an existent nature, other than the residual impression of nescience. Hence it is that though elsewhere there is the rule of residual impressions being located in their own material causes, the location here in what is not the material cause is intelligible. Nor is there non-existence of release from embodiment if residual impressions be admitted; for, that results when, at the close of *prārabdha* karmas, the residual impressions are removed, even through continued meditation of the knowledge of the truth.

CLXVI. If then you think 'since nescience has been removed and since residual impression has no material cause, how can there result the body, organs etc., without a material cause?', then, even when the intuition of the truth has arisen, let there be release in embodiment through the persistence of a trace of nescience, until the consumption of

prārabdha. On the consumption of prārabdha karma, which is the obstacle, even the trace of nescience is removed, because of knowledge of the truth. Therefore, all commencement of (study of) the Vedānta is for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self, which is the cause of removal of all transmigration.

CLXVII. Though in some Vedānta (texts) there are prescribed meditation of what has attributes, yet, since they are incidental like the (prescription of the) godohana (milking pail) ¹ etc., what is declared even there is but the attributeless Brahman that is the object of contemplation. Even the attributes which are laid down as to be contemplated are of service in the comprehension of the attributeless Brahman, on the principle of superimposition and withdrawal ². In the stage prior to the withdrawal, it is possible to lay down that Brahman qualified by particular attributes is the object of contemplation for the sake of particular fruits.

CLXVIII. Now, if the injunction of contemplation based on the superimposed world of attributes is in order to make known the nature of Brahman which has to be known by

¹ In the chapter on the darśapūrnamāsa, the passage 'With the camasa (cup) he is to sprinkle the water' enjoins sprinkling. In the same chapter there is the passage; 'With the milk pail for him who desires cattle'. This passage cannot be understood as enjoining the principal (pradhāna-vidhi). But in the case of one who is already eligible for the darśapūrnamāsa, for its own fruit, there is here *incidentally* the injunction of another *subsidiary* for a further fruit.

² This is a principle according to which the truth (which transcends finite determination and is trans-phenomenal) is determined through superimposition and withdrawal (adhyāropapavādābhyām nisprapañcam prapañcyate). Just as silver is superimposed on nacre, the world of attributes is superimposed on the attributeless Brahman. This is adhyāropa. And just as silver is cognised to be non-existent in nacre, the world of attributes is known to be non-existent in Brahman. This is apavāda.

him who seeks release, then there would be eligibility for contemplation only for him who is eligible for release; this is just as in respect of the (use of the) godohana which is prescribed in the words '(the sprinkling is) with the milk pail, for him who desires cattle', as based on the sprinkling of water established in the words 'With the camasa (cup) he is to sprinkle water' in the darśa-pūrṇamāsa, there is eligibility only for him who is eligible in respect of the darśa-pūrṇamāsa. There is not this defect. There, indeed, since the sprinkling of water is established only for him who is eligible for the darśa-pūrṇamāsa, (and) it is only for him in whose case that is established that, when there is desire for cattle, there is the injunction of the milk pail, there would be the (further) eligibility of the eligible. Here, however, since the cognition of the superimposed world through verbal testimony exists even for him who does not desire release, though there is an injunction on the basis (of that cognition) there is no (further) eligibility of him who is eligible.

CLXIX. Now though the Vedāntas that prescribe the contemplation of Brahman with attributes have knowledge of Brahman for purport, that (purport) does not exist for those which prescribe the contemplation of the vital air etc.; if this be said, no, for, these too culminate in that alone, through the channel of the purification of the internal organ. Therefore, of all Vedāntas whatever Brahman alone is the content; the removal of evil through the attainment of the knowledge of that (Brahman) is the fruit; therefore, even for the śāstra that inquires into it, those two alone should be understood to be the content and fruit.

CLXX. Now, only the obligation to undertake the inquiry is the meaning of the first aphorism; why are the

content and fruit, not mentioned in that aphorism, explained (here) as related to the inquiry into the Vedānta? If this be asked, it is said (in reply): the content and fruit are certainly mentioned (in the aphorism) (but) presumptively. It is thus. It will be stated later that the meaning of the injunctive suffixes, *liṅ*, *lot* and *tavya*, is but instrumentality to the desired. In this statement aphoristically expressed, that the Vedāntas should be inquired into for Brahman-knowledge by him who desires release, there is taught by the *tavya*-suffix, in the case of the inquiry which is the (verbal) stem-sense, instrumentality to what is desired in a general way. That being the case, when there is the desire to know the fruit in its particularity, in the form 'What is it that is desired?', release alone is understood as the fruit of inquiry, because of being, like heaven etc., the qualification of the eligible person. Brahman-knowledge, however, since it is accomplished by the inquiry that is the stem-sense, and since it is the means to release which is the fruit (as it were) ¹, is, like *apūrva* (resulting from sacrifice), of the nature of an intermediate operation.

CLXXI(a). Now, instrumentality to the desired is not the meaning of *liṅ* and other suffixes, but only a *niyoga* (an urge) which is not known from other evidence; and that, while prompting the prompted person in respect of the (acts which are the) stem-senses, postulates, because of its capacity, instrumentality to the fruit, for the stem-sense. This is not sound, because of the non-existence of unintelligibility (necessitating such a postulation). Is it that in the absence of instrumentality to the fruit in the case of the stem-sense, the existence of the *niyoga* (urge) is unintelligible? Or is

¹ Some such qualification is necessary on the reading 'phali-bhūta'.

the causing of appetency by that niyoga (urge) unintelligible? Not the first; because there is the existence of niyoga in respect of the obligatory and the occasioned, even when there is no fruit ¹. Even on the second, does the niyoga cause appetency in dependence on the desire for fruit, or does it cause appetency of itself? On the first, let the desire for fruit itself cause appetency; what is the need for the niyoga (urge), since, in perception etc., for the desire for the fruit independence is seen, in respect of causing appetency? On the second, the niyoga, like the swiftness of the river, would forcibly cause the person to be appetent, though devoid of the desire for fruit. And thus its causing would be intelligible even if the stem-sense were not instrumental to the desired; otherwise, even the swiftness of the river would impel (only) in respect of what is instrumental to the fruit.

CLXXI(b). Though niyoga in general is not a ground for postulating the relation of the stem-sense to the fruit, the niyoga that is cognised by him who desires fruit is a ground for that postulation; if this be said, no; for even here, there exists no non-intelligibility in the absence of the relation of those two. In the case of the fruit of optional rites, its being a qualification of the eligible person is not unintelligible, in the absence of that (fruit) being accomplishable by the stem-sense; for even living etc., which are not to be accomplished (by the oblation), are seen to be qualifications of the eligible person in such cases as 'Let him offer oblations so long as he lives'. Though this be so in the case of those which are not of the nature of what are to be

¹ Obligatory rites have no fruit other than the avoidance of sin (pratyavāya); occasioned rites serve only to remove sin already incurred. In both exists the niyoga or kārya, viz., the apūrva from the rite.

accomplished, in the case of fruit whose nature is what is to be accomplished, its being a qualification of the eligible person is unintelligible in the absence of its being what is to be accomplished by the stem-sense; if this be said, no. By the words, 'to be accomplished' in 'whose nature is what is to be accomplished', is there intended having to be accomplished by the stem-sense or merely having to be accomplished? On the first, because of the non-difference of the postulated and the ground of postulation, there is contingency of self-dependence. Even on the second, is the fact of heaven having to be accomplished cognised from the express word or by implication? Not the first, since there is no word expressive (of it). Not the second, since there is no ground for the assumption. We do not indeed see anything unintelligible in the case of heaven, in the absence of its having to be accomplished. If it be said that if heaven be not what is to be accomplished, the conjunction with one who desires is unintelligible, even thus, it is not a qualification of the eligible person, so that on the strength of it there might be assumed the stem-sense having to be accomplished. Just in 'Devadatta is one who has a dry stick', the stick alone is the qualification of Devadatta, and dryness is the qualification of the stick, similarly, even in 'He who desires heaven is the eligible person', desire alone is the qualification of the eligible person and heaven is the qualification of desire. If it be said that through the channel of desire heaven may be the qualification of the eligible person, even thus there is not established its having to be accomplished by the stem-sense; for in 'He who desires to study is to beg alms', it is not seen that study, though of the nature of what is to be accomplished and a qualification of the eligible person, has to be accomplished by begging which is the stem-sense. If it be said that the contrary too

is certainly seen in 'He who desires riches is to serve the king, he who desires merit should perform sacrifices' etc., then (we say) in the case of heaven and the desire for it even their being qualifications of the eligible person is difficult to demonstrate. It is thus. The words 'desire for heaven' do not exclude non-conjunction of the *niyoga* of *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* with the person, for the exclusion of non-conjunction is established even on the strength of the obligatory injunction. Nor does it exclude its conjunction with some one else; for if he who does not desire heaven be excluded from *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* there is conflict with (its being an) obligatory injunction. The *niyoga* of the optional (*darśa-pūrṇamāsa*) is indeed different from the *niyoga* of the obligatory; in that (former), if there be exclusion of non-conjunction and of conjunction with another, there is not the said defect; if this be said, not so. Though the *niyoga* of the obligatory is made known by the text 'So long as one lives' etc., and the *niyoga* of the optional is made known by the text 'He who desires heaven' etc., yet since the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* together with subsidiaries is recognised as one in both places, there is no difference. As for the difference between the obligatory and the optional, that is intelligible through difference in the *adhikāra* (fruit) alone. Nor may there be suspected the futility of the words 'desire for heaven' if they be not a qualification of the eligible person. Just as in 'The man with the staff chants the permission', since the priest who chants the permission is already established, that statement has for purport the qualification of possessing a staff, in the form, 'He who chants the permission, that is a person with a staff', similarly even the words 'desire for heaven' have for purport the qualification, heaven. That has been said by Pārthasārathi (Miśra); "Since that which is to come into being

is what is desired, the word 'desire' has that for purport. That the qualification may be the principal (sense intended by a text) is shown in 'The man with the staff' etc." Even if the words 'desire for heaven' have the fruit alone as purport, the eligible person results by presumption. When by optative (liñ) and other suffixes instrumentality to heaven is taught of sacrifice which is the stem-sense, a person of himself understands eligibility in respect of the rite, in the form 'This rite is instrumental to the fruit desired by me'. And thus the words 'desire for heaven' whose purport is the fruit are capable of being significant in conjunction with the statement of the instrument. And this results if instrumentality to the desired is the sense of the tavya (suffix), not if niyoga (the urge) be its sense. Therefore, niyoga is not the sense of liñ (the optative) and other (such) suffixes.

CLXXII(a). Others, again, state thus the relation of end and means between heaven and the stem-sense; the niyoga (urge) qualified by the determinant (i. e., the act) and the person prompted is understood from the injunctive statement. The determinant is sacrifice; the person prompted is he who desires heaven; and between these two, reciprocal relation, in the form of object and agent, is understood because of the non-intelligibility otherwise of the origination of the niyoga. If there be no relation, the determinant (act) not being practised by the person prompted, the niyoga which is to be accomplished by the practice of that (act) would not be originated; that being the case, just as of what is in relation to the person with a staff there is relation to the staff too, similarly, of the sacrifice which is in relation to the person prompted as qualified by the desire for heaven, there is relation even to heaven which is the qualification. And this relation is not possible in the absence of the relationship of principal

and subsidiary. Therefore, there being the relation of heaven as the principal and the sacrifice as subsidiary, there may be between them the relation of end and means.

CLXXII(b). This is not sound; for, in the manner stated, there is the contingency of the relation of sacrifice even with living, having the house burnt down etc., which are qualifications of the agent. Let there be; what is the defect? If this be asked, it is said (in reply). Are living etc., related to the stem-sense, as subsidiary (thereto) or as principal? On the first, living, which is a qualification of the person eligible for the obligatory darśa-pūrṇamāsa, being (thus) a subsidiary of the darśa-pūrṇamāsa, there is the contingency of its relation even in the Saurya etc., (rites) modelled thereon. It is thus. That the rite enjoined in 'He who desires the sanctity of a brāhmaṇa should offer an oblation of barley gruel to Sūrya' is modelled on the darśa-pūrṇamāsa is established because the capacity of the injunctive word 'nirvapati (makes an offering)'; here, since the modelled is to be performed in the same way as the model, there is seen through transfer the establishment of the subsidiaries of the darśa-pūrṇamāsa in the modelled rite; hence because of non-distinction from those (subsidiaries), living too would be established (in the modelled); thence, (the injunction) would be 'So long as one lives, one should offer an oblation of barley gruel to Sūrya'. Nor may it be said that there is no defect since there is sublation of obligatory eligibility by optional eligibility; for, just as in respect of the model there is (both) obligatory and optional eligibility, there is similarly the contingency of this in the modelled too. On the second (alternative), living etc., being principal, would, like heaven etc., be what are to be accomplished. Therefore, the words 'desire for heaven' whose purport is a particular fruit, are

expressive in conjunction with words like *liñ* which signify instrumentally to the good in general.

CLXXIII. Now, if instrumentality to the desired be expressed by *liñ* (the optative) and other suffixes, then there would not result the instrumental (case-ending) in 'He is to sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma*'; for the instrumental (case-ending) is laid down in respect of the instrument or causal correlate which is *not expressed* by *liñ*, *kṛt*, *taddhita* or *saṁāsa*. There is not this defect; for though causality is expressed in the case of the stem-sense, i. e., sacrifice in general, the distinctive causality of the particular sacrifice, *jyotiṣṭoma*, is not expressed (by the *liñ* etc., suffix). Therefore, there is no defect whatever in instrumentality to the desired being the sense of the injunctive suffix. And thus, when even by the statement in the aphorism, 'The Vedāntas are to be inquired into by him who desires release', there is expressed of inquiry (*its*) instrumentality to the good in general, it follows by presumption that the particular good, release, is the fruit of the śāstra of inquiry.

CLXXIV. Similarly, by the word 'Brahman' in 'Brahma-jijñāṣa (desire to know Brahman)' the content too is aphoristically indicated. Though the content is known even from the (first) chapter (treating) of the (harmonious) synthesis (of Vedānta texts), and the fruit (only) from the fourth chapter, yet they have (both) to be indicated even in the first aphorism, since they are the causes of the engaging (in the inquiry). Therefore, because of the existence of the content and fruit, the śāstra is to be commenced; that this is the purport of the present varṇaka (section) is established.

SECOND VARṆAKA

1. For the prescription 'The self is to be heard', the direct content is the inquiry concerned with the Vedānta texts; that (content) is to be expounded in the present section.

2. The unity with Brahman is the content of the prescription, through the mediation of the Vedānta; that together with its fruit was expounded in the previous section.

3. If the Vedāntas were devoid of content and fruit, then, the inquiry into them would be far removed; hence the mention of those two (content and fruit) first.

4. When there is (thus) the possibility of inquiry, there being the doubt whether that has been achieved or not by the Purvamīmāṃsā, the settlement of that (doubt) is here declared.

I. Now, for the ascertainment of the sense of the Vedāntas, there is needed a body of (interpretative) principles. And that (body) has been aphoristically declared in the aphorisms beginning with 'Then, therefore the inquiry into dharma'. Nor may it be said that what is attempted there is the ascertainment of the sense of injunctive texts (alone); for the purport of the entire Veda is but injunction. If it be said that the Vedāntas have the existent for purport, no; for, the purport of even these is the injunction of knowledge, as in 'The self is to be seen'.¹ Then, the host of ritual injunctions has been expounded in the Purvamīmāṃsā; the Uttaramīmāṃsā is to be begun for the exposition of the

¹ Bṛh., II, 4, 5.

injunction of knowledge; if this be said, no; for, in the case of the four forms—utpatti, viniyoga, prayoga, and adhikara—which are needed by the injunction and have been demonstrated in respect of ritual, it is possible to know (these) by parity of reasoning even in respect of knowledge. Of these, what is called utpatti-vidhi (originative injunction) is that which makes known the mere form of the rite, e.g., 'He offers (is to offer) the agnihotra oblation' etc. Similarly, that which makes known the relation of principal and subsidiary, e.g., 'He offers oblation with curds etc.' is a viniyoga-vidhi (applicatory injunction). That which makes known procedure in respect of a principal rite together with its subsidiaries is a prayoga-vidhi (procedural injunction). And that, say the Bhāttas, is expressly declared (śrauta); while the Prabhākaras say that it is to be assumed on the evidence of upādāna, which consists in implication by an injunction. That which declares eligibility in respect of a rite for him who desires fruit or for him who is impelled by (the fact of) living etc., is an adhikara-vidhi (injunction of eligibility). These injunctions expounded in connection with ritual are capable of being suitably postulated even in connection with knowledge. Otherwise, those which have been expounded with a particular rite as illustration, would have to be taught over again in connection with a different rite.

II. Now, a fresh śāstra has to be commenced, in the same way as a fresh chapter, for the refutation of further (and peculiar) doubts. It is thus. There being a doubt as to the non-authoritativeness of the Vedas, in the first chapter its authoritativeness is demonstrated. There being a doubt as to the identity of all rites, in the second chapter the difference of rites is demonstrated, in the wake of differences

in the originative injunctions as caused by differences in the (injunctive) words, such as 'yajati, juhōti' etc. There being a doubt of the principal character being equally present in all (rites), there is stated, in the third chapter, the relation of principal and subsidiary (as determined) by evidences like express statement, capacity etc. In the fourth (chapter), it is determined that the performance of such-and-such is for the sake of the rite, and of such-and-such (directly) for the sake of a human goal. In the fifth is exhibited sequence, as in 'Having performed the Vājapeya-istī, he is to perform the Bṛhasptisava sacrifice'. In the sixth, there is the inquiry that for those who desire (fruit) there is eligibility in respect of these (rites) and for those who are impelled by (the fact of) living etc., there is eligibility in respect of these (other rites). Thus, in the earlier six chapters, there is made the inquiry needed by the injunction of the archetypal rite. That injunction which comprises fully all the subsidiaries is the (injunction of the) archetype; that injunction which comprises the subsidiaries defectively is the (injunction of the) modelled rite. The inquiry needed by the injunction of the modelled rite is made in the later six chapters beginning with the seventh. Here too, in the seventh, it is ascertained that of the subsidiaries taught in respect of the archetype there is transfer in general to the modelled rite. Teaching (upadeśa) is of the form 'It is to be done in this way;' transfer (atideśa) is of the form 'It is to be done in the same manner as that (other)'. In the eighth, however, transfer is expounded in detail, as thus: the particular attributes of apportionment, pounding, sprinkling, etc., which, in 'There is that āgneya (cake) which is prepared on eight (earthen) plates' etc., are, in connection with the archetypal sacrifice called darsa-purṇamāsa, declared of the rice-grains that are the basic

material of puroḍāśa cake, these, in the case of the gruel-offering to Surya, which is a modelled rite, are transferred even to the rice-grains that are the basic material of the gruel, through the resemblance in respect of the material (used, viz.,) rice-grains. That has been said: 'When in the seventh (chapter) it has been established that through transfer there are (certain) attributes (for the modelled rite), then in the eighth (chapter) there is the exposition of what (attributes there is transfer), to what and from what'. In the ninth, however, there is shown *ūha* (transfer with a modification) which, when between the archetype and the modelled rite there is difference in respect of the material and the deity, consists in the omission of the words about the material etc., in (the injunction of) the archetype and the importation of (new) words about the material etc., in the modelled rite, in the case of the mantra, *sāman* and purificatory ceremonies taught in respect of archetype and transferred (therefrom) to the modelled rite. This is how: in the case of the mantra 'agnaye juṣṭam (for Agni, worthy of reverence)' there is in the modelled rite the substitution of the words 'sūryāya juṣṭam (for Surya, worthy of reverence).' In the tenth, however, there is shown, in the case of subsidiaries, which are transferred to the modelled rite and have (an unquestioned) place in the archetype, their sublation by the teaching of distinctive subsidiaries and the like, occurring in the (injunction of the) modelled rite. This is how. In the case of the *barhis* (grass) which results for the modelled rite by transfer and which is related (invariably) to the archetype, there is sublation by the teaching of the distinctive (subsidiary) occurring in the (injunction of the) modelled rite, in the form 'The *barhis* is of the nature of the *śara* (grass, in this rite).' Similarly when there is the injunction 'cook the

golden grains', in respect of the cooking of the golden grains, which is the modelled rite, there result (by transfer) the pounding etc., characteristic of the archetype: (but) here, since the removal of husk is impossible in the case of the golden grains called *kr̥ṣṇalas*, there is sublation of the pounding. Similarly, because of the prohibition 'Those two (butter-*portions*) are not offered in the *paśu* (-*yāga*)' there is sublation (of the offering) of butter-*portions* in the *paśu* (-sacrifice). In the eleventh (chapter), however, there is declared what is called *tantra*, which consists in a single subsidiary, (the performance of which is) prompted by the injunctions of more than one principal, being equally subservient to all the principals even by its performance once alone. This is how. In the case of the fore-sacrifice etc., prompted by the full moon rites declared in (the three texts) 'There is that *āgneya* (cake) on eight (earthen) plates', 'He performs the *upāṃśu* sacrifice at intervals,' 'There is the *agnīṣomīya* on eleven (earthen) plates' there is, even by their performance once alone, subservience of (all) three principals. In the twelfth (chapter), however, there is shown what is called *prasāṅga*, which is, in the case of the performance of a subsidiary prompted by a certain principal, its subservience even to another principal prompted by the capacity of that which prompts (the first principal). This is how. In the case of the subsidiaries prompted by the injunction of the *paśu* (-sacrifice), there is subservience even to the *paśu-puroḍāśa*.¹ Thus, therefore, just as diverse aspects of the

¹ "There is an *Agnīṣomīya* animal sacrifice in which an *Agnīṣomīya* animal is sacrificed and *Puroḍāśa* cakes made of animal flesh are also offered. Now the question is whether the subsidiary acts performed in the animal sacrifice should be repeated in the offering of the *Puroḍāśa* cakes; the author says that the principle of *Prasāṅga* comes into play and the repetition of the

injunctions are expounded by the refutation of fresh doubts in each chapter, similarly, since in the case of Brahman, that is to be known, there is a doubt as to the incompatibility of the injunction to know, because of (Brahman) not being established by perception etc., the Uttaramimāṃsā is commenced for refuting that (doubt).

III. This does not stand to reason. For, there being establishment of Brahman, in the same way as of the yūpa (stake), the āhavanīya (fire) etc., (by scripture), though not established by perception etc., a separate inquiry is futile.

IV. Then it may be thought (thus): In 'He fashions the yūpa (stake)' etc., it is not that, with the stake as subject, carpentering etc., are prescribed, in which case the establishment of the form of the stake in ordinary experience would be needed. What then? In order to make a stake, he fashions the basic material, the ebony etc., known from such (texts) as 'The stake is of ebony' etc.; thus the characteristic of being what is to be brought about is cognised to belong to that stake-form, which is not known in ordinary experience; and this form, because of its application being seen in 'He ties the animal to the stake' is known in its distinctive nature, viz., that the stake is a particular kind of stick which results from carpentering etc., and is the support for tying the (sacrificial) animal. Similarly (are to be understood) even the āhavanīya etc. (i.e., not as subjects about which some statement is made, but as things to be accomplished

subsidiary acts is not needed in the Prāśū-puroḥṣa; though the performance of the subsidiary acts is in the animal sacrifice, yet it benefits indirectly the offering of the cakes made of animal flesh, as the text about it is read in connection with the animal sacrifice" (Sandal, *Mīmāṃsā Bāratras of Jaimini*, p. clxviii). The subsidiaries here considered are the five fore-sacrifices (prayājās).

through the scripturally stated means). But here there is not similarly any means for the accomplishment of Brahman. Therefore the Uttaramīmāṃsā has to be commenced.

V. Even this is not intelligible; for, even without the establishment of Brahman, the injunction of knowledge is intelligible when there is contemplation through an imposed form, just as in 'The woman, verily, O Gautama, is fire.'¹ Therefore, because of the non-existence of any further doubt, the Uttaramīmāṃsā is not to be commenced.

VI. Here, a section of the upholders of the final position state the further doubt thus. By that (aphorism) which says 'Dharma is that sense which is of the nature of injunction'² there has been shown the authoritativeness of injunction. And that is not possible in the case of Vedāntas like 'Existence, only, dear one',³ which are devoid of injunctions. Nor may it be said that there is syntactical unity for them with injunctions like 'That (self) is to be sought'⁴; for in the case of the tavya-suffix, which expresses the sense of an abstract noun or an object, there is no injunctiveness here. If it be said that the tavya-suffix is (used) in injunction too, even thus, an injunction is not possible here, since the tavya-suffix denotes the object. In the case, however, of 'gantavyam (should be gone to)' etc., because of the primacy of the (verbal) stem-sense, on account of the tavya-suffix signifying an act (bhāvanā), injunction for the sake of an independent fruit

¹ Chānd., V, viii, 1

² PM., I, 1, 2

³ Chānd., VI, ii, 1

⁴ Chānd., VIII, vii, 1

stands to reason. If it be said that in 'One's own Veda is to be studied' there is an injunction having the stem-sense (of study) for content, even from the *tavya*-suffix denotative of the object (as contrasted with the previous instance, where the *tavya*-suffix signified an act) let there be an injunction in that case for the sake of the fruit, i. e., the attainment relating to one's own Veda, that is yet non-attained (i. e. unlearned). In the present context, however, is sight (knowledge) enjoined in respect of Brahman that is the object, for the sake of an independent fruit (i. e. one attaching to the agent alone) or for the sake of a fruit relating to the object-causal-correlate? Not the first; for the act of seeing, which, like pounding etc., is auxiliary to the substance that is the object-causal-correlate, is not capable of being enjoined for the sake of an independent fruit. Not the second. For, the fruit generated by an act in the object-causal-correlate is (one) of four kinds—origination, attainment, modification and purification. Of these, the (first) three kinds of fruit are not possible in respect of the beginningless, eternally attained, unchanging Brahman. Nor may there be doubted (the possibility of) purification consisting in the removal of impurities like ignorance, unrighteousness etc.; for, not as for the ghee which has been glanced at (by the sacrificer's wife), is there any application elsewhere for the purified Brahman.

VII. Then (it may be said) an injunction is possible in respect of the self, on the analogy of the flour (offered as an oblation). It is thus. Since it is declared in the topic concerning sacrificial rites that 'He is to offer flour as an oblation', it is understood of the flour-oblation that it is subsidiary to the sacrifice. Subsidiaries are of two kinds, (independent-

ly) fruitful rites and purificatory rites. Of these, the fore-sacrifices etc., which are taken up independently without depending on (object-) causal-correlates, are (independently) fruitful rites; those which are auxiliary to causal-correlates like rice-grains are purificatory rites. Here, the flour-oblation is not an (independently) fruitful rite, since it is auxiliary to the material, viz., flour, like sprinkling, which is auxiliary to the material, viz., rice-grains. Nor is it a purificatory rite. For purification is of two kinds, the purification of the enjoined and the purification of what is to be enjoined. This is how. The sprinkling etc., enjoined in respect of the rice-grains as subject, which have been enjoined in 'He is to sacrifice with rice-grains', is a purification of the enjoined; the ceremonial kindling etc., enjoined for the resulting of the *āhavaniya* character for fire, in order to enjoin (later) that 'He is to offer oblation in the *āhavaniya*,' is a purification of what is to be enjoined. Here, in the case of the flour reduced to ashes by the oblation and (hence) of no service in respect of the sacrifice, no application is possible in respect of the sacrifice; hence neither kind of purification fits in here. Nor does the futility of the text about flour-oblation stand to reason, since it is comprised in the scope of the injunction to study (the Veda). Therefore, abandoning the primacy (of the flour) understood from the accusative suffix in 'saktun', and adopting the secondariness of the flour and the primacy of the act of oblation (as understood) from the transformation into the instrumental case 'saktubhiḥ', it is shown that (the oblation) is an (independently) fruitful rite. Similarly, even in 'contemplate the self',¹ through a transformation of the suffix of the word 'ātman', let there be primarily for

¹ Brh., I, vi, 8.

the sake of an independent fruit, only the act of contemplation, whose auxiliary is the self.

VIII. This (replies the Siddhāntakadeśin) is an illegitimate analogy. For, in the example, the flour, though instrumental on a construction of the word, is in fact the object (of the oblation); for, the peculiar result produced by the act of oblation, viz., the change consisting in reduction to ashes, exists in the flour; therefore, the use of the transitive verbal root in 'juhōti (offers as an oblation)' stands to reason. In the case, however, of what is illustrated, if the self were in fact the object, then there should be stated one of the four kinds of the fruit of activity, viz., origination etc., and that (possibility) has been refuted. And if it be not the object, the use of the transitive verb-root in 'upāsita (contemplate)' is unintelligible. Now, in respect of the self, attainment as the fruit of activity is possible; for even in the case of what is eternally attained in respect of existence, there is non-attainment in respect of knowledge, prior to contemplation. This does not stand to reason; for, being of the nature of self-luminous intelligence, it is eternally attained even in respect of knowledge. Therefore, because of the non-existence of injunctions, the Vedāntas have a sense which is not intended; hence, in immediate succession to the inquiry into dharma, there results the ceremonial bath (to signify the close of the life of studentship). Hence, in order to refute this further doubt, this same section of the upholders of the final position introduce the inquiry into Brahman thus: 'Then, therefore the inquiry into Brahman.'

IX. This is the idea—that in immediate succession to the inquiry into dharma, there should be the inquiry into

Brahman, not the ceremonial bath. Nor is injunction non-existent in the Vedāntas; for, just as in 'The mat is to be made', so in 'The self is to be seen' an injunction is intelligible for the sake of the fruit relating to the object-causal-correlate. Purification, consisting in the removal of impurities like ignorance, is, indeed, possible in respect of the self. Nor in the case of the purified self is an application elsewhere needed, as in the case of the ghee etc., since it is itself the human goal, while application (elsewhere) is needed only in the case of the purification of what is not a human goal. Thus, therefore, there is the commencement of the Uttaramimāṃsā in order to refute the further doubt consisting in the non-existence of injunction in the Vedāntas, and to establish the injunction to know.

X. This view of a section of the upholders of the final position is not acceptable to the upholder of the *prima facie* view. It is thus. When there is the further doubt consisting in the non-existence of injunctions, this is the ultimate argument urged at the end by this section of the upholders of the final position, viz., that there is no injunction to know, since (the self) as of the nature of self-luminous intelligence, is attained even in respect of knowledge. That does not stand to reason. Just as, in 'Gold is to be worn', the wearing of gold, which is (already) established for ornamental purposes, is restrictively enjoined for the sake of prosperity, similarly, in the case of self-knowledge, though (already) attained, there is possibility of a restrictive injunction for the sake of the fruit of release inhering in the agent (i.e., the knower). Since there is also a possibility of the non-establishment of the wearing of gold, there may be a restrictive injunction in that case, while here, since, as of the

nature of intelligence, self-knowledge is eternally established, there is no restrictive injunction ; if that be said, then, for the sake of removing the presentation of the not-self (as the self), there may be an injunction of exclusion, with an unseen result. Therefore, a further doubt is not possible.

XI. As for the fruit declared by that same section of the upholders of the final position, in the refutation of the further doubt, viz., the removal of impurities like nescience, that too is not sound. Is it that ordinary self-knowledge removes nescience, or super-normal self-knowledge ? On the first alternative too, the bare existence (of self-knowledge) does not remove that (ignorance) ; for, though the self is constantly cognised as 'I', the removal of nescience is not seen. Nor (is there removal) on the strength of an injunction, for, in respect of the golden grains where cooking is not possible, it is not possible to exhibit cooking in the principal sense, even on the strength of the injunction (to cook them). On the second (alternative) too, is it that that kind of self-knowledge is wholly non-established, or established in its generality, or (established) specifically ? Not the first, since injunction is impossible in the case of the wholly non-established. For, even in the case of sacrifice etc., when for the person who has seen some sacrifice it is known through the general sacrificial character, it is only another particular sacrifice, which is similar to the particular sacrifice already seen and present in the intellect of the cogniser, that is enjoined ; for otherwise, there is not the possibility of the cognition 'For me, this is what is to be done'. Not the second ; for no particular (cognition) whatever has been experienced before as possessing the general character of being super-normal self-knowledge. On the third (alternative) too, is it that

that kind of self-knowledge is established in its particularity in some other person or only in the cogniser of the injunction, the eligible person? Not the first; for establishment for another person is of no service to the eligible person. Not the second; for, in the case of a thing established in its particularity for the eligible person, an injunction is futile. Thus, therefore, since the further doubt and the refutation, as declared by this section of the upholders of the final position are unacceptable, it is not possible for them to declare of the Uttaramīmāṃsā that its purpose has not been already achieved.

XII. Another section, again, of the upholders of the final position declare thus the non-achievement of the purpose already. We do not, like those (others), state the further doubt to consist in the non-existence of injunctions in the Vedāntas, in which case there would be the said defect; but even while admitting injunction (to exist), (we state the further doubt) to consist in the non-establishment of Brahman. It is thus. Though for the four forms (of injunction), the originative etc., needed by the injunction to know, ascertainment has been reached on the principles stated in the injunctions of ritual, yet, since Brahman that is to be known is not exhibited by perception etc., though capable of making known existent objects, since the Veda which has for its sole purport what is to be done cannot declare the true nature of the existent Brahman, and since on the contemplation of Brahman with an imposed form there is no possibility of the final fruit consisting in release, Brahman is certainly not to be contemplated; in order to refute this further doubt, the Uttaramīmāṃsā is to be commenced.

XIII. And here it (the doubt) is resolved thus. The Veda does not have what is to be done for its sole purport,

for through the Vedāntas whose purport is the injunction to contemplate, Brahman too is to be known; this is just as the sense of sight, which sets out to cause the cognition of colour causes the cognition of the (coloured) substance as well. Now, how is the injunction to contemplate the purport of the Vedāntas? What is called contemplation is not the immediate knowledge of Brahman; for this, which, as of the nature of the intuition of supreme bliss, is a fruit, cannot, like heaven, be enjoined. Nor is it verbal cognition, since no injunction is declared in respect of that. Indeed, no injunction of this kind is declared anywhere, that cognition through verbal testimony is to be achieved.* (To this objection the reply is) not thus; for, texts like 'That which is all this is this self'¹, whose purport is injunction (to contemplate), culminate in the injunction of knowledge through verbal testimony. Nor may it be asked how this text has an injunction for purport, since if the nature of the self be taken as the subject in 'yad ayam ātmā (that which is this self)' and the nature of the world be predicated of it in 'tad idam sarvam (that is all this)' through the contingency of the self's non-intelligence, there would be none to cognise the injunction, and since (further) the self being of the nature of the (non-intelligent) world is not a human goal. For, taking as subject the world understood from 'yad idam sarvam (that which is all this)' there is predicated in 'tad ayam ātmā (that is this self)' what is certainly not known, viz., the nature of the self; (further), by a consideration of texts like 'not this, not this', it is specifically ascertained that even by a negation of the world, the self alone is to be predicated. Though in 'That which is all this is the self' no

* Brh., II, iv, 6

injunction is declared, yet an injunction may be assumed as in 'Puṣan is he who has the well-kneaded portion' etc.

XIV. The upholder of the *prima facie* view does not accept the mode of commencement of the śāstra even according to this section (of the upholders of the final position). It is thus. In 'Puṣan is he who has the well-kneaded portion', on the (construction of the) compound as 'He to whom belongs the well-kneaded portion', the relation of material and deity that is cognised makes known the sacrifice inseparable from itself, and the sacrifice (makes known) what is inseparable from itself, viz., the *niyoga* (the *apūrva* to be accomplished) that is the sense of an injunction; thus, the injunctive sense being cognised (even) on the strength of what is expressly stated, merely for the sake of empirical usage (here facility in the use and comprehension of words), (the given text) is concluded (to mean) 'The offering of what is kneaded is to be made in respect of Puṣan'; not thus is a relation of material and deity cognised here, on the strength of which an injunction may be assumed. Then it may be thought: "just as in 'He is to sacrifice with the Viśvajit' etc., the sacrifice and the *apūrva* that are cognised posit, because of unintelligibility otherwise, an intelligent being who desires heaven and is (thus) prompted, so here too, the intelligent self that is expressly declared posits the sacrifice and the *apūrva*". That is unsound, since there is no unintelligibility; for, the intelligent being is seen in ordinary empirical usage, even in the absence of sacrifice and *apūrva*. If it be said that in the absence of an *apūrva*, the rule of the entire Veda having *kārya* (what is to be done) for purport would be unintelligible, even thus a *niyoga* cannot be assumed, since there does not exist any stem-sense

whatever which can establish that. If it be said that that too may be assumed, then, is there assumed the sense of a single volition constant in all stem-senses like cooking and walking in the form 'He does cooking, he does walking,' or is there assumed the sense of a cognition, or both? On the first, the form of the text would be 'that which is all this should be made this self'; and that being the case, there would result the impossibility of enjoining it. For, not even by the most skilled can a pot be made into a cloth. If, then, it be said that the making one into the form of another is seen in 'Let us make these balls of kneaded flour into lions', even thus, the injunction here is imperfect because of the non-existence of *modus operandi*. For, calmness etc., are not of the nature of *modus operandi* in the dissolution of the world, since they are of the nature of *modus operandi* in respect of knowledge. Not the second; for though, on the strength of the injunction, the entire world be cognised as of the form of the self, the world-nature would not be removed. Indeed, in respect of the woman etc., cognised as of the form of fire etc.,¹ the nature of a woman etc., is not removed. Not the third, because of the contingency of the defects of both the (above) positions.

XV. Now, in the case of the woman and the fire etc., there is a mental act, not knowledge; here, however, the world would be dissolved by the enjoined knowledge of the true nature of the self, since the man-nature (of a post) is seen to be dissolved by the knowledge of the true nature of the post; if this be said, then, as for the knowledge of the true nature of the post, so, even for the knowledge of the true nature of

¹ In the contemplation prescribed in the knowledge of the five fires, Chānd., V, viii.

the self, there should be stated something which brings it about and is other than the injunction; for knowledge of true nature, which is dependent on the thing (to be known), cannot be enjoined. If it be said that those words present in the Vedāntas, which are other than injunctive words, bring about that (knowledge), then, since knowledge results even from them, there is no need for the injunction.

XVI. Even when cognition has been originated, there is enjoined again another individual cognition of the same kind. Nor is there futility of the injunction; for, as in the mantras, the injunction again even of what is already established is not unintelligible. It is thus. In 'Svādhyāya is to be studied', one's own section of the Veda is denoted by the word 'svādhyāya'. Therefore, the mantras too which are included therein are understood as having to be studied because of the injunction about svādhyāya. And they, having caused cognition of their own senses for him who has apprehended the relation between words and word-senses, remain devoid of any fruit. Nor is the causing of the performance of their own sense the fruit; for, their own sense, viz., the nature of the material and the deity, is not what can be performed. Nor is the causing of the knowledge of them (the fruit); for the material etc., signified by the mantras, are cognised even through the Brāhmaṇa texts. Therefore, when there results fruitlessness (for them), they are applied by śruti, līṅga etc., in the same way as rice-grains etc., in the relation of subsidiaries to the rite that is fruitful. Thus in the Brāhmaṇa 'With the aindrya (Indra-mantra), upasthāna is to be performed for the Gārhapatya (fire)' the express use (śruti) of the accusative suffix in 'gārhapatyaṁ' makes known the application of the mantra 'kadācana starīrasi' etc., to the upasthāna of the Gārhapatya (fire), though its (the mantra's)

capacity is to make known Indra; for express mention (śruti) is stronger than *linga* consisting in the capacity of what has been expressed. As for the mantra 'I cut the barhis as the seat for the deity', it is applied because of the (significant) capacity of the mantra to the cutting of the barhis-grass. Similarly, various mantras are applied even through *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *saṃākhyā*. And when there is the expectancy as to by what means these mantras help in the establishment of the *apūrva* of the principal (rite), it has to be assumed that it is through the recall of the material, deity etc., required for the performance (of the rite); for, when there is a seen helpfulness, the assumption of the unseen is unintelligible. Indeed, the recall of the sense is possible by mantras other than *hum*, *phaṭ* etc., since the study of them (mantras) extends up to the knowledge of their sense. Though the remembrance of material, deity etc., is possible through the *Brāhmaṇa* texts, yet a special unseen result (*adṛṣṭa*) has to be assumed for the recall through mantras alone, because of the contingency of the futility of mantras otherwise; and that is not consistent with what are known under the injunction to study. And this being the case, the procedural injunction, while causing help to the *apūrva* through all subsidiaries, causes through mantras the help which consists in cognition of their sense. Just as there the text of procedure causes through the mantras the bringing about of a cognition, which is other than the cognition that arose at the time of study and is subservient to the *apūrva*, similarly, here too, let there be brought about another individual Brahman-cognition subservient to release. Nor may it be objected that in what is illustrated there is not, as in the other, any procedural injunction; for it is possible to postulate it.

XVII. Now, in every case of a rite which has been originated (i. e., whose form has been laid down), after the application, if there is relation to eligibility (i. e., fruit), then, subsequently a procedural injunction is sought; here, however, in the absence of the three forms of injunction beginning with the originative, how can there be the postulation of a procedural injunction even from the first? If this be said, no; for, even the three forms of injunction beginning with the originative may easily be postulated here. It is thus. In the form 'Attain self-knowledge through the Vedānta texts', there is assumed an originative injunction in making known the nature of the distinctive self-knowledge as through the instrumentality of the words of the Vedānta. Nor may it be said that the character of an originative injunction is not possible in respect of the cognition of the qualified, since the originative injunction makes known the bare nature; for in 'He is to sacrifice with the soma', there is admitted an originative injunction of the qualified. There indeed, after inquiring whether the word 'soma' is the name of a particular sacrifice or denotative of an auxiliary, it is determined that, since what is settled by convention to denote a particular creeper cannot be the name of a sacrifice, it denotes an auxiliary. Here, though the relation to the auxiliary is cognised when it is said 'He is to sacrifice with the soma' just as in 'He is to offer oblation with curds', yet because of the non-declaration of a distinct originative (injunction), as in 'He is to offer the agnihotra oblation,' this should be admitted to be the originative injunction of a sacrifice qualified by the auxiliary, soma. Similarly, in the present case too, why should there not be an originative injunction of the qualified?

XVIII. And this same originative injunction, when considered, comes to take on the forms of the three forms of injunction, called those of application, eligibility and procedure. First, then, there being the desire to know how there is the self-knowledge made known by the originative injunction, on the principle that 'in the proximity of the fruitful, the fruitless is subsidiary thereto'¹ calmness etc., which are mentioned in the topic of the fruitful self-knowledge and are (of themselves) fruitless, are applied as the *modus operandi*; because of (thus) making known a relation of principal and subsidiary, the originative injunction itself becomes an injunction of application. Thence, that same applicatory injunction, which has resulted, in the form 'Achieve self-knowledge through the instrumentality of Vedānta texts as favoured by the *modus operandi*, calmness etc.', is expectant of an eligible person, one who has the cognition 'For me this is what is to be done' in respect of the act together with the subsidiaries, imports as its fruit, on the analogy of the *rātri-sattra*, the release present in the eulogistic passage, and becomes an injunction of eligibility in the form 'He who desires release is to achieve'. In the *rātri-sattra*, indeed, the eulogy is declared thus: 'Those who perform the *rātris* are, verily, well established'. Here, the eligible person has to be assumed, because of not being expressly declared. There is the doubt whether he should be he who desires heaven or he who desires the establishment mentioned in the eulogy. This being the case, there results (primarily) he who desires heaven, on the analogy of the *Viśvajit*. In 'He is to sacrifice with the *Viśvajit*' there being the need for fruit, which is not expressly declared, it is settled by the aphorism² 'That

¹ Sāhara Bhāṣya, IV, iv, 19.

² PM., IV, iii, 15

should be heaven, since it is non-distinctive in respect of all' that heaven which is in some places declared to be the qualification of the person enjoined, should be assumed as the fruit even elsewhere, since there is no distinction in respect of all desiring heaven; similarly, in the *rātri-sattra* too, heaven is the fruit and he who desires it is the eligible person; when there results this *prima facie* view, the final view is laid down thus by the aphorism:¹ '(What is mentioned in the eulogy) is the fruit, says Ātreya, because of its mention'; in the *Viśvajit* etc., the fruit, since it is not declared in the originative (injunction), may be assumed to be heaven; in the *rātri-sattra*, however, establishment alone, which is mentioned in the eulogy, is the fruit; for, there is the cognition of an injunction, through the text only together with the eulogy; for the syntactical unity of eulogies with injunctions has been settled in the section on eulogies.² Therefore, just as he, who desires the establishment mentioned in the eulogy, is the eligible person in respect of the *rātri-sattra*, similarly he who desires the release mentioned in the eulogy 'He who knows the self crosses sorrow'³ is the eligible person (for self-knowledge); positing this (eligible person) that (applicatory injunction) becomes an injunction of eligibility. Thence, that itself, causing the achievement of true knowledge, with its subsidiaries, by the eligible person, becomes the procedural injunction. Therefore, on the strength of this procedural injunction, the Vedānta words, like the mantras, though primarily making known their own sense, the self, yet subsequently culminate in another individual cognition, which is subservient to the *apūrva* and is enjoined. Nor may

¹ PM., IV, iii, 18

² PM., I, ii, 1-17

³ Chānd., VII, 1, 3

it be said, 'The mantras have purport only in respect of the cognition of what is subservient to the apūrva, since their own sense (i. e. material, deity etc.) is taught by the Brāhmaṇa texts; in the case of the Vedāntas, however, purport has to be declared in respect of their own sense too (i. e., the self), because of non-establishment otherwise; therefore, there is no purport in respect of the enjoined cognition'; for, on the analogy of the construction of a canal, there is no contradiction in subserving both purposes; this is just as they construct canals for agricultural purposes, and they take drinking water even from those (canals).

XIX. Now, in the case of permanent canals etc., there may be the achievement of more than one purpose, whether simultaneously or in sequence, since that is cognised; in the case of the word, however, there is no achievement in sequence, since nowhere is it cognised to function after an interval; nor is purport perceptually cognised in respect of two senses simultaneously; and in assuming it by reasoning, the simultaneous application of two reasonings is not possible; if this be said, no; for, in the texts about the fore-sacrifices, purport is admitted in respect of two senses. It is, indeed, admitted that the five texts 'samidho yajati, tanūnapātam yajati, ido yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāram yajati' make known the five fore-sacrifices as also the order of their performance. Therefore the Vedānta-words, having both senses like the texts about the fore-sacrifices, culminate, like the mantras, in what subserves the apūrva, i. e., in another individual cognition, which is enjoined.

XX. To (all) this it is said (in reply). If the Vedāntas intimate what is enjoined, having their own sense for

purport would not be possible; for, in the case of the injunctive texts about the woman and the fire etc., it is not seen that there is purport in respect of their own sense. Since the word-senses of 'woman' etc. are established in ordinary experience, purport in respect of their own sense does not exist there, while here, since both the injunction and Brahman are beyond ordinary experience, the knowledge generated by the Vedānta may have both for purport; if this be said, is it the individual cognition itself enjoined in the Vedāntas that gives knowledge of the nature of Brahman, which is the sense of the Vedāntas, or is it another individual cognition (which gives this knowledge)? On the first, there is for Brahman the contingency of contradiction consisting in a three-fold conflict (of attributes). Being the principal, being the upādeya, and being the enjoined—these constitute one set of three (attributes); being secondary, being the uddēśya, and being what is re-stated—these constitute the other set of three. Of these, since the cognition which gives knowledge "is for the sake of what is known, Brahman which is known is the principal. Similarly, when there is the need (to know) 'the knowledge of what', since in the form 'knowledge of Brahman' it is that which distinguishes the enjoined knowledge, Brahman is secondary. Similarly, since Brahman, the content of the pramāṇa, as associated with the special result generated by the validity (prāmāṇya), is that which is to be established, it is the upādeya. Similarly, since it is established by its own nature, Brahman is the uddēśya. Similarly, since Brahman, that is now the content of the pramāṇa, is admitted to have been unknown before, it is that which is enjoined; similarly, since Brahman that is now the uddēśya (the subject) is already known, it is what is re-stated. Thus, therefore, on the first alternative that the enjoined cognition itself makes

known Brahman, contradiction is unavoidable. Let there be then the second alternative that the first cognition arising from the Vedāntas has Brahman for purport, and that the second cognition being what is enjoined has the injunction for purport. Even this view is not satisfactory; for, if the word does not have two purports, the cognition generated thereby, though originating more than once, cannot intelligibly have two purports. Nor does the word have two purports, since the example of the texts about the fore-sacrifices will be refuted (later on)¹.

XXI. Now, the contingency of contradiction does not import a defect; for, otherwise, the injunction of auxiliary rites would be unintelligible. It is thus. Auxiliary rites are rites which are for the purpose of purifying causal correlates, like rice-grains, that are subsidiary to the (principal) rite. Here, in the case of the rice-grains, there exist the (characteristics of)-*gunatva*, *uddeśyatva* and *anuvādyatva*, consisting in their being for the sake of another, being established, and being known; because of being causal correlates in respect of the sacrificial act, there is being for the sake of another; because of being known by other evidence (than that of scripture), there are the (characteristics of) being established and being known. Similarly, because of the act of sprinkling, there are possible for the rice-grains, the (characteristics of) *prādhānya*, *upādeyatva* and *vidheyatva*, consisting in being the principal, being what is to be accomplished and being the not (already) known; because of sprinkling being for the sake of the rice-grains, there belongs to rice-grains the characteristic of being the principal; because of their non-establishment earlier in the form possessing the excellence generated

by the sprinkling, there are the (characteristics of) being what is to be accomplished and being what is not (already) known. Of these, the set of three, called *gunatva*, *uddeśyatva* and *anuvādyatva*, is cognised from the word 'vrihi (rice-grains)'. The set of three called *prādhānya*, *upādeyatva* and *vidheyatva*, is cognised through the accusative suffix which is significant of the excellence generated by the act of sprinkling. Therefore, the contingency of two conflicting sets of three (attributes) is unavoidable in a single cognition of auxiliary rites like the sprinkling of rice-grains; hence this (contingence) does not import defect.

XXII. If this be said, not so. The excellence generated by the act there is known not from the suffix; but (it is) known from the unintelligibility otherwise of the injunction of an act for the sake of the rice-grains. Therefore in the knowledge from the word, there are cognised only *gunatva*, *uddeśyatva* and *anuvādyatva*; but *prādhānya*, *upādeyatva* and *vidheyatva* (are cognised) through presumption; hence, because of the difference in the cognitions, there is no contingency of contradiction here. If it be said that, then, in the present context too, there may be non-contradiction because of the difference between Brahman-cognition and the enjoined cognition, no; for, not as in the case of rice-grains etc., is other evidence possible in the case of Brahman. Indeed a difference in the effect is not possible in the absence of difference of causal aggregates.

XXIII. Then it may be said: the aggregate of (Vedānta) words, other than the injunctive words, first declares the nature of Brahman, then generates a restated cognition thereof and through intimating of that cognition that it is the content of an injunction, attains syntactical unity of the

word with the injunctive word; thence is established the difference in pramāṇas. This does not stand to reason; for, prior to the syntactical unity of the word, authoritativeness is not possible for the aggregate of words, which is in a sentence-form. If, then, a two-fold division be made into Brahman-texts and texts enjoining cognition, and a subsequent syntactical unity of the sentence be assumed as between arthavāda (eulogistic or condemnatory) texts and injunctive texts, that is unsound; for, though, in the case of arthavādas which are fruitless there is syntactical unity with the injunction, that is not possible in the case of the Brahman-text, which culminates of itself in a human goal. Then, since the initial verbal cognition, being mediate, is fruitless, since thus it has no causality in respect of the immediate experience that is the fruit, there should be enjoined the cognition that is the cause of that; therefore, for the Brahman-text, syntactical unity with that injunction stands to reason; if this be said, then, like the rice-grains in respect of the sacrifice, there should be stated some instrumental causal correlate in respect of the enjoined cognition; and that is not possible, since, in your view, verbal testimony stops with mediate cognition, and the senses etc., do not have Brahman for their sphere.

XXIV. Then, it may be thought (thus): though for knowledge through verbal testimony there is not seen of itself causality in respect of immediate experience, yet it may be possible on the strength of the injunction; therefore, verbal testimony itself is the instrument in respect of the enjoined cognition. That does not stand to reason. Is it the initial Brahman-cognition generated by verbal testimony that is enjoined, or is it the succession of cognitions in

respect of the Brahman known by that (initial) cognition? Not the first; for, the contradiction has been shown in the enjoined cognition being itself what establishes Brahman. Not the second, since the succession of cognitions is not declared (by śruti). If it be said that in 'Contemplate as the self alone'¹ etc., there is declared injunction of contemplation, which is of the form of a succession of cognitions, no; for, the purport of the text is to declare, in respect of the cognition naturally established, its super-normal content viz., the self; for, from the conjunction with 'alone' it is settled that the self is what is declared (not the subject of a declaration). That has been said: "The conjunction with the word 'yat', initial position etc., are characteristic of the subject (uddeśya); the word 'tat' and the word 'eva (alone)' are characteristic of the predicate (upādeya)".

XXV. Nor is this text capable of declaring the self and the contemplation thereof, because of the contingency of sentence-split. Nor may the text 'is to be contemplated'² enjoin contemplation; for, this which occurs in the midst of texts declaring the self, has the praise of that for purport, because of the contingency of sentence-split otherwise. Now, because of the injunction of cognition in 'See the self in the self alone',³ there is cognised the injunction of the succession (of cognitions), since cognition is everywhere inseparable from a succession; if this be said, no, since inseparability is not established; for, in the case of one who has once seen an object in front, there is seen the sudden turning away of the face etc. Even thus, like the injunction of observances

¹ Brh., I, iv, 7.

² Brh., II, iv, 6.

³ Brh., IV, iv, 28.

for the menstrual period, in the context of the *dārśa-pūrṇa-māsa*, it is possible in the context of the self to enjoin contemplation, which is of the form of a succession (of cognitions); if this be said, even thus, since the succession, which is not a means of valid knowledge, cannot be the cause of immediate experience, there would not result any distinction from knowledge through verbal testimony. Nor may it be said that through excess of contemplation there is seen immediate experience in respect of a dead son etc.; for, there, the object not being in contact, the immediacy thereof is delusive. If it be said that causality in respect of immediate experience is declared of contemplation by the text 'Being of purified intellect through the clarification of *jñāna*, then, contemplating, he perceives that partless one',¹ not so. Here, the syntactical relation is not 'contemplating, he perceives', in which case contemplation would be the cause of perception; but it is 'contemplating, through the clarification of *jñāna* (induced thereby) he perceives'. By the word *jñāna*, here, the internal organ is denoted, on the etymology 'cognised by this'. Its clarification is concentration; and that is an auxiliary cause; for in ordinary experience there is seen the need for the co-operation of mental concentration in the perception of a thing that is difficult to know. And thus, what is said is that in respect of the auxiliary cause, concentration of mind, contemplation, which is of the nature of a succession of cognitions, is an instrument. Nor may it be said that the syntactical relation thus with what is not expressed does not stand to reason; for, it is more consistent with parsimony to assume a difference in syntactical relation alone, rather than assume something unseen and unintelligible. Elsewhere, indeed,

¹ *Mund.*, III, 1, 8.

it has not been seen that contemplation is the cause of immediate knowledge; nor is it intelligible, since contemplation is not of the nature of a means of valid knowledge. But that in respect of intuition verbal testimony alone, which is a *pramāṇa*, is the cause has been established by the Siddhāntin in the earlier *varṇaka*, in the discussion of the attainment of knowledge, depending on the *taddhita* suffix (*anupāśadam*) in 'But (I question) about that (person) propounded in the Upaniṣads.'¹ Therefore, neither for knowledge from verbal testimony nor for a succession thereof is there the possibility of being enjoined, as the cause of immediate experience.

XXVI. As for what was said, that if the Vedāntas like the texts about the fore-sacrifices be for the sake of both purposes, there will be both the teaching of Brahman and the culmination in another individual cognition, which is enjoined, that is foolish: for the example is not established. Indeed, the fore-sacrifices alone are here known from verbal testimony, while the sequence in their performance is known through presumption. Now, the fore-sacrifices are not themselves the sequence, for they are not denoted by the word 'sequence': nor is it possible to demonstrate easily a sequence over and above them, since sequence is not seen in each fore-sacrifice; if it be said that, like conjunction, the sequence is located in more than one, no; for, in that case there is the contingency of simultaneity for the fore-sacrifices, as for what are in conjunction; and if there be simultaneity, sequence in production would be contradicted. Not so, for sequence, which is well known in ordinary experience, cannot be denied; for the very reason that it is a sequence produced in time, there is no dependence on the

simultaneity of the loci. If sequence were not seen independently of reference to the adjuncts of place, time and object, then, like the empirical usage 'forest' in respect of trees with the same spatial adjunct, there may be the empirical usage of 'sequence' in respect of the fore-sacrifices having several proximate instants for their adjuncts. If, then, because of things which have to be performed being of a nature not (already) originated, sequence as produced by place, time or object be not possible, then, let us associate with the things to be performed even the remembered sequence of the mention in the texts. Now, how is this sequence validly cognised as a qualification of what is to be performed, since there is nothing injunctive, in as much as, if the procedural text were injunctive of that, there would be reciprocal dependence, in that if that (sequence) were enjoined there would be the procedural injunction, and that if there were a procedural injunction there would be the postulation of an injunction of that (sequence)? There is not this defect: for sequence is validly cognised because of the unintelligibility (otherwise) of a single agent acting simultaneously in respect of several things. Therefore, since the texts about the fore-sacrifices have a single sense for purport, not through their example is it possible for the Vedāntas to have two senses for purport.

XXVII. As for the statement that through the Vedāntas having contemplation for purport Brahman too is cognised, since by the sense of sight causing the cognition of colour there is seen the cognition of the substance as well, that too is unsound. As the sense of sight is a *pramāṇa* in respect of every object, even without the requirement of contact, not thus is verbal testimony a *pramāṇa* in respect of every word-sense;

but where there is purport, there it is a pramāṇa, and (there too) only collectively. And thus, how can the Vedāntas having injunction for purport make Brahman known? Now, thus, then, let it be that the Vedānta words do not give valid knowledge about the nature of Brahman, but let them give knowledge of Brahman, merely as the content of the injunctive cognition generated by the injunctive word (i. e., suffix); as for the nature of Brahman, that may be established by presumption (from that), because of the unintelligibility of the enjoined cognition in the absence of the object of cognition, viz., the nature of Brahman; if this be said, great indeed is this skill of you long-lived ones in the inquiry into (interpretative) principles, which in respect of a single content, called the nature of Brahman, says that the first cognition is not authoritative, while in respect of that same (content) the second cognition is authoritative, and that similarly, express scriptural statement is not authoritative, while presumption from what is expressly declared is authoritative. If then it be said that express declaration because of being subsidiary to injunction is not authoritative in respect of its own sense, while presumption from the expressly declared is, however, authoritative, because of not being subsidiary to any other, even thus Brahman could not be established here; for, as in 'Contemplate speech as a cow'¹ etc., the enjoined cognition is intelligible even in the absence of a real object of cognition. If, resorting to the intrinsic validity (of cognition), Brahman be established from the enjoined cognition, even in the same way, why should not Brahman be established from the initial cognition generated by words signifying what is existent? And if that be established, release being intelligible even with that much,

¹ Brh., V, viii, 1

there is futility of the injunction. Then, there would be assumption of unseen fruit, when the enjoined cognition has an imposed content; in preference to that, a seen fruit consisting in valid cognition of the content is assumed; if this be said, no; because of the contingency of conflict with all *pramāṇas*. Therefore, since it is impossible to import an injunction of knowledge, which is thus wholly vicious, there is not a procedural text which causes the achievement of another individual cognition through such Vedānta (-texts) 'That which is all this is the self'¹ in the same way as (there is a procedural text which) through the mantras (causes a cognition of material and deity, other than that resulting earlier from the Brāhmaṇa texts). Therefore, not even for this section of the upholders of the final view is it easy to establish of the Vedānta-inquiry that its purpose has not been already fulfilled. Now, in the case of the Vedāntas learnt under the injunction to study, there would be futility, if they did not have dharma and Brahman for content; if this be said, not so. Though there is no Brahman because the Vedāntas do not make known the nature of Brahman, which is an existent, yet there is no futility of the Vedāntas; for, the Vedāntas are admitted to culminate (1) in an originaive injunction of the contemplation of the jiva-self, qualified by agency, enjoyership etc. and known through the cognition 'I', as qualified by the known qualities of agency, enjoyership etc., and by all the unknown qualities mentioned in the Vedāntas, such as internal rulership, Brahman-ness etc., (2) in an applicatory injunction through importing *modus operandi* like calmness, eqanimity etc., (3) in an injunction of eligibility as relating to the person enjoined, viz., he who desires release, and (4) in a procedural

¹Brh., II, iv, 6

injunction, as causing the engagement of the eligible person in an act together with its subsidiaries. That being the case, since all the principles required by the injunctions have been explained even in the earlier Tantra, and since there is not seen any further doubt, the Uttaramīmāṃsā is not to be commenced at all. This is the *prima facie* view.

XXVIII. Here we say (thus). Is it said of the Vedāntas that they have the act of contemplation for purport, because of the non-existence of signification in respect of what is existent, or on the strength of statements of those like Jaimini? The first of these will be refuted under the aphorism on harmony. Not the second; for, the Vedāntas have not been inquired into by Jaimini etc. For, in the aphorism 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into dharma'¹ the section (adhikaraṇa) has been set forth by the commentator and others, as purporting to premise the inquiry into dharma alone, but not as purporting to premise the inquiry into the sense of the entire Veda. It is thus. The subject is the śāstra of the inquiry into dharma. The doubt is whether that is to be commenced or not. For the sake of that, there is considered another matter—whether the injunction to study is for the sake of an unseen or a seen fruit. There results first that it is for an unseen fruit, since in respect of the means to a seen fruit, like eating etc., injunction is not seen. In respect of one's own Veda, the object of the act of study, seen fruit is possible, in the form of purification and attainment; how (then can the study be) for the sake of an unseen fruit? If this be asked, not so. Purification is not possible, since of one's own Veda as purified no application is seen in any rite. Nor even

¹ PM, I, 1, 1.

attainment (is possible); for, attainment which is of the form of merely apprehending the letters is not of itself a fruit and is not a means to any other fruit. If it be said that that is a means to knowing the sense, then, since the relation of end and means is established in ordinary experience between knowledge of the sense and the apprehension of the letters, there is futility of the injunction. If, in the absence of a fruit relating to the object-causal-correlate, there be no possibility of an injunction having the object as principal (being signified) through the *tavya*-suffix, which denotes the object, then, on the analogy of the flour, let us assume a change (of suffix) into '*adhīyāta*' (meaning let him study with the Veda, the Veda being now in the instrumental, not the accusative case). Nor may it be asked how study could be for an unseen fruit, since the fruit is not declared. For, the stream of ghee etc., which, in the words 'He who recites the *Rk*, for his fathers the food becomes a stream of milk; he who recites the *Yajus*, (for his fathers the food becomes) a stream of ghee', are declared to be the fruit of recitative study of the form of *Brahma-yajña* (i. e. the daily recitation of an *anuvāka* of one's own Veda, after midday prayer), can be transferred (as the fruit) even to the initial study, because of similarity in respect of being study. Therefore, on the analogy of the *rātri-sattra*, the injunction becomes 'He who desires the stream of ghee etc., is to study *with* his own Veda'. If some do not recognise the transfer of fruit from the *arthavāda* passage, then, on their view, heaven is to be assumed (as the fruit) on the analogy of the *Viśvajit*. That has been said: 'Since the seen (fruit) results even without an injunction, it is not for the sake of that; but heaven is to be assumed on the strength of the injunction, as in the case of the *Viśvajit* etc.'¹

¹ Śāstra-dīpikā I, 1, 1

Nor may it be asked what, even if it (the study) be for an unseen result, is the loss in respect of the natural capacity (of the Vedic words) to make known their own sense; for, if even what is for another purpose were purportful in respect of its own sense, there would be undue extension in the case of mantras, arthavādas etc. (which should be admitted to be purportful in respect of their own sense). Therefore, since śruti has a sense which is not intended, since dharma is not the content of perception etc., and since inquiry, which consists in argumentation auxiliary to a pramāṇa, has no basis in the absence of any pramāṇa, to which it is an auxiliary, the śāstra is not to be commenced. When there results this *prima facie* view, we declare the final view (as follows).

XXIX. 'When a seen fruit is obtained, there is no (justification for the) assumption of an unseen fruit; as for the injunction, there will be no futility, since it is for the purpose of restriction.'¹ Indeed, in respect of the object-causal-correlate, one's own Veda, there result two kinds of seen fruit generated by the act of study, viz., attainment (i. e. learning) which is the cause of the knowledge of a fruitful sense, and purification. Though the relation of end and means be established in ordinary experience between knowledge of the sense and the apprehension of the letters, there is no futility of the injunction, since it is for the sake of restriction (of the means). Nor is it that for the purified (Veda) there is no application, since application is established even on the evidence of presumption (upādāna) from the injunction of rites. For, the injunction of a rite, being in need of the knowledge relating to its content (the rite),

postulates as the generator thereof one's own Veda as purified (by study). Now, the evidence of presumption postulates one's own Veda alone as the generator of knowledge, not the purification; if this be said, true; yet, even because of the capacity of the injunction to study, which has the object (the Veda) as the principal, it is assumed that the sacrifice generates the unseen result (apūrva) when performed only by him who has the special knowledge generated by his own Veda as purified (by study). In the case of study, though like the ceremonial kindling (of fire) it is not a subsidiary, its being helpful to sacrifice is not contradicted. Therefore, on the strength of both injunctions (of the sacrifice and of study) there results an intended sense (for the Veda). And thus, when there is the possibility of a seen fruit, in conformity with what is expressly stated and present in the object-causal-correlate, it is illegitimate to assume instrumentality on the analogy of the flour and to assume an unseen fruit. Now, by the tavya-suffix there is expressly *denoted* an unseen result associated with the study which is signified by the stem; but (this result) is not *assumed*; if this be said, not so. The tavya-suffix, that denotes an unseen result, would denote the unseen result only as present in one's own Veda, not as present in the study, since the tavya-suffix has for purport one's own Veda, which is the object (and not the act). Though there is a rule that the unseen result is generated by the stem-sense, there is no rule as to being associated therewith; hence its being present in one's Veda is uncontradicted. Now, if one's own Veda have an unseen result, there would not be the possession of an intended sense, as in the case of mantras etc., applied for some other result (besides their own significance) such as counter-acting poison; if this be said, no. If that were so, since even the text injunctive of study would

not have an intended sense, there would not be established even such a view as yours that injunction of study has an unseen result.

XXX. Then it may be said : ' In the case of the text about study, its being for an unseen result is not an obstacle to that (text) intending its (own) sense ; for, the text about study is applied by the injunction to study only in respect of the sense of its own text, viz., the productive operation leading to the fruit defined by study ; indeed, even in the case of mantras, the bare fact of (their) being applied is not the cause of their having an unintended sense, but (their) being applied to something other than their own sense ; and the text about study is not applied to something other than its own sense ; therefore in the case of this which has its own sense for purport, how can there be the possession of an unintended sense ? The texts about the jyotiṣṭoma etc., however, are applied by the injunction to study to something other than their own sense, consisting in the productive operation leading to the fruit defined by sacrifice etc., i. e. to the productive operation leading to the fruit defined by study ; therefore, for one's own Veda, (in this part), which, like mantras, is applied to something other (than its own sense) and is for an unseen result, the obstacle to (its own) sense being intended is difficult to avoid.' This does not stand to reason. The intention of (one's own) sense is not obstructed by (the text) being for an unseen result ; for though there may be the doubt of obstruction somehow, in the case of the unseen result that is independent (of the object-causal-correlate) and generates fruit like heaven without any dependence (on the object-causal-correlate), there is not that (doubt) here. Here, indeed, in order to account

for the cognition of objectness in relation to one's own Veda, there should necessarily be assumed an unseen result present in the object; and since its fruit is expected only through the channel of the object, the knowledge of sense resulting from the capacity of the letters may itself be that fruit. And thus, here, the unseen result is not an obstacle to the intention to declare (its own) sense, but on the contrary is certainly helpful (thereto). When an unseen result relating to the object is unavoidable and when that unseen result has fulfilled itself by the origination of fruit consisting in knowledge of the sense, it is not possible to assume over and above these an independent unseen result or its fruit, because of the contingency of prolixity. Nor does application to something else obstruct the intention of (its own) sense; for, in the case of mantras, though applied to something else, there is seen the making known of the sense established by their own capacity: otherwise, in the case of the material, deity etc., which are capable of being recalled even through the texts of the Brāhmaṇas etc., how could the injunction with a restrictive fruit, to recall them through the mantras alone, be reconciled? That has been said: 'The capacity of the mantra to affirm (its own sense) is not removed by the injunction; this (capacity) of itself affirms (the sense) and because of the injunction it recalls (the same sense).' Therefore, the śāstra of the inquiry into dharma, which sets out in dependence on the scripture that intends its own sense, and which is helpful to (the understanding of) that, should be commenced. Thus, therefore, by the consideration of the section relating to the commencement of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, it is understood that the first aphorism sets out to show that the entire Veda intends its own sense and that there is occasion to inquire into dharma alone, but not to premise an

inquiry into the sense of the entire Veda. Now, from the capacity of such words of the commentary as 'Inquire into the the Veda' there is understood the inquiry into the entire sense of the Veda. Not so; for the opinion underlying that is not understood by you. Indeed, the commentator, after mentioning the established nature of dharma in respect of its general character and the disputes in respect of its particular nature, states the *prima facie* view that, since obeisance to the caitya (sacred fig tree) etc. are dharma, only the statements of the Buddha etc. are to be inquired into and thus introduces the aphorism stating the final position, after giving out its meaning: "Causing the inquiry into the Vedic texts, for the sake of dharma, in order to show that the Veda intends (its own) sense and that there is occasion for inquiry, Jaimini made the aphorism 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into dharma'". Therefore, from a consideration of what goes before and after, it is ascertained that what is intended by the commentator is the inquiry into dharma alone. And this is the meaning of the aphorism: immediately after the study of the Veda, since the Veda which intends (its own) sense is the cause of inquiry, there should be undertaken the inquiry into dharma. Even here, when by the word 'atha' is mentioned the antecedence of the study of the entire Veda and by the word 'atah' there is stated as the cause the entire Veda intending (its own) sense, that which results as what is premised is only the inquiry into the sense of the entire Veda, because of the discrepancy otherwise between the result premised and the cause; though this be so, yet it is understood that the inquiry into the sense of part alone of the Veda is intended by the aphorist who in premising (the inquiry) abandons the word 'Veda', and uses the word 'dharma'. And it stands to reason that dharma

alone is what is inquired into. For, in ordinary experience, that which is doubted and is fruitful is the subject of inquiry; and dharma is subject to doubt, since it is established in its general nature in worldly usage, and since there is disagreement among disputants in respect of its particular nature, whether it is performance of agnihotra or worship of the caitya etc.; and as instrumental to the happiness sought by men it is fruitful; hence it is fit for inquiry. As for the sense of the Veda, it is not established in its general character, prior to the declaration of the authoritativeness of the Veda. For the same reason it is not disputed about in respect of its special character. Nor is it understood to be instrumental to a human goal. How, then, is there for it the fitness to be inquired into? Nor may it be said 'It is only of the sense of the Veda, such as agnihotra, that establishment by inquiry is admitted even by you'; for (the inquiry into these) is admitted as prompted only by their character of dharma (not the character of Vedārtha). Nor is there the said defect of discrepancy; for, what is inquired into, i. e. acts of dharma like agnihotra, being by chance the sense of the Veda too, the discrepancy is remedied. Therefore, the first aphorism has for purport the inquiry into dharma alone.

XXXI. Similarly, even the second aphorism 'Dharma is that sense (of the Veda) which is characterised by injunction'¹ makes known the inquiry into the sense of a part alone of the Veda. Here, from the express sentence 'What is characterised by injunction, that is dharma', the aphorism has for purport the definition of dharma; and by implication, there is the statement of the means of valid knowledge; thus say the Prābhākaras. The followers of the Vārtikakāra say that, on the construction 'What is dharma, that is what is

¹ PM, I, 1, 2

characterised by injunction' the mention of the means of valid knowledge is primary and that the definition of dharma is by implication. Here, on both views, if the entire Veda taught dharma alone, then it should have been said 'Dharma is that which has the Veda as its means of valid knowledge.' It is understood, however, that the aphorist in saying 'characterised by injunction' holds part alone of the Veda to have dharma for purport.

XXXII. Be it thus: the use of the word 'injunction' is not for the sake of making known that part (alone) of the Veda has dharma for purport; but it is for the sake of indicating that the artha-bhāvanā (fruitful productive operation) consisting in human effort culminates in a human goal. It is thus. There is what is called bhāvanā (productive operation) associated with the three elements—what is to be accomplished (bhavya), the instrument (kāraṇa) and the *modus operandi* (itikartavyatā); for it has been said by the Preceptor Bhaṭṭa that bhāvanā is that which is perfect with the three elements—*what, wherewith and how*. And that is of two kinds—artha-bhāvanā and śabda-bhāvanā. Of these, human effort is artha-bhāvanā. Some say that suffixes like *liṅ*, as qualified by the three elements, are themselves śabda-bhāvanā. That has been said: 'The suffix that is complete with what is required, viz., the *what* etc., is capable in respect of injunction; the text which prompts through that is called *codanā* in this śāstra'¹. Others say that the operation of suffixes like *liṅ*, consisting in the prompting of the person, is śabda-bhāvanā. Yet others say that the attribute of suffixes like *liṅ*, consisting in the capacity to prompt the person, is śabda-bhāvanā. In all three forms of śabda-bhāvanā,

¹ Ślokaṭīkā, p. 45

it is only the artha-bhāvanā, of the nature of human effort, that should be understood as what is to be accomplished; the instrument is but the cognition which gives knowledge of the śabda-bhāvanā; the *modus operandi* is the cognition of arthavādas etc., eulogistic or condemnatory. Nor is it that there is no word expressing śabda-bhāvanā; for, of what terminates in suffixes like *liṅ*, though it denotes artha-bhāvanā (human effort) through the general verbal character (*ākhyātatva*), yet in its special character as optative etc., there is admitted the denotation of śabda-bhāvanā too. That has been said: '*Liṅ* etc. certainly denote another, the abhidhā-bhāvanā (i. e. śabda-bhāvanā) (too): the other, however, i. e. artha-bhāvanā, is understood from all verbal forms' ¹. 'They certainly denote the abhidhā-bhāvanā too'—this is the construction. Now, in the words 'Its instrument is the knowledge of the relation', the knowledge of the relation of end and means as between heaven and the sacrifice has been said to be the instrument, by Maṇḍanācārya; therefore, instrumentality does not belong to the cognition that gives knowledge of the śabda-bhāvanā; if this be said, no; for both are instruments, since two instruments are seen in 'pierced by the hand with the arrow' etc., and since the cognition of the śabda-bhāvanā is equipped with the characteristic of instrumentality, in as much as its definition is that the instrument is that cause of what is to come about which is favoured by the *modus operandi*; and since the cognition of śabda-bhāvanā, being favoured by the cognition of eulogy etc., is the cause of what is to come about, viz., human effort, because it is a prompting cognition, why should it not be an instrument? This śabda-bhāvanā possessing the three elements, while prompting a

¹ *Tantravārtika*, p. 844

person in respect of what is to be accomplished by itself, i. e. the artha-bhāvanā consisting in human effort, is called codanā; for the word 'codanā' comes from the root 'cud' meaning 'to prompt'. And this codanā-prompting does not result unless the artha-bhāvanā has a human goal for content, since man does not engage in activity in respect of what is not a human goal. 'Now in "yajeta (he is to sacrifice)", in the case of the artha-bhāvanā understood from the liṅ-suffix, it should be said that the sense of the stem (i. e. the act of sacrifice) is what is to be accomplished, since it is most proximate, being conveyed by the same word; and that is of the nature of exertion (which of itself is not a human goal); how, then, can it be that the artha-bhāvanā has a human goal for content?' If this be asked, it is said (in reply): it is because of this same unintelligibility that we abandon the sense of the stem and assume heaven, the qualification of the eligible person, though conveyed by a different word, as what is to be accomplished. And thence result the three elements of the artha-bhāvanā, viz., heaven etc., as what is to be accomplished, the sense of the stem (i. e., the act) as instrument, and the fore-sacrifices etc., as the *modus operandi*. Thus, therefore, in order to indicate of the artha-bhāvanā that it culminates in a human goal, there is the use by the aphorist of the word 'codanā' signifying the sense of prompting, but not in order to indicate that a portion alone of the Veda has dharma for purport.

XXXIII. This is unsound; for even if the word 'Veda' had been used in the aphorism, there would be established in the case of artha-bhāvanās, their culmination in a human goal. It is thus. In 'One's own Veda is what is to be studied' the function of the tavya-suffix ('is to be') is śabda-bhāvanā. And that, being related to what is to be accomplished, viz.,

the artha-bhāvanā consisting in human effort whose content is study, having for instrument the cognition relating to (the śabda-bhāvanā) itself, and having for *modus operandi* the cognition of arthavādas etc., relating to such fruit of study as the stream of ghee (flowing as food for one's fathers), originates the artha-bhāvanā consisting in human effort, which has study for its instrument, is related to one's own Veda as what is to be accomplished, and has for *modus operandi* such things as facing the east. Here, the śabda-bhāvanā, being incapable of originating that artha-bhāvanā unless one's own Veda that is to be accomplished is the cause of generating fruitful cognition, posits indirectly, in the case of the kratu-bhāvanā denoted by words like *hi* present in one's own Veda, that they relate to heaven etc. Therefore, even from the capacity of the injunction to study, it is established of the Veda that it declares bhāvanā whose content is some distinctive fruit; hence since the sense intended results even from the use of the word 'Veda,' not for that purpose is the use of the word 'codanā' needed in the aphorism; on the contrary, for you who say that the entire Veda has dharma for purport, that (word) is certainly a hindrance; for, when the word 'codanā' is used, there may be the doubt that dharma is the purport of injunctive texts alone, not of the others, the Vedānta texts; but that these have some other sense as purport; similarly even in the case of injunctive statements in ordinary experience it may be doubted that dharma is the purport; to exclude both of these (doubts) it follows that in your view, the word 'Veda' alone should have been used in the aphorism. If it be said 'By him who premises the inquiry into dharma in immediate succession to the study of the Veda and says "characterised by codanā" Vedic injunction alone is understood to be intended,' no; for, in the first aphorism, there is not

the specific qualification 'in immediate succession to the study of the Veda'; for, in conformity with this (second) aphorism, there is the contingency of the assumption there too of immediate succession to all injunctions. Nor is undue extension remedied by the word 'Veda' occurring in the Veda-section, in the aphorism 'The Vedas, some say, are of recent date etc.'; ¹ for the Veda-section is too far removed (from this aphorism). Therefore, because of the view of the aphorist, the commentator, and the author of the *Pārtika*, that the use of the word 'codanā' is for excluding (the possibility of) the Vedāntas having dharma as purport, it follows that the Vedāntas have Brahman alone as purport. Nor because of the Bhāṣya-statement 'Its sense is, indeed, seen to be the imparting of knowledge about ritual' is it established that the entire Veda has dharma for purport; for, this general statement of the Bhāṣya has to be ascertained in conformity with the specific statements occurring under the first and second aphorisms. Indeed, that Bhāṣya-passage, on a consideration of what goes before and after, stops merely with the Veda having a sense: therefore, it excludes non-conjunction, consisting in not imparting knowledge of ritual, but not the conjunction with another, consisting in imparting knowledge of Brahman.

XXXIV. Now, from the aphorism 'Since scripture is for the sake of ritual, there is futility of what is not for that purpose' ² there is futility of what is unconnected with ritual; if this be said, not so. Futility, now, is not the non-existence of (any) denotation; for, the denotation is shown in the Bhāṣya-passage 'Even, thus, they restate an existent

¹ PM, I, 1, 27.

² PM, I, ii, 1.

thing.' Nor is it the non-existence of fruit; for though in the case of arthavādas like 'He howled' there is no fruit in the absence of syntactical unity with an injunction, in the case of the Vedāntas the declared fruit cannot be got rid of. Hence it is that in this section (of arthavādas) there are cited only arthavādas occurring in the ritual contexts, but no Vedānta-text whatever is cited. Thus therefore it is established according to the Bhaṭṭa system that the Vedāntas have a purpose not (elsewhere) accomplished.

XXXV. Now, the Prābhākaras, however, state the commencement of the śāstra thus. The injunction to study does indeed enjoin inquiry; and that, being expectant of one's own Veda culminating in fruit, would only enjoin the inquiry into the Veda, not the inquiry into dharma. Nor is it that there is no knowledge in general in respect of the sense of the Veda; for, in the case of him who has studied the Veda with its subsidiary disciplines, there does exist a superficial knowledge of its sense. Nor does there not exist conflict about the particulars; for in 'He who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid' etc., there is doubt as to the specific character of the statement, such as whether in respect of him who desires cattle (as the subject) the sacrifice is enjoined (as predicate) or whether in respect of the injunction of the sacrifice (as the subject), the desire for cattle is (predicated as) the qualification. Therefore, for the section 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into dharma'¹ the content is the inquiry into the sense of the Veda. The doubt is whether that is to be undertaken or not. It follows first that it is not to be undertaken, since there is no pramāṇa on which it is based. If it be said that inquiry is based on

¹ PM, I, 1, 1.

scripture, no; for scripture, being subsidiary to the injunction to teach, cannot intend its own sense. If it be said that scripture cannot possibly be subsidiary to teaching, since there is nothing which makes this application (of principal and subsidiary), no; for, subsidiariness due to being the prompted cannot be avoided. Study, since its practice is prompted by the injunction to teach, becomes subsidiary to that; and that study consisting in utterance has to be brought about by one's own Veda which is to be uttered; therefore, the injunction to teach, which prompts study, prompts also scripture, which is its auxiliary; and since being prompted, it is a subsidiary, it does not intend its own sense. If, then you think, 'Not merely because of being prompted is there subsidiariness, since being prompted is possible even in the case of an auxiliary (like *adhana*, the ceremonial kindling of fire) which is not a subsidiary; therefore, there is no failure of intention in respect of its own sense, as in the case of mantra texts used to counteract poison etc.,' then, we make out in another way the failure of intention in respect of (its own) sense. Since, in the injunctive text about one's own Veda, an unseen result is declared by the *tavya*-suffix, there is understood of one's own Veda subsidiariness to that (*apurva*). Though for study prompted by the injunction to teach there results subsidiariness in respect of teaching too, since in the case of the fore-sacrifices etc., prompted by the sacrifice, there is seen subsidiariness to the sacrifice, yet it is not possible to do away with the primarily understood subsidiariness to the unseen result. And therefore since in the case of one's own Veda, the subsidiary to an unseen result, there is failure of intention in respect of (its own) sense, the inquiry into the sense of the Veda is not to be commenced. When this *prima facie* view results, we

(Prābhakaras) state the final position (thus). The subsidiariness of study to teaching, on the strength of being prompted (by the latter), does not stand to reason; for, in the case of the ceremonial kindling prompted by the subsequent sacrifice, there is not seen subsidiariness thereto; in the case of the fore-sacrifices etc., subsidiariness is established by such evidences of application as prakarāṇa; here, however, there is no such evidence. That study is for the sake of an unseen result is not, however, an obstacle to the intention of sense; for, the unseen result being denoted by the *tavya*-suffix present in one's own Veda, when there is the expectancy of a fruit (for that *apūrva*), because of the unintelligibility of assuming what is unseen when a seen (fruit) is possible, it is possible to assume that the fruit is the fruitful cognition generated by the capacity of one's own Veda. Therefore, it is settled that there should be undertaken the inquiry into the sense of the Veda, which does intend its sense. And thus in the view of the Prābhakaras who thus premise the inquiry into the sense of the Veda, it is difficult to make out that the Vedāntas have a purpose not (elsewhere) accomplished.

XXXVI. To this it is said (in reply). Though the inquiry prompted by the injunction to study the entire Veda would have for its content only the sense of the Veda, yet because of the use of the word 'dharma' not explained otherwise, in the aphorism, the content comes to be (only) a part of the sense of the Veda. Not thus is there conflict with the injunction to study; for, since the injunction which is general in form functions distinctly in respect of the study of each text and the inquiry into each text, its purpose is fulfilled even with the inquiry into a part of the sense of the Veda; this is just as for the injunction 'See colour with the sense of

sight' the purpose is fulfilled with the perception even of (any one colour, say) blue colour. If, then, it be (said) that there is a limiting down there because it is impossible to perceive all colours, here too, even because it is not possible for one who is not non-attached and is (hence) ineligible to inquire into the Vedāntas, let there be a limiting down (of the inquiry to the injunctive texts). Nor thus is there a contingency of limitation in respect of study too; for non-attachment is not there a condition of eligibility. And if the inquiry be not restricted, the use of the word 'dharma' would be unintelligible, since only the words 'inquiry into the sense of the Veda' should have been used. If it be said that in order to indicate (its being) the human goal, the sense of the Veda is itself designated by the word 'dharma', no; for, the word 'dharma' does not denote the sense of the Veda, since the word 'dharma' is applied by some even to what is not the sense of the Veda, e. g., worship of the caitya (sacred fig tree) etc. If, then, you think "The word 'dharma' denotes what is established by co-presence and co-absence to be the means to beatitude; and since the sense of the Veda is the means to beatitude, the word 'dharma' applies thereto," in that case, Brahman which is of the (very) nature of beatitude is not denoted by the word 'dharma' since instrumentality is absent therefrom. Therefore, inquiry into a part (alone of the sense of the Veda) should be admitted. If not, in order to include Brahman too, the words 'sense of the Veda' should be used in the aphorism. Nor may it be asked how there can be the inclusion of Brahman which is not apprehended even in its general nature; for, in the case of him who has studied the Veda with the subsidiary disciplines, there is, of Brahman too as of dharma, a superficial apprehension prior to inquiry. And therefore, because of

the absence of the words 'the sense of the Veda,' the first aphorism has for content the inquiry into dharma alone.

XXXVII. Similarly, even the second aphorism, whose purport is definition, has dharma for content, and does not have for content the sense of the Veda. A definition indeed has the object of refuting the delusion of the contingency of what is defined elsewhere (than where the definition applies). Here, if dharma be what is defined, there is refuted the delusion of its contingency in the worship of the caitya (sacred fig tree) etc., since some get the delusion of dharma in respect of the worship of the caitya etc., and dispute about it. Now, even in respect of the sense of the Veda, there are disputes, as to whether the sense of the Veda is characterised by arthavāda etc., or whether it is characterised by injunction; therefore in order to refute these, definition may be stated; if this be said, then, the definition in the aphorism should be stated in the form 'The sense of the Veda is what is characterised by injunction'; for, if the word 'dharma' be used, the refutation of disputes about the sense of the Veda would come to be what is not declared (in the aphorism). If it be said that the word 'dharma' has been used only with the intention to signify the sense of the Veda, no; for, the former does not denote the latter. Nor does the word 'dharma' secondarily imply the sense of the Veda; for in wholly exclusive implication there is the contingency of the sense of the Veda being what is not dharma; for, in the case of the bank etc., which are other than the denoted and are secondarily implied, it is seen that they are not (what is denoted, such as) the Ganges. Even in non-exclusive implication, what is the form of the statement? Is it 'That which is characterised by injunction is dharma' or is it 'That

which is dharma is characterised by injunction? In both cases, there does not result the intention to declare the sense of the Veda; for there is no reason for the words 'injunction' and 'dharma', denoting a part of the Veda and a part of its sense, to imply the entire Veda and its sense. Indeed, in (the statements) 'That which is cognised by the sense of sight is colour' and 'That which is colour is cognised by the sense of sight', there is not seen secondary implication of all perception and its objects. The non-existence of unintelligibility in respect of the principal sense is common to both (possible forms of secondary implication).

XXXVIII. Then it may be said: "As in 'That twice-born one, who, having caused the pupil to approach, teaches him the Veda together with the liturgy and the mysteries, is called preceptor',¹ this aphorism has for purport the injunction of a name; and therefore, for the word 'dharma' though there is no denotation or secondary implication, there may yet be intention to declare the sense of the Veda". That is not (so), since there is no benefit. Just as the name 'preceptor' is enjoined for the sake of an injunction in respect of something else to be done, such as 'He is to give a cow to the preceptor,' not thus is there anything else to be done here, for the sake of which the name 'dharma' is enjoined in the case of the sense of the Veda. Even if the word 'dharma' be admitted to denote the sense of the Veda, it is not possible on your view to avoid (the defects of) the futility of the word 'arthah' present in the aphorism, the word 'codanā (injunction)' having for purport the secondary implication of the entire Veda, and unintelligibility in the setting out of the section. Nor are (statements) like 'He who

desires to cast a spell is to sacrifice with the *śyena* excluded by (the use of) the word 'arthah' (since 'arthah' means a human goal and casting a spell is not a legitimate human goal); for, if these too be the sense of the Veda, their exclusion is impossible, and if they be not the sense of the Veda, (their) exclusion results even through the word 'dharma'. If it be said that the word 'arthah' restates the exclusion which is certainly established (by the word 'dharma'), no, for, in that case, the futility continues. On the view, however, that the inquiry is into dharma, which is a part of the sense of the Veda, the object of the word 'arthah' comes to be the establishment in the case of the hawk-sacrifice etc., characterised by prohibitory injunctions, that as non-*artha* (not contributory to the human goal) they are not dharma. Even though there is futility of the word 'arthah', how does the word the '*codanā*' come to have (as you allege) secondary implication for purport? If this be asked, it is said (in reply). Is it that there is some part of the Veda over and above injunctions or not? If not, then the meaning of the aphorism would be 'That sense characterised by injunction is the sense of the injunction'; thence would result the identity of the defined and the definition. If there is (some other part of the Veda), is that part of the Veda too significant or not? If significant, how can that, which is known through injunction, be the sense of the non-injunctive part? Even if that (part) be devoid of significance, how can the sense of injunctions be the sense of the Veda, which is a compound of two parts, significant and non-significant? Therefore, it is not possible for you to avoid secondary implication of the entire Veda by the word '*codanā*'. And the section would have to be set out by you thus: there being the doubt as to the sense of the Veda, whether it is characterised by injunction or characterised by *arthavāda* etc., (it is settled) that

it is not characterised by *arthavāda* etc., but characterised by *codanā*. This setting out is unintelligible; for, prior to the declaration of the authoritativeness of the Veda, even its possession of sense is not ascertained. Though, in the first aphorism, non-authoritativeness is refuted as consequent on the injunction to study, there is not refuted the non-authoritativeness consequent on having a personal origin etc.; otherwise there would follow the futility of the string of subsequent aphorisms which declare authoritativeness. Nor may it be said that there is re-declaration for re-inforcement; for, there is no suspicion of lack of strength. If it be said that since even the authoritativeness of the Veda falls within the sense of the Veda, there is declaration (of it) by the string of (subsequent) aphorisms, no; for in that case, authoritativeness being of the nature of what is existent, there is the contingency of the abandonment of the position that the Veda relates solely to what is to be done. Then, the first aphorism alone establishes authoritativeness, not any other string of aphorisms; if this be said, no, because of conflict with the *Bhāṣya*. The commentator, indeed, in commencing the second chapter, restates (what is past) in the words 'The preceding is the chapter on *pramāṇa*' and shows (in the following words) that by the first chapter is established only the authoritativeness of the Veda: 'Further, the sense of the Veda is what is characterised by injunction, not characterised by *arthavāda* etc.' If this alone were the sense of this (second aphorism), then there is the contingency of the non-commencement of the section about *arthavādas* and *mantras*; for, in this same aphorism is refuted the capacity of *mantras* and *arthavādas* to give valid knowledge of *dharma*. If it be said that the commencement of this section is to declare (the authoritativeness of *mantras* etc.) in some other way, such as

by eulogising etc., no ; for the capacity to give valid knowledge of dharma being refuted even here, the *prima facie* view, consisting in their capacity to teach dharma, cannot arise there (and without a doubt and a *prima facie* view there cannot be an independent section). Thus, therefore, on a consideration of the first and second aphorisms, that part of the Veda which relates to what is to be done emerges as what is to be inquired into ; and that is inquired into, not that which relates to the true nature of things. Therefore, since that part of the Veda which relates to the true nature of things has not had its purpose already accomplished, in order to inquire into that, the Uttaramīmāṃsā is to be commenced ; this is established.

HERE ENDS THE SECOND VARNĀKA.

THIRD VARṆAKA.

1. Thus, from the purport of the (first) aphorism the commencement of the śāstra (of the Vedānta) has been demonstrated (as necessary) in the two (preceding) varṇakas; next is set out the commentary on the words (of that aphorism).

2. When the purport has been ascertained earlier, it is easy to construe the words in that (light); therefore the purport was stated in the (preceding) two varṇakas.

3. Here, in the third varṇaka, in order to strengthen (the conclusion about) the commencement of the śāstra, through commenting on the words of the aphorism, the senses of the words are inquired into.

I. For the word 'atha' four senses are well known, on the strength of its application in the usage of elders, viz., immediate succession, what is begun (adhikāra), auspicious invocation, and having a sense other than the sense of the present context. Of these, by the exclusion of the rest, immediate succession is accepted (as signified) by the word 'atha'. And that is obtained on the adoption of the etymological sense of the word 'jijñāsā'. Here, what is called 'adhikāra' is beginning. The desire to know Brahman cannot indeed be begun whether as something to be done or as something to be taught; for, desire is generated solely by the attractiveness of the object; nor is it what is taught in every section.

II. Now, the word 'jijñāsā' has the conventionally settled sense of inquiry, since it is used by the commentator and

others with the intention to mean inquiry; therefore, on the principle that the conventional drives out the etymological sense, the adoption of the etymological sense does not stand to reason; therefore, the word 'atha' too may have the sense of what is begun, since it is possible to begin an inquiry; if this be said, not so; for, the principle that the conventional drives out the etymological sense does not apply here. It is thus. The significance of words is of two kinds, being divided into principal and non-principal. Of these, two—the conventional and the etymological—are principal, and two—*lakṣaṇā* and *gaṇa*—are non-principal. Words like 'horse' and 'elephant' whose meaning is learnt without dependence on the sense of the (component) parts, and solely through the usage of elders, have conventional sense. Words like 'the four-faced one, the lotus-seated one', which through the sense of the component parts denote a qualified sense, have etymological sense. The cognition of what is inseparable from the denotation is called *lakṣaṇā*; the signification resulting from the association with qualities implied, is recognised as *gaṇi*; because of this statement, the word 'Gāṅgā' causing the cognition of the bank which is inseparable from its (own) denotation, has a *lakṣaṇā* sense; the word 'lion' applied to Devadatta because of his association with qualities like courage, has a *gaṇa* sense. Nor may it be doubted that in respect of words like 'paṅkaja (mire-born)' there is a fifth (mode of) verbal significance called *yoga-rūḍhi* (etymological-cum-conventional); for, there is no advantage in assuming a conventional sense there, as, even because of the extensive usage (of that word) in respect of the lotus, there results the exclusion of lily etc. (from the denotation); there is indeed seen in the case of the word *go*, though having many senses, the initial cognition of a thing

possessing a dewlap etc., because of extensive usage. Therefore, verbal significances are only of four kinds. This being the case, when a word has a conventional sense in respect of one thing and an etymological sense in respect of another—like the word 'aja' conventionally signifying 'goat' and etymologically the 'self'—, there, when it is said 'See the aja', the principle applies that the conventional drives away the etymological sense. Here, however, the word 'jijñāsā' does not have inquiry as the conventional sense; for, inquiry is not wholly distinct from the etymological sense, consisting in the desire to know. Indeed, the sense of the word 'jijñāsā' is not mere desire to know, but desire having for content knowledge that is to be accomplished by inquiry. The knowledge, verily, that is desired, is desired, as cognised along with the content; for, desire is impossible in respect of an unknown content. And therefore the knowledge, that is desired in respect of a cognised-object, is desired as having the fruit of ascertainment in respect of what is in doubt or the fruit of immediacy in respect of what is mediate. And since both of these are to be accomplished by the inquiry into pramāṇas etc., the distinctive knowledge that is desired in respect of a cognised object, implies, as inseparable therefrom, the inquiry into pramāṇas. Therefore the word 'jijñāsā' has been used by the commentator and others secondarily in respect of inquiry, but not in the conventional sense, in which case the said principle would apply.

III. Now, though from the words the desire be the principal, desire alone is not what is taught by the aphorism, since there is no fruit; but, by way of showing the knowledge that is desired, it implies the means thereto, i.e. inquiry, which is included in the expressly stated (jijñāsā), and that

alone is taught as the purport; therefore the word 'atha' is for the commencement of that one which is taught as the purport, as among knowledge, inquiry and Brahman, which are principal in respect of the sense (as compared with the word); if this be said, not so. For, in that case, since there would not be through the word 'atha', by way of signifying immediate succession, the intimation, based on logical principles, of the particular person eligible, viz., he who possesses the four-fold means mentioned in the śāstra, the inquiry that is enjoined as to be undertaken would be devoid of an eligible person (and hence) not capable of being carried out. Nor may it be asked "the very injunction of inquiry may, on the principle of the Viśvajit (sacrifice)¹, posit the variety of person eligible and culminate in appetency; what (is the need) of the word 'atha' in the sense of immediate succession?" For it may easily asked (in reply) "Inquiry which is understood as having to be undertaken presumptively implies the commencement; what (is the need) of the word 'atha' in the sense of commencement of the inquiry?" If it be asked "Then, if both result on the strength of the injunction (of inquiry), what is it that is determinative?" we say that because of being a cause demanded by the injunction it is only the intimation of the eligible person, by way of signifying immediate succession, that stands to reason. If without explicitly stating the particular eligible person through the word 'atha', you assume one on the principle of the Viśvajit (sacrifice), then, because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the injunction of inquiry, it would be necessary to postulate eligibility generally for the three castes, and again through denying that assume eligibility (only) for him who desires release; thus there would

¹PM, IV, iii, 15

be prolixity. Better than this is it to intimate the particular eligible person even through the word 'atha'.

IV. Now, there is the said defect when there is a difference in time between the cognition of the injunction and the cognition of the particular eligible person; here there is no difference in time; rather is it that, (even) at the time of the cognition of the injunction, the injunction is cognised as qualified by the eligible person, in the form 'He who desires release or he who desires Brahman-knowledge is to inquire', through transforming into the fruit, on the principle of ratri-sattra, the release or Brahman-knowledge occurring in the artha-vāda; therefore there is no prolixity, consisting in denial after postulation; if this be said, this must here be stated: does the śāstra of inquiry have a particular (class of) eligible person or does it have all three castes as eligible persons? On the first alternative, the cognitions are with a difference in time, in that the injunction as cognised relates as a general rule to all three castes and that, subsequently, on the strength of the arthavāda it relates to a particular class among the three castes, i. e. those who desire release; hence the said defect (of prolixity) is difficult to avoid. Now, even on your view, eligibility being contingent for all on the strength of the injunction, since the particular eligible person is intimated by the word 'atha', the denial after postulation is difficult to avoid; if this be said, no; for, the word 'atha' intimates through logical principles, only that eligible person who is mentioned in the context of the injunction to hear and who possesses the four-fold means.

V. On the second (alternative) too, is it because of the fruit or because of the injunction that the śāstra has all as

eligible persons? Not the first; for, there does not exist in all a seeking for the fruit, consisting in Brahman-knowledge. Nor may it be asked 'How is it there is non-existence of seeking in respect of Brahman-knowledge which is of the nature of the intuition of true happiness?'. For, since even the mind is dissociated from Brahman-knowledge, there is declared the removal of the attachment to all material objects. And that removes together with their means all grades of happiness beginning with universal empery and ending with Brahmaloka, each (subsequent grade) of which is declared (by scripture) to be superior to the preceding one. Therefore the man in the street, who thinks 'Brahman-knowledge is not a human goal, since it removes supreme happiness, in the same way as disease etc.,' does not seek Brahman-knowledge, but turns away from it, on the contrary. Brahman-knowledge is a human goal, since it is the cause of unexcelled bliss, like dharma; and its being the cause (of that) is established by śruti; if this be said, even thus, it does not stand to reason to abandon material objects, the means to seen happiness, and desire Brahman-knowledge, the means to a happiness that is (merely) heard of. That has been said: 'If this bliss is declared by śruti and not directly experienced by a means of valid knowledge, then, that has not the capacity even to dull the desire for happiness from material objects'.¹ Now, since the bliss that can be accomplished by attachment to all material objects (whatsoever), results (even) from Brahman-knowledge alone, for the sake of permanent satisfaction; Brahman-knowledge may be desired, to the abandonment of material objects; if this be said, no; for, in the case of the vulgar, even when satisfied, there is seen aversion to the loss of the material object. And thus fools say: 'Lo, hard it is

¹ Sambandhavārtika, v. 248

(to reflect) why creation was not such as to allow constant capacity to enjoy, non-satiation, and non-diminution of objects of enjoyment'. That release, however, does not equal even a fragment of the happiness from material objects—this is their opinion. And to this effect they cite the song of the man of attachment: 'He desires rather the life of a jackal in this desolate Brndāvana, but never release, where there are no objects (of enjoyment), O Gautama'.

VI. Now, let there then be the second alternative that because of injunction the śāstra has all as eligible persons. For, this injunction to study, which has a seen fruit, functions up to the understanding of the sense, and causes the undertaking of inquiry too, for the sake of the origination of (its own) fruit. And thus, since for the injunction to study, there is eligibility for the three castes, it stands to reason that there is a similar character even for the inquiry prompted thereby. Though inquiry is not the content of the injunction to study since reading alone is the sense of the stem, nor is auxiliary thereto since reading results even without inquiry, yet in order that the injunction to study may culminate in its fruit, inquiry comes to have the character of being prompted by that injunction. This is just as in 'He is to pound the rice-grains', though the injunction is intelligible even with a single act of pounding, yet for the sake of the resulting of the fruit consisting in the generation of rice (from the paddy), the repetition of pounding, which is neither enjoined nor even an auxiliary to the enjoined, is prompted by the injunction. Therefore since of the injunction to study the fruit is the ascertainment of sense, accomplishable by inquiry, it follows that in respect of the śāstra there is eligibility for all.

VII. This is not sound. The knowledge of the sense, as the seen fruit of study, does it result from co-presence and co-absence? Or is it part of the śāstra, because of being enjoined in respect of that (as subject)? Or is it obtained (presumptively) through the capacity of the injunction to culminate in fruit? Even on the first (alternative), the ascertainment of the sense is not the fruit of study, since ascertainment does not arise from mere study or from that as accompanied by repetition. If that arises through inquiry, it will be the fruit of inquiry alone, not of study. If the superficial cognition of sense be the fruit of study, then inquiry cannot be what is prompted by that (i.e. the injunction to study), since that (fruit, i. e. superficial cognition) results even from the study of the Veda with the subsidiary disciplines.

VIII. Now, let there then be the second alternative that it (the fruit) results from the śāstra, on the strength of an injunction. It is thus. By the tavya-suffix in 'adhyetavyah (is to be studied),' its function, the śabda-bhāvanā, is expressed in the form of an injunction. And that śabda-bhāvanā, while originating artha-bhāvanā, posits, as what is to be accomplished, a human goal, i. e. the knowledge of a fruitful sense. Thus, since there is obtained something else as what is to be accomplished, study, which is conveyed by the same word (as the injunctive), comes to be instrumental (to the former). If study itself were what is to be accomplished, then there would not result even your view that the learning of the letters is the fruit. Therefore, the knowledge of the sense, which is what is to be accomplished, will, on the strength of the injunction (to study), be the fruit of study which is the instrument. Even this is not intelligible.

When by the *tavya*-suffix which signifies the object (here, the Veda), it is possible to express what is to be accomplished, consisting in the attainment (i. e. learning) relating to one's own Veda, which is the object, it is impossible to assume something else as what is to be accomplished. How is it possible to abandon 'study' which is conveyed by the same word and assume as what is to be accomplished the attainment of one's own Veda, which is conveyed by a different word and is (thus) remote? If this be asked, no; for, one's own Veda being the sense of the *tavya*-suffix which signifies the object, in respect of the *bhāvanā* that is the sense of the suffix, that (Veda) is more proximate than study, which is the sense of the stem.

IX(a). Nor is the third (alternative possible); for, the apprehension of letters is alone the fruit of the injunction to study.

IX(b). Now, since the apprehension of the letters is not of itself a human goal, since the fruitful knowledge of sense is not admitted by you to be the fruit of the injunction, and since there is no other fruit relating to the object-causal-correlate, there is the contingency of abandoning the principal character of the object, on the analogy of the flour, and assuming that one is to accomplish heaven by the study of one's own Veda; better than this is (it to assume) knowledge of the sense as the fruit of the injunction, on the principle that when a seen (fruit) exists, an unseen is not to be assumed. Indeed, ascertainment of sense is possible merely from the study of the Veda with the subsidiary disciplines; for Grammar, which is the cause of the knowledge of sense, is also one of the subsidiary disciplines. Nor thus is there the futility of the *śāstra* of inquiry; for that is required to

remedy the conflicts realised in the cognised sense. Therefore, knowledge of a fruitful sense, which is a human goal, is the fruit of the injunction, not the apprehension of the letters.

IX(c). If this be said, not so; for, as the cause of the knowledge of sense, the apprehension of the letters too is a human goal; for seeking by men is seen even in the case of cows etc., which are the causes of the fruit, viz., milk etc. If it be said that, if the injunction were exhausted with the apprehension of the letters, the knowledge of the sense would be due to chance, no; for, knowledge of the sense is prompted by the fruit (i. e. apprehension of the letters). Knowledge of the sense is not indeed prompted by the injunction; for, in the case of trustworthy worldly statements, it is seen that they cause knowledge of a fruitful sense (even) in the absence of an injunction. Nor may it be asked 'Since there is (thus) no difference of the apprehension of letters from study, how can there be the relation of cause and effect between them?'; what is called the attainment (learning) of the letters is an attribute of the letters, which is called (their) capacity to be pronounced (by the pupil) independently; study, however, is the functioning of speech and mind for that purpose; thus there is a difference. If it be said 'Thus, then, since study being the cause of the apprehension of letters is established by co-presence and co-absence, the injunction is futile', no; for, like pounding etc., it has the purpose of a restriction for the sake of the origination of the unseen result (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Nor thus is there the abandonment of the possession of a seen result; for the unseen result from the restriction is admitted only as inherent in the attainment of the letters, which is the seen result; the principle that when a seen (result) exists, an unseen is not to be assumed has for content the (assumption

of an) independent unseen result; even by you who say that knowledge of sense is alone the fruit, the character of a restrictive injunction is admitted. Nor may it be asked 'when reason is equally balanced (between both) why this partiality for the apprehension of letters alone (as the fruit)?' On the view that a fruitful knowledge of sense is the fruit of the injunction to study, when there is eligibility for a certain person in respect of a certain rite, by him there would be study of the texts, relating to that alone, not the study of other texts, since in their case there is not the fruit of appetition etc.; therefore there would not result the study of the entire Veda. On our view, however, the attainment of the entire Veda is useful in recitation for expiatory purposes and so on.

X. Now, study should be enjoined with reference to knowledge of sense as the qualification of the eligible person, since injunction devoid of eligibility is impossible. Even if it be enjoined with reference to the attainment of the letters, only he who desires that attainment would be the eligible person; if this be said, no; for if the word be not uttered as preceded by the intention of the knowledge of sense, purport will not be established for the text; for, in ordinary experience, purport is seen in the word which is uttered with the intention of the knowledge of sense. Nor may it be said 'Let there be no injunction, even as in ordinary experience;' for, here, there is not, as in that (ordinary experience) the desire that brings about the utterance of the word. Then it may be said: 'On the analogy of the Viśvajit, let him who desires heaven be assumed as the eligible person; or else, since in the text of the Vajasaneyins, "I have attained brahmacarya" etc., the investiture (with the sacred thread) belongs to the context, it may be assumed on the evidence of the context

(prakarana) that he who is invested is the eligible person.' That is unsound; for, when there is an eligible person, i. e. he who desires the seen fruit consisting in the knowledge of the sense, the assumption of any other is impossible. And thus, the injunction results: he who desires knowledge of the sense is to achieve knowledge of the sense through study. As for the injunction 'He is to achieve knowledge of the sense through inquiry' that is presumptive, for, when conflicts are not remedied by inquiry, ascertainment of the sense does not arise. (Hence) knowledge of the sense is alone the fruit.

XI. This is not sound. When, on the strength of the injunction, the apprehension of letters alone has resulted, is it assumed that by the person who has studied Grammar the sense of the Veda too, like the sense of worldly statements, is known of itself, and this knowledge said to be the fruit? Or is it because of an injunction having as subject him who desires knowledge of the sense? The first of these, we acknowledge. The second is unintelligible; for, the sense of the Veda not being known prior to study, desire is impossible even in the case of the knowledge which is qualified by that and not (already) known. If it be said that the sense of the Veda is known by the inference 'The Veda has sense, since it is verbal testimony, like the statement of a trustworthy person', then even because of being established by the inference, knowledge of the sense of the Veda would not be desired. The sense of the Veda, though inferred in respect of its general nature, is not cognised in respect of special forms like the agnihotra; if this be said, then, how can even that knowledge, which has agnihotra etc., for its sphere and is not (already) known, be desired? If agnihotra etc., be known

even from the teaching of a father etc., the futility of desire (for that knowledge) stands as before. If then it be said that, since knowledge through (such) teaching is non-authoritative, ascertained knowledge is desired, the desire for ascertained knowledge is not possible, where non-authoritativeness has been ascertained, since the sense is a mere delusion; where however, non-authoritativeness is suspected, there is need only for inquiry into that, not for study. Then you may think: 'It is only for the sake of inquiring into the authoritativeness of knowledge through teaching that there is study of the Veda and the inquiry into its sense, since the Veda is the basic evidence for that (teaching).' Thus, then, let knowledge of the sense be somehow the qualification of the eligible person; yet an injunction in respect of that (qualification) as subject does not stand to reason. The specific cognitions of the sense of the Veda, do they in their specific form stand as the subject of the injunction of study, or in their general form? Not the first, since that is impossible simultaneously (for all the specific cognitions). On the second (alternative), for the word uttered with the intention of the sense alone (in general), purport would be in respect of that alone, not in respect of the specific cognition of the agnihotra etc. If, then, though on the strength of the injunction there be purport in respect of the bare (general) sense, purport be assumed in respect of a specific sense, in conformity with the capacity of the sentence, then, the injunction would not be the cause of purport in respect of that. Further, even if there be somehow an injunction with that (specific sense) as the subject, knowledge of the sense does not result as a seen fruit from study alone, since that is not seen. Now, if the Veda be not uttered with knowledge of the sense as the intention, it would have no purport in respect of its

own sense, because of the non-existence of the cause of purport; if this be said, not so. First, the utterance of the hearer is not the cause of purport, since that does not exist in ordinary experience. Nor (is that cause) the utterance of the speaker, because of the contingency of the non-existence of purport in the Veda which is of non-personal origin. Now, even thus, the Veda could not declare sense, because of the non-existence of the cause of the declaration (of sense), viz., utterance with (the sense as) the intention; if this be said, no; for, it is of the nature of the word to declare (sense). Then, the utterance of words, in the world, with the knowledge of the sense as the intention, would be futile; if this be said, no; for, that is for the sake of remedying the obstacle called doṣa caused by the relation (of the word) to a human being. Now, even if the Veda have the capacity to declare sense, it has not the capacity to give knowledge of it, since knowledge is dependent on purport, and purport, which is a human attribute, is here impossible; if this be said, not so; for, purport, being capable of being known by the six kinds of marks, is an attribute of the word, not an attribute of a human being; this will be stated under the aphorism on harmony. Thus, therefore, since the injunction to study does not function up to the stage of the fruit, knowledge of the sense, it does not follow from the injunction that for the śāstra of inquiry there is eligibility for all.

XII. Now, in the case of the injunction to study you do not admit eligibility for him who desires knowledge of the sense; and no other (ground of) eligibility is declared; therefore non-study alone would follow. To this, the Prabhākaras say (thus): the injunction to study does not need an independent eligible person, since the performance

of its content (i. e. study) results as prompted by the injunction to teach. Nor may it be asked 'An injunction indeed causes the performance of its own content or of what is subsidiary thereto; and study is neither the content of the injunction to teach, nor a subsidiary thereto; then, how is the performance of that caused by that (injunction)?' For, in the case of the ceremonial kindling (*adhana*) though neither the content (of the injunction) nor a subsidiary thereto, the performance is caused by the subsequent injunctions of optional rites.

XIII. This answer given by the Prabhākaras is unintelligible. It is thus. Even the injunction to teach certainly does not have a declared eligible person; for, in 'Let him invest a brahmin eight years old, let him teach that one,' it is not declared that he who desires to become a teacher (is to do that). How, then, is study prompted by that (injunction)? If the eligible person be assumed there and study be (then) said to be prompted by that (injunction), then, let us assume an independent eligible person in respect of study, because of parsimony; prompting by an injunction relating to oneself is indeed more consistent with parsimony than prompting by an injunction relating to another. Then you may think that when even by the assumption of an eligible person in one case, performance prompted thereby is possible in respect of the other, there is prolixity in assuming that (eligible person) in respect of both; then, why do you not assume the eligible person in respect of study itself and say of the other that it is prompted by this (study)? If, because of study resulting even from the reading of what is written, the injunction to study does not prompt an enjoined teaching, then, since teaching results even from non-enjoined

study, devoid of (the pupil) facing east etc., the injunction to teach would not bring about the enjoined (type of) study. Then it may be said: in the words 'The pure one, facing the east and pavitra in hand, is to study', the pupil's facing east etc. are declared as subsidiaries to study; it is similarly declared in connection with teaching too, in the words 'He is to teach him who faces east and has a pavitra in hand,' that facing east etc., are qualifications of the pupil; hence it prompts only the enjoined (type of) study. Then, since there exists condemnation of the (mere) reading of what is written, in the words 'He who reads in a sing-song fashion or fast or shaking his head or what is written, he who knows not the sense and he whose voice is low, these six are the worst of pupils', and since in the words 'Study the Veda under a teacher' there is a restrictive injunction of the dependence of study on a teacher, why should not the injunction to study prompt teaching?

XIV. Then it may be thought that in 'Study under a teacher' the meaning of the text is 'Study as prompted by the injunction to become a teacher', since teacher-ship comes into being (only) subsequent to teaching; that is unsound; for, in the words 'Since that (investiture) is the second birth, he is the teacher (acārya),' teacher-ship (acāryatva) is declared (to result) merely because of being the cause of the second birth called investiture. In the smṛti 'Since he knows the meaning of the śāstra, confirms (his pupils) in right conduct and himself follows that, he is said to be the teacher (acārya)' there is cognised this etymology (for the word) that he confirms the pupils in right conduct; if this be said, even thus, teachership prior to teaching is uncontradicted. If teachership came into being subsequently to the teaching,

there would result the construction involving importation (of words) in the form 'Study as prompted by the injunction to become a teacher.' Therefore, because of parity in the assumption of the eligible person and parity in respect of each being prompted by the other, when prompting of study is possible by the injunction of what is desired, how is there prompting by the injunction to teach?

XV. To this it is said (in reply) (by the Prābhākara). For the injunction to teach, the eligible person has not to be assumed, since he is cognised from śruti and smṛti. It is thus. From the ātmanepada ('Upanayita' instead of 'Upa-nayet') in the śruti text 'He is to invest a brahmin eight years old', it is cognised that the attainment of teachership is what is to be accomplished; for by the grammatical aphorism (of Pāṇini), 'sammanana, utsaṅjana, acāryakarana' etc.,¹ that (ātmanepada) is prescribed where the attainment of teachership is to be accomplished. Nor is there any teachership well known in ordinary experience. Therefore, just as in 'He is to offer the oblation in the āhavanīya', when the āhavanīya is enjoined as the locus of the oblation, since the unpurified cannot be the locus of oblation and a purified (locus) is possible, it is ascertained that the fire purified by ceremonial kindling (ādhana) is the āhavanīya, even so, in 'He is to give the cow to the teacher' the teacher being understood as the recipient in respect of the gift, since he who is of no service cannot be the recipient, and since one who is of service is possible here, it is ascertained that teachership belongs to him who is of service to the pupil through the service known as the accomplishment of investiture. Now, even thus, teachership would be something accomplished by investiture, not

¹ Pāṇini - sūtra, I, iii, 96

something accomplished by teaching; if this be said, no; for investiture is subsidiary to teaching, since there is understood a single procedural injunction in 'Let him invest, let him teach that one'. Nor may it be said that because of the difference as two independent injunctions, there is not a single procedural injunction; for, a single procedural injunction is assumed in the form 'Having invested, he is to teach'; for by the word 'that' in 'that one' which refers to what is of the context, the oneness of the object is cognised. Nor may it be said that though investiture be subsidiary to teaching, study is not prompted by that (teaching); for the sense of the text (enjoining teaching) being taken to be 'Accomplish teachership through teaching which relates to the pupil,' since the pupil, as helping to fulfil the act of teaching, is auxiliary to that act, there should be stated (some mode of) his being serviceable; (this being so) since, when the seen is possible it is illegitimate to assume the unseen, it is assumed that he is of service by approaching (the teacher) and studying. Now, though of the teaching, that has to be accomplished by approach and study, teachership is the fruit, yet the eligible person has to be assumed in the śruti text, since there is no declaration 'He who desires such-and-such (is to teach)'; if this be said, no; for, only the supplement of desire has to be assumed. And thus, in the śruti text, there results injunction to teach along with the (statement of) eligibility, in the form 'He who desires to attain teachership is to invest and teach'. Similarly, in the śruti too, because of the single procedural injunction of investiture and teaching in 'That twice-born one, who having invested the pupil teaches him the Veda together with the liturgies and the myteries, is called a teacher',¹ because of the mention (therein) of the injunction

¹ *Manu - smṛti*, II, 140

to teach, and because of the mention of the fruit of teachership, (the injunction) emerges 'He who desires teachership is to invest and teach the pupil.' In respect of study, however, there is not any scripturally declared cause of eligibility; this is the difference (between the two injunctions). Nor may it be objected how of study enjoined by an independent injunction, the performance can be prompted by a different, independent injunction; for, it is prompted in the same way as in the example of ceremonial kindling. In respect of ceremonial kindling, indeed, it is declared by śruti 'A brahmin is to kindle the fire ceremonially.' Here, is the ceremonial kindling to be performed independently, or as prompted by some other? On the first (alternative) too, it is not possible to enjoin the independent ceremonial kindling as obligatory in regard to the person; for, since ceremonial kindling, which like sprinkling etc. is of the nature of a purification of the object-causal-correlate, has a substance for its purport, what is intended as the subject is the fire. Nor can it be enjoined independently as an optional rite, since no fruit is declared. Nor may eligibility (i. e. fruitfulness) as of the obligatory or as of the optional be suspected by assuming a reversal of the positions of the primary and secondary, on the analogy of the flour; for though there is assumption of a reversal there because of the impossibility of utility of the flour reduced to ashes, that is not possible in the present context, since for the purified fire there is the fitness to be employed in some other rite. Even on the second (alternative), for the ceremonial kindling, is there prompting by a subsequent injunction of an obligatory rite? Or is the prompting by a subsequent injunction of an optional rite? Not the first; for in the case of the āhavanīya which is the subject and not the

predicate, its performance as prompted by the injunction of a rite is impossible. For it is only the predicate of which the performance is caused by an injunction; otherwise there is the contingency of performance even in the case of the desire for heaven etc. Therefore, there is left over the (possibility of) prompting by a subsequent injunction of the optional. Desire, indeed, does not, like obligation, cause the performance of the predicate alone, in which case there would be the above defect; but rather, whatever is subject or predicate, in the absence of which that which is desired does not result, the performance of all that it causes, as auxiliaries to the injunction. There is indeed seen in ordinary experience difference in nature between obligation and desire. The obligation 'Be seated on the golden seat', when there is no such seat, does not cause the person to be seated thereon; desire, however, causes the sitting thereon, at least by creating a seat of that kind. And this being the case, in the present context, it is only the desire to attain teachership that, for the sake of the resulting of teaching through prompting the teacher, brings about (also) study by the pupil; this is settled.

XVI. This view of the Prābhakaras, the Vedāntine do not respect. It is thus. In 'He is to teach that one', is teachership what is enjoined (i. e. the content of the injunction), or the (very) form of the injunction, or the (unseen) fruit that is the *niyoga* (urge)? Not the first; for, the injunction has for its content the stem-senses of investiture and teaching. Not the second; for teachership, which is, signified by the *ātmanepada*, not being the signification of the injunctive term, cannot be of the (very) form of the injunction. Not the third; for, on the etymology (that

the teacher is one who) 'causes the apprehension of right conduct', teachership, which is conditioned by being the causative agent, is (a result) within ordinary experience, while only what is trans-experiential is of the nature of *niyoga*. Nor may it be said that since it is to be accomplished through investiture, teachership is trans-experiential; for in the *smṛti* 'Since that is second birth, he is the *ācārya*' there is understood as the connotation of the word *ācārya*, only what is within experience, viz. being the causative agent in respect of investiture. If teachership were trans-experiential, how could it be mentioned in the grammatical aphorism with worldly things like *sammānana*? Now, a *niyoga* (urge) is cognised because of the mention of an injunctive suffix, and for that, there being the expectancy of an attribute of the person prompted, it must be admitted of teachership that, like heaven, it is the qualification of the person prompted only because of its being accomplishable through *niyoga* (the unseen result); for in the case of the fruit of being a causal correlate (as agent), that (being the qualification of the person prompted) is unintelligible; nor is the connotation of the word '*ācārya*' both the teaching of conduct and causative agency in respect of investiture, because of the contingency of option; therefore because of the prescription of other trans-experiential instruments like *mantras*, teachership is trans-experiential (as a fruit); in the case of *sammānana* etc., however, because of the non-existence of that (mention of trans-experiential instruments) let it be that they are within experience; therefore, though mentioned along with them, teachership is certainly trans-experiential. If this be said, even thus, that (teacher-ship) may be the result of the injunction of investiture; thereby how does there result fruitfulness for the injunction to teach?

XVII. Then it may be thought : teachership though mentioned in connection with investiture may be the fruit of teaching, since investiture is a subsidiary to that. That is not (so) : for, if that were so, on the principle 'The declaration of fruit in respect of subsidiaries is an arthavāda,' there is the contingency of the impossibility of teachership being the qualification of the person prompted. Now, if this be the case, study which has no eligibility would not in any way be performed; if this be said, no ; for he who has been invested is eligible in respect of study : for in the Vajasaneyi-branch (of the Veda), study is enjoined after commencing the topic of investiture ; and it is understood from all smṛtis that he who is invested is to study. Therefore, in the case of study, its performance being intelligible as prompted by injunction in respect of itself, there is no need, for establishing the performance of that, to worry the mind by assuming an eligible person in respect of teaching. Now I do not assume him, but he certainly exists ; for though difficult to make out in the śruti, he is understood from the statement of Manu 'That twice-born one who having invested the pupil ' etc. : if this be said, no ; for, that statement, through restating investiture and teaching, is injunctive of the name ācārya in respect of the agent, the restatement and the injunction being decided respectively by the words 'yat' and 'tat' occurring in the statement; and the name 'ācārya' is made use of in the injunction of obeisance etc.

XVIII. Now, even thus, in the case of the pupil who does not know (the Veda) and has been invested, it is not possible for him to know his own eligibility and perform (this task of study); it is only the injunction to teach that, as

somehow having an eligible person, should be said to prompt study too; if this be said, then, does the injunction to teach prompt a study that is not enjoined, or one that is enjoined? Not the first; for, in the case of persons who are not prompted by the injunction to study and who are devoid of fruit from that, activity in respect of the teacher, as subsidiary to him, is impossible. On the second, in order that the existence of the injunction may result, there should also be admitted an eligible person in respect of study. If it be said that the content alone is instrumental to the existence of the injunction, not the eligible person, then, since there is no specific person eligible for the study that is enjoined, it would follow that he is to teach any one. Therefore, the injunction to study which possesses fruitfulness through the eligible person, the invested person intimated by the context, itself makes the person active in respect of its content; otherwise, for him who is not actuated even by the injunction of his own eligibility, activity would be impossible. Nor is there the impossibility of knowing his own eligibility, in the case of the infant (the unlearned pupil); for, though not knowing the sense of injunctions, like the cognition of the obligation to worship sandhyā, to collect samit and so on, there is the cognition (also) of the obligation to study, on the strength of the teaching of the father etc. Now, if study be prompted by the injunction to teach, there is not this difficulty, since for the teacher who knows it is possible to cognise his own eligibility; though some intelligent pupil would not engage (in study) without knowing his eligibility, yet another who does not know would certainly engage in it as prompted by the teacher; thus, in the form of a continuous stream, teaching would be uninterrupted; if this be said, even thus, is the teacher to teach the pupils invested by another, or

those invested by himself alone? Not the first; for investiture too being in your view a subsidiary of teaching, when there is failure of that (investiture) the unseen result (niyoga) does not emerge and the fruit of teachership does not result. Then let it be the second, because of the non-existence of the said defect; if this be said, no; for even thus the conflict in the conjunction of the obligatory and the non-obligatory cannot be set aside. It is thus. Teaching is non-obligatory, since it is for the purpose of earning money. Teachership cannot indeed be the fruit of teaching; for, not being of the nature of a means to the attainment of happiness or the remedying of misery, it is not a human goal. Nor may an unseen result be assumed as the fruit thereof, since that is impossible, when there is a seen (result). There is a seen (result), since teaching is said to be the means to earn money, in the *smṛti*:¹ 'Of his six activities, three are for livelihood, viz., helping in the performance of sacrifices, teaching and acceptance of gifts from the pure'.

XIX. Now it stands to reason in the case of helping in the performance of sacrifices that it is for the sake of livelihood; for there being the injunction to give *dakṣiṇā* to the priests (*ṛtviks*), it is ascertained that for him who causes the performance of all subsidiaries there is earning of money, as causing the performance of the offering of *dakṣiṇā* etc; here, however, since there is prohibition of teaching for a salary, and there is earning of money by other means (than teaching), teaching is not for the sake of that. If this be said, not so; since for the pupil there is enjoined as subsidiary to study, *dakṣiṇā* to the preceptor etc., the injunction to teach, which causes the performance of the principal,

viz., study, causes also the performance of dakṣiṇā, service etc., which are subsidiaries. Therefore, as it has to be performed by him who desires to earn money, teaching is non-obligatory; whereas the purification called investiture is obligatory, since defect is declared (to ensue) on its non-performance. After permitting the secondary (less satisfactory, but permissible) period for the investiture of the three castes, in the words 'Up to the sixteenth year (for brahmins), the twenty-second (for kṣatriyas) and the twenty-fourth (for vaiśyas)'¹ it is said in the smṛti 'Later than that, all those three who are non-purified according to the respective times become those who have fallen from (the right to worship) Sāvitrī, vrātyas, those who have ceased to be Aryas. No brahmin will anywhere even at a time of distress have anything to do in a brāhma or yauna way with those who have not been purified according to injunction.'²

XX. Now if merely because of the declaration of a defect (consequent) on non-performance, investiture be obligatory, there is the contingency of obligatoriness even for expiation; for, in the words 'when, however, a long time has elapsed, a two-fold observance (of expiatory rites) is necessary,' in order to remove the defect caused by the non-performance of expiation, another expiation is enjoined; expiation, indeed, is not obligatory, since it is to be performed by him who desires to remove a defect (i. e. sin). It is said (in reply). The two-fold observance is declared not for the removal of the defect caused by the non-performance of expiation; but it is said rather that even for the prior defect that should have been removed by expiation, there is, when a long time has elapsed,

¹Yājñavalkya-smṛti, I, 37

²Manu-smṛti, 11, 39, 40

removal only in dependence on a two-fold observance; for, otherwise, there is the contingency of an infinite regress of expiations. Therefore, in the obligatoriness of investiture, there is no undue extension. And that investiture, which is obligatory, posits, since it is a subsidiary to study, the obligatoriness even of the principal, viz., study.

XXI. Now, it does not stand to reason that investiture is subsidiary to study, since it is mentioned without the introduction of study (as the topic of the context). If, when it is not a subsidiary, its being a purificatory rite is not intelligible, then, as for the wearing of gold, some other explanation has to be assumed. Indeed, in 'gold is to be worn', being an (independently) fruitful rite (*artha-karma*) like the fore-sacrifice etc., does not fit in with the case of the wearing of gold, since, it is prescribed with the object-causal-correlate (not a rite) as the principal. If it be a purificatory rite, even then, would it relate, through the gold to be purified, with a particular sacrifice or with sacrifice in general? Not the first, since there is no express statement etc., such as can make known the relation to a particular (sacrifice). Nor the second, since it is unintelligible that a single purificatory rite subserves all sacrifices. Therefore, giving up (the possibility of) its being a purificatory rite, it is admitted that it is an independent injunction with prosperity as the fruit. Similarly, even the injunction of investiture may certainly be independent, with prosperity as the fruit.

XXII. To this it is said (in reply). Though there do not exist the evidences of express statement etc., mentioned in the third chapter of the earlier tantra (the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*), in order to make known of investiture, which is mentioned not after the introduction (of study as the topic), that it is

subsidiary to study, yet the subsidiariness of investiture to study is established by the evidence called upādāna, which is of the nature of implication by an injunction and is mentioned in the fourth chapter of that (work). Study without approaching one's own teacher is unintelligible, since through the prohibition of the reading of what (śruti) is written etc., there is a restrictive injunction in respect of the approach, in the form "study the Veda under a teacher". Therefore, the injunction to study implies approach as subsidiary to itself. Similarly the injunction of the purificatory rite called investiture, being needful of a fruit, posits only the unseen result inherent in approach, since when an unseen result inherent in the seen is possible, an independent unseen result is impossible (of assumption). And thence, on the strength of presumption from the two injunctions of investiture and study, there is understood the subsidiariness of investiture to study. Nor may it be asked: 'Even if a subsidiary, there is no subsidiariness through being a purificatory rite, like sprinkling etc.; why should there not be only such subsidiariness as helps (ultimately) in the fruit, in the same way as for the fore-sacrifice etc.?' For, purification, which as bringing about the existence of the principal, is a proximate auxiliary, is nearer (and therefore more readily assumed); that subsidiary, however, which helps (ultimately) in the fruit, is not near, since it is a remote auxiliary (operating) through an unseen result (apūrva). Therefore, only as a rite purifying the pupil is investiture a subsidiary that helps in the existence of study. Further, like the evidence of implication (upādāna), even express statement and context make known the subsidiariness of investiture to study; for, there is intended the transformation of the (given) text into 'an eight year old brahmin should

approach (a teacher); he should study.' Even the express mention of 'he' ('that one' in the text as it stands) relates to the pupil purified by investiture and directs him to study. Nor does it stand to reason to say that by the word 'that one' there is reference to the pupil alone, not to the purification; for, the purification is the immediate antecedent in the context. Nor is there the contingency of the intimation of what the text is not expectant of; for it has been shown that investiture and study are mutually expectant through the channel of approach. Now, in 'he should study' the purified pupil is the sense only of the stem, but not the sense of a suffix; and the stem alone is not capable of making known the relation of subsidiary and principal, since only the explicit use of the accusative suffix etc., can make that known; if this be said, not so; for even the stem, as signifying what is in relation, can declare a relation. If it did not signify what is in relation there would not be its use at all. Therefore the express use of the word 'he' makes known subsidiariness. Similarly, context too is an indicator of that; for, in the branch (of the Veda) belonging to the Vajasaneyins, and in the śrutis inferred as the bases of all smṛtis, study is enjoined after commencing the topic of investiture. Nor may it be said 'Thus, it would follow that only the study mentioned in the topic of investiture is the subsidiary'; for, study is fruitful, and on the principle that in the proximity of the fruitful, the fruitless is subsidiary thereto, subsidiariness results for investiture alone. Therefore through presumption, express statement and context the subsidiariness of investiture is established. And that investiture, being itself obligatory, how could it not bring about obligatoriness for study which is the principal? Indeed, never anywhere is a subsidiary possible in the absence of the principal. As in the

case of investiture, so even in the case of study there is sin in non-performance, since it is said in the *smṛti*: 'That twice-born one who without having studied the Veda exerts himself in other things, he, even while alive, quickly attains, together with his family, the status of a śūdra,'¹ and 'Those who have not studied their section of the Veda, those who have not learnt the Veda by repeating after a teacher, those who have not tended the fires, come to have the characteristic of śūdras'. And thus, how can study, which is obligatory, be prompted by teaching which, as having to be performed by him who desires wealth, is non-obligatory? Nor may it be said that teaching though optional is yet obligatory since it is the cause of livelihood which is always desired; for with this much there does not result the performance of teaching, as if obligatory. Indeed when there is cognised through the evidence of verbal testimony the need to perform obligatorily, as in the worship of the *sandhyā* etc., then because of the fear of sin on non-performance, a person would be active (in respect of that) as a rule. In the case of teaching, however, the need to perform obligatorily is not cognised from verbal testimony, but is assumed as the cause of the fruit called livelihood which is always desired. It is indeed not possible to assume thus, since livelihood may result in the absence of teaching, even through helping in the performance of sacrifices, accepting gifts etc.

XXIII. Then you may think: there may be obligatoriness for investiture and for teaching as subsidiaries to the obligatory injunction to procreate a son; and the injunction to procreate a son is obligatory, since there is the declaration of sin in the words 'For the sonless there is no enjoyment

¹ *Manu-smṛti*, II, 168

(loka)'; similarly, after introducing the three obligations in the words 'He is born verily with three obligations, that of brahmacarya (study of the Vedas) to the Rsis, that of sacrifice to the deities and that of (procreating) children to the fathers', subsequently in the words 'He verily, is free from obligations who has a son, has performed sacrifices and is a brahmacarin (one who has studied the Vedas)' there is shown freedom from obligations to the fathers, for him who has a son; and that freedom from obligation is intelligible because of the son being the cause of satisfaction to the fathers, through the performance of piṇḍa-pitr-yajña etc; and the performance of that is not possible for one who has not been invested, or has not studied, or has not understood the sense of the Veda; therefore, teaching, which is needed by the obligatory injunction to procreate a son, in order that it may culminate in its fruit, is enjoined as subsidiary to that (injunction), in the words 'Therefore, they say the instructed son is the enjoyment; therefore he instructs him'; and thence, even on the strength of the obligatory injunction on the father to procreate a son, there results the obligatoriness of the injunctions of investiture and teaching.

XXIV. This is not sound; for, the text, 'Therefore, they say the instructed son' etc., which is of the nature of an arthavāda subsidiary to the injunction of the rite of sampratti¹ (the handing over of his responsibilities by a dying father to his son) is not capable of enjoining instruction. When, indeed, the father is certain of his (impending) death through disease etc., then he is to hand over to his son what should be performed by him—the Veda, its sense and its fruit; and that son is to take them over as to be performed

¹ Brh., I, v, 17

by himself; this is the rite of sampratti. And thus it is declared by śruti: 'Then, therefore, the sampratti; when he thinks he is about to die, then he tells the son "Thou art Brahmā (the Veda), thou art the sacrifice, thou art the enjoyment." That son replies "I am Brahmā, I am the sacrifice, I am the enjoyment"' And since, in that sampratti rite, it is not intelligible that in the absence of prior instruction everything that is to be done is comprehended by mere chance, there is certainly already accomplished the instruction implied by such injunction to procreate a son, as culminates in its fruit; that (instruction) is restated by this text by way of arthavāda.

XXV. Now, let there not be the injunction of instruction, by this text; yet, even on the strength of the obligatory injunction to procreate a son, it follows that for the father there is certainly an obligatory injunction to instruct through investiture etc.; if this be said, not so, for, the father is not the cause of the performance (of these) in respect of the son; otherwise, in the case of the suckling infant or some other who has lost his father, there is the contingency of the absence of investiture etc. As for instruction, that is understood, from the capacity of what is expressly stated, to be but the teaching of these things which are to be done. And thus says śruti ¹. "There was one Śvetaketu, son of Aruṇi. To him the father said 'O! Śvetaketu, lead the life of a brahmācārin (by seeking a preceptor and studying under him); verily, dear one, none of our family remains without study as if brahmins by blood.'" Nor may it be said that, when the father is somehow dead, the pupil will call for another teacher and accomplish the

¹ Chānd., VI, 1, :

obligatory injunction etc., and that, therefore, (what is called) instruction (anuśāsana in the śruti) is but the causing of the performance (of these). In that case, does the pupil get another teacher in order that his own eligibility may result or in order that the urge (niyoga) relating to the teacher may result? Not the first; for, by you who say that study is prompted by (the injunction of) teaching, a distinct eligibility belonging to the pupil is not acknowledged. Not the second. For, the urge relating to one does not generate in another the cognition '(it) has to be done'. Nor does it stand to reason that there is the acquisition of means for the performance of what has not to be done. Then, (you may say), in the same way as there is acceptance of a substitute in the case of other means, so in the case of the eligible person too, by accepting a substitute, the pupil is to obtain what is to be done; that is not (so), because of disparity (between the illustration and the illustrated). Everywhere, indeed, for the sake of the eligible person performing what is to be done, there is accepted a substitute in the case of other means. The substitute for the eligible person, however, for the sake of whose performance of what is to be done, is he accepted? In the case of the teacher who is dead, there is no possibility of what is to be done, since the cause of his relation to an injunction (i. e. his eligibility) has ceased. Nor is there the possibility of that for the teacher who is to be accepted as a substitute; for that teacher is subsequent to the establishment of what is to be done. Therefore, the pupil is not capable of studying after accepting another teacher.

XXVI. If then (you think) another teacher may take hold of the pupil instructed by the dead teacher and teach

him in order to fulfil his own eligibility, that too does not stand to reason: for, in the case of the formerly invested pupil, a fresh investiture by another teacher being impossible there is a lack of the subsidiary, consisting in being the investor, and hence the emergence of the principal, viz., teaching, is impossible. Nor may it be said that the subsidiary, investiture, has been performed by this teacher in respect of another pupil: for, in that case, the principal, teaching, having also been performed there, a fresh performance is impossible. If (it be said that) when the person invested by oneself dies even prior to teaching, there is, in order that the principal alone may be performed, the taking hold of another pupil, then he may teach even him who is not invested. If it be said that having taught the one invested by himself, he teaches others also for the sake of more wealth, then he should not teach the poor. If it be said that he may teach the poor too for the sake of service (rendered in return), even thus, on your view, it is difficult to avoid conflict with empirical usage, worldly and scriptural. In the world, indeed, a teacher is sought for the fulfilment of what is to be done by the pupil, but a pupil is not sought for the fulfilment of what is to be done by a teacher. In the Veda too it is understood that Satyakāma, the son of Jabala, for the sake of brahmacharya (Vedic study) himself sought and approached a teacher. And thus the śruti:¹ 'He, indeed having reached Gautama Hārīdrumata, said, "I desire to live as a pupil with your reverence; I have approached your reverence."' Thus, therefore, since there are many defects in the obligatoriness of teaching, and since, if study which is obligatory be prompted by that (teaching) which is non-obligatory, there is the conflict of the conjunction of the obligatory and the non-

¹ Chānd., IV. iv, 8.

sense itself, is the operation of prompting agent, how can there be enjoined what is not denoted, the operation of the (direct) agent? Nor may it be said 'Let there not be an injunction of the pupil's operation in respect of investiture; but it may be in respect of teaching;' for the two statements are similar in form. It is said (in reply): it will be said (later) that by the root 'nayati (leads)' though denoting the prompting agent's operation, there is indicated even the pupil's operation that is not denoted; hence that alone is adopted as the secondary implication of the stem and enjoined, not the operation of the prompter, since that is established of itself. Now the establishment of that is difficult to make out, because of the contingency of reciprocal dependence; for, when there is enjoined for the pupil study together with the subsidiaries of dakṣiṇā, service etc., and when that (study) is prompted by an injunction in respect of itself, then results the activity of the teacher as for the sake of livelihood; and when activity is established for the sake of livelihood, it is possible through restating that to enjoin the pupil's operation such as study. Not so; for even in 'He who desires a village is to be helped to sacrifice' there is the contingency of difficulty in making out that helping to sacrifice is established; when there is enjoined the agent's (sacrificer's) operation together with subsidiaries like dakṣiṇā, there is the establishment of the prompting agent's operation, as for the sake of livelihood; and when this is established, through restating it there is the injunction of the agent's operation; thus there is reciprocal dependence. If now, (it be said that) the prompting agent's operation as for the sake of livelihood, established in a general way in other sacrifices prompted by injunctions in respect of themselves, may be restated and (thence) the particular sacrifice enjoined for him who desires

a village, then, here too, through the restatement of the prompting agent's operation established in a general way in other injunctions, there may be enjoined the pupil's operations of approach, study etc. Now, the prompting agent's operation, only as of the nature of helping to sacrifice, is established in other sacrifices; but that which is of the nature of investiture or teaching is not thus established in other injunctions; if this be said, then let there be establishment in the (near) future. Even on the strength of the injunction of the pupil's operation, there will result the prompter's operation, since the pupil's operation is preceded by that. Nor may establishment in the reverse order be suspected; for it has been said that there is indeed no establishment possible of the obligatory through the non-obligatory. Now though for the established an originaive injunction is impossible, through the restatement of it there may be an injunction of eligibility; if this be said, no; for, there is not declared in the text any eligibility, constant or optional, such as being alive¹.

XXIX. Then, let it be an injunction of specific auxiliaries, like 'He is to buy with (a calf) that is ruddy and has yellow eyes'; and that auxiliary is said to be an eight-year old brahmin; if this be said, no; for in the case of the two auxiliaries stated as brahmin-hood and being eight years old, which are qualifications devoid of mutual relation, an injunction of what is qualified (by both) is impossible; if they be enjoined independently there is the contingency of sentence-split. In the text about the ruddy (calf), however, since even that which is qualified, viz., the purchase of the means to the sacrifice (the soma-plant), is not otherwise

¹ 'Being alive' is the element constituting *adhikāra-vidhi* in 'So long as one is alive, one should offer the *agnihotra* oblation.'

established and has to be enjoined, when each of the qualifications of ruddiness etc., relates syntactically to that (qualified), the injunction of the qualified stands to reason. Not thus here is the prompter's operation to be enjoined, since it is established. Therefore, not of more than one is there injunction as auxiliary. That has been said: 'When the (main) rite is established, it is not possible to enjoin more than one auxiliary; when, however, it is not established, even many (auxiliaries) are enjoined with a single effort'.¹

XXX. Now just as injunction is refuted in the case of the prompter's operation, because of (its) being established, similarly, it is possible to refute it even in the case of the pupil's operation; for, in 'He is to invest the pupil' no operation is cognised in the case of the pupil, who is the object; indeed in 'go to the village' no operation of the village is cognised. Not so; for here the pupil's operation of approach is cognised both from the word and from reasoning. In ordinary experience, indeed, in verbal usage expressing the sense of leading (*nayati*), there is seen the motion of him who is led: hence there is the cognition of that from the word. Similarly, for the sake of instruction in letters there is seen the going of children towards the house of the teacher. Therefore, reasoning too makes known the pupil's operation. Indeed, the prudent pupil does not engage in study etc., in the absence of an injunction; for its being for the sake of a visible fruit, like knowledge of the sense, having been refuted, appetite resulting from desire is impossible. Therefore, through a transformation of the text, the pupil's operation is here to be enjoined. Just as in 'He who desires a village is to be helped to sacrifice' there is transformation into 'He

1. *Tantrā-vārtika*, II, ii, 6

who desires a village is to sacrifice', similarly in 'He is to invest the brahmin eight years old', there will be the transformation into 'The eight year old brahmin should approach (a teacher), he should study'.

XXXI. Now, even thus, an injunction does not fit in here, because of there being no eligibility. Being eight years old is not alone the cause of eligibility, because of the contingency of investiture etc., even for the śūdra; nor brahminhood alone, because of the contingency of that investiture etc.) for one that is barely born; nor both, because of the absence of mutual relation between the two, on the principle that 'For qualities, because of their being for the sake of another (the relation is with that other, not among themselves)'¹. Then you may think: for these two also there may be a derivative mutual relation; this is just as in 'He buys with the ruddy one, he buys with the yearling' etc., where there is expressed by the word the relation of the act with each (quality) separately, there is subsequently a reciprocal relation (among the qualities) on the strength of their having a single fruit. That is not (so), since in that case there is the contingency of the cause of eligibility not being expressed by the word. Therefore this injunction which is without eligibility does not stand to reason.

XXXII. There is not this defect, since there is no rule that everywhere the cause of eligibility should certainly be expressed by the word; for, the capacity to perform a rite together with its subsidiaries,' though not expressed by the word (in 'He unto whom a son is born and whose hair is dark is to kindle the fire,' where the qualifications are not imperative requisites, signifying, as they do, only the capacity

¹ PM, III, i, 12

to perform the rites), is the cause of eligibility. Even if somehow there be a rule about being expressed by the word, there is the establishment of that by the assumption that the purport of the two words is the intimation of the (one as) qualified (by the other) through signifying the relation (of both) to the act.

XXXIII. Now, even thus, the qualified is not the cause of eligibility, since it is a qualification of the predicate (upādeya). It is thus. In 'He is to instruct that one', the accusative suffix that signifies of the pupil that he is the object in respect of the prompter's operation, indicates of the pupil that he is the agent in respect of his own operation, since on the principle 'He prompts him who acts' the prompter's operation has for its content the agent (prompted). Nor may it be said that since in the case of the text 'He is to teach' a transformation has been stated (to be necessary), there is eligibility for the pupil and not agency; for, there, through a restatement of the (already) established prompter's operation, only the relation of the injunction to the agent's operation results from the transformation, but the pupil's agency, established by the word, is not rejected. Therefore, the pupil is the predicate (upādeya) because of answering to its definition. Its definition is indeed that it is that which directly or indirectly is to be performed as the content of the injunction; and since agent etc. are causal correlates in respect of what is to be performed, they are indirectly what are to be performed. Therefore, the age qualified by caste, which is the qualification of the agent, the predicate, i. e. the pupil, that is not the cause of eligibility; for in 'The priests with the red turbans go round' the qualification of the agent, such as having red turbans,

is not seen to be the cause of eligibility.¹ Nor is the agent himself the eligible person, since for the agent, as a causal correlate of what is to be performed, there is the nature of an auxiliary in respect of the injunction, while of the eligible person, as the lord (the owner of the result), there is relation to the injunction as a principal. Nor thus is there the impossibility of any cause of eligibility at all; for the qualification of that which is not a predicate is the cause of that (eligibility). What is not a predicate (anupādeya) is that which is related to an injunction, while being other than what is to be performed as prompted by the injunction or what is a qualification thereof; and such a qualification of what is thus is being alive, having one's house burnt down, desire for heaven etc. Here, however, being eight years old etc., is a qualification of a predicate (upādeya); how, then, can it be the cause of eligibility?

XXXIV. To this it is said (in reply). Do you say this, taking the sense of the sentence to be bhāvanā (productive operation), or an urge (niyoga), or instrumentality to the desired? Not the first, since in that case, the relation of eligibility having to be preceded by the relation to the agent, the qualification of the agent is itself the cause of eligibility. Bhāvanā indeed is human effort. And that, being of the nature of an act, primarily needs the causal correlates that bring about its existence. Of these, when the human goal and the stem-sense relate as what is to be accomplished and as the means thereto, by elimination, he who desires heaven etc. relates as the agent. And of this agent the distinguishing attributes are being alive,² having

¹ For the *śyena* sacrifice, the eligible person here being he who desires to cast an evil spell.

² For obligatory rites

one's house burnt down¹, desire² etc. Therefore, since the fruit is restricted to the agent alone, that agent himself, being the lord (of the result) as conditioned by enjoyership of the fruit, attains eligibility. And therefore, the qualifications of the agent, which are upādeya, themselves come to be the distinctive attributes of the eligible person too.

XXXV. Now let there be the second (sense for the text). The urge indeed needs the person prompted and the determinant, even as the cause of its own existence, since in their absence, the expectancy as to whose urge it is and in respect of what (act) is unfulfilled. Therefore he who desires heaven etc. present in the text relates as the person prompted and the stem-sense as the determinant. Nor is there needed here a separate relation of eligibility; for to the very person prompted, who has the cognition 'This urge relates to me', there is eligibility as the lord of that. And that eligible person, not seeing the (way to the) accomplishment of the urge except through the performance of the determinant (act), gets related to that performance as the agent. And thus, on this view, at the stage when there is the relation of eligibility, it is settled that heaven etc. are qualifications of the anupādeya.

XXXVI. This is not sound; for it is not contrary to (what is sought to be established in) the context. Even those who maintain the urge (niyoga, to be the sense), though saying that only the qualification of the anupādeya (non-predicate) is the cause of eligibility, in some places distinguish the eligible person through a qualification of the agent; for, in 'The king who desires independent empery is

¹ For expiatory (naimittika) rites

² For optional (kāmya) rites.

to sacrifice with the *rajasūya*', the eligible person, he who desires independent empery, has to be qualified by the qualification of the agent, i. e. kingship (*kṣatriya*-hood); for, otherwise, there is the contingency of eligibility for that in the case of even the *vaiśya* etc., who desires independent empery. Nor thus is there the violation of the rule that the *anupādeya* alone is the cause of eligibility; for kingship, which cannot be brought about through performance by *vaiśyas* etc., is what is not a predicate (*anupādeya*). And thus, in the present content too, why should not brahminhood associated with eight years of age, which cannot be obtained by any other through performance, be the cause of eligibility, though it is a qualification of the agent?

XXXVII. Now, thus, then, let there be the third view (of the sense of the text). There, the sense of the text being instrumentality to the good, since for the good, which is of the nature of what is to be enjoyed, the expectancy of the enjoyer is primary, even for what is instrumental thereto the relation to the enjoyer comes first. Nor may it be objected that in the case of the instrument, which as capable of being willed is expectant of the agent, the relation to the agent alone is primary; for the capacity to be willed is not invariable, since it is not seen in respect of the rise of the moon etc., though instruments to the good. Even where there is this capacity, since the good is the principal, the syntactical relation should be stated in conformity with this. If then, (it be said that) since the instrument is the sense of the sentence, that is primary, yet the good is of the nature of the condition of its existence, since it has to be determined in the form 'What is it instrumental to?' As for the need for him who uses the means, that is subsequent to the

cognition of the distinctive instrument. Therefore, in conformity with the good that is primarily cognised there being the syntactical relation with the enjoyer, subsequently, since instrumentality to the desired is laid down by the injunction as present in the stem-sense that is capable of being willed and is instrumental to the desired, and since volition needs an agent, that same enjoyer, the eligible person, attains agency (also). Therefore on this view, the qualification of eligibility belongs only to what is not the predicate (anupādeya).

XXXVIII. Even thus, there is no conflict in the present context; for, in the case of the pupil for whom there has primarily resulted the relation of eligibility, as enjoyer, in respect of the instrument to the desired, in the nature of approach, though he may subsequently attain the relation of agent as well, the qualifications of brahminhood etc., are qualifications of him as anupādeya. Therefore, when investiture which is the subsidiary has an eligible person, this results even for study which is the principal, since everywhere there is (but) one eligible person for both subsidiary and principal.

XXXIX. Now, thus, then, since like brahminhood, even being eight years old, a cause of the eligibility for investiture, relates to study too, there follows the conclusion of the study even before the ninth year; and that is not possible; if this be said, no; for, there is no rule as to identity in time between the subsidiary and the principal. Otherwise, it would not be possible to perform the subsidiary, the anvādhana, on the parva (here, the new moon) day and perform the principal, the (darśa) ṣṭi on the first day (of the succeeding fort-night). Therefore, the time, which is a

cause of eligibility in respect of the subsidiary, is not a cause of eligibility in respect of the principal. Thus, therefore, since there is the possibility of eligibility in respect of the obligatory, there is no unintelligibility whatever in the injunction to study.

XL. Now, since, on the principle that when once performed (i. e. read), the sense of the śāstra has been performed (fully), the injunction to study is established even with studying once, repetition would not be obtained; if this be said, no; for that (repetition) is obtained because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the seen fruit consisting in the learning of the letters; even by you, that (repetition) is assumed only because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the fruit, viz., knowledge of the sense. Then, it is only knowledge of the sense as preceded by the learning of the letters that is the cause of the repetition; if this be said, no; for knowledge of the sense is seen to result even from texts of another branch (of the Veda) or human statements, though not mastered by repetition. Nor may it be said 'Then, let there not be the learning of letters and repetition;' because of the contingency of the impossibility of the injunctions to recite one's own Veda and to study (learn by rote). Indeed, when the letters have not been learnt, it is not possible to recite one's own Veda by way of *Brahma-yajña*. Nor is study (learning by rote) possible without repetition; for, what is denoted by the word 'study' is that operation which culminates in learning the letters. Therefore, the injunction to study terminates (only) with the apprehension of the letters. If an unseen result be needed for the injunction, then that must be assumed only as inherent in the learning of the letters, since where an

unseen result inherent in the seen is (possible), an independent unseen result is impossible. And thus since the injunction to study culminates only with the apprehension of the letters, the inquiry comes to be prompted by the injunction of the rites.

XLI. As for this that in the *Sābara-bhāṣya*, the commentator, while stating of the Veda that without dependence on any other it is the cause of inquiry, acknowledges of the injunction to study that it is the cause of inquiry—there, indirect causality is to be understood. For, one's own Veda learnt through the study that is enjoined, makes known the injunctions to sacrifice. And those injunctions learnt superficially from one's own Veda, being incapable of causing performance in the absence of ascertained knowledge of what is to be performed, prompt inquiry, for the ascertainment of that. Nor may it be said 'Let there be no performance at all;' for, sin consequent on non-performance in respect of the obligatory injunctions is cognised (even) on the surface. In the case, however, of the injunctions of the optional, the desire for fruit itself prompts inquiry, in the same way as (it does) the ceremonial kindling (though not a subsidiary). Now, rather than assume the prompting by more than one injunction, it is better to assume the prompting of inquiry by the injunction to study; if this be said, no. For an injunction is in every case the prompter of what is enjoined by itself or of what is helpful thereto, not of any other; inquiry, however, is not enjoined by the injunction to study nor is it helpful thereto. Nor is it thus possible to refute the prompting of inquiry by the later injunction to sacrifice; for, it is helpful in respect of what is enjoined by that injunction. Nor is there

unintelligibility in inquiry which is single being prompted by more than one injunction (to sacrifice); for the ascertained knowledge attainable by inquiry being different with each text, that is intelligible; for, the ceremonial kindling, though one, is seen to be prompted by more than one injunction (to sacrifice). If, fearing prolixity in being prompted by more than one injunction, you declare that inquiry is prompted solely by the injunction to study, then, it should be said even of the performance of sacrifice etc., that it is prompted by that (single injunction) because of parsimony; and because, on your view, as the fruit of the injunction to study culminates in the attainment of heaven etc., the performance of sacrifice is (only) auxiliary to what is enjoined (i. e., study); thence would result the futility of the injunction to sacrifice. Now, even in the final position there is parity of this undue extension—the study which is in dispute is prompted by the injunction to sacrifice, since it causes the performance of the sacrifice, in the same way as ascertainment of the sense by inquiry; if this be said, no; for the injunctions to sacrifice, which are not known prior to study, cannot be prompters of study. If it be said that even the injunction to study is not known prior to study, true; yet the injunction to study heard from the father etc., in the same way as the injunction to worship sandhya etc., prompts study. Nor is it possible for injunctions to sacrifice to be heard from the father etc., prior to study, in which case, being prompted by them would result for study. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that study is prompted by the injunction to study, and that the inquiry into dharma is prompted by the injunctions to sacrifice.

XLII. Let it then be that for the inquiry into Brahman too, as for the inquiry into dharma, there is prompting

by a later obligatory injunction in respect of which all three castes are eligible; if this be said, is there for the inquiry into Brahman prompting by the injunction to hear (study) or prompting by the injunction to sacrifice? Not the first; for there being no sin for all three castes on the non-performance of hearing etc., its being an obligatory injunction in respect of them is unintelligible; for there is sin for the ascetic alone on the non-performance of hearing etc. Nor the second, since Brahman-inquiry is not helpful to sacrifice. Now, in order to ascertain that in the Vedāntas, there is not the host of subsidiaries etc., which have to be performed by those who perform the agnihotra etc., the Vedāntas have to be inquired into; if this be said, no; for, that much is ascertained even from the superficial cognition generated by study. Thus, therefore, since in respect of Brahman-inquiry, there is not, as for the inquiry into dharma, eligibility for (members of) all the three castes who have studied their own branches of the Veda, in order to establish by reasoning the qualification of eligibility consisting in the possession in abundance of the four-fold means mentioned in the context of the injunction to study etc., the word 'atha' signifying 'immediate succession' has been used by the aphorist, (but) not with the intention to declare a commencement; this is settled.

XLIII. Now, at the commencement of a śāstra in order to keep up the practice of the worthy and for the removal of obstacles, an auspicious invocation should be made; therefore, let the word 'atha' have the sense of auspiciousness; it is, indeed, possible for it to have the sense of auspiciousness, because of the smṛti: 'The two words *Om* and *atha* issued forth from Brahman's face, splitting his throat; therefore, they are both auspicious'; if this be said, does the

auspiciousness relate to the desire to know Brahman non-appositionally by becoming a causal correlate, or appositionally by becoming a qualification? Not the first, since there is no evidence of auspiciousness being one of the causal correlates, such as agent etc. Nor is this the evidence, viz., the unintelligibility otherwise of the desire to know; for that is intelligible even through other causal correlates. The jīva is the agent, the Vedānta text with mental concentration as the auxiliary is the instrument; such are the other causal correlates. Nor the second; for if it is said 'The desire to know is auspicious' there is the contingency of its being an arthavāda as having eulogy for purport. As for auspicious invocation for the sake of the practice of the worthy etc., it is possible to obtain that through the word 'atha' as signifying immediate succession; for, auspicious nature belongs to the sound of the letters 'a' 'tha' etc., in the same way as to the sound of the drum (mṛdaṅga) etc.

XLIV. Even thus, just as in 'If, then (atha), you think thus', let the word 'atha' express a sense other than the present (i. e. just considered) sense; if this be said, no; for, when immediate succession in the relation of cause and effect is expressed, the possession of a sense other than the present sense is established as included in that. Nor may it be said that in the reverse way immediate succession itself may be established as included (in the other). Here, is there indicated a particular thing which as invariably antecedent is of the nature of the cause? Or is there needed some antecedent thing whatsoever? Not the first, since, in the absence of the signification of immediate succession, there is not established the invariability of the particular thing as causally antecedent. Not the second; for, since in ordinary experience, in respect

of all activities whatsoever, there is established something other than something else, previously existent, for the word 'atha' there is the contingency either of being a restatement or of having an unseen result. Therefore, in order to indicate the invariably antecedent full cause, immediate succession alone should be signified by the word 'atha'. Though on the signification of immediate succession alone that is not established, yet it is certainly established on the adoption of immediate succession in the principal sense. The immediate succession of the effect from the full cause, that alone is (such) in the principal sense, because of non-remoteness and non-inconstancy. As for the immediate succession between what are not cause and effect, that, since it is sometimes inconstant and sometimes remote, would be but secondarily (the sense). Nor may it be asked 'If the effect is seen, what (is the need) of knowing the full cause?' For, the full cause being the qualification of the eligible person, its cognition is needed for engaging in desire, inquiry etc., that culminate in the fruit.

XLV. Now, the qualification of the eligible person has certainly been stated already by the word 'then (atha)' in 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into dharma'; if this be said, no. There, indeed, immediate succession to study (of the Veda) is stated by the word 'then'. And it is not possible for that to be the qualification of the eligible person here; for, there being no bare co-absence, it is not the cause. Indeed, when there is fullness of causes like calmness, equanimity etc., and there is the defect of the absence of study (of the Veda), there is not seen non-appetency of the desire to know Brahman. Though, since when the Vedāntas are not studied there is no inquiry into them, (their) study too is

included in the full cause, still study (of the Veda) which is a common cause of the inquiries into dharma and Brahman, is not the full cause in respect of the Brahman-inquiry, and is, therefore, common to the inquiry or the non-inquiry into it; hence, that in immediate succession to which there is invariably the engaging in the inquiry into Brahman, that kind of full cause is to be sought. Since the inquiries into dharma and Brahman, being reciprocally related as the helper and the helped, are subsidiary to a single fruit, immediate succession to the helper, the inquiry into dharma, is included in the full cause of that which is helped, Brahman-inquiry; hence that may be the sense of the word 'atha'; if this be said, no; for the relation of the two as helper and helped is not established. If it were the helper, then, indeed, as for the study of the Vedānta, for the inquiry into dharma too, (the relation of) co-absence should be stated; and that cannot be stated; for even though there be not the desire to know dharma, there is cognised, for him who has studied the Vedānta, the desire to know Brahman.

XLVI (a). If then, for the learning of meaning etc., there be need of the earlier Tantra, even then, this should be stated; what is it that is needed from there, (A) the reasoning, or (B) the ascertainment of the sense of the text, or (C) rites like agnihotra? (A) On the first, is there need of (a) the reasoning instrumental to and needed by the authoritative-ness of the Veda mentioned in the first pāda, or of (b) some other reasoning? (a) Not the first, since even in the later Tantra, the reasoning needed by the Vedānta is stated in such aphorisms as 'Because of being-the-sāstra-source'¹ and 'Eternality, for that same reason'². Or let it be that for

¹Br. Śū., I, 1, 8

²Br. Śū., I, 1, 22

the sake of reinforcement there is need of the first pāda (of the *Purvamīmāṃsā*); not with this much is there the contingency of immediate succession to the desire to know dharma, since the first pāda is common to the desires to know both dharma and Brahman. If it be said "Let the meaning of the word 'atha' be immediate succession to the inquiry in the first pāda into the authoritativeness of the *Vedānta*," no; for that too, like study (of the *Veda* in general) is not the full cause. (b) Even on the second, is that other reasoning needed (1) in the teaching of Brahman, or (2) in the importation of attributes? (1) Not the first; because, for the other reasoning that helps to ascertain the four forms of injunction as originaive etc., there is no use in the teaching of an existent thing, which cannot be performed. If it be said that in aphorisms like 'The ether (is Brahman), because of the characteristic marks of that (Brahman),'¹ śruti (statement), *linga* (characteristic mark) etc. are depended on, no; for, there, only such statement etc., as are established in ordinary experience, are depended on (not śruti in the sense of express statement, *linga* as the capacity of what is so stated and so on). (2) Not the second; for, since the meditations on what is with attributes, which are of the nature of mental acts, fall within dharma, there is no conflict even if there be dependence on that (other reasoning) in the importation of attributes. In the desire to know Brahman, however, the relation of meditations is incidental.

XLVI(b). (B) Even on the second, the ascertainment of the sense of texts in the earlier *Tantra* is not of service in engaging in the inquiry into Brahman, since nowhere is it seen that the knowledge of one content is the cause of

¹ *Ibid.*, I, III, 99

activity in respect of something (wholly) different. Nor is there use for it in the valid knowledge of Brahman, since knowledge of dharma is not capable of causing valid knowledge of Brahman. If it be said that, because of Brahman being the cause of the knowledge of dharma, there is inference of the cause from the effect, then, since it is possible to infer Brahman even from the world that is an effect, what (is the need) of knowledge of dharma (for this purpose) ?

XLVI(c). (C) Even on the third alternative, how is there utility for rites like agnihotra, in the inquiry into Brahman ? (1) Is it said that just as by a succession of steps one climbs to the first floor, similarly, beginning with the worship of sandhya and taking on each subsequent rite of greater magnitude after abandoning each earlier lesser rite, one comes to the unsurpassed rite (called) the thousand-year-rite and then by elimination (of all rites) lands in Brahman-knowledge ? (2) Or is it (said) that the fruit all of rites being attained in succession, all desires having objects which end with the Brahma-loka having been dissolved (sated) by enjoyment, he who is rid of desires therefor lands in the inquiry into Brahman, through the desire for supreme bliss ? (1) Not the first, since there is no evidence (of such passage from the final rite to Brahman-knowledge). (2) On the second, Brahman-inquiry would not be eligible for human beings, since it is subsequent to the attainment of Brahma-loka. Even then, since for him who has desires there is no eligibility in respect of Brahman-inquiry, desire has certainly to be dissolved ; that being the case, just as fire, after burning up all that is present as combustible, dies down, similarly, desire too is dissolved by the enjoyment of everything ; if this be said, no ; for, as enjoyments like that of Hiranyagarbha

perish every moment, desire as relating to future enjoyment is intelligible; even fire is seen to flame up (again) in the presence of some other combustible material. Hence it is that it has been said; 'Never does desire die down through the enjoyment of desires; it only grows again like fire with what is offered to it.'¹ Now, a person, whose mind is clear through the fulfilment of desire, is seen to be capable of doing something else; if this be said, true; there, the removal of desire is the cause of the clarity of the mind, not the attainment of the desired; for mental clarity is seen for that person who has not enjoyed objects and is devoid of desire (for them). And desire is removed for certain not by enjoyment, but by the cognition of defect in the object. Nor is there any scripture to the effect that the quenching (of desire) is by enjoyment.

XLVII. As for him who thinks that all the words of the Vedas have jointly for purport the knowledge of the dissolution of the world, since even the texts like that about the jyotistoma serve to dispel the notion that the body is the self, in the case of those who engage (in them), holding to a self over and above the body, he will be refuted even by conflict with experience.² Therefore, in no manner whatsoever is it easy to make out the dependence on the earlier Tantra.

XLVIII(a). Now, through the channel of ritual, there may be dependence on that for Brahman-inquiry. It is thus. The obligatory rites when performed endow the person with a good quality called virtue; and this virtue removes

¹ Manu-smṛti, II, 94

² For the view criticised here and the criticism thereof, op., *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 26, 27, 28-30,

the impurity called sin; therefore, the person purified through the two purifications of endowment with a good quality and removal of impurity, is eligible for Brahman-inquiry. Thus says Gautama: 'He, for whom there have been these forty-eight purificatory ceremonies, goes to unity with Brahman, to the same world (as Brahman).' Here by the word 'these' are referred to the rites beginning with nuptials and ending with the seven soma sacrifices. Nor may it be said: 'If rites be purificatory, they could have no independent fruit (of their own), since there is no independent fruit in the sprinkling of the rice-grains etc.; thence, would be affected the śruti text—*All these come to be inhabitants of meritorious worlds*—which declares independent fruit for those who perform the duties of the various orders of life;' for, since there is not admitted of these rites, as for sprinkling etc., subsidiariness to something else, there is no opposition to the possession of independent fruit. Just as the acquisition of wealth, which is ascertained to be an independent human goal, is helpful to sacrifice though not a subsidiary to sacrifice, similarly, even for rites which are not subsidiary, there may be utility in respect of Brahman-inquiry; otherwise there is unintelligibility of the smṛti about the rites being purificatory. And thus mere rites have prosperity as fruit; but, when conjoined with hearing, reflection, etc., they generate Brahman-knowledge; hence there is no conflict between smṛti and śruti. Nor may it be said that because of the capacity (līṅga) of the word 'sālokya (living in the same world)' in the smṛti of Gautama, only the attainment of (the status of) Hiranyagarbha is the fruit of purificatory rites; for, release is (also) expressed there by the word 'sāyujya'; in smṛtis like 'Knowledge arises for human beings through the exhaustion

of sinful deeds,' there is stated quite clearly the application of rites in the origination of knowledge through purification consisting in the exhaustion of sin. Just as sprinkling etc., which are purificatory rites, combine in (the production of) heaven as causing the origination of the existence of the *darsa-pūrṇamāsa* (sacrifice), similarly rites, obligatory and occasioned, combine in (the production of) release, as causing the origination of knowledge. Now, then, there results the character of a subsidiary rite, even as for sprinkling etc.; therefore, there is at no time whatever the establishment of independent fruitfulness; if this be said, no; for, since for the soul which is here to be purified there is not as for rice-grains the quality of being enjoined, there results that (independent result). Brahman-knowledge dependent on sources of valid knowledge is not indeed capable of being enjoined, in which case there could be for the self the quality of being enjoined. Now, if this be the case, there would not belong to the obligatory and the occasioned, the quality of being a purificatory rite, since that is established only in respect of a rite which is purificatory of the material that is an enjoined subsidiary; if this be said, not so; for, it is established even in respect of the purification of the curd which is subsidiary to eating that is not enjoined.

XLVIII(b). Now if the obligatory rites be the *modus operandi* in respect of Brahman-knowledge, in that case, there would not result the instrumentality mentioned in the injunctive text, since in one and the same place there is no possibility of instrumentality and the character of *modus operandi*, which are of the nature (respectively) of principal and accessory; and if there be not the character of *modus operandi*, then, there would not result the nature of being.

purification of the material (intended) for some other purpose, like the purification of curd etc.; if this be said, there is not this defect, since either way there is no conflict. First, it is not the case that instrumentality and the character of *modus operandi* are not possible for the same; for in 'Having performed Agnicayana (building the fire-altar) he is to sacrifice with the Sautrāmaṇi', 'Having sacrificed with the Vajapeya, he is to sacrifice with the Brhaspatisava', even in the case of the Sautrāmaṇi and the Brhaspatisava independently enjoined elsewhere as instrumental to something else there is seen the character of *modus operandi* to the Agnicayana and the Vajapeya. If it be said here that the Sautrāmaṇi etc. subserving both purposes stands to reason because of the difference in the evidence, i. e. the texts declaring instrumentality and the character of *modus operandi*, then, here too, on the strength of the obligatory injunction and on the strength of the śruti texts inferred (as the basis) for the smṛti about (these rites being) purifications, let us assume their subserving both purposes. Nor is it that purificatory nature is non-established for what is not a *modus operandi*; for in the case of the ceremonial kindling, it is only to what is not a *modus operandi* that purificatory nature belongs.

XLVIII(c). Now, if rites be instrumental to knowledge, because of their performance up to the rise of knowledge, there would not result renunciation due to the desire to know; if this be said, no; for, when, through purification, there results for the mind the turning to the inner self, there is no conflict in acknowledging the cessation of the performance of these (rites). That has been said: 'Rites after having originated for the intellect, through purification,

a turning to the inner self, accomplish what they purpose and disappear, like clouds at the end of the rainy season '¹ Thus, therefore, on the view of purification, there is established the utility of rites in respect of Brahman-knowledge.

XLIX(a). Next, that (utility) is stated even on the view of (their serving) the desire to know. It is declared by śruti 'That (self) the brahmīns desire to know through study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through gifts and through austerities like fasting.'² Here the immediate experience of the true nature of the self, being what is desired, is understood to be accomplishable by a productive operation, in the same way as heaven etc., since it is a human goal. Nor may it be suspected that desirability belongs to knowledge from verbal testimony, since when verbal knowledge has arisen, desire does not arise in respect of it, whereas when that (knowledge) has not arisen, desire in respect of that is all the more impossible even because of the object (of desire) being unknown. In respect of immediate experience, however, desire is certainly possible; for when verbal knowledge has arisen, the object is established in a general way. When, however, verbal testimony itself is (recognised to be) the originator of immediate knowledge, even then, since it is liable to disturbance, undisturbed knowledge is certainly to be desired. This being the case, since sacrifice etc., which are understood as instruments to the productive operation expressed by the akhyāta, relate syntactically with the desirable thing to be accomplished, they are understood to be instrumental to the experience of Brahman. Nor is (their) syntactical relation with the desire alone, since that is not

¹ Naiskarmyasiddhi, I, 49.

² Brh., IV, iv, 22

what is to be accomplished. And thence results the injunction 'He who desires the experience of the self is to perform sacrifice etc.' Nor is there conflict with the present (indicative) in 'They desire to know,' since an injunction is understood by the adoption of a *leṭ* (optative, in the place of the present indicative). Nor may it be asked how for sacrifice etc., which are obligatory, there is relation to him who desires the experience of Brahman; for, it is intelligible like the relation to him who desires heaven (in the case of the *agnihotra*, which is elsewhere treated as an obligatory rite).

XLIX(b). Now, what are in dispute, the sacrifice etc., which cause knowledge, are different from obligatory sacrifice etc., since they are enjoined in another topic, like the monthly *agnihotra* (mentioned) in the *kundapāyinām ayana*; what is called the *kundapāyinām ayana* is a sacrifice to be performed in a year; in the case of what is enjoined there, in the form 'He offers the monthly *agnihotra* oblation,' there is indeed ascertained its difference from the well known *agnihotra*, because of its mention in a different topic; similarly (there is difference) here too. This does not stand to reason, because of disparity. For, in the illustration, the word '*agnihotra*' is not capable of referring to the well known *agnihotra*, since this, which is the name of what is not in ordinary experience, is dependent on the *ākhyāta* and denotes the object stated in the *ākhyāta*. Nor is the *ākhyāta* word capable of (denoting) that (*agnihotra*); for when there is a particular rite mentioned in its own topic, qualified by the *upasada* and the quality of being performed monthly, it is not possible to abandon this and refer to (what is mentioned in) some other topic. In what is illustrated, however, since the words—study, sacrifice, gift, austerity and

fasting—are independent, as denoting what is in ordinary experience, the reference to *agnihotra* etc., prescribed elsewhere, is intelligible; and hence it is intelligible that these same rites are enjoined in a different relation.

XLIX(c). Now, even thus, in the case of Brahman-knowledge that is generated by the seen causal aggregate, viz., means of valid knowledge, there is no dependence on an unseen result, since when there do exist the means of valid knowledge, it is not seen that knowledge does not arise, because of the fault of the non-existence of the unseen result generated by sacrifice etc.; if this be said, no; for in respect of an object that is to be known solely from the *śāstra*, the non-existence of co-absence (of the alleged cause and effect) is not a defect.

XLIX(d). As for what is thought by those who maintain the combination (of knowledge and rites),—that rites are not instrumental to knowledge since they are not of the nature of means of knowledge, but are instrumental to release—that is unsound; for there is conflict (of what they say) with the instrumentality to knowledge declared by *śruti* in 'By sacrifice they desire to know'.¹ If instrumentality is not directly possible, then, it has to be assumed, as through the purification of the internal organ; for, in ordinary experience, in 'He cooks with fuel' etc., the instrumental suffix is seen (to be used) even in respect of what is indirectly an instrument; even in the Veda, in the case of sacrifice etc., declared to be instrumental to heaven, instrumentality is assumed (only) through the channel of unseen potency. Not thus is instrumentality to release cognised in this text; but on the contrary, the instrumentality of rites to release is

¹Brh., IV, iv, 22

denied in another text 'Not by rites, not by children'¹ etc. Therefore there belongs to them causality in respect of knowledge alone.

XLIX(e). Now, if they be the cause of knowledge through purification, what is the difference between the views of (their serving) purification and the desire to know? It is said (in reply). Purification generates knowledge only when there is the presence in abundance of the auxiliary causes—hearing, reflection, contemplation, repetition etc.; in their absence, (it produces) prosperity alone; but on (the view of) the desire to know (being what is subserved), since knowledge is the fruit of rites, it generates knowledge even through procuring the instruments that culminate in the fruit; this is the difference. Thus, therefore, on both views, since through the rites (that have to be performed), the earlier Tantra is needed, immediate succession to that is the meaning of the word 'atha'.

L(a). This is not sound, since the rise of knowledge is possible when the internal organ is purified even by rites performed in another life.

L(b). Then it may be thought: rites should be performed in this life in order to discharge the obligations; for there is the *smṛti* 'Having discharged the three obligations the mind is to be set on release; he however who without discharging (them) seeks release goes down below.'²

L(c). This is unsound, since it is sublated by the explicit *śruti* text³ 'Or else, otherwise, he is to renounce

¹ *Mahānārāyaṇa*, X, 5

² *Manu-smṛti*, VI, 35

³ As contrasted with the *śruti* which has to be inferred as the basis of *Manu-smṛti*.

even from the student's order of life.'¹ That has been said: 'Since renunciation (even) in the beginning is established on the authority of the express statement of the Veda, the statement "Having discharged the three obligations etc." is a smṛti without authority.'² If it be said that there is śruti too 'Verily, a brahmin, even in being born, is born with three obligations,'³ no; for that is an arthavāda subsidiary to the cutting out of the heart etc. (of the sacrificial animal). Nor is this an arthavāda stating a fact, because of (its) conflict with reasoning. By the word 'obligation' here, are there mentioned only the son, the sacrifice, and the study of the Veda, or the injunctions thereof? Of these (two possibilities), for him who is (just) born, the relation to a son etc., does not stand to reason, since that is opposed to competent non-cognition (of what would have been cognised if it existed). Nor is relation to the injunction thereof (possible); for in the case of him who is (just born and) devoid of the cognition of the injunction and the capacity (to carry it out) there is no eligibility; and capacity is a qualification of the eligible person. If then it be explained thus, that the house-holder, when he is born (i. e. becomes) such, becomes so with three obligations, even thus, it is difficult to avoid the conflict with the injunction 'renounce from the house- (holder's life)'⁴ and the conflict with the reasoning set forth above. For there is not seen the relation to a son or the capacity to procreate one, on the very day of marriage. Nor is it possible to say that this text is for the sake of remedying the relation of other opposed injunctions (to the person) from birth and

¹Jābala, 4

²Sambandha-vārtika, v. 487

³TS, VI, iii, 10 (6)

⁴Jābala, 4

prior to his full possession of such eligibility as (the procreation of) a son etc.; for, that is opposed to the injunction of renunciation mentioned above (from the householder's life). Therefore, this text ending with 'Therefore, this one, verily, is without obligation, who has a son, has sacrificed, has studied the Veda: this (debt) he discharges (avadayate) by these (avadānas) acts of cutting out; hence the avadānatva of the avadānas (the acts of cutting out)' is merely an artha-vāda which does not state a fact.

L(d). Now, when there is conflict with the injunction, 'Having finished with the student's order of life, he is to become a house-holder,'¹ how can renunciation be enjoined even from the student's order of life? Not so; for renunciation and the house-holder's state are distinguished through the difference in what they relate to, viz., him who is non-attached and him who is not non-attached.

L(e). He, however, who thinks the distinction to be due to this, that renunciation relates to those like the blind and the lame who are ineligible for rites, he is to be asked whether this is understood from a consideration of the injunction or whether it is assumed. Not the first; for, the text 'Renounce even from the student's order of life'¹ is cognised as common to both those who are eligible and those who are ineligible for rites. If it be said that, since the house-holder's state is enjoined in respect of those who are eligible, that text ends in (application to) the ineligible alone, no; for, in the subsequent text 'Then, again, whether he has no vows to keep or has vows (to keep in order to attain samnyāsa) whether he has performed the ceremonial bath (after completion of studies) or he has not performed

¹ Jñāna, 4

the bath, whether he has had the fire quenched (because of the loss of his wife) or has had no fire at all, the day on which he is non-attached, that very day he is to renounce'¹ eligibility for renunciation is expressly accepted for both those who are eligible and those who are ineligible in respect of rites. Nor thus is there the contingency of the eligibility of renunciation for all; for, non-attachment is regulative (of eligibility). If he who is not non-attached, even if blind etc., should renounce, that would lead to the condition of one who has fallen; for, in 'He who having become an ascetic' etc., the pursuit of (sense-) objects is prohibited. Nor is it the second (that it is assumed); for there is no (valid) basis for the assumption.

L(f). Then you may think: 'Though the senses may exist, they have to be checked by the ascetic; better than this is it that there should be eligibility for that (renunciation) only in the case of him who is devoid of the senses'. Not so. Here, is it because of non-utility in respect of renunciation, which is a subsidiary, that there is checking of the senses? Or is it because of non-utility in respect of the principal, self-knowledge? Or is it because of generating opposed activities too? Not the first; for, the senses are useful for carrying out such duties of renunciation as 'He is to set his foot on ground which has been seen to be pure'² and 'He is to move on the ground lightly like a worm'. Not the second, since in 'Let my body be whole, my tongue be honied'³ etc., the soundness of body, senses etc. is prayed for, for the sake of self-knowledge. On the third

¹Jabala, 4

²Manu-smṛti, VI, 46

³Taitt., I, iv, 5 & 6

(alternative), however, opposed activity alone is to be abandoned, not the existence of the senses. What then is the path for those who are not non-attached, who are blind, lame and so on, and who are (therefore) not eligible in respect of rites associated with the acts of looking at the ghee, going round the fire etc.? If this be asked, we say that there is eligibility in respect of other rites such as procreation of sons, and the recitation of the Veda. Therefore, in respect of renunciation, which is mentioned in the topic of self-knowledge and is subsidiary thereto, even though there is soundness of the body etc., only for him who is non-attached thereto is there eligibility in the principal sense.

L(g). Now, earlier there were stated the views of (rites subserving) purification and the desire to know; there, it was said of obligatory rites that they are subsidiary to self-knowledge; here it is said of their abandonment that it is the subsidiary; thus there is conflict between the earlier and the later; if this be said, no; both are subsidiaries. Nor is there impossibility of the performance of the two which are contraries; for this is intelligible through difference in the time (in which each is to be performed). Up to the purification of the mind, rites are to be performed; after that they are to be abandoned. And the possession of a single fruit by rites and their abandonment is intelligible, because of the difference of the channel (through which each is effective). Rites, indeed, through the channel of purifying the mind, are remote auxiliaries in respect of self-knowledge; renunciation, however, is a proximate auxiliary, through the channel of originating hearing (of the Vedānta) etc., without (distraction by) any other activity.

L(h). As for Bhāskara who does not recognise the abandonment of obligatory rites like the worship of *sandhya* and of the sacred thread that is a subsidiary thereto, he is to be neglected, since he has not reflected on what is contained in the *śāstra*. For the abandonment of the sacred thread is expressly enjoined in 'The muni, having abandoned sacrifice and the sacred thread, is to live as a recluse'. Nor may it be suspected that though the original sacred thread is abandoned another is put on; for, even in the *Jābala-śruti*, after the question 'How can he who has no sacred thread be a brahmin?', by the word 'alone' in (the answer) 'This alone is his sacred thread, viz., the self,'¹ external sacred threads are excluded and the character of the sacred thread is established for the self alone. Thus, therefore, since renunciation is prescribed for those eligible for self-knowledge, since the text about three obligations, which is opposed to that (prescription), is an *arthavāda* stating what is not fact, dependence on the earlier *Tantra* is not established even through rites; therefore, not even immediate succession to the inquiry into *dharma* is capable of being the sense of the word 'atha'.

LI(a). Now, if between the inquiries into *dharma* and *Brahman*, immediate succession as between the cause and the caused be not possible, then let the word 'atha' state sequence implied by mere succession between them; for in 'He cuts out the heart first, then the tongue, then the breast', the word 'atha (then)' is seen to declare sequence; if this be said, it must be asked here 'Does the word "atha" itself declare sequence? Or does it indicate briefly the reasoning needed by the sequence cognised through some other

¹ *Jābala*, 5

evidence?' Not the first; for, that (word 'atha') itself falls within an aphorism setting out reasoning. Not the second; for there is no possibility of any evidence that makes known sequence. For, sequence is needed when there is impossibility of the simultaneous performance of many acts which have a single agent. And there is single agency in the case of the subsidiary and the principal or in the case of several subsidiaries related to a single principal or in the case of acts dependent on the prompting by some other interest. And there is no evidence like express declaration for any of these here. Though only for him who is eligible (interested) in respect of the jyotistoma etc., there is eligibility in respect of the meditations relating to the subsidiary, even thus there is no defect for us; for it has been said that of meditations, which are only particular forms of dharma, there is (but) an incidental connection with the present śāstra; in the case of Brahman-knowledge which is the purportful content of the śāstra there is no eligibility for one already eligible (in respect of some rite).

LI(b). Now, just as, in the case of the six sacrifices, the Āgneya etc., there is not any of the three kinds (of common agency) mentioned above, yet because of the singleness of the fruit, there is singleness of the agent as also sequence, similarly it may be as between the inquiries into dharma and Brahman; if this be said, no; for there is no evidence of the two having a single fruit. The injunction of combination, in 'Knowledge and non-knowledge, he who knows both together,'¹ etc., is itself the evidence; if this be said, no; for, in the rest of the text 'crossing over death by non-knowledge, by knowledge he enjoys immor-

¹ Iśa., 11

talit'y'. difference in fruit is understood for rites, which are called non-knowledge, and for knowledge.

LI(c). If it be said that the text 'He who knows Brahman, also he who does what is meritorious, and is bright, attains thereby'¹ is injunctive of combination, not so. There is not here the injunction of the combination of knowledge and rites in one and the same person, but there is an injunction of the association of both persons on the path, him who knows Brahman and him who does what is meritorious: for, by (the use of) the particle 'ca' in the sense of anvācaya (also), the relating of each (of these persons) to the path (signified by 'tena') separately and independently is intelligible. By the word 'he who knows Brahman' there is denoted here he who meditates on Brahman with attributes, since for him who knows the attributeless Brahman there is no departure along the northern path. And by the word 'he who performs what is meritorious' what is intended is the person who meditates on the symbols, since the path of smoke etc. is declared by śruti for those who perform mere ritual. Therefore, this text has for purport the association of the Brahman-knower and the doer of what is meritorious in going together on the northern path up to the world of lightning. Nor is it easy to establish an injunction of the combination of knowledge of rites in 'Perform those invariably, O lovers of the true',² since mere rites alone are mentioned. Nor does the word 'true' signify Brahman; for in the rest of the text 'This is the merit acquired by you, the Brahma-loka attained by good deeds,' there is mention of Satya-loka (the world of Brahma). Nor is this an

¹ Brh., IV, iv, 9

² Muṇḍ., I, ii, 1

injunction of combination, viz., the text 'This self is to be attained by truth, by austerity, by right knowledge'.¹ For, the word 'austerity' here does not indeed denote *agnihotra* etc., but contemplation; for there is the *smṛti* 'concentration of the mind and of the senses is the supreme austerity'.

LI(d). Therefore, there is no evidence in respect of the combination of knowledge and rites. On the contrary the instrumentality of rites to release is directly denied in 'There is nothing to be done by him who has achieved (knowledge)',² 'Not by rites, not by children'³ etc. Nor may it be said that the negation is only of mere rites; for, in the absence of any (valid) evidence enjoining combination, the negation of all rites is intelligible. Otherwise, the injunction of the renunciation of all rites, as a subsidiary to knowledge, would not be intelligible. Let there be the combination of the duties of the ascetic's order of life; if this be said, no; since those duties, meditation etc., are of use in (bringing about) the existence of knowledge, their combination in respect of the fruit (release) is unintelligible.

LI(e). If it be said that the unintelligibility otherwise of the injunction of obligatory rites itself causes the assumption about obligatory rites that as auxiliaries to knowledge they have the fruit of release, no; for, on the *Prābhākara* view, there is no need of a fruit for them; on the *Bhāṭṭa* view, heaven is assumed (as the fruit), on the analogy of the *Viśvajit*; on the *Vedāntin's* view, purification and the desire to know have been mentioned as the fruit.

LI(f). If it be said that Brahman-knowledge itself causes the assumption of the instrumentality of rites to

¹ *Mund.*, III, 1, 5

² *Mund.*, I, 11, 12

³ *Mahānārāyaṇa*, XI, 5

release, as its *modus operandi*, no; for, there does exist another *modus operandi*, of the nature of calmness etc., and in the case of rites which are established to be instruments as mentioned in the injunction 'By sacrifice they desire to know' the character of *modus operandi* is opposed to the injunction. Even if somehow there be assumed their instrumentality to release, why should there not be mere option between knowledge and rites, as between the offering of oblation after sunrise and before sunrise? And thus there is no establishment of combination.

LII. Nor is it easy for him who maintains combination to demonstrate the element in release that has to be accomplished by it. The identity of Brahman and the self is not accomplishable by it, since that is of the nature of an existent. Nor is the removal of nescience and its products accomplishable by it, since 'He who knows the self crosses sorrow'¹ etc., its removal is declared to be accomplishable by knowledge. Further, on the view of him who maintains combination, even what is accomplishable by knowledge is not the fruit. Is the fruit of knowledge the removal of the cause of karma, or is it the removal of illusory superimposition, or the removal of the stream of that (superimposition), or else the removal of the residual impressions of illusory ignorance, or the manifestation of the nature of Brahman? Not the first; for, the causes of karma, being real objects, are not removable by knowledge. Not the second; for, illusory superimposition, being momentary, is removed of itself. Not the third; for there is no separate destruction of the stream in the absence of the removal of that of which it is a stream. Not the fourth; for, it is not seen that the

residual impression of silver etc., is removable by the cognition of nacre etc.; (and) if it be removable by the residual impression due to the repetition of the cognition, this residual impression would alone be the cause of release; thence would be contradicted the śāstra that kaivalya (release) is from knowledge alone. Not the fifth, because of the self-luminosity of Brahman.

LIII(a). As for the babbling of Bhāskara, that even on the strength of combination, the knowledge of Brahman is in immediate succession to the knowledge of dharma, that is refuted even by the refutation of combination. Or even if there be combination, how is that (other result) established? For, the contingency of the reverse is difficult for you to avoid. It is thus. Since rites accomplish release only as performed by those who possess knowledge, it stands to reason that first Brahman-knowledge should be originated and that everything (else) like the inquiry into dharma should be conducted only by that student who has this knowledge, seeking to enquire into dharma; thus, there may be only the reverse sequence. If it be said that though performance of rites may be subsequent to Brahman-knowledge, the inquiry into dharma may be carried out even prior (to that knowledge), no; for, in that case, for him who desires release even from the beginning, there is the contingency of the futility of all the rites of one's order of life performed up to the stage of culmination in the inquiry into dharma. Enjoyment is not their fruit, since (that) person is non-attached to enjoyment. Nor is release (the fruit); for knowledge being non-existent at that stage, there is no combination (there-with). If it be of service through the channel of an unseen potency, where that results even through rites performed in another life, the performance of rites in this life is needless.

Nor is it that there is no desire at all for release prior to the inquiry into dharma. For, there are seen those who desire release from their infancy. Nor may it be said that the inquiry into dharma should alone be undertaken first, since it is common to both him who desires release and him who does not desire release; for, commonness is not established, since, on your view, it is the cause of something which is desired, viz., release. If then (it be urged that) because of being prompted by the obligatory injunction to study, the inquiry into dharma is common, even then, there is no rule as to its coming first; for, the enquiry into obligatory rites is intelligible even in succession to the inquiry into Brahman that is desired. Though there is sin in the non-performance of rites immediately in succession to study, even then, in order to remedy this, a single text about rites is to be inquired into prior to Brahman-knowledge; the rest, however, (are to be inquired into) subsequent to that; for, in this case, even for duties of the student's order, which are performed by him who knows, there results instrumentality to release. If it be said that instrumentality to release belongs only to duties like the agnihotra, not to the duties of the student's order, no; for, instrumentality to release is intelligible even in the case of the student's duty (of study), because of the independent use of the instrumental suffix in respect of each (of the means stated), the study of the Veda etc. Hence it is that śruti enjoins renunciation even from the student's order of life. Therefore, the combination with knowledge of the duties of the student or of the duties of the ascetic being intelligible, on your view, there is certainly the contingency of the non-performance of agnihotra etc.

LIII(b). Further, the ritual injunctions alone are prompters of the inquiry into dharma, but not the

injunction to study; otherwise, there is the contingency of Brahman-inquiry too being prompted by the injunction to study. If it be said that there is another prompter thereof, viz., the injunction '(The self) is to be heard,' no; for, when the prompting of the Brahman-inquiry too is possible even by the injunction to study, whose nature as a prompter is settled in respect of the inquiry into dharma, there is prolixity in assuming the character of prompter even for the injunction '(The self) is to be heard'. If it be said that since Brahman-inquiry is optional, there is not its being prompted by the obligatory injunction to study, no; for, in the case of the inquiry into optional rites, the prompting thereby is acknowledged. Nor may it be said that since in Brahman-inquiry there are more subsidiaries, like calmness, equanimity and the approach (to a teacher), than in the inquiry into dharma, the former is prompted by another injunction; for it is possible for one and the same injunction of study to be the prompter in respect of the two inquiries, into dharma and Brahman, having (respectively) fewer and more subsidiaries. For, one and the same injunction of the *darsapūrṇamāsa* causes the performance both of the *agneya* and *agniṣomiya* sacrifices, where the offerings are *puroḍāśa* and there are subsidiaries like pounding, as also of the *upāṃśu* sacrifice which is devoid of those (subsidiaries) and has ghee for the offering. Now, an injunction indeed causes the performance everywhere of that which is a predicate (*upādeya*); calmness, equanimity etc. are, however, not predicates, since they are qualifications of the person eligible for Brahman-inquiry; therefore, the injunction to study is not that which causes the performance of that (inquiry); if this be said, no; for, as only the invested person, who is eligible in respect of the injunction to study, is also eligible

in respect of the Brahman-inquiry prompted by that (injunction), calmness, equanimity etc., are not qualifications of that (person). Otherwise, even in the case of the injunction to hear, there would not be the character of causing the performance of that (inquiry) (as, here too, calmness etc. would continue to appear as qualifications of the eligible person). Thus, therefore, since the views of Bhāskara and others, who maintain combination, are defective in many ways, and since it is not possible for the inquiries into dharma and Brahman to have the same fruit, there is no commonness of the agent; therefore, the word 'atha' does not signify sequence prompted by that (alleged commonness).

LIV(a). Now, even thus, in all the twelve chapters of the earlier Tantra, dharma is the one (content) desired to be known; just as here there is a regulated sequence of chapters, similarly, even as between the earlier and later Tantras, there being oneness of what is desired to be known, the word 'atha' may be for the purpose of regulating the sequence; if this be said, no; for even what is desired to be known is, like the fruit, different (in the two cases). Just as because, in the earlier Tantra, prosperity dependent on performance is the fruit, while, in the later Tantra, beatitude, not dependent on performance (is the fruit), there is difference in fruit, similarly, in the earlier Tantra, what is desired to be known is dharma dependent on human activity and non-existent at the time of knowledge, while, in the later Tantra, what is desired to be known is Brahman, not dependent on human activity, and existent even at the time of knowledge; therefore, though one in respect of being the sense of the Veda, it is not possible to avoid the difference in what is desired to be known.

LIV(b). If it be said that, where there is identity of the means of knowledge, difference in the objects known does

not stand to reason, no; for, the identity of the means of knowledge is not established. Indeed, in respect of neither dharma nor Brahman, is the Veda the authority, merely in the form of Veda; rather does it give knowledge of dharma, while in the form of injunction, and about the nature of Brahman, while in the form of Vedānta texts. Here by 'injunction (codanā)' is denoted the word which effects the verbal productive operation. And this injunction while *effecting* the artha-bhāvanā qualified by (its) three elements, *declares* the artha-bhāvanā only for the sake of prompting the person, since when that is not known, human appetite is not possible. The Vedānta text, however, merely gives knowledge, but does not prompt the person in respect of Brahman or the knowledge thereof; for Brahman which is not what is to be done is not dependent on the person; and knowledge, which is dependent on the means and objects of knowledge, is not under the control of human desire and effort, since there is seen the cognition of evil odour etc., even for him who does not desire it and makes no effort (for it). Thus, therefore, because of the absolute difference in nature between dharma and Brahman as also between the means of knowing them, not even as prompted by oneness of what is desired to be known is it possible here for the word 'atha' to declare sequence. Therefore, the word 'atha' is only for the sake of indicating, by way of signifying immediate succession, that qualification of the eligible person, which is of the nature of the full cause (of the inquiry) and is stated in the śāstra (itself).

LV. And that qualification of the eligible person is well known in the śāstra to be four-fold, viz. the discrimination of things eternal from the non-eternal, non-attachment

to the enjoyment of fruit here or here-after, the possession in abundance of means like calmness and equanimity, and the desire for release. Of these, the discrimination of things eternal from the non-eternal is shown (as a requisite), in the context of the injunction 'That is to be sought',¹ by the words 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment acquired here by deeds is consumed' etc. And in the context of the injunction to hear, there is shown non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here and hereafter, in the words 'But because of the love of the self, all this becomes dear'.² In 'See the self in the self alone'³ which is the context of the injunction to see, calmness etc. are shown by the words 'Endowed with calmness, equanimity' etc. In 'Desire to know that' which is the context of the injunction to inquire, the approach to a preceptor is shown in the words 'He approached his father, Varuṇa'.⁴ Nor is there no evidence to establish the desire for release (as a requisite). For, everywhere, the declarations of fruit are for the purpose of showing eligibility in the case of him who desires release, through the channel of generating desire (in him); otherwise, since the fruit results even from the pursuit of the means, there will be futility in the mention of that (fruit). Though calmness etc., are mentioned in the context of the injunction to know, yet there is no conflict in their being qualifications of the person eligible for inquiry; for knowledge being incapable of being enjoined, inquiry alone, which is instrumental thereto, is enjoined here.

LVI. Even thus, since the injunction of inquiry differs with every branch (of the Veda), the respective qualifications

¹ Chānd., VIII, vii, 1

² Brh., II, iv, 5

³ Brh., IV, iv, 28

⁴ Taitt., III, i, 2

of eligibility declared there also remain distinct and do not combine; if this be said, no; for the injunction to inquire is single, on the principle of all (similar) cognitions in all branches (of the Veda, being one). When, for rites like the *vyotistoma* mentioned in different branches, difference results (*prima facie*) through the difference in the branches, the final position is established by the aphorism 'But they are one, because of non-distinction in respect of the conjunction (with fruit), the form (i. e. material and deity), the injunction and the name'.¹ Just as there, because of the non-distinction throughout (the branches) in respect of conjunction with the fruit, the form consisting of the material and the deity, the injunction such as 'He is to sacrifice', and the name like *vyotistoma*, there is singleness of the rite, even so inquiry too is but one throughout. And that one injunction to inquire, being needful of eligibility, both on the strength of the topic (*prakarana*) and in order to remedy the futility (otherwise) of the mention of the fruit, accepts the above-mentioned host of attributes as the cause of eligibility; for, in the case of an injunction without eligibility, its culmination in appetence is impossible.

LVII. Now, since the word 'inquiry' is absent from these texts, how is it known that inquiry is enjoined? It is said (in reply). The inquiry, which is included in 'That should be desired to be known', 'Desire to know that', is enjoined, since the character of being enjoined is impossible in the case of the knowledge that is desired or the desire. In 'That is to be heard' inquiry is of itself enjoined. As for (its presence in) 'He is to see' that has been mentioned even before. Therefore it is established that everywhere there is enjoined hearing, as

the principal, with reflection and contemplation as subsidiaries.

LVIII. Now, since everywhere in the injunction of what is instrumental to fruit, the desire for fruit is alone the full cause of eligibility, here too, the desire for release is alone the qualification of eligibility, while calmness etc., as having to be practised, may be, like the fore-sacrifice etc., subsidiaries subserving the fruit; if this be said, true. (But) even in the case of a subsidiary, there is no conflict in its being a qualification of the eligible person; for there is the *linga* (the capacity of what is expressed) in the form 'coming to possess the qualities of calmness etc., one is to see'; in the case of what is known from the *śāstra* alone, denial based on reasoning is impossible; (and) in the case of the *dikṣā* (a purificatory rite), though of the nature of a subsidiary, it is seen to be a cause of eligibility in respect of a subsequent rite. Though it is not within the region of the seen, that when there is desire for release there is (yet) no activity because of the fault of the non-existence of the other qualities, yet since the others are causes of the very existence of the desire for release, it is impossible to avoid their causality in respect of eligibility. Indeed, when there is no discrimination of things eternal from non-eternal, non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter is not intelligible; nor when this is non-existent, is the desire for release possible as associated with calmness etc. Therefore each earlier (quality) is the cause of the existence of each subsequent one.

LIX. Now, this being the case, existence would result for none (of these), since the primal cause, discrimination of things eternal from non-eternal, is impossible; there is indeed nothing called eternal, of which there may be discrimination

from the non-eternal : nor is it that there is no evidence for the non-eternality of everything ; everything in dispute is non-eternal, because it is existent, like the pot. If this be said, not so ; for, even because of the origination and destruction of the host of effects, there is established the eternality of a single material cause, which is beginningless, immutable, and of the nature of a limit (to change). It is thus. An effect without a material cause is unintelligible, because of conflict with experience ; therefore, a material cause has to be admitted. And material causality is not possible in the case of (what is itself) another effect ; for, in that case, since it is a rule that only what is persistent in the effect is a material cause, there should be admitted the persistence of each prior effect in each subsequent effect, and there is the contingency of the persistence of all prior effects in the final effect ; and it is not seen to be thus ; therefore, that material cause is certainly beginningless. And since, when it is possible for even one such to originate all effects, there is prolixity in assuming multiplicity, singleness is admitted ; and immutability (is admitted) because of not being subject to change, and because if changeable there is the contingency of its being an effect. And that immutable entity is the limit of the host of modifications that perish ; otherwise if there were limitless destruction of (what existed in) the previous æon, a material cause being impossible, there would not be even the present creation. Therefore, since the immutable entity is eternal, the discrimination of things eternal from non-eternal is established ; thence its effect, the aggregate of qualities ending with the desire for release, being also established, causes appetite for the eligible person, in respect of the inquiry into Brahman. As for him, who, though devoid of the possession of the said means, (yet) because of chance or

enthusiasm or an intellect well versed in śruti, is appetent in respect of that, he, though appetent, has his mind not turned inwards but clinging only to what is without; hence he is not capable of apprehending without a doubt that Brahman is the self. Therefore, the meaning of the word 'atha' is immediate succession to the host of entities above described.

LX. Here, Bhāskara babbles (thus): in the case of the aphorist who, indeed, declares that inquiry is to be undertaken, calmness etc. have not entered his mind; and a thing that has not entered the mind is not capable of being accepted as the qualification of the eligible person; the inquiry into dharma, however, which has entered his mind, is accepted as the qualification of the eligible person. This does not stand to reason; for, in the case of calmness etc., which are very proximate, as being mentioned in the context of the injunction to inquire, non-entry into the mind is impossible. Nor is it that they are of no service here, since they fall within the qualifications of the eligible person prompted by the injunction. And their service to inquiry has been shown through co-presence and co-absence. Not thus closely proximate is the inquiry into dharma, since it relates to dharma occurring in a different work (prakaraṇa). Nor is it of any service here; this has been already established. Therefore, it is settled that the meaning of the word 'atha' is only what has been stated by us.

LXI(a). The word 'ataḥ' signifies a reason. Now it has been said that even the word 'atha' by way of expressing immediate succession, indicates what is causally antecedent; therefore this is a repetition. Nor may it be said 'causality is not expressed by the word "atha" but is presumptively cognised; here, however, it is expressed by the word "ataḥ";

hence there is no repetition ;' for, even what is presumptively cognised, being the content of purport, is the sense of the word 'atha', on the principle 'That which is the purport of a word is the sense of the word'. Nor is it possible for the word 'atha' to have purport in respect of the predication of immediate succession alone, because of the contingency of futility. Therefore, causality being the purport of the word 'atha' even if presumptively, the repetition in the (use of the) words 'athatah' is difficult to remedy.

LXI(b). There is not this defect. When by the word 'atha' the four-fold means are apprehended as the cause of inquiry, there being the doubt as to the impossibility of sustaining that (causality), the word 'atah' is used in order to sustain causality through refuting that (doubt). It is thus. Inferring for heaven etc. (their) non-eternality, on the grounds of their being produced, being limited etc., the eternal is to be discriminated from these, which are non-eternal.

LXI(c). Nor is this discrimination easy, since the stated grounds are inconclusive in respect of destruction (which is eternal, though produced), primal atoms (which are eternal, though limited) and so on. And the eternality of the fruit of rites is declared by śruti in 'Imperishable, verily, is the merit of him who has performed the cāturmāsya sacrifice' etc. Therefore, how could human beings turn away from the human goal, the fruit of rites, and engage in what is not a human goal, Brahman-knowledge? Though there is bliss in Brahman, yet that is not capable of being enjoyed by the jīva, since only the experience of happiness as located in oneself is enjoyment; and in the case of happiness that is an attribute of Brahman, experience as located in oneself is

impossible ; for, in ordinary experience, one's happiness is not seen to be located in another. If then you think 'since there is no inconstancy, if enjoyment be but the immediacy of happiness, the qualification "located in oneself" is futile', even thus, if the jīva and Brahman be different, immediacy of Brahman-bliss is unintelligible, since there is not seen immediacy in respect of another person's bliss. As for the non-difference of the jīva and Brahman, that is opposed to experience. Therefore, turning away from release that is blissless, a person strives for material pleasure though mixed with some small pain, on the principle that because of the fear of indigestion, there is not indeed the abandonment of food, but that it is to be cured ; therefore, the meaning apprehended from the word 'atah' is not sustained. Thus may it be objected.

LXI(d). This objection is not to be urged ; for the Veda itself shows the non-eternality of the host of human goals other than Brahman, in 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment acquired here by deeds is consumed, even so, the enjoyment acquired hereafter by merit is consumed' etc. Nor may it be said that this general text may be restricted to contents other than that of special texts like that about the cāturmāsya. Here, first, the text about the cāturmāsya declares the non-consumption of the merit alone, not of its fruit. Nor is it possible to assume that the purport of the text is the non-consumption of the fruit, by way of stating the non-consumption of the merit ; for there is conflict with evidence, since through *probans* like limitedness, non-eternality of the fruit is inferred. Nor is there inconclusiveness of these (*probans*), since non-eternality is not admitted even in the case of primal atoms etc. Nor when merit is unconsumed is the consumption

of its fruit unintelligible, since, like non-enjoyment, that (too) is intelligible; indeed, even when merit does exist, in some cases its fruit is not enjoyed; for there is the *smṛti* 'Sometimes a meritorious deed remains as if unfruitful'. Similarly, why should there not also be the consumption of the fruit? Nor is it easy to establish the eternality of the fruit, in other texts like 'Those who give gold enjoy immortality'; for, here too, the conflict with the general text, supported by inference, remains as before. Therefore, non-attachment to non-eternal human goals other than Brahman is intelligible, as preceded by the discrimination of things eternal from the non-eternal.

LXI(e). Nor is it that Brahman-knowledge is not a human goal; for, it is the intuition of bliss. Since the non-difference of the *jīva* and Brahman has been established in the first *varṇaka*, through the example of the prototype and reflection, the intuition of that (bliss) is certainly possible. Nor need there be any dispute about the eternal Brahman-bliss, which is of the essential nature of the *jīva*, since there is never any failure of the *jīva* being the object of supreme love, the means to happiness being exhausted (in their functioning) merely with the manifestation of that (bliss); for, otherwise, there would be prolixity in that for the means there would be, in respect of happiness, the characters both of generating and of manifesting. And thus, all material pleasures being fragments of the Brahman-bliss, those who turn away from migration that is the ocean of misery, are appetent in respect of Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme bliss. Thus, therefore, there is the word 'atah', in order to sustain the sense of the word 'atha', through refuting the aforesaid objection; this is unassailable.

LXII. By the word 'Brahma-jijñāṣā' a possessive compound, as 'desire to know in respect of Brahman', should be understood, but not a dative compound, as in 'Dharma-jijñāṣā, i. e. inquiry for the sake of dharma'. There, indeed, resorting to the primacy of the sense, viz., the inquiry, included (in the desire to know), with the intention to declare the fruit, there is adopted the dative compound 'for the sake of dharma'. Truly, what is the fruit of (that) inquiry is not itself the object thereof, in which case there might result the possessive compound 'in respect of dharma'. Here, however, there is adopted the primacy of what is conveyed by the word, viz., the desire to know; and for desire, that which is the object is itself the fruit; therefore, there follow the (possibilities of both the) possessive compound and the dative compound (meaning) 'for the sake of'. Of these, because of its primacy as being the cause whose existence is established, the possessive signifying the object is alone adopted and the compound thus explained.

LXIII. Here the Vṛttikāra, suspecting that the word 'Brahman' denotes (the brahmin) caste, the jīva, Brahṁa (the lotus-seated one) and the Vedas, refutes it thus. For caste etc., verily, there is no possibility of a syntactical relation here whether as the object or as the agent. For the brahmin caste object-ness is not possible, since, being established by perception, it is incapable of being desired to be known; nor is agency (possible), since eligibility for the desire to know belongs to all three castes. Nor is the jīva to be desired to be known, since he is established by the cognition 'I'. Though there is agency for him, yet the acceptance of that (as the sense) is futile, since there is no contingency of the agency of any one else. Nor is

agency possible for the host of words, constituting the Veda, which is non-intelligent; nor is objectness (possible) for it, since by the (Purvamīmāṃsā) aphorisms about the inquiry into dharma and about (the relation of the sense to the word) being natural,¹ its possession of significance and authoritativeness has been demonstrated. Even Hiranyagarbha is not to be desired to be known, since desire to know is taught in the case of one who has turned away even from his state; nor is agency possible for him, since knowledge and non-attachment are (to him) connate. This effort of the Vṛttikara is futile; for, when there is apprehended Brahman which is about to be defined as 'That whence for this what begins with origination'² the doubt about (its signifying) caste etc. does not arise.

LXIV. Now, even thus, this cannot be a possessive compound in the form 'in respect of Brahman'; for, in that case, though for Brahman's nature alone there may result the premising of its being what is inquired into, that does not result for anything else. When, however, the possessive is understood in the sense of relation in general, then there results the premising of inquiry into everything connected with Brahman, viz., nature, means of knowledge, reasoning, the means and the fruit. Then it may be thought: 'When there is a possessive signifying the object (but) not otherwise, there is mentioned what is desired to be known, which is that which is needed by the desire to know; and in the absence of that (object) the desire to know is not easy to set forth'. That is not (so); for even on the view of the possessive as signifying relation in general, there

¹ PM. I, i, 1, and 5

² Br. Śū. I, i, 2

results Brahman being the object. For, the general does not get into empirical usage without culminating in the particular. There being the expectancy here 'what is this particular?', since for the act of the desire to know, which relates to an object, the object-causal-correlate is proximate, it (the relation in general) ends in objectness. Therefore, in order to include all, the possessive is to be understood as signifying relation in general, not as signifying the object.

LXV. If this be said, there is not this defect; for when by the possessive as signifying the object there is mentioned the principal, the object of the desire to know, i. e. Brahman, the means of knowledge etc., needed thereby, being established presumptively, do not need to be stated separately. Truly, when it is said 'The king goes', it is not necessary to state separately the going of the retinue needed by him. And thus, on our view, the inquiry into the principal is explicitly premised, the rest (is premised) by presumption; on your view, however, it is in the reverse way. Therefore, our view alone is superior. Further, since in the śruti text 'Desire to know that' which declares the injunction to inquire together with the eligibility and the content (therefor), Brahman is designated as the object-causal-correlate, in the aphorism too, as having the same sense as that (text), there is to be understood only the object-ness of Brahman.

LXVI. By the word 'jijñāsa', the (etymological) sense of the components is to be understood, i. e. that jijñāsa is the desire to know. And thus, since desire has fruit as its content, the culmination in the fruit of unshakable immediate realisation comes to be indicated in the aphorism. Nor may it be said that the desire to know can result neither when Brahman is known nor when it is not known; for when it

is known either mediately or with unsettled immediacy, the desire for that is intelligible, for the sake of unshakable immediate realisation.

LXVII. Now, what is called cognition is the consciousness that is the fruit of the means of knowledge—thus (hold) the Saugatas, Prābhākaras, Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas ; these who follow the Vārtikakāra (Bhaṭṭa) say that it is an operation of the cogniser, which generates consciousness ; the Kṣāṇākas (jainas) and the Lokāyatas say that it is but the soul's intelligence ; the Sāṅkhyas and the Vedāntins say that on the derivation as instrumental viz., (that) whereby is known, the psychosis of the intellect is cognition, while, on the derivation as substantive, it is but consciousness. Of these, which is the kind of cognition desired ?

LXVIII. If this be asked, it is said (in reply). The views of the four (disputants) beginning with Sugata, and of the Lokāyata are not intelligible ; for, in the case of the consciousness that is the fruit, though it is originated, it is not admitted by them to be preceded by the activity of the agent. This is opposed to the inference : 'What is in dispute is preceded by the activity of an agent, since it is a fruit, like reaching a village'. Hereby is refuted the view of the Kṣāṇākas too. Though on this view consciousness is non-originated in its own nature, yet its origination must be admitted as conditioned by its being the manifester of objects ; for, otherwise, there is the contingency of the manifestation of all objects at all times. Now, in the case of the self, which is partless, the activities of motion and transformation do not stand to reason. True ; hence it is that the view of those who follow the Vārtikakāra should be rejected. On our view however, the transformation, in the form of cognition, in

the case of that self, which has been identified with the internal organ originated by superimposition, does stand to reason. Nor may it be said 'In the case of that kind of self, let there be transformation even in the form of consciousness (not cognition);' for consciousness is, in respect of its own nature, eternally established. Nor thus is there the impossibility of consciousness, which is unoriginated, being the fruit; for origination is admitted of that as conditioned by the content. Though all transformations whatsoever of the internal organ are immediate, being witness-cognised, yet that transformation of the internal organ, which is the cause of immediacy along with the content, is immediate; the rest is mediate: thus is their distinction. This being the case, this kind of immediate cognition, of the form of a transformation of the internal organ, is designated in this aphorism as what is to be desired.

LXIX. Now, if this first aphorism is included in the śāstra, then if its commencement be established by itself there is the contingency of self-dependence; if (established) by another, there is infinite regress. If it is not included, then, there is the contingency of the non-commencement of that (aphorism); if this be said, there is not this defect. The very injunction to hear, superficially known from the study of one's own Veda, causes the commencement of the first aphorism, for the sake of the inquiry into three supplements (viśaya, prayojana and sambandha) needed by itself. And thus, being prompted by the very injunction that prompts the entire śāstra to be set forth, there is its inclusion in the śāstra. Because of being prompted by an injunction which is of non-personal origin, there is no infinite regress. Nor may it be objected 'If the injunction to hear may cause the

commencement of the first aphorism alone for the ascertainment of itself, then what will be that which causes the commencement of the string of subsequent aphorisms?; for their commencement is intelligible even by that same injunction, as ascertained in the first aphorism. Hence it is that the primacy in the śāstra of this aphorism which ascertains that injunction, and its relation to the chapters on harmony etc., are easy (to establish); for, texts like 'is to be heard', through their harmonious relation with their own content, are the cause of harmonious relation with Brahman, even of the Vedānta texts, which are to be inquired into.

LXX. And in this aphorism, in order to avoid the character of restatement, the words 'is to be undertaken' are to be imported; since the knowledge to be desired, which is the fruit and is of itself known as what is to be acquired, is incapable of being enjoined, the means thereto, the inquiry included (in it), is to be secondarily indicated; since, in respect of Brahman-knowledge, even unseen potency is instrumental, the injunction is to be justified (on that basis); the view of the injunction (as signifying) instrumentality to the desired is to be adopted; and thus the expressed sense of the text is to be stated as 'By him who desires release, inquiry is to be undertaken for the sake of Brahman-experience.' And when this is stated, the connection, the content and fruit are presumptively understood; this is settled.

HERE ENDS THE THIRD VARNĀKA.

FOURTH VARNAKA.

(1) In the third varṇaka the sense of the words and of the text of the aphorism was stated; the eligible person was there directly established by the word 'atha'.

(2) But the three, however, viz., the connection, the content and the fruit, were (only) briefly indicated; in the fourth varṇaka all these (three) are objected to (discussed) and demonstrated.

(3) In the first varṇaka these were established, in dependence on super-imposition; in this varṇaka, however, they themselves are directly objected to (discussed) and established directly.

I. Now, if the nature of Brahman be known through some other evidence, then, it is not capable of becoming the content of this śāstra: for, there is no sense not (already) known. Nor is the knowledge of that the fruit of this (teaching), because of its establishment even prior to this śāstra. If, then, (Brahman) be unknown, how could this śāstra be related to a sense which has not entered the intellect at all? Though perception etc., are seen to relate even to a thing that has not been seen at all, yet that is not possible for the śāstra, which is of the nature of inquiry, for everywhere, relation to inquiry is seen only in the case of what is known superficially. If this be said, thus then, in the case of Brahman too, which is a content superficially known through study and not ascertained, there being a connection with the śāstra of inquiry, the knowledge of that (Brahman) is the fruit; thus there is no defect whatever.

II. Now, the content, fruit and connection have not to be taught here, since they are established even from what are to be declared, viz., the chapter on harmony etc.; nor is there non-appetence for the hearers, when those are not taught; for, appetite is possible through the certainty as to the existence of content etc., even because of the worthiness of the author. Not so; for, even though the existence of content etc., be ascertained in general, appetite is not possible, when there is not cognised the particular fruit intended by oneself.

III. Now, then, as subsidiary to appetite, the particular fruit alone should be stated, not the content and the connection. If, then, the content too, as instrumental to the fruit, be subsidiary to appetite, still, that is cognised even from the cognition of the fruit, since contentness is invariable only for what is related to that (fruit). For, in ordinary experience, it is only for the faggot, which is in a relation of inherence to the fruit called dividing into two, that there is contentness in respect of the act of cutting. When the object and the subject are cognised, their connection too is certainly cognised; hence that too has not to be separately stated.

IV. If this be said, not so. Here, among the content, fruit and connection, is it because of absolute non-difference in their nature that there is no need to state (each) separately? Or is it because by the mention of any one the rest are established by presumption? Or is it because, each being separately and independently capable of causing appetite, subsidiariness to appetite does not exist for them together? Not the first; because of the difference of these (three) in that the fruit is of the nature of a human goal, the content

is what is not established otherwise, and being-taught-by-this is the connection. Of these (two), there is discrimination, in that content-ness is of the form of the exclusion of conjunction with any other (pramāṇa), and connection is of the form of the exclusion of non-conjunction (with this pramāṇa). Not the second; for the non-existence of the rest being seen even when one exists, establishment by presumption is not possible. It is indeed seen in the case of the teeth of a crow that though there is content-ness because of not being established by any other work, and connection, as being capable of being taught, there is yet no fruit in that inquiry. Similarly, though, in the case of such things as peeling the skin of a ripe banana, there is connection for the hatchet, knife etc., as capable of achieving it, and fruit, as desired by human beings, there is no contentness in respect of the operation of the hatchet etc., since that peeling is accomplished even by the finger etc. Thus, even in the case of the Meru etc., which are contents, as not being led to by another, and which are fruitful, we do not see any connection with the operation of leading in which those like us are the agents, because of impossibility. Therefore, among those which are thus reciprocally inconstant, there is not even the suspicion of establishment by presumption. Not the third, since in the absence of the combination of the said three, there is no appetite. Truly, not in respect of the inquiry into the teeth of a crow, nor in respect of the (use of) hatchet etc., for the peeling of a banana etc., nor in the leading to the Meru etc., is human appetite cognised.

V(a). Be it thus: the nature of Brahman is the content of the Vedānta alone, not of the śāstra of inquiry; for this has for content the arguments that are grounds for the possibility of the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge etc.

V(b). To this, he, who thinks he knows the final position, replies: the śāstra of inquiry, which is in dispute, has an object not different from the Vedānta, since it is the *modus operandi* of that, just as the fore-sacrifice etc. has the same content as the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa (rites); or just as the water, earth, etc., which are auxiliaries to the seed, are originators of a single effect, along with that (seed). Though by the śāstra arguments alone are seen to be directly taught, yet it is possible for Brahman to be the content indirectly: this is just as the cutter's manual operation, though directly having the hatchet alone for content, has indirectly the tree too for content.

V(c). This reply of him who thinks himself learned is not suitable; for it is not established of inquiry that it is the *modus operandi* of the Vedānta. Just as revelation is the evidence for the fore-sacrifice etc. being *modus operandi*, or just as the auxiliariness of water, earth etc., is established by co-presence and co-absence, not thus is there any evidence for inquiry being the *modus operandi*. Nor may it be objected how there can be instrumentality in respect of Brahman-knowledge for the word of the Vedānta, devoid of (any) *modus operandi*; for the cognition of the word and the residual impression of the cognition of its signification constitute the *modus operandi* thereof. Let inquiry too occupy the place of a *modus operandi* in respect of the word, as causing the valid knowledge of Brahman through the removal of defect; if this be said, no; for, in the word of the Veda, there is no defect. Nor is there thus the futility of inquiry, since it is the cause of the removal of human defects. And human defect is of two kinds, the erroneous ascertainment of the signification and purport of the word, and

cognition of the contrary through perception etc. Of these, having seen in worldly usage like 'In this village, this one alone is the secondless lord', that there is signification and purport only in respect of the exclusion of what is of the same class, one ascertains them to be even so in the usage of the Veda too; this erroneous ascertainment will be refuted in the inquiry into harmony. And the cognition of the contrary (will be refuted) in the inquiry into non-contradiction (i. e. in the second chapter). And thus, in the case of inquiry which is exhausted even with the removal of obstacles, how can there be causality in respect of the valid knowledge of Brahman? Therefore, Brahman is not the content of the śāstra of inquiry.

VI. To this it is said (in reply). Brahman-knowledge, though arising even from the word, is established only when there is the removal of obstacles, but not before that. And thus, since inquiry too, which removes obstacles, is figuratively the cause of the ascertainment of Brahman, its having Brahman for content is intelligible. Here some say that since purport, which is known by inquiry, is the cause of the valid knowledge of the sense, inquiry too is the cause of that same valid knowledge of the sense, not (the cause) of the removal of obstacles. That is unsound. Is purport the cause of valid knowledge of the sense while (itself) uncognised, or while cognised? Not the first; because in the case of all statements worldly and scriptural, there is the contingency of the futility of that inquiry whose fruit is the knowledge of purport, inasmuch as even if the purport be not known, there is (i. e. can be) no erroneous cognition (of the sense). On the second (alternative) too, purport does not have for content the word-sense, since it is of no service in the cognition of the sentence; and if it have the

sentence-sense for content, there is reciprocal dependence, in that when the sentence-sense which is the content and the qualification (of the purport) is known, there is knowledge of the purport qualified thereby, while when purport is known, there is valid knowledge of the sentence-sense. Then, you may think that immediately after knowing the word-senses through the words, there is the guess 'certainly there is conjunction among them, since they are used together;' and that, in knowing the sentence-sense thus, there is not the said defect. That does not stand to reason. This guess is not a recollection, since it knows a thing not already known. Nor is it doubt, since there are not two alternatives. Nor is it error, since there is no sublation. By elimination it should be admitted that the word-generated cognition of the sentence-sense is certainly valid knowledge. And thus it is difficult to avoid either the word's capacity to give knowledge without dependence on the knowledge of purport, or the above-mentioned reciprocal dependence.

VII. Now, like the intension of words like 'cow' in respect of generality like 'cow-ness', for sentences too there is purport in respect of being sentence-sense in general; and thence, since the generality is known already, it can be the qualification (of purport); hence the purport as qualified (thereby) is known; and in the valid knowledge of the particular sentence-sense through the purport, there is not the afore-mentioned defect; if this be said, no; because of the contingency of the non-existence of purport in respect of the particular sentence-sense. Then (it may be said) 'just as the word "cow" expressing "cow-ness" terminates in (denoting) a particular cow, purport, having generality alone for its sphere may terminate in the particular'; even thus, purport

is not the cause of the valid knowledge of the sense. What is in dispute, i. e. knowledge of the sentence-sense, is conditioned only by the signification of the word, since it is verbal knowledge, like the knowledge of word-sense. And if purport were the cause of valid knowledge of the sentence-sense, then the sentence-sense would not be verbal knowledge, since the valid knowledge thereof would result from purport alone. And the co-presence and co-absence of the word would be intelligible, as of service to that which causes purport, by way of setting forth the word-sense. Therefore, in order that the character of verbal knowledge may result, this alone should be admitted, that the word itself is the cause of valid knowledge of the sense, and that purport is what removes obstacles. And thus, since even the cause of purport, viz. inquiry, is a remover of obstacles, its having Brahman for content is only figurative.

VIII. Now, not even figuratively is it possible for Brahman to be the content of inquiry, since it is difficult to establish even its being superficially known; it is not known in ordinary experience, since it is not the sphere of any other means of knowledge; nor is it known from the Veda, since the word 'Brahman' has there an unascertained sense; on the principle that (only) that word whose capacity has been determined in ordinary experience is capable of giving knowledge in the Veda too, a word whose meaning has not been learnt can give no knowledge even in the Veda. Not so; for, on account of the unintelligibility otherwise of the Vedic usage, some sense of the word 'Brahman' has to be assumed, as in the case of 'heaven' etc.; for the proximity of known words is common to both the texts, about Brahman and about heaven. Even thus, for the word 'Brahman' a

(general) sense alone is established, not a particular sense; if this be said, no; for, on account of the proximity of known words, there is to be assumed only such particular sense as is capable of syntactical relation with it. Nor is there the impossibility of the application of the word to that particular sense which is intended to be declared; for the word, though not applicable thereto in the conventional sense, is capable of applying thereto through generating the sense of the parts; for it is only for this purpose that everywhere Nigama, Nirukta and Grammar set out. And thus, because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the usage here (of the word 'Brahman') in the śruti 'Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman,'¹ and in the aphorism 'Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman', it is assumed that the sense of the word 'Brahman' is a thing which is free from sublation, is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of limits, and is to be desired to be known as culminating in the human goal.

IX(a). And the word 'Brahman' which comes from the root 'Br̥ha, br̥hi, to increase,' signifies greatness; and that greatness, because of the non-existence of a topic or qualifying words to narrow the sense, comes to be only that which is unexcellable. Thence, it comes to be said to be free from limitation due to space, time or (other) things. Similarly even freedom from defects, like sublatability, inertness and not being a human goal, is but greatness (connoted by *br̥h*); for, in ordinary experience, there is seen the usage 'great men' in respect of men who are free from defects and possess merits. Therefore, on the strength of etymology, the word 'Brahman' applies to the sense above stated. In respect of caste, the jīva, the lotus-seated one etc., though

¹Taitt, II, 1,

there is not the sense above stated, the application of the word 'Brahman' (to them) is intelligible, as due to conventional sense.

IX(b). Now, by following the sense of the root *bṛh* is it the sense of the word 'Brahman' in the aphorism that is described, or is it of (the word in) the śruti? Not the first: for in the case of human usage, which stands in need of a basic authority, ascertainment in the absence of that (authority) is of no use. If, then, śruti be the basic authority, even thus, since in the next aphorism it is to be ascertained that Brahman is the cause of the origination etc. of the world, no effort is to be expended in the present aphorism. Not the second, since the sense is ascertained (by Scripture) itself, in such texts as 'That whence, verily, these beings are born...desire to know that, that is Brahman'¹, 'Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman'².

IX(c). There is not this defect: for in the case of the second aphorism which has not come into being at the stage when the first aphorism is set out, it is not possible for it to be the cause of the ascertainment of the sense of that (first aphorism); in the śruti too, in the absence of the word-sense being established otherwise, valid knowledge of the sentence-sense is impossible; here in both cases, the sense (of the word 'Brahman') has to be described by the following the sense of the root. If it is said that following the root-sense is the cause of the cognition of possibility alone, not the cause of ascertainment, let there be no ascertainment; for, what is needed here as the content of the desire to know is only that thing which is possible and unascertained.

¹Tait. III, 1

²Ibid. II, 1

X. If, then, there be needed the ascertained establishment of what is intended to be declared, i. e., the sense of the word 'Brahman', then that too is made out. The self is perceptually cognised by the whole world, in the form 'I exist'; that itself is indeed Brahman, because of the śruti text 'That Brahman, verily, is this self'¹. And thence, since inquiry, whose subject is what is cognised, is possible, there results connection, consisting in the capacity to be taught. And thus, since there is not absolute non-establishment, there results content-ness. Now, thus then, since, as being the sphere even of perception, there is no non-common-ness, content-ness is not established (for Brahman); if this be said, no; though it is established in the perception of all as 'I', in the general character of self-hood, the perceptual establishment of its particular character, which is subject to dispute is not possible. Though in the self there does not really exist a distinction of general and particular, yet, just as for the rope-substance, being-cognised through a form common to staff, a snake, a streak etc. is itself the generality, similarly, for the self too, being-cognised as (of a form) common to the disputed alternatives, the things called body, senses, manas, intellect, the void, agent, enjoyer, the omniscient and Brahman—may (itself) be the generality; for in the case of the word 'I' expressing the self, even when applied to perceptually established objects, like the body, dispute as to sense is possible, as in the case of the word 'go'.

XI(a). For, in the case of the word 'go' which is used in respect of perceptually established senses like the individual, the configuration, the generality, the activity and the quality, the generality is understood to be the sense by those

who follow the Veda; the individual (is understood) by the Śākhyaś etc.; both by the Grammarians; *ākṛti*, which is called the configuration of the parts, by the Ārhatas etc.; and all three by the Naiyāyikas. If then (it be said) 'Since in the use of the word "*go*" there is invariability of the co-presence and co-absence of generality etc., there is the doubt as to (one of) them being the sense', then, even because of the invariability of the co-presence and co-absence of the body etc., in the use of the word 'I', let there be the doubt as to having (one of) those as the sense.

XI(b). Of these (possibilities), those persons who are devoid of the purification due to (study of) the śāstra, adopt perception alone, devoid of inquiry, as the means of valid knowledge and understand the intelligising body to be the self.

XI(c). Similarly, the Laukāyatikas, who maintain the reality of the four elements alone, think that, because in 'I am a man, I know', the body is cognised as the substrate of the cognition 'I' and as the locus of knowledge, that (body) itself is the self.

XI(d). Others, again, say thus: since even when the body exists there is not the cognition of colour etc., without the sense of sight etc., the senses alone are intelligences. Nor are the co-presence and co-absence of the senses with cognition explained otherwise by (their) being instruments; for, the assumption of material causality is more suitable than the assumption of instrumentality. Therefore, the senses which are the substrates of the cognition 'I' in 'I am one-eyed, I am dumb' etc., and are intelligences, are to be admitted as each the self. As for the body being the substrate of the cognition 'I', and (its) being intelligence these

are explained otherwise by its being the locus of the senses which are the self. Now if in one and the same body several senses be intelligences, there would not be the recognition 'The same *I* that formerly saw the colour now hear the sound'; similarly, enjoyership in respect of colour, taste etc. would be certainly simultaneous, not in sequence; if this be said, not so; for oneness of intelligence is not the cause of recognition and enjoyment in sequence, but only being located in one body. Therefore, just as when in the case of many men in one house, at the marriage of each one the others are accessories, similarly, in the case of the senses too which are selves, at the time of the enjoyment of each, the others are accessories.

XI(e). Others, however, think thus: in dream, even though the sense of sight etc. are non-existent, the qualities of being the locus of cognition and being the substrate of the cognition 'I' are cognised in the bare *manas*. Nor do the cognitions of colour etc. have the sense of sight etc., for locus; for, in that case the recollection of colour etc. by the bare *manas* would be unintelligible. Therefore, the sense of sight etc., are but instruments. As for the cognition 'I', that results by the figurative ascription of agency thereto. Nor does recognition stand to reason in respect of (i. e., among) many selves, merely because of their being located in a single body; because of the contingency of that (recognition) even among those located on a single story. Therefore, *manas* alone, having the sense of sight etc. as instruments, and the body as its support, is the self.

XI(f). The Vijñānavādins, however, who think that the reality of any thing other than momentary cognitions is opposed to experience, declare the self-hood of cognition.

Recognition, however, is intelligible, because of similarity, as in the case of a flame, among the constantly arising cognitions. Merely because of the cognitions belonging to (one) succession of cause and effect, there is the establishment of karma, knowledge, bondage, release etc.

XI(g). The Mādhyamika, however, since even cognition is not seen in sleep, says that the void alone is the true self. If, in sleep, there be the stream of cognition, then there is the contingency of the presentation of content too, since a content-less cognition is impossible. If it be said that only waking and dreaming cognitions have a content, not the cognitions of sleep, no: because there is no distinction. What is in dispute has a content, since it is a cognition, like what is admitted. If it be said that since he who has awakened has no recollection of a content in sleep, there is no content in that (stage), then, even because of invariable non-recollection, let there be no cognition either in that (stage). Nor is the void to be disputed; for just as the determinate (cognition) is generated by the indeterminate which is opposed (in content) to its own content, similarly, even the cognition of the real, it should be admitted, is generated by the void which is opposed (in content) to itself. And thus, since the cognition of reality 'I exist', which arises on waking, and is (thus) devoid of a cause consisting in an immediately antecedent cognition, is not capable of being true, the void alone is real.

XI(h). Yet others, again, say that the self is that which is other than the body, senses, manas, cognition and the void, is permanent, migrates, is agent and enjoyer. Nor is the cognition 'I' intelligible in the case of the void, because of the contingency of that (cognition) even in cases like the

barren woman's son. Nor in the case of momentary cognition does empirical usage in sequence stand to reason. The whole world, indeed, first knows the advantageous thing, then desires, then strives, then attains it, and then derives happiness (therefrom). If such empirical usage, which appears as having a single agent, be brought about by several selves existing in a single succession, even though not knowing one the language (i. e., the nature) of another, then why should not those (selves) existing in different successions bring about (that usage)? Therefore, in order to account for such unsublated recognition as "The same 'I' that knew this thing, now desire it", a permanent self should be admitted. And this is not of the form of cognition, since the experience of oneness is not of the form 'I am cognition'. This relation is experienced indeed in the form 'Mine is this cognition'. Nor is this experience figurative, like 'My self', since there is no sublation. Hereby is refuted the self-hood of the body, senses and manas, since there too the cognition of relation (as between possessor and possession) cannot be avoided; for, the designation as 'I' in respect of these is due to superimposition.

XII. Nor does this self have a beginning; for, looking at the attainment of happiness and misery even immediately after the origination of the body, it is understood that the agent of the merit and demerit, which are causes thereof, exists even earlier. Nor is this non-eternal, since destruction is indemonstrable. The destruction is not of itself, since the causeless destruction, which is too wide (an assumption), is not admitted by others than the Sugatas. Nor from another, since for the partless, conjunction with a cause of destruction is impossible. Even if it were possible,

destruction would not result. For, conjunction with another is indeed caused by karma; and that, for the sake of the enjoyment of the fruit of that karma, would establish only the permanence of the self, not its destruction. Therefore is established of the beginningless and indestructible (self), migration, of the nature of entering and departing from an infinite number of bodies. Since enjoyment is impossible for the unchanging, if there be admitted change, in the nature of the fruit of activity, it is 'not possible to avoid agency, which is of the nature of entering into activity. And the experienced enjoyership too, since it is unintelligible in these (others) which begin with the body and end with cognition, culminates only in the afore-said self. It is thus. The body is of the nature of an aggregate of the five elements, because of the śāstra 'When, dear one, the body which is of the nature of the five elements has attained destruction,' etc.

XIII. As for what the Naiyāyika thinks—that for residents on the earth, the body is but earthy, that the cognition of wetness etc., therein is, as in the case of the cloth etc., due to the association of another element—that is unsound; for, just as of the existence of the cloth etc., there is no decrease, even when by drying etc., the water departs, similarly there is the contingency of the non-existence of decrease for the body even on the departure of (the agents of) wetting, cooking, collecting and giving space.

XIV. And that which the Vaiśeṣikas say—that, if the body be of the nature of the five elements, there is the contingency of its imperceptibility, since, air and ether being imperceptible, it exists in the perceptible and the imperceptible (together), that too does not stand to reason; for, in

that case, there is the contingency of the imperceptibility of all wholes, since they exist in parts which are (some) perceptible and (some) imperceptible. Indeed, those parts of wholes, which are subtle or are situated on the side that is away (from the observer), are not capable of being perceived. Therefore, the body is the aggregate of the elements. Nor may it be said that, in the case of what possess odour etc., and what are devoid of them, there is not the origination (together) of a single effect, because of reciprocal opposition. For, if that be so, in the case of blue etc., there is the contingency of the impossibility of generating a single picture. If this (capacity) be admitted there, even on the strength of experience, that is not ruled out with a baton, in the present case too.

XV. Here, the Lokāyatas, who declare enjoyership in the case of the body, should be asked (thus). Does enjoyership belong to each element distributively or to the aggregate? Even on the first, there is not enjoyership for all simultaneously; for, then, the reciprocal relation of subsidiary and principal being unintelligible among those which are appetent in respect of their respective objects, there is contingency of the non-existence of aggregation. If there be enjoyership even without the aggregate, there should be cognised enjoyership for each element even outside the body. Nor is there enjoyership for them in sequence, since the unintelligibility of aggregation remains as before. Nor is there intelligibility of that through the relation of subsidiary and principal, on the analogy of the marriage of (several) bridegrooms; because there is disparity. Just as for each bridegroom there is a distinct bride as the object of enjoyment, not thus are distinctly fixed colour, taste, odour

and touch as objects of enjoyment for the four enjoyers—earth, water, fire and air. How is there enjoyment in sequence? If then they be somehow distinctly fixed, even then, when there is simultaneous proximity of all objects, sequence is unintelligible. This is just as at a particular auspicious hour, in the proximity of separate brides as objects of enjoyment, there is not for the bridegrooms either marriage in sequence or aggregation in the relation of subsidiary and principal. Nor is enjoyership possible for them in the aggregate; for, the intelligence, non-existent in each, being non-existent in the aggregate too, enjoyment is unintelligible.

XVI(a). Then you may think: just as, in the case of sesamum grains thrown into the fire though there is not in each the capacity to generate the flame, there is that capacity to generate in the collection of sesamum grains, similarly there may be intelligence for the aggregate. Even then, a cause should be stated for the resulting of the aggregation. If the cause be said to be future enjoyment, no. If the enjoyment be in the relation of a subsidiary, then, in the case of the elements which are principals, devoid of the reciprocal relation of subsidiary and principal, how can aggregation result? As for principal character, that, in the case of enjoyment, is unintelligible, since it is subsidiary to the enjoyer. Nor may it be said that in the case of two enjoyers subsidiary to enjoyment as the principal, viz., the bodies of the man and the woman, aggregation is seen; for, even there, it is not admitted that the bodies are the enjoyers.

XVI(b). The example which was given, that in respect of the flame there is aggregation of the sesamum grains, that too is non-established for you, since the aggregate has

not been explained. What is called an aggregate is not mere location of the enjoyment and enjoyer in one place, as in the case of a forest; for, if that were so, since on that principle that (aggregate) would exist everywhere in the case of the pervasive elements, there is the contingency of intelligence and enjoyment existing everywhere. Nor is the aggregate the whole produced by them; for if that be different from the elements, there is the contingency of the admission of a fifth real; if it be non-different, being but the elements, the character of an aggregate is impossible; and difference *cum* non-difference is not admitted. If then it be that because of the dependence of the whole on others, there is not the contingency of a fifth real, then even the four reals would not be established, since water etc., are dependent on earth etc. (for support). Nor is the aggregate the resulting of the capacity to be the substrate of the cognition of a single substance; for the cognition of oneness in what are really many is but a delusion. Nor is the aggregate the simultaneous relation (of many) in a single practically efficient activity; for, then, when water is heated by fire located in the faggot and blown on by the wind, because of the aggregation of the four elements here, there is the contingency of enjoyment. Nor is the aggregate intimate union as between fire and the ball of iron; for that kind of union does not exist in the body in respect of air; (if this absence be neglected), there is the contingency of enjoyment in the iron-ball which is pervaded by fire, has absorbed water and is in conjunction with air. Nor may it be suspected, in order to remedy the said defects, that enjoyership is invariable only for some one element; for in the proximity of all, it is not determined that enjoyership is for this (one) alone.

XVII. As for the two views of certain sections of Lokāyatas, that enjoyership belongs to the senses, and that enjoyership belongs to the aggregate of body and senses, they are to be refuted by the reasoning afore-mentioned.

XVIII(a). Now, what again are the senses whose enjoyership is refuted? Here, the Sūgatas say they are but the orbs; the capacities of these (orbs) say the Mīmāṃsakas; (they are) some other substances other than these (two) say all other disputants.

XVIII(b). Being the orb alone does not stand to reason; for, the cognition of sound etc., exists in the case of snakes etc., though devoid of the ear cavity etc.; and in the case of trees, devoid of all (sensory) orbs there is the cognition of objects, because of such sāstra as 'Therefore, the trees see'. Nor are trees non-intelligent, since their being (intelligent) creatures is understood from the prohibition of injury etc. For the same reason the senses are not capacities of the orbs. If then he (the theorist) thinks that rather than assume another substance possessing capacity, there is parsimony in the assumption of capacity alone in the things already cognised, then because of the greatest (degree of) parsimony let us assume of the self itself the capacity for all cognitions in sequence; what (is the need) of the senses? Nor is it that in the case of the omnipresent self the transformation as cognition is unintelligible in the region of the orbs alone; for by you there is admitted of that same (self) the transformation as cognition only in the region of the body. And thus the co-presence and co-absence of cognition of the orbs, though (these are) not senses, is explained otherwise by their being of the substance of the body. Therefore, the Mīmāṃsā view is not intelligible.

Let the senses then be other substances (than these); and they because of association with particular orbs are denoted by such words as cakṣus. That too does not stand to reason, since there is no evidence in respect of these (substances). The cognitions of colour etc., which are in dispute, are caused by instruments, since they are activities of an agent, like the act of cutting; if this be said, no; because of inconclusiveness, in as much as in that activity of the agent, which consists in directing the instrument, there is no other instrument, since otherwise there would be infinite regress. If it be said that the senses are known from the revealed text 'From this is born the vital air, manas as also all the senses,'¹ no; for, the senses are known even to those who are devoid of the purification (consisting in the study) of revelation. Nor are the senses, like the manas, known by the witness, for of the sense of sight etc., there is no cognition by the witness alone, without depending on *probans*, i. e. what is called cognition of colour etc. Therefore, the senses do not exist at all.

XVIII(c). To this it is said (in reply): the senses, which are other than the orbs, are known from revelation alone. Indeed, those devoid of the purification (consisting in the study) of that, do not know these, but only the orbs (as senses).

XVIII(d). As for what is said by the Sāṅkhyas that these senses are produced by individuation (*abhāṅkāra*), is it the personal individuation that is the cause? Or is it some primal nature which pervades all products and is called individuation? For neither is there any evidence. If then (it be said that) several statements of the Purāṇas are evidence for the second view, that is not (so); because

¹ Muṇḍ., II, i, 3

of conflict with śruti; for, in such śruti texts, as 'Manas, dear one, is the product of food (earth), the vital air is the product of water, speech is the product of fire'¹ etc., it is understood that they are modifications of the elements. Therefore, the Purāṇic statements declare of the senses alone, their dependence on individuation.

XVIII(e). As for the elemental nature of the senses declared by those who resort to dry reasoning (without dependence on Scripture), that too does not stand to reason; for, it is not possible for them to state the evidence. The senses are elemental, since they have parts, like pot etc.; and their having parts is because of being of medium size; if this be said, no; for, since there is no sublation even if the senses be atomic in size, the *prōbans* is non-established. The contingency of the presentation of the objects too being atomic is the sublation; if this be said, no; for in your view, by the manas, even though of atomic size, there is cognition of pervasive substances like the self. The sense of sight must have as its material cause that which has the quality of colour, since among the five beginning with colour, it manifests colour alone; that which manifests something invariably, has for its material cause what has that something as its quality, like the light which manifests colour and has for its material cause that which possesses colour (i. e. fire); similarly is this to be reasoned out in other cases too; if this be said, no; for in respect of the sense of hearing, which manifests sound alone, since it is not *produced* by ether which possesses the quality of sound, there is inconclusiveness; for it is admitted by you that the sense of hearing is (not a product of ether, but) only ether defined by the ear cavity.

¹Chand., VI, v, 4

If it be said that there is no inconclusiveness in the particular pervasion (about the sense of sight), even thus undue extension is difficult to avoid; for in the case of the *manas* which manifests the four beginning with colour, it would be easy (thus) to establish production by the four elements. If it be said that as apprehending even what is not an element, e.g., the self etc., the *manas* is not a product of the elements, then, for the sense of sight etc., there would be no production by the elements, since they apprehend even number, size etc. (which are not elements). If it be said that when there is admitted the production (of the senses) by their distinctive contents, there is established their elemental character, then the *manas* too should be produced by its distinctive content, the self. Though the self which is single (uncompounded) may not be the producer of a substance with parts, why should it not be a producer in respect of the mind-substance, which is partless? Therefore, the establishment of the elemental character of the senses is not from reasoning, but only from revelation.

XVIII(f). These senses, again, are pervasive, declare the *Yogas*. That too is devoid of evidence. The self, the senses and the *manas* are omnipresent, as their activity is seen everywhere, like ether; their activity, cognition, is indeed seen everywhere; if this be said, no; for if by 'everywhere' the whole universe be intended, there is the contingency of non-establishment; if what is intended be 'wherever there is the body', there is inconclusiveness even in respect of the body. It is indeed seen that wherever the body is, there is throughout the activity of the body; and there is no omnipresence for the body. Then, the senses are omnipresent, since their motion is conditioned by something else,

like ether; just as the motion of ether is conditioned by pot etc., similarly the motion of the senses is conditioned by the body; if this be said, no; because of inconclusiveness in respect of the parts of the body; the motion of these (limbs) is indeed conditioned by the vital air. Further, if the senses be omnipresent, there would be the simultaneous cognition of all objects. Since their activity obtains in the body alone, there is not this defect; if this be said, then the assumption of the existence of external senses has neither evidence nor fruit. Therefore, the senses are not omnipresent.

XVIII(g). As for what the Sugatas assume, that they are effective without reaching (to the object), that does not stand to reason. Is there activity without reaching, only in the case of the senses of sight and hearing, or even in the case of the others? Not in the case of the others, because of the contingency of the cognition of touch, taste and odour even from a distance. Nor (is) the first (view possible). The senses of sight and hearing, which are in dispute, are effective by reaching (to the object), since they are external senses, like the sense of smell etc. And since, in the case of light, there is seen quick travel to great distances, the reaching of the sense of sight to the pole-star etc., with the mere opening of the eye, is uncontradicted. And in the case of sound, what is said by the Logicians, that the reaching consists in the inherence in the sense of hearing indirectly as by a succession of waves, that is unsound; for in that case, it would be cognised as 'There is sound *here*, in the sense of hearing'; but it is cognised as 'The sound is *there*'. Therefore, in conformity with experience it is only of the sense of hearing that there

should be assumed the motion thereto. Thus, therefore, it is established that the senses are elemental, finite and effective by reaching (to the object).

XIX. What, then, is this which is called *manas*, in which self-hood is considered (to exist) by another section of the *Lokayatas*? *Manas* is eternal, partless, and atomic in size, say the Logicians. Of these (properties), it is not eternal, since it is finite, like a pot. What is in dispute is eternal, since it is a partless substance, like the self; if this be said, no, since the *probans* is non-established. What is in dispute has parts, since it is an instrument, like the sense of sight etc. Otherwise the *manas*-being-a-product of the earth, which is declared by *śruti*, would be sublated. How, then, is there non-obstruction by a corporeal substance? If this be asked, we say that it is because there is no going away (of the *manas*) from the body during life. At the stage of death, however, non-obstruction certainly exists even for the sight etc., which are considered to have parts. Hence it is, because of having parts and because of having conjunction and disjunction, as for pot etc., there is no atomicity in size. And if omnipresent, there is contingency of the cognition of all (sensations), because of the simultaneous conjunction with all senses. But if of medium size there is no defect whatever. Even then, when bodies big and small, like those of the elephant and the ant, are attained in succession, how is there existence as equal (in size) to the respective bodies? If this be asked, we say that it is through the increase and decrease of parts. The *Śākyas*, however, declare that the immediately antecedent cognition is itself *manas*, being the instrument of the subsequent cognition. That is unsuitable; for without dependence on a

rule of pervasion, it is not possible for a prior cognition as such to generate the subsequent cognition ; for the cognition of the *probans* is seen to generate cognition of the *probandum* only in dependence on a pervasion. If it be said that cognition of the word certainly produces cognition of the sense, even without dependence on pervasion, no ; for in your view, verbal knowledge being included in inference, pervasion is needed there too. If it be said that cognition of the qualification is certainly without dependence on pervasion the producer of the cognition of the qualified, no ; for, the cognition of the qualified is generated by sense-contact (with the *viśeṣya*). Then, the immediately antecedent cognition does not produce the subsequent cognition, but merely intimates the form of that (cognition) ; if this be said, no ; because of the non-difference of form and that which has the form ; (and) for form, being natural (to a thing), there is no dependence on any other. Therefore, it is established that the *manas* is certainly something other and has parts.

XX. Now what is this true self, which is superimposed by deluded disputants on those which begin with the body and end with cognition ? Here, some say that this omnipresent *jīva* is the self. That is unsound, since for those who rely on dry reasoning, there is no *probans*. Then it may be thought : all instruments of enjoyment, both without and within the body, function only for the enjoyment of the self ; and that functioning requires conjunction with the self possessing unseen potentiality ; therefore, this (self) is omnipresent. Here, is it that conjunction is required in that part of the self wherein there is the unseen potentiality ? Or is it conjunction with the self as qualified *per accidens*

by the unseen potentiality? Not the first; for it is unseen potentiality inherent in the self as defined by (this) body that is the cause of enjoyment in heaven (with another body). Not the second, because of the contingency of enjoyment even in release. Therefore, omnipresence is established by revelation alone.

XXI. And this self is not inert, since self-luminosity is understood through perception, inference and revelation. Of these, perception should be understood to be that of sleep. There are inferences too (thus): the self is self-luminous, since when it exists, it is devoid of separation from luminosity, like the light of the lamp and like cognition; similarly, because it is the agent in the manifestation of objects, like the light of a lamp; because it is the locus of the manifestation of things, like light; because, while not being the sphere of the senses, it is immediate, like cognition; this self, when the substrate exists, has the attribute of non-generated luminosity since it has the attribute of luminosity, like the sun etc. And there is revelation too like 'Here this person is self-luminous' etc.¹ And this self is but one in all bodies, since everywhere it is known by the cognition 'I' with (but) a single form, like 'cow-ness.' Even because of the bodies being different, as in the case of past bodies etc., there is not the contingency of the recollection of (one's) enjoyment (by another). Now, then, when there is difference in this human body too, through changes every instant, there is the contingency here (in this life) too of the self's non-recollection of enjoyment; if this be said, no, since through the recognition 'This is that same body' its oneness is understood. Nor is there delusiveness as in the

¹Brh., IV, iii, 9

case of the recognition of (oneness in) the flame; for there on close inspection, the difference among the flames is cognised even perceptually, while here that (cognition) does not exist. Thus, therefore, the final position is that the self is one and self-luminous.

XXII(a). This self, those who have no faith in the Vedas cognise as of the form of any substance (in the series) beginning with the body and ending with the intellect.

XXII(b). The Mimāṃsakas and others, however, though cognising the difference from body etc., consider it as agent and enjoyer.

XXII(c). This the Sāṅkhyas do not tolerate. The self's agency is not natural, since in the case of the self which is omnipresent and partless, entering into activity, consisting of motion or transformation, is not possible. If entering into activity were, like intelligence, natural, it would at no time be inconstant. Nor is agency adventitious, since in what is partless, the association with a cause of agency is impossible. Nor is it possible to superimpose the agency of the intellect on the self; for in the doctrine of (error as) non-apprehension (entertained by the Prābhakaras), there is no delusion. Therefore, there is no agency (for the self). Nor is it possible thus to deny enjoyership. For, enjoyment is not the relation to happiness and misery, in which case, it would, like agency, be inconstant; but enjoyership consists in being the witness of what is cognised, because of being of the nature of intelligence. Therefore, the self is enjoyer alone; this is the view of the Sāṅkhyas.

XXII(d). The Vaiśeṣikas, Yogas and Naiyāyikas infer that, other than the said enjoyer, the jīva, there is also one

Īśvara, omniscient and omnipotent. The universe in dispute has an agent possessing knowledge of its nature, material cause etc., since it is a diversified effect, like a storied mansion etc. Here, since the agency of a single being is accepted because of parsimony of assumption, there is the establishment of omniscience : thus (say) the Vaiśeṣikas etc. The capacities of knowledge and lordship, which are in dispute, reach a supreme limit somewhere, since they are excellible, like size : thus the Yogas. The fruit of merit and demerit, which is in dispute, is dispensed by one who knows karma, its fruit, its enjoyer etc., since it is a remote fruit of karma, like the fruit of service : thus the Naiyāyikas.

XXIII(a). Now the introduction of the view about the Lord does not stand to reason, since here what has been commenced is to show the disputes, in respect of the object of the desire to know, i. e. Brahman, of the nature of the inner self. There is not this defect; for, it culminates only in a dispute about the inner self, in the form whether the inner self is other than that Lord or not other.

XXIII(b). Here Bhāskara says: the inner self is not here the object of the desire to know, in which case disputes about it could be introduced; but the Lord alone is referred to by the word 'Brahman' and inquired into; for, causality in respect of the world is stated as the definition in the aphorism 'That whence for this what begins with origination,'¹ and this definition is impossible and contrary to experience in respect of the inner self. Here it must be asked whether Īśvara is other than the cause of the world or not other? If other, the exhibition, in your work, of disputes about the cause of the world in the words 'Some (mention) the pradhāna,

¹Br. Śā. I, 1, 2

others the primal atoms' etc., would be irrelevant; for disputes about the Lord alone should be exhibited by you. And if not other, your introduction of the views about the pradhāna, primal atoms etc., should be in the view that they are the Lord; and that does not stand to reason. The disputants do not indeed dispute whether the pradhāna is the Lord or the primal atom is the Lord. Though in the case of the inner self, the vulgar do not experience (its) causality of the world, yet those who are expert in śruti, smṛti and reasoning do certainly experience it. And thus, when through the definition well known in śruti etc., of being the cause of the world, there is made known Brahman, the distinctive nature of the inner self that is disputed about, such a statement as 'That which is the cause of the world is Brahman' in the second aphorism, stands very much to reason. Similarly, through the removal of those bonds beginning with the body and ending with the intellect, which cause hindrance to human beings, there remains over, as fruit for the inner self, the nature of Brahman, as truth, knowledge and infinite bliss. On your view, however, since the cause of the world is disputed about, the particular (form) of that alone is to be taught through a restatement of (the word) 'Brahman'. And thus, there would result for the aphorism a statement in the form 'That which is Brahman is the cause of the world'; and for human beings, there would not be any fruit from that knowledge. Nor is meditation the fruit; for, meditation being possible even through a superimposed form, there is futility of the declaration of that (form as cause of the world). Therefore, this view of Bhāskara's does not fit in.

XXIII(c). Those, however, who see the final truth, hold that what is the Lord is itself the inner self. The jīva

and the Lord, which are in dispute, are not really different, since their difference is not manifested except in relation to adjuncts, as in the case of the prototype and the reflection. Otherwise, there would not result in Brahman syntactical relation with the sense of unsurpassed greatness; for even if it be pervasive of all space and time, yet because of difference from the jīvas, there is no real omnipresence.

XXIV. Now, if for the recurrence of the sense of *brh* it be admitted of Brahman that it is the self of all, since there would have to be admitted its being of the nature of misery as well, there would result its being not of the nature of a human goal. If it be said that, since there is the nature of bliss too, there is the nature of being a human goal, not so. Verily, merely because it is the cause of removing hunger, food mixed with poison is not sought by human beings. If it be said that because of such śāstra as 'It is not affected by the misery of the world'¹ it is not of the nature of misery, no; for, that is sublated by such śruti declaration of identity with all, as in 'The self alone is all this'² and by such reasoning as (that based on) its being the material cause of all. If then, adopting the view of a few, it be said, that, because of the non-existence of ignorance and illusory cognition in the omniscient one, there is no connection with evil, no; for in that view, in order to generate the real (according to it) identity with the whole world, nescience etc. are not needed. Hence it is that even when there is true knowledge, the disappearance (of this identity) is difficult to establish. Even then, since Brahman is devoid of merit and demerit, connection with

¹ Kāṭha, V, 11

² Chānd., VII, xxv, 2

misery etc., or the experience thereof is not possible for it; if this be said, no; for, the relation thereto, as the material cause of the entire world of misery etc., and the experience thereof as being omniscient, cannot be avoided. If then in the desire to remedy this defect, there be admitted the difference of Brahman from the effected world, or two Brahman, as effect and as cause, then the sense of *brh* would not recur (therein). Therefore, Brahman, that is the self of all and omniscient, not being a human goal, is not the object of the desire to know.

XXV. It is said (in reply) to this. There may be this defect in the view of the world as absolutely real. On the view of illusion, however, there is no defect whatever, since in reality Brahman is taintless.

XXVI. Thus, therefore, the things beginning with the body and ending with the taintless Brahman are disputed to be the inner self by the disputants having recourse to reasoning and texts. The reasonings advanced by the respective views have already been set forth. And the texts (are as follows): 'That, verily, is this person, who is constituted of the essence of food (the earth),'¹ 'That Brahman is this self, constituted of the earth, constituted of water, constituted of air, constituted of ether, constituted of fire' etc. are to be understood (in support of) the doctrine that the body is the self; "They said unto speech, 'Do thou sing unto us'; saying 'so be it' speech sang unto them"² etc., in (support of) the doctrine that the senses are the self; 'manas sang' in (support of) the doctrine that the manas is the self; 'Which is the self? That which is a mass of

¹Taitt, II, 1

²Brh, I iii, 2

cognition'¹ etc., in (support of) the doctrine that cognition is the self; 'Non-existence, verily, this was in the beginning'² etc., in (support of) the doctrine that the void is the self; 'The permitter, knower, agent,'³ 'in dream the jīva is the enjoyer of happiness and misery'⁴ etc. in (support of) the doctrine that the agent and enjoyer is the self; "' One of those two eats the tasty berry' that is the intellect; 'The other shines without eating'"⁵ etc., in (support of) the doctrine that the mere enjoyer, characterised by being the witness, is the self; 'He who rests in the self and rules the self from within' in (support of) the doctrine that the Lord is different from the self (not identical with the self or related to the universe as its material cause). In support, however, of the doctrine that the taintless Brahman is the self, all the Vedānta texts are to be understood. That of these (texts and reasonings) the reasonings and texts mentioned by those who maintain that the taintless Brahman is the self are valid and those mentioned by others are fallacious, this the aphorist himself will make clear in various places.

XXVII. And this being the case, that person desirous of release who, without the study of this śāstra of inquiry, thinks himself learned, and holds to any one of those beginning with the body and ending with the Lord different (from jīva) as the self, will not attain release; for, release which is to be obtained by true knowledge is not capable of being obtained by erroneous cognition. Nor is there expiation

¹ Brh., IV, iii, 7

² Taitt., II, vii, 1

³ Prāna, IV, 9

⁴ Kaivalya, 18

⁵ Paingirahasya-brāhmaṇa

for that most sinful being. Erroneous cognition is indeed the greatest sin, on the principle 'He, who understands in one way the self which exists in another way, by that thief who injures his own self, what is that sin that has not been committed?'¹ Therefore is declared by śruti the attainment of difficult worlds by him who brings about the assumption of unreality for the self which is of the nature of truth, knowledge, bliss etc., (and) who is (thus) a killer of the self: 'Those worlds are called asurya (demonic), enveloped in blind darkness; to these go, after death, those people who are killers of the self'².

XXVIII. Now, though true knowledge be brought about by the inquiry into Brahman, release is not intelligible, since there is not the removal of the universe of earth etc. There is not this defect. Though there may exist the earth etc., common to all people, since, when there is the removal of the super-imposition of organs (on the self), there is no cognisanship, and since for the self's intelligence there is not of itself (directly) association with objects, it does not attain the cognition of that (universe), in the same way as one without a sense-organ (does not have) the cognition of colour etc.; this is one view. The other view, however, that of the removal of all duality, will be stated under the aphorism on harmony.

XXIX. Thus, therefore, since what is perceptually known to all in the general form of self-hood as 'I' is not wholly unknown, and since though subject to the disputes of disputants in respect of its particular nature it is not

In the translation the reading of Ms. C has been preferred, omitting the words 'atas tasya'.

established in any other śāstra as of the particular nature of Brahman unrelated to the world, it is established to be a content. And since that Brahman is capable of being propounded by this śāstra, connection too, consisting in the relation of what is expounded and what expounds, is established. Thus, both being established, and release having been mentioned as the fruit, Brahman-inquiry is to be carried on, without any obstacle; hence everything without exception is exceedingly auspicious.

HERE ENDS THE FOURTH VARṆAKA.

END OF THE FIRST APHORISM.

SECOND APHORISM

FIFTH VARNAKA.

I. In 'Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman',¹ it has been premised that by him who desires to know Brahman, there is to be heard (studied) this śāstra of inquiry, which is the means to Brahman-knowledge; for, the word 'jijñāsā' without abandoning its own sense of 'the desire to know', secondarily implies the inquiry that is included (therein). And when Brahman-inquiry is premised, its subsidiaries too—definition, means of knowledge, argumentation, means (of attainment) and the fruit—are certainly premised; hence the string of aphorisms, which declares the definition etc., and is about to be mentioned, fits in eminently. Otherwise, for the aphorist who, premising as what is to be done the desire for knowledge which is not dependent on the person, declares the definition etc., which are of no service to the desire, there would follow considerable lack of *expertise*. Though, because the accomplishment of what is to be accomplished is dependent on the means, the means etc. alone are first to be inquired into, yet these, being qualified by Brahman, in the form 'means of knowledge in respect of Brahman, argumentation in respect of Brahman, means of attaining Brahman and Brahman-cognition,' are dependent on the ascertainment of the nature of Brahman and accessories. Therefore the revered aphorist first defines the nature of Brahman which is independent

¹Br. Śū., I, 1, 1

and principal, in 'That whence for this what begins with origination'.¹

II. Now, is the definition in respect of that whose nature is unknown or known? Not in respect of the unknown; because there does not arise the desire to know in the form 'What is the definition of *this which is to be defined*?' and because there is not cognised the relation between the defined and the definition in the form 'Of *this*, this is the definition'. Nor in respect of the known, because of futility. Further is there stated the definition of essential nature or a definition *per accidens*? Not the first; for causality of what begins with origination, which has a counter-correlate, cannot be the essential nature (of Brahman); and if it be the essential nature there is the contingency of (Brahman) possessing particularities. Nor the second, since in the absence of the definition of essential nature, it is not possible to cognise the essential nature through merely the definition *per accidens*, and since the definition of essential nature is not established elsewhere. Even if it be somehow established elsewhere, there is over-pervasiveness of this definition *per accidens*; for causality of the world is possible even in the case of the *pradhāna* etc. Therefore what is it that is declared by this aphorism?

III. Here we say: 'That cause whence result the origination, sustentation and destruction of the world, that is shown (here) through definition of essential nature and through definition *per accidens*.'² For him who has read the Vedānta, who knows the relation between word and word-sense, who, knowing the nature of Brahman superficially, desires to know it in detail, this statement of definition is certainly

¹ Br. Śū., I, 1, 2

² Vivaraṇa, p. 204

fruitful as having a settled relation of the defined to the definition. That being the case, even if causality of what begins with origination be the definition of essential nature of Brahman qualified by māyā, there is no contradiction; of the pure Brahman, however, it is the definition *per accidens*. The definition of its essential nature, however, is well known in such śruti texts as 'Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman'¹. Nor is there over-pervasiveness of the said definition, since causality of the world, in the case of the pradhāna etc., will be refuted. In order to ascertain the definition through remedying defects like over-pervasiveness, the means of knowledge and argumentation should be understood to be presumptively indicated even here; for those two alone, the means of knowledge and the argumentation, will be elaborated by the aphorist in (the first) two chapters.

IV. Now in the bahuvrīhi 'janmādi', since sustentation and destruction are the (two) other things (referred to by the compound), it should be in the masculine dual. It should not be, since origination too is intended to be declared as one of the other things (referred to by the compound). Nor, if this is the case, is there the contingency of one and the same (thing), origination, being both what is qualified and the qualification; for, the three beginning with origination are intended to be declared as what is qualified. For the same reason there is not even the possibility of the masculine plural (for the denotation of the compound is collective). Though in respect of the beginningless transmigration there is no real primacy of origination, yet, in dependence on what is empirically established in the world, viz., that (something) after being born and existing is dissolved, there is the

¹Taitt., II, 1

mention of the primacy of origination in the śruti 'That verily whence these beings are born' etc.¹; in dependence on that the mention in this aphorism too is intelligible.

V. In the word 'for this' of the aphorism, by the stem-sense is denoted the entire world cognised by perception etc.; for 'this' is a pronoun (sarvanāma), and there is not here, as elsewhere, any (consideration) like the topic to restrict (the denotation). For the same reason, by the possessive suffix there is here intended to be declared all kinds of relation, indeed, between what begins with origination and the world. Nor may it be said 'since for origination etc., located in the world, there is not, as for the crow located in the house, any relation, that is not a definition'; for though not related to pure Brahman, that is related to Brahman which is qualified by māyā and is the cause.

VI. By the word 'whence' in the aphorism there is designated the cause (Brahman) alone, not the pure. Now causality too is included in what is to be defined; causality indeed is either being of such a nature as enters into activity whose sphere is different kinds of products, or being of such a nature as has the capacity to bring forth those (products); and neither of these can be included in the pure Brahman, the object of the desire to know; therefore, what begins with origination, which is related to the cause, is not a definition. If this be said, not so; for, it (i. e. being a definition) is intelligible like (a house) being the locus of a crow. Being the locus of a crow is not indeed included in (the signification of) the house; for, if that were the case, on the departure of the crow, there is the contingency of the cognition of the loss of a part of the house. Therefore, what is called

¹Taitt., III, 1

the house being the locus is an accidental attribute ; and that, by elimination, is included in the definition alone. Just as its determinant, the crow, is a definition, similarly for Brahman too, causality, an accidental attribute, falls within the definition. In its determinant, i. e., what begins with origination, being the definition, what is the loss to you ?

VII. Now, the causality which is recognised in respect of Brahman as falling within the definition, of what kind is it ? Is it efficient causality alone, or material causality alone, or both ? Not the first or the second ; for, another having to be necessarily recognised as material cause or efficient cause, there is not in Brahman the syntactical relation of the sense of *brh* and there is the contingency of the loss of infinitude declared in scripture. Nor the third, since there is no evidence in respect of one and the same being both causes. Inference, indeed, is not possible here. It is thus. Is the world of elements and elementals made the subject, or the elements alone ? On the first there is sublation in part, since in the elementals there is seen the contrary of the *probandum*, viz, possession of a non-different efficient and material cause. Not the second, since the *probans* 'being a product' is inconclusive even in respect of *pot* etc. Therefore causality is not the definition.

VIII. If this be said, not so ; for by the alternative 'whence' in the aphorism, causality of both kinds is intended to be declared, since the ablative is laid down in respect of the material cause as well as the efficient cause of a thing that is originated. Nor may it be said that since material causality is seen in the threads which are many, material causality is impossible for Brahman that is one. Here, is it that material causality in respect of the gross elements is impossible,

or material causality in respect of the elementals? Not the first. The gross elements have reality as the material cause; for, they are interpenetrated by that (reality); that which is interpenetrated by something has this (latter) for the material cause, like the cloth which is interpenetrated by threads and has threads for the material cause. And the oneness of reality is established in dependence on ordinary experience and the Veda. Since in the case of space, time etc., though interpenetrated by substance-ness, they do not have this as material cause, there is inconclusiveness (of the *probans*); if this be said, no; for, material causality is admitted by the Vedāntins, even in the case of substance-ness and so on; substance-ness etc. are indeed varieties of reality conditioned by adjuncts, and are not independent. Therefore, in respect of earth etc., there is not the contingency of material causality for two—reality and substance-ness. Nor the second; for even in respect of the elementals which are interpenetrated by reality, it is admitted, on the ground of parsimony, that through the channel of the elements, the reality interpenetrating the elements is itself the primal material cause. Nor is there impossibility of evidence in respect of the material cause being itself the efficient cause. The world in dispute has a material cause non-different from the efficient, since it is generated as preceded by knowledge, like the happiness, misery, attachment, aversion etc., present in the self. In order to exclude the nacre-silver which has nescience for material cause and a defect (of the senses) for efficient cause, it is said 'preceded by knowledge'. Since even pots etc. are (within) the subject (of the conclusion), there is no inconclusiveness. Since in the form of the potter etc., Brahman itself is the efficient cause, there is not sublation even in respect of (that) part. If it be said that, since

different efficient causes are seen, like unseen potentiality, there is failure of the *probandum* (in the example), no; for, what is inferred is the oneness only of the material cause and the controller. And this being the case, in respect of the world there is the contingency of efficient causality, for an unseen potentiality which is different from Brahman; if this be said, thus then, efficient causality in respect of happiness etc., should be understood only of the self as qualified *per accidens* by unseen potentiality. If, now, your mind afflicted by fallacious reasoning, you are not at all pleased with this inference, then, the dual causality of one, as established by the creational text, is here mentioned as the definition; and the creational text declares efficient causality in 'That desired' and material causality in 'May I become many';¹ thus we have to be satisfied.

IX. Here some introduce the doctrine of transformation, saying that because of the intrinsic validity of śruti, the world-becoming of Brahman occurs even while being of the nature of that (reality). Here, what is called 'being of the nature of that'? Is it (1) reality,² or (2) being other than non-existence in its own locus, or (3) non-sublation in the adjunct that is its own locus, or (4) non-sublation in respect of existence? Not the first, because of the contingency of dream-creation being real, since the resulting of intrinsic validity for the cognition of that (creation) too is difficult to avoid. If, then, you think that because of defect there is invalidity in that case, while it is not so in the case of śruti, even thus there is the contingency of reality in the case of the silver cognised in the valid means of knowledge, i. e., the

¹ Ohand., VI, II, 8

² The reading 'satyatvam' has been adopted in preference to 'satynābaddhābhī-
dheyatvam,' following the text of the Vivaraṇa, page 206.

inference in 'This silver is illusory, because of being sublated'. Not the second, for even by the māyāvādins there is admitted of the creation known from śruti etc., exclusion of non-existence in its own locus, i. e. Brahman. Not the third, for, even in the case of posited attributes due to adjuncts, like the darkness of the reflection, and the limitedness of the pot-ether, there is non-sublation in the adjunct that is their own locus. Not the fourth, since even of creation it is admitted that there is sublation only in respect of the element of absolute reality, not in respect of existence.

X. If there be no reality of creation, there would be non-authoritativeness of the creational text; if this be said, no; for in the case of śruti, which has set out to give valid knowledge of the existence alone of creation, authoritativeness being intelligible with the mere existence of creation, its reality is of no use. Indeed, the sense of sight which gives valid knowledge of colour does not fail to be valid because of the non-existence of sound (in visual cognition). If merely because of the fault of being a means of valid knowledge, purport be assumed in respect of reality, there would be that nature even for the text about dream-creation. As for absence of fruit, that is common to both (creational texts); and being the cause of evil, in respect of the element of misery and what is instrumental thereto, is equal (in both). If the reality of creation be declared, the fruit will be the establishment of the authoritativeness of the ritual section (of the Veda) or of perception etc.; if this be said, no; for, the authoritativeness of that being intelligible even in the view of the Mīmāṃsaka, who maintains the eternality of the world, the doctrine of transformation does not result. In other views too, since there is empirical usage of the world even prior to the knowledge of the creational text, there is

established the authoritativeness of that (usage). Therefore, the creational text would be certainly fruitless. On our view, however, the major texts set out to know Brahman that is the one impartite essence, not known by any other means of knowledge; as for the creational text, that is for teaching the impartite essence, on the principle that 'Through superimposition and removal that which is trans-phenomenal is explained,' 'The product does not exist elsewhere than in the cause; if it is not there, where could it be?'; hence there is no futility whatever.

XI. Now, just as for the cognition 'this is silver' there is non-authoritativeness, since, though as cognition it has for its sphere the bare existence of silver, in reality it has for its sphere the appearance of silver (where it is not), similarly, (there may be illusoriness) even for the śruti-derived knowledge of creation; if this be said, no; just as in that case there is established a silver in the principal sense, other than the appearance of silver, not thus is there another creation in the principal sense; hence that itself being creation in the principal sense, the authoritativeness of the cognition having that for its sphere, as of the cognition of silver in the principal sense, is intelligible. Nor may it be said that in the case of the absolutely real Brahman there is contradiction in its becoming of the nature of the illusory world; for in the case of Devadatta there is seen through māyā the becoming of the nature of the illusory tiger etc. Nor is there unintelligibility in the application of the word 'creation' in respect of an illusory product, since there is seen such usage as 'This māyā was created by me'.

XII. Nor is it that there is no evidence in respect of the illusoriness of creation, since there exist śruti, smṛti,

perception, inference and presumption. Śruti and smṛti in 'Know māyā to be the material cause'¹ and 'My māyā which is difficult to transcend'² show of creation that it is of the nature of indeterminable māyā. Perception too, which apprehends the non-existence of pot etc., shows the illusoriness of creation. Just as in the case of what is cognised in the locus of the 'this' in 'This is silver', there is sublation as 'This is not silver' even while the locus exists, similarly, in the case of what is cognised in the locus of the meaning of 'exists' in 'The pot exists', sublation is seen even through perception in that same locus, in the form '(The pot) does not exist'. Now the denial of pot is with reference to a particular place or time, or to the meaning of 'exist' as conditioned by those (place and time), not with reference to the bare meaning of 'exist'; thence the existence of the pot in another place and time; if this be said, no. When space and time are (themselves) denied, then, because of the non-existence of another space and time, it should be said only of the bare meaning of 'exist' that it is the locus (of the negation), since negation without a locus is impossible. Therefore since what is there settled to be the locus is possible (even) in the denial of pot etc., there is contingency of prolixity in assuming another locus. Nor may it be said "In this way, since when there is negation of the meaning of 'exist' there is no other meaning of 'exist', and the negation has no locus, there is admitted negation without a locus"; for, of the meaning of 'exist', which is persistent, there is no negation. Therefore, perception, which makes known the non-existence of pot etc. in Brahman, the meaning (denotation) of 'exist', is evidence of illusoriness.

¹ Śvet., IV, 10

² Gīta, VII, 14

XIII. In respect of him, however, who says that non-existence is cognised by a sixth means of knowledge, let the perception of each thing qualified by the non-existence of another or the sixth means of knowledge itself make known illusoriness.

XIV. There are stated inferences too which make that known. The modifications in dispute are posited in a single entity that is constant in them (all), since each is interpenetrated by one nature and since they are (yet) different, like the differences of moons (reflected) in water, interpenetrated by the nature of the moon and posited in the moon. In order to remedy the (charge of) establishing the established, in respect of him who maintains the void, there is the word 'in an entity'; in respect of him who maintains that the form of cognition is posited on many objects, (there is the word) 'single'; in respect of him who maintains that everything is posited in a single momentary cognition, there is the word 'that is constant in them (all)'; in order to exclude inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in respect of trees which are interpenetrated by forestness, but are not posited in that (forest), (there is the word) 'each (is interpenetrated)'. Difference is posited, because of inertness, or because it is a product, like silver; (and) because of difference, like the different moons; because it is denied in the locus of cognition, by such texts as 'not gross',¹ like the notion of the body being the self; because it is characterised by becoming a contrary effect without destroying the contrary nature of the cause, like an illusory tiger; because in the stage of dissolution, there is annihilation (of it) together with time in its own locus, like the notion of the body being the self. In order to remove the objection that there is annihilation in

¹ Brh., III. viii. 8

the *time* of dissolution alone, not in its own locus, it is said 'together with time'.

XV. There is presumption too. The origination and destruction of the world are unintelligible in the absence of illusoriness, since for Brahman and the void which are not illusory there are not seen origination and destruction. Nor may it be said 'If thus there be admitted the illusoriness of the world there is inferred illusoriness for Brahman-knowledge too as for knowledge of the world;' for in respect of its own nature, illusoriness is admitted. As for the illusoriness of its content, that is contradicted by the (Scriptural) text 'That is the true, that is the self'.¹ Now by texts like 'not gross' there is taught that there is also a form other than gross etc; but the gross etc. form is not denied; therefore, the *probans* 'being denied (by Scripture)' is non-established. If this be said, no; for, negation thus is unintelligible even if it be with the intention to declare another form of Brahman that is in a relation of identity with the gross world. Truly, with the intention to declare abundance of milk in a white cow, one does not use (the expression) 'the cow is not white'; what then? (One says) 'the cow has plenty of milk'. Therefore it should be admitted that only through negating the world that is gross etc., another form is declared. If it be said that, since reasoning is unsettled, there can be no inference of illusoriness, no; because of the contingency of the non-commencement of the śāstra of inquiry. The commencement of the śāstra of inquiry is not indeed for the purpose of exhibiting reasoning determinative of the sense of śruti, but only for the purpose of refuting the reasoning of others; Brahman, however, is established by śruti alone; if this be

¹ Chānd., VI, viii, 7

said, then, on the strength of two such texts as 'Non-existence, verily this was'¹ and 'Existence alone, dear one, this was'² there should be both existence and non-existence of the cause. If it be said that, because of the omnipotence of Brahman, everything is intelligible, no; for, in that case there is the contingency of nullity (void-ness) too some time. Omnipotence, however, has to be understood only in conformity with śruti. And the sense of śruti has to be ascertained by reasoning conformable to it. Therefore, inference too that is not in conflict with śruti will certainly establish the illusoriness of the world. Nor is there conflict with the recurrence of the cognition 'exists', in 'the pot exists' etc.; for, the existence that is recurrent is the substrate, while only the particulars, pot etc., are illusory. Therefore the doctrine of transformation, it is established, has not the support of Scripture.

XVI. And this being the case, in the śruti, the dual causality of Brahman is declared, only in the view of the doctrine of transfiguration (illusory manifestation). And though that causality, as the definition *per accidens*, is separate from Brahman, the defined, yet, because of its illusoriness, there is no conflict with the non-duality of the defined. Nor may it be said that the character of a definition belongs to the real alone, not to what is illusory. It is a distinctive relation that is determinative of the character of definition, not the reality of the definition; for in the case of even what are real but unrelated, like the crow, there is not seen the character of indicating a house; while in the case of even what are unreal but related, like the silver, there is the

¹ Taitt., II, vii, 1

² Chānd., VI, ii, 1

character of defining the nacre etc., in the form 'That which appeared as silver, that is nacre'. And here, though there is no real relation between the world and Brahman, there does exist a superimposed relation of identity. Therefore, by the causality in respect of the origination etc., of the world, which (causality) is an *accidens*, the object of the desire to know, viz., the nature of the pure Brahman, is defined *per accidens*, without any hindrance. Nor can pradhāna etc. be defined by the said definition, since for them there is not omniscience or omnipotence, while omniscience and omnipotence are intended to be declared by the word 'whence' occurring in the aphorism. And this intention is obtained by a consideration of the produced world which is the denotation of the word 'this' occurring in the aphorism.

XVII. And this world, the disputants analyse in conformity with their respective teachings. It is thus. Those who follow the author of the *Vārtika* (i. e. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) (say) they are substance, quality, activity and generality. The Śaivas (say they are) the five, viz., the world, the Lord, yogic trance, the performance of ceremonial baths like the triṣavāṇa, and release, which are denoted (respectively) by the words the effect, the cause, yoga, prescription and the end of misery. The Vaiśeṣikas (say they are) six, viz., substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence. The Kṣāpanakas (say they are) seven, viz., jīva, ajīva, āsrava, saṃvara, nirjara, bondage and release; of these the denotation of the word 'jīva' is three-fold, the bound, the released and the eternally perfect; the denotation of the word 'ajīva' is four-fold, viz., pudgalāstikāya, dharmāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, and akāśāstikāya; since through generating cognition it makes the human being flow towards

objects, sense-activity is āsrava; since it obstructs the channel of the current, activity in the form of calmness and equanimity is samvaraḥ; since it exhausts merit and demerit without residue, through the enjoyment of happiness and misery, such acts as standing on a heated stone are nirjarāḥ; the eight kinds of activity are bondage; constantly going upwards in a non-mundane ether is release. The older Prābhākaras (say they are) eight, viz., substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity, dependence, potentiality and niyoga (the unseen result); the modern (Prābhākaras) (say they are) eight, viz., substance, quality, activity, generality, inherence, potentiality, number and similarity. The Naiyāyikas (say they are) sixteen,¹ viz., pramāṇa, prameya, doubt, fruit, example, final position, members (of the syllogism), *reductio ad absurdum*, ascertainment, vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍa, fallacies, chala, jāti, and nigrahasthāna. The Sāṅkhyas (say they are) twenty-five, viz., the eleven organs of sense and action, the five prāṇas,² the five gross elements, individuation, mahat, the unmanifest and spirit. The Vedāntins, however, relying on the two śruti texts 'Three,

¹ The Naiyāyikas admit four pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge), perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Prameyas are objects of knowledge such as substance, quality etc. Doubt (samśaya) arises when there is either confusion of qualities that are similar or conflict of opinions. Fruit (prayojana) is that for attaining or abandoning which one is active. Example (dṛṣṭānta) is that about which there are no two opinions. Final position (siddhānta) is the conclusion which is established through argumentation. Members of the syllogism are five; proposition (prātijñā), probans (hetu), illustration, (udāharana), application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana). Tarka (*reductio ad absurdum*) is reducing the argument of the opponent to an absurdity. Nirṇaya is ascertainment. Vāda is debate, jalpa disputation and Vitaṇḍa destructive criticism. Hetvābhāsas are logical fallacies. Chala is quibble, jāti refutation and nigrahasthāna is an occasion for the opponent's defeat. The Naiyāyikas hold that through a knowledge of these sixteen categories one may attain niḥśreyasa or the highest good.

² 'pañca-prāṇa' has really no place in this scheme; it ought to be pañca-tanmātrāpi; Cf. Vivaraṇa, p. 209

verily, is this, name, form and activity',¹ and 'I shall create name and form'² admit three-foldness or two-foldness.

XVIII. And the last view stands to reason, since the name and form, having what is to be created for their sphere, enter first into the creator's intellect; for, this is seen in ordinary experience, in the case of the potter etc., who desire to make a pot. The primal cause too creates what has entered its intellect through name and form, since it is a creator, like the potter. With this much it follows that the world is the product of an intelligence possessing an intellect. Nor may it be suspected to be a product of the jīva; for all jīvas who are qualified by agency and enjoyership and are of the nature of name and form fall within the product. Nor may there be a dispute about the omniscience of the cause of the world; for, the world is the locus of (effects) distinctly regulated in respect of place, time, exciting cause, activity and fruit. The black antelope etc. are those produced in distinctly regulated places; the nightingale etc.³ are those produced at distinctly regulated times; the impregnation of the she-crane etc., occasioned by the noise of fresh thunder (i. e. thunder at the commencement of the rainy season), have distinctly regulated exciting causes; distinctly regulated acts are the brahmins (alone) helping to perform sacrifice and so on; distinctly regulated fruit is happiness in Brahma-loka, misery in hell; thus is it (i. e. the statement about regulation) to be illustrated. This kind of regulation, how can one, who is not omniscient, procure without confusion? Nor may there be dispute about omnipotence, since the world is of the form of

¹Brh.. I, vi, 1

²Chand., VI, III, 2

³Of the Bhamatl, which mentions, more suitably, the song of the nightingale; see p. 128 (TFH edition)

an arrangement that cannot even be conceived by the mind. Truly, the form of arrangement of even a single body, qualified by the articulation of a host of diverse *nādis*, cannot even be conceived by the mind; remote (is the possibility of conceiving the form) of the arrangement of the world. This kind of world, how can one, who is not omnipotent, create? Thus, therefore, even by the word 'whence' occurring in the aphorism, both omniscience and omnipotence are intended to be declared.

XX. And the aphorism, which declares the definition *per accidens*, should be thus construed: 'For this', for the world that is of the kind afore-mentioned, 'whence' from which omniscient and omnipotent cause, 'what begins with origination' comes about, 'that' cause is Brahman.

XXI. Now in this aphorism there is not stated the definition of the essential nature of Brahman. And, in the absence of that, essential nature is not known; for, when, without declaring the pre-eminent luminosity, it is said only 'at the end of the bough is the moon', the nature of the moon is not known. If it be said that that (nature) is declared by the word 'that' (in 'that whence'), is it omnipotence or omniscience? Not the first, since that is possible even in the case of the *pradhāna* etc. Not the second, since that (attribute) which has the all for adjunct, cannot possibly be of the nature of pure Brahman. And omniscience is difficult to state. Is it omniscience through the six means of knowledge or through perception alone? Even on the first (alternative), there is not omniscience simultaneously, since perception and the rest do not function simultaneously. Even if there be omniscience (through these six means) in succession, is there immediacy of all or merely the cognition of all? Not the first, since in

the case of what are always to be inferred (e. g. primal atoms, *adrsta* &c.) immediacy is unintelligible. Not the second, because of the contingency of omniscience for us too, through the six means of knowledge (functioning) in sequence. Omniscience even through perception, is it through external (perception) or through mental or through witness perception? Not the first, since for the external senses there is no direct contact with objects remote in space or time; if there be indirect relation, there is contingency of omniscience for us too. On the second (alternative) too, is it (a) through the bare *manas*, or (b) through that as associated with an excellence generated by the practice of yoga, or (c) through that associated with the residual impressions of all contents? (a) Not the first, since the bare *manas* has no independence (to function) in respect of what is external. (b) Not the second, since excellence can apply only to what is its (mind's) own content; for, even in the case of the cat's vision etc., possession of excellence is seen only in respect of what is capable (of being cognised by sight, viz.) colour. (c) Not the third, since when there is not the initial apprehension of all, residual impression thereof is impossible. Even if residual impression be assumed when there is apprehension of all in sequence, (yet) since in the case of the endless things past, future, and present, the extent is undetermined, the apprehension of all is unintelligible. Nor is there omniscience through perception by the witness, since for that, as for the light of a lamp, there is not the capacity to apprehend the past and the future. Therefore, there is no omniscient being.

XXII. To this it is said (in reply). Intelligence reflected in the modifications of *māyā*, which bears the forms of all contents, is said to be the experience of all. And

because of its superimposed relation with the contents, omniscience in respect of the present is established. In the case of past contents, when there are removed the modifications of māyā defined by these (contents) and the experiences defined by these (modifications), there occur as in those like us, because of the residual impressions of those (experiences), modifications of māyā which have the past for content and are of the form of recollections; through experience reflected therein there is established omniscience even as having the past for content. Similarly, since even prior to creation, the determination of the thing to be created is seen in the potter etc., even the knowledge of all future contents may occur in dependence on the modifications of one's own māyā; hence omniscience stands to reason. Nor is there no evidence in respect of this, since there is the śruti 'He who is omniscient'.¹ Nor is there the impossibility of its being the definition of essential nature; for in the context of the statement of the definition, there is intended to be declared, by the word omniscient, pure intelligence alone defined *per accidens* by the capacity to manifest all. Thus, therefore, of Brahman, the cause of the three effects called origination, sustentation and destruction, the definition of essential nature too is established in (this) aphorism itself.

XXIII. Though the three modifications of being, increase, transformation and decrease are well known as distinct from origination, sustentation and destruction, yet increase etc. are set forth only in the form 'increase originates', 'increase is sustained', 'increase perishes', and not otherwise. Therefore, since increase etc. are included in origination etc., there is no separate apprehension of these by the [word 'adi

¹Mund., I, i, 9

occurring in the aphorism. Nor may it be said that if there be apprehended the six modifications of being mentioned by the author of the *Nirukta*, there is no effort (needed) to include (some in the others). For, then, for this statement of the sage (Yāska), inference etc. is not the basis, since that being possible even for us, that statement (of the sage) would be futile. Nor is perception (the basis), since of the gross elements, the modifications generated by Brahman are imperceptible in the absence of śruti. If it be said that only the modifications among the elementals are mentioned by the sage, then, if those be apprehended here, there would be the cognition that only the five gross elements, the causes of the elementals, are defined as Brahman in the aphorism. Therefore, only the śruti-mentioned three viz., origination etc., should be apprehended here. Śruti, indeed, does not require basic evidence, in which case there would be the alleged defect. Therefore, whatever has origination, whether element or elemental, as the primal cause of all that, the śruti-declared Brahman alone is understood to have been defined.

XXIV. Now, even thus, in the aphorism, let there be indicated only the origination declared in śruti, since the sense stated is established with this much alone; if this be said, no; for, sustentation and dissolution are (mentioned) for the purpose of excluding the doubt of mere efficient causality. Sustentation and dissolution are not indeed possible in what is not the material cause, but is merely the efficient cause. Though origination, sustentation and dissolution are mentioned even by the author of the *Nirukta*, yet the fact that the aphorism is based on śruti need not be assumed through his statement; for, the aphorisms have directly the purport of ascertaining the sense of śruti. Otherwise, in the

aphorisms to be stated, statements of sages alone would be cited and (their meaning) ascertained. Therefore, only the origination, sustentation and destruction mentioned in the śruti text 'That, verily, whence these beings are born'¹ etc. are directly mentioned in the aphorism, and their cause, Brahman, is defined.

XXV. Now, how is there causality for Brahman? Is it that Brahman abandoning the earlier form is transformed into another form? Or does it transfigure itself without abandoning (the earlier form)? On the first, subsequent to creation, there would be destruction of Brahman of the form of knowledge and bliss. If then that Brahman transformed in the form of the world, should again at the stage of dissolution be transformed into Brahman that is knowledge and bliss, even thus, because of that Brahman being of such a nature as will be transformed again into the form of the world, there is the contingency of non-release. Nor is the creational text evidence in respect of transformation; for that (text) which is exhausted with (declaring) creation alone, is indifferent in respect of the abandonment or non-abandonment of the earlier form. Nor is any other text possible in respect of transformation, since in 'The unborn self, the great, the firm,' there is mentioned, by the word 'firm', immutability opposed to transformation. And the immutability of Brahman is intelligible because of partlessness.

XXVI. Now, even the partless is certainly transformed. It is thus. The transformation into necklet etc., occurring in gold, leads indirectly to the (transformation of the) primal atom, since it exists in the parts, like conjunction. Conjunction, indeed, inherent in a part of the whole, is well known

¹Taitt., III, 1

to have indirectly for antecedent the conjunction of the partless primal atom.

XXVII(a). Here, it should be asked, 'what is this transformation?' (1) Like the lump of clay coming to have the form of a pot, is transformation the increase of parts through one's own parts coming to have a conjunction other than the earlier conjunction? (2) Or like milk becoming curd through the conjunction with the parts of the buttermilk poured (into the milk), is it the increase of parts through the conjunction with other parts? (3) Or like the ageing of the young is it (the attainment of) a different state? (4) Or is it a change, like the stick becoming a post? (5) Or like the atom becoming a dyad through conjunction with another atom, is it the conjunction with another thing? (6) Or is it motion, like water becoming a river? (7) Or like the difference in colour of a ripe fruit, is it the rise of another quality? (8) Or is it the origination of another substance associated with the material cause?

XXVII(b). Neither the first nor the second, since that kind of transformation is unintelligible in the case of the partless.

XXVII(c). Nor the third and the fourth; for, in that case, when there is transformation in the form of the world, becoming Brahman again being unintelligible, there is the contingency of non-release; the old man does not indeed ever become a youth; nor does the post grow into the form of a tree; if it be said that in some places even the growing again is seen, then for release too if there be the nature of being thus transformed again, non-eternality would be difficult to avoid.

XXVII(d). Nor the fifth nor the sixth nor the seventh, because of the over-extensiveness of the definition of transformation; for in the ether that is conjoined to another thing, in the bee that moves about, and in the cloth wherein redness has appeared, there is not the cognition of the transformation of substance.

XXVII(e). Nor the eighth; for though the whole be so transformed, the transformation of the parts is difficult to state. Is it that the parts of gold are transformed into the form of the necklet, or into the form of another substance utilised in the necklet, or into the form of another state utilised in the necklet? Neither the second nor the third, since other than the necklet, there is not seen any other substance or state utilised therein. Nor the first, since the necklet is the product of the whole; and if it were the product of the parts there is the contingency of the creationist doctrine. Nor is there the unintelligibility of the parts persisting in the necklet, since that is intelligible through the channel of the whole. Nor, in the absence of change in the loci, the parts, is change unintelligible in the located, the whole; for, origination and destruction, which are certainly non-existent in the primal atom, are seen in the dyad. If it be said that the (aforesaid) character (of non-existence in the whole if not existent in the parts) belongs to attributes other than origination and destruction, no; for, the generality 'potness' which is certainly non-existent in the potsherd, is inherent' in the pot. If it be said that in the absence of a change of state for the pervaders, the parts, a change of state for the pervaded, the whole, is unintelligible, no; for, though there is no change of state for the pervaders, generality and quality, that (change) is seen in the substance pervaded. Or let there (even) be transformation of the parts; even then,

since it is prompted by the transformation of the whole, that is not an illustration of the transformation of Brahman. There is not indeed anything which has Brahman as a part and undergoes transformation, as prompted by which there may be transformation of Brahman. Because of partlessness there is not the establishment of Brahman's transformation even through the example of the whole (which is transformed).

XXVIII. As for (the statement that there is) transformation like the conjunction of the partless, here too, is it stated of the perceptible conjunction of the whole that it is inherent in the primal atoms? Or is it assumed to be preceded by the conjunction of primal atoms? Not the first, because of the contingency of imperceptibility, as of the colour etc., present in the primal atom. Not the second, since like the inherence of the generality 'potness', conjunction (too) is intelligible in respect of the whole itself. As for the persistence of the parts in the conjunction, that is otherwise explained through the channel of the whole. If it be said that, because of the contingency of pervasion of the entirety if conjunction be present in the whole, the existence (of that) is in the parts alone, then, because of the impossibility of conjunction among wholes, the threads, there is the contingency of the non-production of cloth. As for pervasion of the entirety, that, in respect of the Logician, is to be answered by the example of conjunction of primal atoms, which does not exist in the parts; in respect of others, sound existing in the ether is to be cited as an example. Therefore, not by the example of conjunction is it possible to infer the transformation of the partless.

XXIX. Now, how is there the partlessness of Brahman, whereby transformation could be refuted? We say that it

is because having parts is difficult to state and because of śruti. If it have parts, is there self-luminosity for both the parts and the whole, or for either alone? On the first, since either is not the content of the other, by no one will the possession of parts be cognised. On the second, there is not the establishment of the relation of part and whole between them, any more than between pot and the self. Śruti too in 'Having no parts, having no activity, calm'¹ states the non-existence of activity and parts. If it be said that activity too, like controlling, is declared by śruti, then, let there be the distinction that in reality there is non-activity and that through māyā there is the possession of activity; for, there is the determinative text '(He) takes on many forms through māyās'²; (and) because, through the experience of the human goal by the non-active intelligence in sleep, it is intelligible that non-activity is real. Nor is there no argument for Brahman's activity being of the nature of māyā, since illusoriness is intelligible because of fruitlessness as in dream activity. Thus, therefore, the partless Brahman is not transformed, but is transfigured; this second view is to be admitted. On this view too, since Brahman, that does not abandon its earlier form, is changeless, there should be admitted some other thing that is changed into the world of waking experience. Is that māyā or something else? Not something else, since, whatever is other than Brahman and māyā being a product, causality is impossible (for it).

XXX. On the māyā-view too, is (1) intelligence denoted by the word māyā, following the nomenclature 'māyā is

¹ Śvet., VI, 19

² Brh., II, v, 19

intelligence, similarly intellect', (2) or spells, drugs etc., because of what is well known (by that name) to the vulgar, (3) or else some absolutely real potency of an inert nature (posited) by one considering himself learned, (4) or an indeterminable potency following such śāstra as 'There was no non-reality' etc.? (1) On the first too, the character of māyā is not possible for intelligence of the nature of Brahman-intelligence as stated in such scriptural texts as 'Intelligence (prajñā) is established', 'Intelligence (prajñānam) is Brahma'¹; for, in such śāstra as 'Again, at the end, there is the removal of the world-māyā,'² 'This (māyā) is divine and constituted of the guṇas'³, 'Being deprived of their knowledge by māyā,'⁴ there are predicated of māyā removability, constitution by the guṇas and obscuration of intelligence, while this is impossible in the case of intelligence. Nor does the character of māyā belong to prajñā of the nature of intellect, stated in the nomenclature dhī, prajñā, śamusi, matiḥ (all meaning 'intellect'); for, material causality is impossible in the case of the intellect. Not the second; for, in ordinary experience, the word 'māyā' is not used in respect of spells, drugs etc. What then? In respect of their products, the *fata morgana* etc., which are sublated. Not the third, since there is no evidence for an absolutely real potency. On the fourth too, is that indeterminable māyā the material cause of the world or the (efficient) cause in the origination of the world? This should be distinguished. Here, because of the śruti text 'Know māyā to be the material cause'⁵ material causality

¹Alt., V, 8

²Śvet., I, 10

³Gītā, VII, 14

⁴Gītā, VIII, 15

⁵Śvet., IV, 10

stands to reason. Nor is the word 'prakṛti' to be explained as an instrument, by the etymology 'created through this'; for, its conventional sense is material cause and the conventional sense is the stronger. If it be said that there is instrumentality (alone), because of the express use of the instrumental (case) in 'Indra through his māyā'¹ etc., no; for, instrumentality is declared there only in respect of the self being manifold. And with that much where is the harm in being the material cause of the world? By the ablative in 'From the self ether originated'² material causality is declared of the self; therefore, māyā is not the material cause; if this be said, no; for, the ablative is possible even in respect of the efficient cause. Nor may it be said 'Let māyā itself be the efficient cause', since in the form of inertness there is persistence of māyā in (the effect) the world. If it be said that the self too is persistent in the form of reality or in the form of manifestation, thus then, let the self and māyā be both the material cause. And thus, because of over-pervasiveness in respect of māyā, the pure Brahman is not established by the definition of causality in respect of the origination etc. of the world.

XXXI. To this it is said (in reply): since for a single product two reciprocally independent material causes are impossible, it should be said that by combining māyā and Brahman there is one material cause. Of this three ways are possible. Like the two conjoined strands in the case of the rope, both are the material cause of the world, in a relation of equal primacy. Here Brahman serves in respect of the elements of reality and manifestation; māyā, however, in respect of the elements of inertness and change:

¹Brh., II, v, 19

²Taitt., II, 1

thus say some. On the strength of the *śruti* text 'the potency of the divine self'¹, the potency called *māyā* is alone the material cause; since potency is invariably dependent on the potent, material causality presumptively leads even to Brahman that possesses the potency: thus say others. Since, for the superimposed *māyā*, there is not in reality any existence other than the existence of the substrate, Brahman, though material causality may belong directly to *māyā* alone, for Brahman too, as its substrate, material causality cannot be avoided: thus say yet others. On the first view, material causality in the principal sense belongs to Brahman qualified by *māyā*; on the second and third, however, it belongs to *māyā* alone. On all three views material causality is only figurative in the case of the pure Brahman. Of these, causality of the world is the definition of essential nature in the case of the material cause in the principal sense; but in the case of the figurative material cause it is the definition *per accidens*. That being the case, what is it that is over-pervasive of *māyā*—that which is considered to be the definition of essential nature or that which is (considered to be) the definition *per accidens*? Not the first, since *māyā* falls within what is to be defined. Not the second, since causality of the world does not exist in *māyā* in the form of definition *per accidens*. Therefore there is the establishment of the pure Brahman, through the definition *per accidens* in the form of causality of the world and through definition of essential nature in the form of knowledge, bliss etc.

XXXII. Now, material causality of the earth etc., is not the definition of Brahman, since no origin is seen of

¹Śvet., I, 8

the earth etc.; nor is material causality of pot etc. (the definition), since pot etc. are products of the earth etc. If this be said, not so. What are in dispute—earth, water, fire and air—are originated, since they are the spheres of the cognitions of earth, water, fire, and air (respectively), like what are admitted (to be originated), viz., parts of earth, water, fire and air. Ether, time, space etc. are originated, since they are differentiated, like pot etc. Now there is counter-inference: earth etc. are not originated, since they are gross elements, like ether; and ether is not originated, since it is a partless substance, like the self. If this be said, not so; for 'being the sphere of the cognition of earth', which has a specific nature for content, is stronger than the *probans* 'being a gross element' which has a generality for content. That has been said by the Bhaṭṭācārya: 'Just as of the teaching of the general there is sublation by that (teaching) which has the specific for content, similarly there is sublation of one inference by another inference'. In the inference of the non-origination of ether, there is conflict with śruti; and the example is devoid of the *probans*, since in the self that is quality-less, there is no substance-ness, consisting in the possession of qualities. Therefore material causality, in respect of the entire originated world of earth etc., is the definition of Brahman.

XXXIII. Now, the disputants dispute about the material cause of the world. It is thus. All the modifications in dispute have for material cause the generality of happiness, misery and delusion, since they are of a nature constantly accompanied thereby; those which are accompanied by the nature of something have that (thing) for the material cause, like basin etc., which are accompanied by (the

nature of) clay and have clay for their material cause. Similarly, all the modifications in dispute have a single undifferentiated material cause, since they are limited, multiple and modifications, like basin etc. Thus the Sāṅkhyas infer the *pradhāna* as the material cause of the world. The produced substance in dispute is produced by what is smaller in size than its own size, since it is a produced substance, like a cloth: thus primal atoms are postulated by those who maintain them. Every product is preceded by non-existence, since it has a prior state, which while being capable (of being cognised) is not cognised, unlike the self assumed by the others: thus those who maintain the void declare the void (as the material cause). The Yogas and the Śaivas, on the strength of the revelations belonging to them, declare *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Paśupati* (respectively).

XXXIV. (All) this does not stand to reason. Between happiness etc., which are internal and pot etc., which are external, difference being perceptually cognised, the *probans* 'being accompanied by the generality of happiness, misery and delusion' is non-established. Modifications like pot are of the nature of happiness, misery and delusion, since in the mind, the adjunct that manifests them, they are the cause of the appearance of the forms of happiness etc., just as that which causes in the adjunct, the mirror, an appearance in the form of a face is the proto-type whose nature is the face: thus, there is the establishment of the *probans*. If this be said, no; for in that case for him who cognises one thing alone, there is the contingency of the simultaneous cognition of the three, happiness etc. If it be said that because of unseen potency there is cognition of one (alone), no; for, the capacity of things cannot be controlled by unseen potency;

truly, a stone does not become soft because of unseen potency. For unseen potency, though there is not the function of controlling the capacities of things, there certainly exists the function of controlling cognition : if this be said, even thus, the *probans* 'being accompanied by the generality of happiness etc.' is inconclusive; for in the case of substances accompanied by qualities like whiteness and generality like potness, it is not seen that they have those for material cause. Limitedness too, if produced by (other) things, is inconclusive in respect of the *pradhāna* and spirit, which are eternal (though each limiting the other) : if produced by space and time, there is inconclusiveness in respect of pot, snow, hail, which are perceptually seen to have different material causes. Hereby are explained (away) the two (other) *probans*, being multiple and being modifications. And being a produced substance (in the Logician's inference) is inconclusive in respect of the rope substance, which is produced by two long and broad silk cloths, but is contracted (to smaller dimensions by the twisting). If then (it be said that) other than the conjunction of the two silks there is nothing else called the rope-substance, even thus, that (original argument) is affected by counter-inference; for there is the counter-syllogism : 'The dyad in dispute is produced by what has parts, since it has parts, like the pot.' Even for him who maintains the void, the *probans* is non-established, since clay, the prior state of the pot, is perceptually cognised. As for the revelations of the Yogas and the Śaivas, they are non-authoritative because of conflict with the Veda.

XXXV. Now, though the disputants' means of knowledge be unintelligible, the objects of knowledge (as set out by them) are not unintelligible; indeed, merely because of affliction of the sense of sight, it is not seen that there

is abandonment of what is to be seen—colour etc. If this be said, no; for, even the objects of knowledge, according to the others, are difficult to demonstrate. Is pradhāna the cause of the world, merely as such, or as controlled by Īśvara? Not the first, since in the case of the non-intelligent, distinctly regulated creation is unintelligible. On the second too, if that Īśvara is established by śruti, there is the contingency of the Brahman-doctrine; if known by inference, then even by the example of the potter etc., there would be the possession of limited knowledge and capacity. Then (it may be said), since there is no multiplicity as of the potter &c., there is one omniscient creator of the world, and for him omniscience and omnipotence result by presumption. Even thus, undue extension cannot be avoided thus: 'The world in dispute is originated from the jīva and Īśvara, since it is a product, like the pot'. Since through the channel of unseen potency there is creatorship of the world for the jīva too, that is a contingency of the acceptable; if this be said, then, in order that there may be difference from pot etc., in respect of the earth etc., there is the contingency of three agents. As for the void, since that is indefinable, there is not even the possibility of its being the material cause of the world, since the world is interpenetrated by reality. If it be said that the interpenetration by reality is a delusive assumption, even thus, since on the view of you, who hold (the doctrine of) residueless destruction, there is no residual impression of the previous aeon, there would not be the rule that the present aeon is similar to that; and thence results the destruction of the empirical usage about activity, its fruit and the means of knowledge thereof. Since in the case of ritual acts (karmas) performed in the desire to become divine beings etc., possessing special configurations, there is not

originated in another aeon that kind of divine or other form, there is the destruction of karma. In the śruti there is declared as fruit for him who is absolutely meritorious that, after having enjoyed heaven to the end of that aeon, there is birth in another aeon as preceded by remembrance of the earlier birth; and that fruit, since there is no residual impression in residueless destruction, would not be possible. Similarly, when there is residueless destruction of the earlier Veda, since dharma is not knowable by any other means, and since human beings are incapable of creating new words having that (dharma) for sphere, the means of knowledge in respect of dharma would also be destroyed. And if that be admitted, in the same way there would be destruction even of what are acceptable to them as activity, its fruit and the means of knowledge thereof.

XXXVI. The Barhaspatya thinks that every product is originated by its very nature. He is to be asked, 'Is it meant that each is its own cause? Or is it originated without a cause?' Not the first, because of self-dependence. On the second, there would be simultaneous existence and non-existence of the pot, since there is no dependence on a cause that effects sequence. Then you may think: 'On your view too, if the effecting of sequence be natural to that cause, that is the (acceptance of the) doctrine of nature; if there be need for another cause, there is the contingency of infinite regress; even if through difference in time there be admitted of that (cause) itself states which effect sequence, if that temporal sequence be natural, that is the doctrine of nature; if there be need of another cause, there is infinite regress'. That is unsound. By this deduction of infinite regress, is it declared of the capacity of things that there is no dependence on

another cause, or that, when there is the capacity for things, the following up of another cause is futile? The first is certainly admitted. On the second too, is it said (a) that the dependence on another cause is not cognised, or (b) that though cognised it is difficult to demonstrate? (a) Not the first, because of conflict with perception; for, in the case of the potter producing the pot, the dependence on the staff, wheel etc., is established by perception. (b) Not the second; for to him who maintains the indeterminability of all, difficulty of demonstration is an ornament (not a defect). For him who thinks that the four elements alone are real, that perception is the one means of valid knowledge, and that the doctrine of nature is alone the absolute truth, if a *probans* be mentioned in respect of the sense there premised, there is the contingency of (change) having a cause; and if it be not mentioned there is non-establishment of the sense premised. And if the cognition alone be resorted to (without attempt at demonstration), there is the contingency of the doctrine of indeterminability.

XXXVII. Thus, therefore, the possibility of the causality of anything else being refuted, by elimination, only what is declared by us, the omniscient, omnipotent Īśvara, is the cause; this kind of argumentation too is to be understood to have been indicated by this same aphorism, whether by tantra¹ or by repetition. And when by such argumentation there is the possibility of Brahman as above declared, it is

¹What is called tantra consists in a single subsidiary, the performance of which is prompted by the injunctions of more than one principal, being equally subservient to all the principals. In the case of the fore-sacrifice etc., prompted by the full-moon rites declared in the three texts 'The āgneya on eight pots/herds,' 'He performs the upāśana sacrifice at intervals,' 'The agniśomīya is on eleven pots/herds,' there is, even by their performance once alone, subservience to all the three principals.

possible later to establish that (Brahman) through revelation. As they say: 'When what is premised is (shown to be) possible, that proposition may be established by *probans*; of that (however) which is destroyed even at its rise, there is no saving by means of *probans*.'

XXXVIII. Now, Īśvara as above declared is established even by inference; what (is the need) of the two—argumentation and revelation? Nor may it be said that when there is revelation the effort to infer is futile, since revelation, like 'That whence, verily'¹ etc., is a restatement of the thing established by inference. And inference is to be thus applied: the world in dispute has a creator who knows all, e. g. the material cause, the accessory etc., since it is a product, like a house; this is said by the Vaiśeṣikas. If this be said, no; for, in the form, 'The world in dispute has many creators or has a non-omniscient creator', undue extensiveness too may similarly be easily established. The capacities for cognition and lordship increasing in degree terminate somewhere, since they are properties that increase, like size; thus say the Sāṅkhyas and Yogas. If this be said, no; for, in the case of those who maintain that there is no Īśvara, it (the inference) is an establishment of the established in respect of (minor) deities etc. Even in establishing termination in that which possesses capacity for cognition and lordship in respect of all things, there is inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in respect of weight, attachment, aversion, misery etc. The fruit of karma as merit and demerit is dispensed by him who knows that fruit etc., since it is the fruit of karma, like the fruit of service: thus infer the Naiyāyikas. If this be urged, no; because it is an establishment of the established even with (the admission of) deities etc.

¹ Taitt., III, 1

XXXIX. Therefore, it is only the argumentation which has been said by us to be an auxiliary, as the cause of the cognition of possibility, that the Vaiśeṣikas etc., because of ignorance, consider as inference. Truly, argumentation itself is not inference. The semblance of pervasion, the semblance of non-intelligibility (otherwise) and the exhibition of an illustration alone—these three, as generating the cognition of possibility, are said to be argumentation: that which has a non-inconsistent pervasion and gives certitude about the thing is inference. Therefore, in the case of the syllogisms of the Vaiśeṣikas and others, though defective as inference, there is no conflict in their possession of the character of argumentation, as stated by us, as being the cause of the cognition of possibility in respect of the Brahman established by śruti. Thus, then, it is only what is considered to be inference by the Vaiśeṣikas and others that, by way of argumentation, is mentioned in the aphorism about what begins with origination, as giving certitude about Brahman; if this be said, (no); for even if from bare inference there be established the existence of a cause, since Brahman's nature, as reality, knowledge etc., is not established in the absence of revelation, the purport of the aphorism is only the stringing together of revelation. The revealed texts indeed are cited by the aphorisms to be mentioned and ascertained in respect of their purport; for, the intuition of Brahman is dependent on ascertaining, through principles conforming to verbal testimony, that the purport of the Vedānta texts is Brahman. Truly, in the case of the Vaiśeṣikas etc., who would ascertain through inference and other such means of valid knowledge, there is not seen Brahman-realisation. Nor does it stand to reason that for the non-personal (śruti), inference, which is personal, is the

basis. Nor may it be said that thus there would be no need for inference at all; for in order to strengthen the sense of śruti, there is need of reasoning not in conflict with śruti. In 'The learned man, the wise one'¹ etc., the helpfulness of the human intellect to revelation is admitted by śruti itself. Otherwise, Brahman being known even by study (adhyayana of the Veda), the restrictive injunction as to instruction by a teacher in 'That person, who has a preceptor, knows'² would be futile. For, the preceptor, through illustrations conforming to śruti, generates strength of cognition in the pupils. And that strength of cognition, being of the form of reflection, is the cause of realisation. That, indeed, is reflection, which consists in the bringing about of strength to the cognition gained from śruti, through the argumentation of the preceptor and through one's own argumentation. And that reflection is the cause of realisation is established by the śruti 'is to be reflected on'³.

XL. Now, in the inquiry into dharma, Veda, smṛtis, epics and purāṇas, these alone are the evidence, not inference etc. There too, there are causes of ascertainment, viz., express statement, capacity, sentence, context, place and name. A word that has no need of another word (for its significance) is 'express statement'. The inseparable relation of a declared sense with another sense is 'capacity'. Words, which possess reciprocal expectancy, juxtaposition and competency, constitute a 'sentence'. That which is the capacity of two sentences and has for content what is stated after the commencement (of something) is the 'context'. In the

¹ Chānd., VI, xiv, 2

² Chānd., VI, xiv, 2

³ Brh., II, iv, 5

case of word-senses in a sequence, the relation according to the sequence with (other) word-senses in a sequence is 'place'. Similarity of appellation is 'name'. By these alone let there be the ascertainment of Brahman too. If this be said, no; for, in the desire to know Brahman there is need even of argumentation and experience. The need of argumentation has already been established. What is called experience is a particular psychosis of the internal organ whose fruit is Brahman-intuition. And without this, the expectancy of knowledge does not cease. Nor may it be suspected that Brahman's nature is incapable of being experienced, since, like pot etc., it is an existent thing. The Brahman-text in dispute generates cognition culminating in the fruit without the need of experience, since it is a text of the Veda that is a means of valid knowledge, like the text about dharma; if this be said, no; for, it (the inference) is affected by having as adjunct 'having for content what is incapable of being experienced'; truly, dharma, that is to be accomplished by performance, is not capable of being experienced prior to the performance, at the time of knowing the texts. Performance, however, even in the absence of experience, is established even from the knowledge through verbal testimony; hence the experience of dharma is certainly not needed.

XLI. Now, besides the capacity to be experienced and the need to be experienced, there is no other difference of Brahman from dharma; on the contrary, being the object of knowledge through the Veda is certainly common (to both); therefore, let there not be even the difference made by experience; if this be said, no; for between dharma and Brahman, what is to be done and what exists, there exists considerable difference such as dependence and non-dependence on a person. In ordinary experience, Devadatta goes

on horse-back or does not go or goes on foot; thus, in the doing, not doing or doing otherwise of what is to be done, dependence is seen on a person. Similarly, in the Veda too, doing and not doing are declared in 'In the atirātra, one uses the sixteenth cup', 'In the atirātra, one does not use the sixteenth cup';¹ doing and doing otherwise (are declared) in 'He offers oblation after sunrise' and 'He offers oblation before sunrise'; there are prescriptions and prohibitions in 'He is to sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma', 'Do not eat the flesh of any animal struck with a poisoned weapon'; there is option at will in 'He is to sacrifice with rice grains or with barley'; there is combination of the six sacrifices (constituting the Darśapūrṇamāsa); there are general rule and exception in 'Injure not any living being' and 'He is to kill the agni-ṣomiya animal'; there is sublation of the barhis consisting of kuśa, transferred from the model rite, by the barhis consisting of śara, taught in the modelled rite;² practice of the nāriṣṭa-homas belonging to the model rite in combination with the upahomas of the modelled rite is supplementation;³ there is differentiated option through differences of the section of the Veda (to which one belongs) in 'He offers oblation after sunrise' and 'He offers oblation before sunrise'. Not thus in the case of the existent Brahman would there be the possibility of dependence on a person, prescription, prohibition, option at will, combination, general rule, exception, sublation, supplementation, differentiated option etc. If it be said that even in respect of an existent thing there is option in the form 'post or man', no; for this which, as dependent on human desire, is not dependent on the thing

¹ See Note to the Bhāmatī, p 279 (TPH)

² PM, X, iv, 2

³ PM, X, iv, 1

is invalid. In 'The woman, verily, O Gautama, is fire'¹ etc., scriptural contemplation, which is certainly dependent on human desire and not dependent on the thing, is cognised as valid; if this be said, no, since that has for sphere what is to be done. Even then, since the existent thing is dependent on valid knowledge, and since valid knowledge is dependent on the desire (will) of the cognising person, the thing too comes to be dependent on a reason; if this be said, no; though there be human desire, valid cognition is not seen in 'This is silver', where the thing (silver) is non-existent; and, in the case of the tiger etc., there is the contrary (of what is desired). Therefore, of valid cognition having the existent for its sphere, the thing itself is the principal determinant. This being the case, since Brahman-knowledge too, whose sphere is existent, is but dependent on the thing, not even through the channel of knowledge is there the dependence of Brahman on a person. Therefore, in the case of Brahman, which is wholly different from dharma, and is existent, the need for argumentation and experience stands to reason.

XLII. Now, since Brahman, as an existent thing, like pot etc., is the sphere of other means of knowledge, let the sphorism about what begins with origination be only for the purpose of introducing an inference; if this be said, not so. Brahman is not to be known through perception by one who knows not the Vedānta, since it is devoid of colour etc. Inference too, is it (based) on the general pervasion that whatever is a product has a cause or the particular pervasion that whatever is a product has Brahman for the cause? Not the first, since with that much Brahman is not

¹ Chānd., V, viii, 1

established? On the second too, if Brahman be a content of the senses, there is futility of the inference; if not a content thereof, there is non-establishment of the apprehension of pervasion.

XLIII. Now this being the case, Brahman would not be the sphere even of argumentations, which live under the shadow of inference. True it is thus. Yet, argumentations are the causes of the cognition of possibility in respect of Brahman to be known from verbal testimony. It is thus. Since, by the examples of clay etc., it is demonstrated that there is no product different from the material cause, non-duality is made possible; by the example of the redness in the crystal, the imposedness of agency etc., on the self (is made possible); by the example of the reflection, the oneness of the jīva and Brahman (is made possible); by the example of the rope-snake, the non-existence of independence for the world as different from Brahman (is made possible); by the example of pot-ether, (there is made possible), through the channel of being unattached, (Brahman) being the pure, non-dual, inner self; by the example of the red hot axe, (there is made possible) the reality of the oneness of the jīva and Brahman. And thus, just as for statements of prescription and prohibition there are eulogistic or condemnatory arthavādas, needed for the causing of appetite or desistence, the reasonings mentioned in the śruti attain the status of arthavādas making out the possibility, that is needed by the statement of the nature (of Brahman), in order to culminate in its fruit; otherwise they would be purposeless. Therefore, the aphorism is only for the purpose of exhibiting the Vedānta-text as preceded by the (mention of the) argumentation that is helpful,

XLIV. Now, since, in all Vedic statements the word 'Brahman' is not established (as to its meaning), that word is not capable of intimating its own sense as the subject qualified or as the qualification in a sentence-sense; therefore, what is that Vedānta text which is intended to be indicated in the aphorism? It is said (in reply). Though the sense of the word 'Brahman' which is of the nature of reality, knowledge, infinite bliss and is the inner self, be not established, (yet) since mere 'brahmatva (greatness),' which is of the nature of the sense of *brh*, is established, it is possible to cognise the distinctive Brahman by the re-statement of that and on the strength of the reciprocal relation among words like 'truth'; hence the text 'truth' etc., has for purport the declaration of the nature of Brahman, by way of-definition. Nor may it be said that, since what is established by another means of knowledge is the definition, if 'truth' etc. too be the definition, there is the contingency of that text being a re-statement of what is established by another means of knowledge; for, though presumptively a definition, it is directly the means of knowledge, as giving knowledge of Brahman not known by any other means of knowledge. The text, however, is to be construed in disregard of the sequence of study in one's own Veda, thus: 'That whence the ether originates, that is the self', '(that is) Brahman (which) is truth, knowledge, infinitude;' for causality, which is well known, is that which is to be restated, on the principle that restating the well-known the unknown is declared. Other Upaniṣadic texts too are to be thus construed as declaring Brahman. This being the case, the text beginning with 'Bṛgu, the son of Varuṇa',¹ and ending with 'that is Brahman' is the citation for two aphorisms (the 1st and the 2nd); of this too, from 'Bṛgu'

¹Taitt. III, 1, 1

up to 'seek to know that' belongs to the first aphorism, since what are to be declared in that aphorism, the eligibility and the need to obtain certain knowledge, are understood from that citation: leaving out 'seek to know that', what begins with 'That, verily, whence' and ends with 'That is Brahman' is the citation for the second aphorism, since oneness of sense is understood for these two, the aphorism and the text.

XLV. Now, in respect of the cause of the world, there is cognition of multiplicity too, since the *tasil*-suffix in 'yatah (whence)' is mentioned in the case of both the plural and the singular; and thus, by the restatement of that, how can there be declared here the non-dual Brahman? It is said (in reply): because of the rest of the text 'whereby, being born' etc., the *tasil*-suffix is determined to have for content the singular alone; and that suffix gives valid knowledge of the oneness of the cause. Though in 'whence' there is the character of a restatement for the stem-sense, the mere cause of the world, because of (that) being established even by inference, yet since oneness, the meaning of the suffix, is not established by any other means of knowledge, there is no conflict in the suffix giving valid knowledge. Now, here, is oneness the definition or the defined or something else? On the first, the two-fold definition, causality and oneness in respect of Brahman, would be futile. On the second and third, however, there is the contingency of sentence-split, because of there being declared two, viz., oneness and what is called Brahman. If this be said, not so. On the first, since causality is the definition *per accidens* and oneness is the definition of essential nature, both are purposeful. On the second, since by restating the cause, Brahman, as qualified by oneness, is predicated (thereof), there is no sentence-split. On

the third, however, first restating the cause in the form 'That which is the cause is one', oneness is predicated; subsequently causality together with oneness is restated and Brahman-hood is taught in the form 'That which is the one cause is Brahman'; hence, because of the syntactical unity as of a sentence, there is no sentence-split. And thus, when there is the oneness of the cause of the entire world, since creatorship is impossible in the absence of cognition and power having whatever is to be created for their sphere, even the omniscience and omnipotence of the cause result presumptively from this very text. Now, like 'That which is like a cow is the denotation of the word *gavayah*,' the (present) text seems to have as purport the relation of the name and the named, in the form 'That, which is the one cause, is the denotation of the word Brahman'; and that being the case, it would not be that which declares the thing which has for its nature the meaning of *brh*. If this be said, no; for after having in the words 'seek to know that' premised that as what should be desired to be known, there being the expectancy 'of what nature is that?', its nature is declared in the form 'that is of the nature of the meaning of *brh*.' As for the relation of the name and the named that will come about presumptively. And this being the case, the one omniscient, omnipotent and undefined in every way is the cause of the world; and that is the denotation of the word 'Brahman'; this is the sentence-sense that results.

XLVI(a). Now, in the absence of a statement of the unconditioned, there is not cognised the substrate of the conditioned, omniscience etc.; therefore, like 'That which has space is ether', 'That which is the pre-eminent luminary is the moon', some definition of essential nature alone should

be stated by śruti. If it be said that being the denotation of the word 'Brahman' is itself the definition of essential nature, no; for, that denotes only the attribute of greatness; just as where one says 'big pot' an unconditioned pot is cognised as the substrate of bigness, similarly here too (some substrate) should be stated. If it be said that being the denotation of the word 'real (sat)' is the definition, no; for, that denotes only the *summum genus*. Just as when it is said 'real' a particular subordinate genus 'pot' is needed as the culmination of the *summum genus*, similarly, here too a particular subordinate genus should be stated. If it be said that knowledge itself, as possessing the attributes of greatness, omniscience etc., is the definition of the essential nature of the unconditioned Brahman, no; for, in the view of the Vedāntin, the nature of knowledge being, in relation to happiness, misery, attachment and aversion, of the nature of a *summum genus*, there too is not removed the need of a subordinate genus as the particular substrate.

XLVI(b). To this it is said (in reply). By the śruti text 'From bliss alone, verily'¹ etc., bliss alone is determined to be nature of the unconditioned Brahman. Another śruti text too in the words 'That which is great, that is happiness'², declares of happiness alone that it is the attribute of Brahman.

XLVI(c). Thus, then, because of the apposition 'Knowledge, bliss'³ unconditioned knowledge may be the quality of Brahman; if this be said, it is to be asked here: is there the apposition of knowledge and bliss, with the intention

¹ Taitt., III, vi, 1

² Chand., VI, xxiii, 1

³ Bṛh., III, ix, 28

to declare the relation of quality and possessor of the quality, as in 'blue lily' or with the intention to declare the relation of higher and lower generality, as in 'pot is a substance'? Not the first, because of the śruti text 'Pure and without qualities'.¹ Since there has not been demonstrated the difference or non-difference of the quality from the possessor of the quality, the non-possession of qualities is intelligible. Here, he who maintains difference *cum non-difference* quibbles that the quality-less is no substance. Let it not be that the quality-less is a substance; Brahman, however, is not a substance, since there is no evidence. If it be said that, because of being the intimate cause, it is a substance, no; for, the creationist doctrine is not accepted. If it be said, that, because of being the material cause, it is a substance, no; for, even in the case of quality etc., there is material causality in respect of the attributes present in them, like knowability and expressibility. What is called quality is an attribute; and thus the attributeless is no entity; if this be said, no; for, even of some attribute, there has to be admitted the non-possession of attributes, as otherwise there is the contingency of infinite regress. Therefore, the statement 'There is no quality-less Brahman' is only (due to) hatred of the true system. The second view (of apposition) is certainly admitted. 'Knowledge' refers to the generality; its particularisation is bliss; that alone is Brahman. Nor is there the possession of a second, because of the attributes of omniscience, non-duality etc; for, being conditioned by the universe, they are indeterminable. Even knowledge as a generality is certainly indeterminable, being conditioned by misery, attachment etc. In respect of the substrate of that kind of generality, i. e., in respect of bliss

¹Śvet., VI, 11

which is practically efficient as prompted by knowledge, even the empirical usage of 'knowledge' is certainly intelligible. Now, just as in respect of the nacre that is the substrate of the assumptive silver, the empirical usage of 'silver' is not in the principal sense, so too should be the empirical usage of 'knowledge' in respect of bliss. If this be said, no; for, there is disparity, since here is no other absolutely real generality, as (there is) there. Thus, therefore, bliss of the nature of knowledge is Brahman; this definition of essential nature being stated in śruti, everything without exception is very auspicious.

HERE ENDS THE FIFTH VARNĀKA.

END OF THE SECOND APHORISM.

THIRD APHORISM

SIXTH VARNĀKA.

I. In the second aphorism was stated the two-fold definition of Brahman. Here is stated by the aphorist the *probans* in respect of Brahman's omniscience, in the words "Because of being *śāstra*-source".¹

II. Since omniscience has been established through *śruti* and argumentation, even in the previous aphorism, this is futile; if this be said, not so. Because of (Brahman) being the material cause of words, the capacities present in words to reveal things exist with Brahman alone, just as the lamp's intense capacity, relating to objects as (their) manifestor (*viśayin*), belongs to the fire; and the cognitive capacity of the seer is not instrumentality, but certainly the manifestation of what is in conjunction, as in the case of the light of a lamp; hence, once again, there is established here the possession of knowledge in respect of all. This is the meaning. Even what was established is again confirmed through another *probans*. Nor is there the contingency of repetition; for, when omniscience is objected to on the ground of the doubt that (Brahman), though the creator of the world, is not the creator of the Veda, it has to be answered. Brahman in dispute is the support of all the capacities present in the Veda to reveal objects, since it is the material cause of the Veda, like fire, which is the support of the illumining capacity present in the lamp and is the

¹Br. Śa., I, 1, 3

material cause of the lamp; this indeed is the syllogism. Though in respect of the Veda there is the instrumental capacity too, yet because of being intelligence, cognitive capacity alone is to be inferred in Brahman. Indeed, in the case of an intelligent agent, instrumental capacity is not apposite. Nor is there a rule that the relation of the material cause and what is caused by it should be only through the recurrence (in the latter) of all the capacities (of the former); for in the light that is the product of fire, there is recurrence of the illumining capacity alone, while the capacity to burn does not recur. Similarly, of Brahman, though the material cause of the Veda, let the cognitive capacity alone be recurrent; where is the conflict?

III. Nor need there be any dispute as to the Veda revealing all; for there is no evidence as to the existence of anything which is not made the content of the Veda, as supplemented by the different branches of knowledge like the purāṇas. Nor is material causality in respect of the Veda non-established; for the Veda falls within the world of name, and the material causality of Brahman in respect of the world of name and form is established by all the Upaniṣads. Now, Brahman is not the material cause of the Veda, since that, like the *ṛṣis* etc., possesses the knowledge of everything declared in the Veda; if this be said, no, since there is the extraneous adjunct (to the *probans*), viz., 'possessing knowledge only of what is declared in the Veda'. Brahman, however, knows even more than what is declared in the Veda. It is thus. The Veda is the work of one who possesses knowledge relating to more things than the content of its own knowledge, since it is a means of valid knowledge through verbal statement, like the *śāstra* which is the work

of Pāṇini. This *probandum* is indeed possible; for, in the world there is known through experience even what is not the content of speech, e. g. differences of sweetness among milk, jaggery etc. And thus for the Veda, since it reveals all things of which there is empirical usage, there is omniscience. Brahman, however, the material cause of the Veda, manifests through its own intelligence even its real nature that transcends empirical usage; hence (for it) there is unsurpassed omniscience. Then, let it be that even the Veda reveals Brahman's nature through secondary implication; even thus Veda reveals some things through principal significance alone, some through secondary implication, some in their generality, some in their particularity; Brahman, however, reveals everything in all ways; hence it certainly possesses more knowledge than the Veda.

IV. Now if what is called Brahman's production of the Veda consist only in utterance, then, like the (ordinary) teacher, Brahman would be non-omniscient; if it be produced after knowing the sense, like Grammar etc., the Veda would be relative to a person. Then you may think: let Grammar etc., which have been produced after knowing the sense through some other means of valid knowledge, and with the intention to declare (it to others), be relative to a person, as dependent on some other means of knowledge; in the case of the Veda, however, which is produced by Īśvara, possessing eternal desire generated by eternal knowledge, and is not dependent on any other means of knowledge, how can there be relativity to a person? This is not sound, since there is no evidence in respect of such Īśvara; for it has been shown in the previous aphorism that inferences are not capable of establishing Īśvara. If it be said that revelation is what

establishes that, no; for there is reciprocal dependence in that when Īśvara of the said nature is established, there is the establishment of this authoritativeness of the revelation declared by Him, and that when this (latter) is established, there is the establishment of Īśvara of the said nature. There is authoritativeness of the Veda, even because of non-dependence (on other pramāṇas), not because of being declared by Īśvara; therefore there is no reciprocal dependence; if this be said, even thus, the contradiction is difficult to remedy that Īśvara's desire is eternal and (yet) generated by knowledge. Then, though production after knowing the sense (otherwise) be equal, for Grammar etc., since they are prompted by the opinions of the speaker, there is relativity to a person; for the Vedas, however, as prompted by the (purport implied in the) injunction to study, there is no relativity to any person. If this be said, no; the Vedas in dispute are prompted by the speaker's opinions, not prompted by (the purport implied in) the injunction to study, since they are produced after knowing the sense like Grammar etc.; in this way, relativity to a person cannot be avoided. Nor may it be said that for the Vedas, the antecedence of indeterminate knowledge called (pure) intelligence, constitutes their differences from Grammar etc.; for even intelligence is determinate when there is association with what is instrumental to the desired.

V. Now, the Vedas are not relative to any person, since while the stream (of study) is uninterrupted, their authorship is not remembered, as in the case of the self; if this be said, which is the *probans* here, authorship which is not in the sphere of memory or authorship which cannot be validly known? The first is inconclusive in respect of a disguised well

etc. The second is non-established. The Veda is the work of a distinguished person knowing much, since it is a means of valid verbal knowledge in respect of many things, like the *Bhārata*; 'He created all this, the ṛks, the yajus and the sāmans'; thus through inference and revelation the author of the Veda is validly cognised.* Thus, then, the contingency of the relativity of the Veda to a person is acceptable; if this be said, no, because of the contingency of the loss of (its) authoritativeness. Nor is there authoritativeness because of being produced by Īśvara possessing eternal desire, since that has been condemned. Nor because of acceptance by people at large, since invalidity is seen in the case of (the notions of) the body being the self, the moon being but the size of a span etc., which are certainly accepted by people at large. If it be said that the sense may be valid, as established by some other means of knowledge, as in the case of statements of smṛtis, purāṇas or parents, not so. Dharma and its opposite, which are the sense of the Veda, are they known perceptually or through another revelation? Not the latter, because of infinite regress. On the first too, we do not cognise dharma and its opposite through the perception of those like us. Nor is yogic perception what apprehends it; for that brings about excellence only in respect of colour etc., which are its own content. Nor may it be said that dharma and its opposite, as inherent in the self, are perceived by the mind; for at the time of the creation of the Veda, dharma and its opposite, which are of the future, were not present. Dharma and its opposite, observed in a previous, aeon certainly existed then; if this be said, no; for even at the prior creation (of that previous aeon) it would be so; there being infinite regress thus, there is the contingency of a succession of the blind. Therefore if the Veda be relative to a person, its authoritativeness

would be difficult to establish. Hence it is that the Sugatas and Ārhatas declare the Veda to be non-authoritative; if this be said, no, because of the contingency of non-authoritativeness for them in respect of their own revelations. Hence it is that the Lokāyata does not recognise revelation at all; if this be said, no; if, for him, all statements are invalid, there is no eligibility for debate; if worldly statements be valid, what is the crime of Vedic statements? Thus, therefore, if there be relativity to a person, there would be destroyed the authoritativeness recognised for the Veda; if not relative to a person, there is the contingency of non-omniscience for Brahman, as for a (human) teacher.

VI. To this it is said (in reply). We do not tolerate relativity to a person. It is thus. Is there relativity to a person (1) in the case of the word, sense and their relation, or (2) in the case of sentences existing in a sequence? (1) Even on the first, jīvas are not the authors; for, in that case, some one intending to mention the sea would use even the word "Meru" to denote (it), because of his independence (in the matter). Nor is Īśvara the author; for there is the inference of beginninglessness thus. The empirical usage of word, sense and their relation, at the beginning of an aeon etc., is dependent on a succession of earlier empirical usages, since it is an empirical usage of the name and the named, like (similar) empirical usage at the present time. Nor is there inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in respect of conventional words like Dīthā, since they are only semblances of names like 'gāvya' (to signify 'cow' the appropriate name of which is 'go'). Not the second; for, beginninglessness is established thus: the study of the Veda at the time of creation is conditioned by the remembrance of earlier study of the Veda, since it is study of the

Veda, like the study of the Veda at the present time. Nor may it be said that thus it is easy to establish this beginninglessness in respect of all works; for, since by those same works their respective authors are declared, there is conflict (of any such inference) with their revelation (of authorship). Here, too, the author of the Veda is declared by śruti itself; if this be said, is it by the text 'He created all this, the ṛks, the yajus'¹ etc., which relates to Hiranyagarbha? Or is it by the text 'Of that great Being, this is the breath'² etc., which relates to Īśvara? Not the first; for, from the text 'He who created Brahma'³ there is understood the existence of the Veda even prior to the origination of Hiranyagarbha. In the case of the Vedas which were certainly existent, even the text (that they were) 'created' is intelligible, in the view of their first manifestation in the intellect of Hiranyagarbha. Not the second; (for) that text occurring in the topic of the material cause, declares of Īśvara material causality alone in respect of the Veda, not authorship too of the Veda. If it be said that having Īśvara as the material cause and non-relativity to any person are contradictory, no; for, that kind of relativity to a person is admitted. In the case of the *Bhārata* etc., relativity to a person consists in having been produced by Vyāsa etc., after (their) having known the sense by some other means of knowledge; therefore, the authoritativeness of those is dependent on the basic means of valid knowledge. The Veda is not produced after knowing the sense (otherwise), since, while not being the statement of a non-omniscient Being, it is the means of valid knowledge in respect of dharma, its opposite, and Brahman, like Īśvara's cognition

¹ Brh., I, ii, 5

² Brh., II, iv, 10

³ Śvet., VI, 18

postulated by others. And thus, for the Veda, though produced by Brahman, authoritativeness being self-established, there is no detriment whatever. Now, he indeed is a trustworthy person who states what he has cognised through a means of valid knowledge; he who states what is not so cognised or what is guessed is untrustworthy; and thus the Veda is not a means of valid knowledge, since it is not a statement made by a trustworthy person, like the statement of a mad man. If this be said, not so; for, there is also the syllogism 'The Veda is a means of valid knowledge, since it is a statement not made by an untrustworthy person, like the statements of Mann etc.'

VII. How, then, is there ascertainment (as between these two positions)? It is said (in reply). Our final view indeed is that validity is self-established, while invalidity is due to defective causes. Here, in the case of a mad man's statement, invalidity is appropriate, since its basis is cognition presented by delusion or by guessing. In the case of the statement of Manu etc., validity being intrinsic, the merit called production by a trustworthy person is also of service as removing an obstacle, a defective cause. In the case of the Veda, however, obstacles being impossible, validity is established intrinsically even without the (aforesaid) merit. Now, if usage by a trustworthy person be not needed, a pot might be validly cognised even by the remembered word 'pot'. Let it be so cognised in some cases; but in a particular place in front, which is devoid of a pot, it is not validly cognised, because of conflict with other means of valid knowledge.

VIII. Then it may be thought that for some one at some time when there has not arisen any other means of valid knowledge, a pot may be validly cognised even in that

place by the remembered word. Then, let usage by a trustworthy person be alone the cause of validity. And that usage comes about in two ways. The statements of Manu etc. are made after cognising the sense by other means of knowledge; the Vedic statements are made after remembering earlier usages. The mad man's statements, again, because of the non-existence of both of these (usages), are certainly invalid.

IX. Now, thus, authoritativeness in the case of the Veda would be caught up by (the defect of) a succession of the blind. If this be said, then, let the distinction be thus; there is no valid cognition of sense from remembered words, since there is no purport in them; in the Veda, however, because of the purport (implied by) the injunctions to study, valid cognition may arise even though there is no usage by a trustworthy person. Nor may non-authoritativeness be suspected because of the absence of purport for the text enjoining study, since purport is established by (that text) itself. Nor thus is there the defect of self-dependence; for there is no conflict in respect of those that account for both themselves and others, like the word 'word'. Therefore, for the Veda too as for Brahman, beginninglessness results on consideration, but not relativity to a person, as for the work of Kalidasa etc. Nor may it be suspected that though beginningless there may be, as for purāṇas etc., production in an altered form, (in each fresh aeon); for in the case of what are denoted by the word 'Veda', viz., the letters, words, sentences, topics and chapters, which are certainly qualified by a regular sequence, and which even at the beginning of the aeon and at all dissolution undergo only manifestation and concealment, there is admitted immutable eternality.

X. Then, the Veda does not have Brahman for material cause, because of being beginningless and immutably eternal,

like Brahman. If this be said, (no), because of (the inference) being affected by the extraneous adjunct, viz., independence. The Veda, however, is dependent on Brahman, because of being imposed on Brahman, just as the snake imposed on the rope is dependent on the rope.

XI. Now, how for the Veda, as for the rope-snake, is illusoriness declared? We say that it is because of its being incapable of (precise) determination. It is thus. Are the letters alone the Veda, or the letters in association with sequence? Not the first, since there is not the cognition of the Veda in letters pronounced without sequence or in a different sequence. On the second too is that sequence (a) present in the letters, or (b) present in the pronunciation, or (c) present in the cognition? (a) Even if present in the letters the sequence cannot possibly be effected by space, since letters are omnipresent. Nor is it effected by time, because of the eternality (of the letters). Nor is it effected by (other) things, because of contradiction; truly, not at one and the same time do there stand to reason the antecedence and subsequence of the letter "j" in *raja* and *jara*. (b) Nor does the sequence present in pronunciation attach to the letters, since pronunciation and its sequence are not contents of the sense of hearing, while the Veda is of the nature of letters and capable of being apprehended by the sense of hearing. (c) Even if present in cognition, (i) is it an attribute of the letters, or (ii) is it imposed on the letters, or (iii) is it a qualification of the letters *per accidens*? (i) Not the first, since it is not intelligible that what is present in one is an attribute of another. (ii) On the second too, since, for him who maintains *akhyāti* (error as non-apprehension), the sequence alone or the letter alone is not capable of being

SEVENTH VARNAKA.

I. Or else, the definition being stated in the second aphorism, by the present one, the means of valid knowledge is premised in the words 'Because of having śāstra-source';¹ because of having the Veda as the means of valid knowledge; this is the meaning. The indication of more than one sense is an ornament to the aphorism and does not import the defect of sentence-split; for that is shown in the definition of the aphorism as 'many faced'. And the Vedic text giving valid knowledge of Brahman is 'That, verily, whence these beings'² etc. Though this has been cited even in the previous aphorism, yet there is not the futility of the present aphorism; for, assuming what is to be declared in the present aphorism, viz., that Brahman is to be known through śāstra alone, the purport of the previous aphorism was declared to be the stringing together of revealed texts. Otherwise who could avoid the previous aphorism having for sole purport the mention of argumentation? And with the mere mention of argumentation, since it is also possible for each effect to be originated by a separate cause, this sense that the omniscient, omnipotent Brahman is the cause of the world would not be established. Nor is there its establishment because of the persistence of the sense of the root *br̥h*; for even the word 'Brahman' denoting the sense of *br̥h* is used in the Vedas alone. Indeed in ordinary experience the word 'Brahman' is not used of the cause of the world. Therefore 'That

¹Br. Śū., I, 1, 3

²Taitt., III, 1

whence for this what begins with origination, that has the śāstra alone for the means of valid knowledge' so much is one aphorism, since (only) with that much is there removed the doubt of (there being a statement of) mere argumentation. As for the splitting it up, that is in order to state through another explanation that omniscience is easy to establish, as the material cause of the śāstra. Therefore, it is established by the two aphorisms that the omniscient Brahman, the efficient and material cause of the world's origination etc., is to be known from the śāstra alone.

II. Here, Brahman, which is in the position of prototype and endowed with the energy of māyā, is the cause; and the jīvas are each separately bound by avidyā: thus say some. That which is reflected in māyā, i. e. avidyā, is the cause of the world; the pure Brahman is the abode of immortality; and the jīvas are bound by avidyā: thus say others. On the first view, there is difference between māyā and avidyā, and there is no reflectedness for Brahman; on the second (view), however, there is the contrary of these; this is the difference. The author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, however, says thus: it is the jīvas alone that are individually deluded in respect of Brahman, as (if) of the form of the world, because of their own nesciences; the cause of the world is not, however, Brahman as qualified by māyā or as having the form of prototype or reflection; as for (mutual) agreement like 'That which is seen by you is seen by me', that is intelligible because of similarity, as in the second moon cognised by several persons; the mention of Brahman as the cause of the world is in the view of its being the substrate (of the world) in respect of existence. The author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* describes that (causality) in another way, viz., that the one Brahman

alone through its own avidyā transfigures itself in the form of the world, as in dreams etc. All these are final positions (for the advaitin), since the (diverse) teachings are (merely) assumptive, in order to give knowledge of the truth; hence everything is taintless.

HERE ENDS THE SEVENTH VARṆAKA.

END OF THE THIRD APHORISM.

FOURTH APHORISM

EIGHTH VARNAKA.

I. In the third aphorism it was premised that the Vedāntas are the means of valid knowledge in respect of Brahman; in the fourth aphorism the validity thereof is explained.

II. Now, the validity of the Vedāntas in respect of Brahman is not possible (1) because of conflict with the statement of the aphorist (Jaimini), (2) because of the teaching of an existent thing is not possible, (3) because there is no fruit, and (4) because there is no content not already known. For, the aphorist, Jaimini, in the aphorism, 'Since Scripture is for the sake of what is to be done'¹ declares but futility for the Vedāntas which are not for the sake of what is to be done. Though because, in the beginning, middle and end of the Vedāntas, purport is seen in respect of the unity of Brahman, there is not the possibility of futility, (i. e. meaninglessness), yet the validity (of the Vedāntas) does not fit in. The Vedāntas that make Brahman known are not means of valid knowledge; for, they make known Brahman, which, while being capable of (being the object of) other means of knowledge, is not known by other means of knowledge; like the visual cognition which makes known the existence of elevations and depressions (apparently) present in a picture, which though capable of (being the objects of) the sense of touch, are not known by the sense of touch. Nor is there non-establishment

of the qualification ('being capable of other means of knowledge'); Brahman is capable of (being the object of) other means of knowledge, because of being an existent object, like pot etc. Nor may it be said that Brahman is cognisable by a single means of valid knowledge, alone, since it is an existent object like odour etc.; for there is inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in substances like pot, which are objects of apprehension for both the sense of sight and the sense of touch. Even thus, the *kārya* (unseen result) favoured by the *Prābhākara*s is capable of (being the object of) other means of valid knowledge, since it is other than bare non-entity, like pot; (yet it is not thus known and is admitted to be knowable solely through Scripture); thus there is parity of fallacy (in the position of both the *Prābhākara* and the *Vedāntin*); if this be said, no, because of the adjunct 'being an existent object'. Since in the case of future rain etc., which are objects of (another *pramāṇa*, viz.,) inference, there is not the character of an existent object, there is no pervasion of the *probandum* (by the alleged adjunct); if this be said, even thus, if being-other-than-bare-non-entity, which is counter-correlate-dependent, be the determinant in respect of the being capable of other means of valid knowledge, there is prolixity, while if the character of an existent object, which is not so dependent, be the determinant, there is parsimony; hence there is no parity at all. Brahman is cognisable by verbal testimony alone, since it is devoid of colour etc., or the apprehension of pervasion etc., like the *kārya* (unseen result) of the opponents; if this be said, no, since there is admitted by you even its knowability by experience. And this being the case, the qualification present in the *probans* in the first inference, viz., 'which is not known by any other means of knowledge' is non-established; if this

be said, no; for Brahman-experience not being established for those who urge this inference, the qualification is established (for them). Therefore, by the first inference is established the invalidity of the Vedāntas which are devoid of a basic means of knowledge accordant with them. For the words of non-personal origin there is no dependence on a basic means of knowledge; if this be said, true. Yet because of sublation by such a perception as 'I am a man' there is certainly invalidity as for (the text) 'The stake is the sun'. Though the said perception, as generated by a defect, be not the sublater of śruti, yet, since in respect of the existent Brahman there is no possibility of fruit consisting in the attainment of the desired or the avoidance of the undesired, accomplishable by appetite or desistence, the Vedāntas, which are (thus) purportless, do not obtain any validity at all. If then it be said 'Neither fruit nor purport is the determinant of validity, but the making known of a thing not already known,' even thus, let the Veda give valid knowledge of kṛyā (the unseen result) alone, which is incapable of (being the object of) other means of knowledge, but not the existent Brahman, which is so capable (of other means of knowledge). Therefore, the Vedāntas are futile.

III. If it be said that, in the case of what are apprehended because of the injunction to study, invalidity does not stand to reason, then, let there be subsidiariness to the injunction of a rite, as making known the nature of the agent, the jīva, and the nature of the deity, Brahman; and thus will be established validity as for mantras and arthavādas. If it be said 'Let there be validity even as enjoining Brahman,' no; for, an injunction, whose content is a rite, is impossible in respect of an existent thing.

IV. Now, the Vedantas are not subsidiaries to any single injunction, since there is not, as for 'Ha howled'¹ etc., the mention in a (particular) topic; nor (are they subsidiaries) of the aggregate of all injunctions, since of all the injunctions which declare different things, there is no syntactical unity. Nor may it be said that only one thing, dharma in its generic nature, is what is declared by all injunctions; for, the generic is not capable of being performed (while what the injunction prescribes should be so capable). Then it may be said that just as, in the case of the ladle, which is related to all rites, the text about being made of parṇa, while intimating the thing which is the material (cause thereof), occupies the position of a subsidiary in respect of each of the texts enjoining rites, though (itself) mentioned without the commencement (of any particular topic), so too may be the Vedantas which intimate the agent. This is not sound; for, when by the Vedantas which have principally the distinctionless (as the sense), the self is either praised or declared, there is no serviceability to activity in rites. Nor is it possible to assume serviceability; for, the refutation of all distinctions like agency is opposed to appetition. Therefore, the Vedantas are not subsidiary to an injunction of rites.

V. Thus, then, let them be subsidiary to the injunction of the contemplation of the Saguna. Nor may it be thought thus: 'By the Vedantas, even as subsidiary to the injunction to contemplate, there is not established the nature of Brahman, as qualified by attributes like omniscience, as the cause of the world and as an existent, since there is no basic evidence accordant with it; therefore, when the object of contemplation is non-established, how can there be an injunction to

¹ TS, I, v, 1

contemplate? Remote is the subsidiariness of the Vedāntas thereto.' For, when by inference there is known a cause of the world, whose specific nature is not designated, in the injunction of the contemplation thereof, there is syntactical unity for the Vedāntas through imposing the qualities to be contemplated, such as eternality, purity, intelligence, reality, knowledge, infinitude. Now, for the Vedāntas as having for purport an injunction to contemplate, there is no syntactical unity with the devatākāṇḍa, since the (two) topics are different; in its own topic which stops with the bare object, no injunction whatever is heard or is capable of being assumed, since there is not declared here any ground for assuming an injunction, like the relation of material and deity in 'Puṣan is (the deity) who gets the well-kneaded portion'.¹ If this be said, not so; for, assuming validity (for the Vedāntas) because of being apprehended in consequence of an injunction to study, it is possible to assume an injunction to contemplate, because of the unintelligibility otherwise of that validity. And the fruit should be understood to be of the nature of release occurring in such arthavādas 'This much, verily, is immortality'.² Therefore, the Vedāntas are means of knowledge not in respect of Brahman, but in respect of contemplation.

VI(a). When the *prima facie* view results thus, the aphorist says; 'But that, because of harmony'.³ By the word 'but' the *prima facie* view is negatived. 'That' is the premising of his own view. That, i. e., Brahman, is validly known by the Vedāntas: this is the meaning. Whence (is this)? Because of the harmonious synthesis of the Vedāntas in respect of Brahman as (their) purport.

¹ TS, II, vi, 8

² Brh., IV, v, 15

³ Brh., Sa., I, 1, 4

VI(b). Now, what is called purport is the attribute of a person; and how can this belong to the Vedāntas? If this be asked, not so. For, the intention to state is not itself purport, since though there be intention to state, when a word is not used, there is not the empirical usage of purport (existing in such a case). Nor is usage by a person itself (the purport), since it does not exist in the usage of lunatics etc. Therefore, purport is subsidiariness to the valid knowledge of that (particular) sense; and that is certainly the attribute of the word. Nor may it be said that even there, what effects that (purport) is only the intention to state; for there is no (instance of) mere co-absence, inasmuch as it is not seen that there is no purport even where there is subsidiariness to that (sense), (merely) because of the fault of the non-existence of the intention to state. Nor is it that other than the intention to state there is nothing to indicate purport; for there exist the initial passage etc.

VI(c). Nor is it that the indicator of purport is only the character of kārya (what is to be done) belonging to the object of valid knowledge; for in 'A son is born to you' etc., though there is not the character of what is to be done, purport is seen. There too, even because of the purport, let us infer for the object of knowledge that it culminates in what is to be done; if this be said, no, because of the contingency of reciprocal dependence as between the valid knowledge of the character of what is to be done and purport, in this way: when there is valid knowledge having what is to be done for content, there is established purport characterized as the capacity to generate that valid knowledge, and when this latter is established, there is the establishment of that former valid knowledge. Now absence of purport is an obstacle to valid knowledge, for in 'Eat poison' etc., the valid knowledge

that one is to eat poison etc., which results even from the statement, is obstructed by the absence of purport (in the eating); and what removes that obstacle is purport; and thus, when first there is valid knowledge of what is to be done from the sentence itself, subsequently, in that same way, because of the valid knowledge of what is to be done, it is known that there exists purport too, which removes the obstacle; (but) the valid knowledge of what is to be done is not generated by purport; therefore there is no reciprocal dependence. If this be said, true; even thus, the character of what is to be done is not a mark of purport; for in 'He is to offer oblation with jartila gruel or gavidhuka gruel' etc., though there is what is to be done, there is no purport; for, in the subsequent text 'jartilas and gavidhukas are verily not oblations' there is negation of wild sesamum and gavidhuka (as fit objects for the oblation, goat's milk alone being enjoined).

VI(d). Therefore, the marks of purport are only the initial passage etc. For it has been said: 'The initial and the concluding passages, repetition, novelty, fruit, arthavada (eulogy or condemnation) and reasoning—these are the marks in the ascertainment of purport.' In all the Vedāntas, it is well known that there are the initial passage etc., in respect of Brahman. Therefore the Vedāntas relate harmoniously to Brahman as purport.

VII. What is called the harmoniousness of the syntactical relation is the declaration of sense in a unique manner. Elsewhere indeed, words like 'Bring the cow' declare the relation of act and causal correlate. In 'He is to sacrifice with the udbhid', though the word 'udbhid' and 'sacrifice' have same denotation, there exists the expectancy

of niyoga (unseen result). In 'The lily is blue' there are declared difference and non-difference as between the quality and the possessor of the quality. In the case of other words, even though declaring a single denotation, gender and number are unavoidable. The Vedāntas, however, do not thus declare a relation or a sense that is expectant of difference and non-difference or what is qualified by gender and number; but they declare, whether by express signification or by secondary implication or through the channel of adjuncts, only the single, impartite essence, through the restatement of what is in a generic way the cause of the world.

VIII. Of these (modes of declaration) the word 'knowledge' is understood to signify intelligence reflected in a psychosis of the internal organ associated with manifold modifications. And the word 'bliss' is well established in the world in respect of any particular, which is manifested by a psychosis of the internal organ that is of the nature of pure sattva, and which appears as eminently desirable. These two words, 'knowledge' and 'bliss', because of conflict with another text declaring eternality, abandon the psychosis-aspect and signify (only) the particular which appears as desirable. And thus in the aspect of abandoning the psychosis (-element) there is secondary implication; in the other aspect, however, there is principal signification. The words 'One', 'Real', 'Infinite', through expressly signifying the non-existence of difference in itself, the non-existence of illusoriness, and the non-existence of a second, whether of the same class or a different class, apply to that (Brahman) by secondary implication. And words like 'Omniscient' apply to that (Brahman) as having the indeterminable world for adjunct. And words like 'This self is Brahman'¹ 'That

¹ Brh., II, v. 19

thou art'¹ apply to Brahman alone through partly exclusive secondary implication. Thus therefore all the Vedāntas declare the one, impartite essence, Brahman.

IX. Now, if words like 'truth, knowledge' have different significances, how is there application to the one impartite essence? If they have the same significance, there is the contingency of repetition. There is not this defect; for, though there be oneness of what is declared as the purport, there is manifoldness of what are excluded, the indeterminable things like non-reality and inertness. And neither by an indeterminable thing nor by its non-existence is there any detriment whatever to the non-duality which is of the nature of the absolute existent. Therefore the major texts like 'That thou art', in the same way as statements like 'This is that Devadatta' declare the one impartite essence. It is thus. Two persons see a single Devadatta at the same time and place. Again, at another time and place, the same two see that same (Devadatta). Of these two, one has the recognition 'This is that Devadatta'. The other, however, thinks that the later seen one is different from the formerly seen Devadatta. To him who is devoid of recognition, the other teaches 'This is that Devadatta'. Here, the teacher recognises the oneness not of what are explicitly cognised as different—the respective places and times or the two Devadattas as qualified by them—because of contradiction. But the one Devadatta, who is qualified *per accidens* by the two (persons so) qualified, is the sphere of recognition. And this recognised oneness of Devadatta's nature, he, through the words denotative of the qualified, in the form 'This is that', makes known to the other, through the abandonment of a part of their own sense and the secondary implication (of the other part).

¹ Chānd., VI, viii, 7

X. Now, the identity of Devadatta, which belongs to the word-senses 'this' and 'that' (i. e. is cognised along with those word-senses), is that itself declared by the sentence too or some other (identity)? On the first, there is the contingency of (the sentence being) a restatement; not the second, since there is no other identity. If this be said, no; for, on this reasoning, there is the contingency of invalidity even for recognition, since here too it may well be said that if it makes known the very identity present in the cognition(s), there would be the character of a restatement, while as for another identity, that does not exist. The object of valid knowledge in recognition is the relation of one to two times; if this be said, no, since this too is established even by the two cognitions. Then, (it may be said) for recognition though there be not the character of knowing a thing not already known, yet, since it is a remover of the delusion of difference, there is in the effect distinction from cognitions which do not remove the delusion of difference, and hence, there is validity (for it); then, even for the sentence 'This is that' since in this same way there is distinction from the (constituent) words, let there be validity. And thus, even the sentence 'That thou art', abandoning from the sense of the word 'Thou' the conflicting aspect of agency etc., takes up the bare witness, and, even though (identity is) understood even at the time of cognising the word-senses, (yet) for the sake of removing the delusion of difference, declares identity with the bare intelligence, that remains on the abandonment of the aspect of remoteness etc., in the sense of the word 'That.' Hence this syllogism: the sentence 'That thou art' etc., relates to impartite sense, since while relating to a substance that is other than cause or effect it expresses apposition, like the sentence 'This is that Devadatta.'

XI. Now in 'The pot is clay', 'The lily is blue' etc., a distinctive identity of each word-sense with itself is the object of valid knowledge for each word; but the reciprocal identity of the word-senses is the object of valid knowledge for the sentence; just as thus the validity of the sentence (there) is even because of knowing what is not already known, so let it be even here; and thus there would not be the difficult (tortuous) assumption that there is validity merely because of distinctiveness in removing the delusion of difference. If this be said, no, because of disparity. For, there, identity is declared between different, as between effect and cause, substance and quality, since on the principle 'In empirical usage the path of the Bhaṭṭa (is followed)' there is admitted (by us with reference to empirical usage) difference *cum* non-difference. Here, however, the one, impartite essence is declared; hence there is great disparity.

XII. Here, some say (thus): Because of such śāstra as 'He who stands within the self', 'This that is within all is thy self',¹ difference and non-difference should be admitted even as between the jīva and Brahman, as otherwise there would be confusion between the word-senses and the sentence-sense. They have to be asked: is the difference there removed by knowledge or not? If not, there would be no release. If removed, then too, is the remover of that only such knowledge as has difference *cum* non-difference for content or is it some other knowledge having non-difference alone for content? Not the first, since it is not possible for knowledge to remove its own content (difference *cum* non-difference.) Not the second, since there is no means of valid knowledge to originate the knowledge of non-difference; for in your view, the śāstra has for content difference *cum* non-difference. If it be said

¹ Brh., III, 17, 1

that, by the repetition of the knowledge of difference *cum non-difference* generated by the śāstra, there arises the knowledge of the non-difference, even thus, for difference, if removable by knowledge, there would be illusoriness. By knowledge ignorance is removed, while difference, however, perishes through ritual acts; if this be said, no; for in 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself' it is understood that the removal of difference denoted by the word 'itself' is caused by knowledge. Then (it may be said), for difference, removable by knowledge, like the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, there is no illusoriness; even thus, the aspect in respect of which there is difference of the jīva from Brahman, is it through that same aspect that there is non-difference too, or through some other aspect? On the first, when difference is removed, non-difference too would be removed, because of the identity of the aspect which determines them (the two). On the second, in the case of the jīva that is of the nature of the partless Brahman, difference which is an attribute cannot be removed by ritualistic acts. Even if it be removed by knowledge, if the jīva be qualified *per accidens* by that difference, then the jīva would be but Brahman (and there would be no difference *cum non-difference*). If then it be qualified by difference (as by a proprium), when difference perishes, the jīva too would perish. If then (it be said that) that even on the perishing of the qualified form, the jīva in the aspect of the substrate (of the qualification), would enjoy release consisting in identity with Brahman, then, it should be admitted that even in the stage of transmigration the jīva is that same substrate-aspect, which has attained identity with Brahman; for, difference of loci is not possible for transmigration and release. Hereby is

¹ Mund., III, ii, 9

refuted this too, which is stated by Amṛtananda, viz., that as between jīva and Brahman there are not simultaneously difference and non-difference, because of contradiction, but that there is difference at the stage of (their being) word-senses, and impartiteness at the stage of the sentence-sense. There is also conflict with such śruti texts as 'It is to be seen as one alone',¹ 'There are no different whatever here'.² Nor does a śruti text like 'He who stands within the self' declare difference *cum* non-difference; rather does it restate the difference established through delusion and teach non-difference alone. How, then, is there remedied the confusion between word-sense and sentence-sense? If this be asked, it is said (in reply): here, in the case of the express word-sense there is no contingency of confusion with the sentence-sense; for the express sense is that which is qualified by adjuncts posited by nescience. As for what is secondarily implied by the word, its being the sentence-sense (too) is certainly acceptable. Therefore there is never any unintelligibility in respect of the impartite sense of the major text.

XIII. Similarly, even such a minor text as 'Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman'³ is related to the impartite sense, since it is the statement of a definition, like the sentence 'The moon is the pre-eminent luminary'. Here, some one who does not know the denotation of the stem 'moon' asks some one else 'In this sphere of luminaries, which is it that is called the moon?' This (latter) too with the intention to state only the denotation of the stem 'moon' uses (the words) 'The moon is the pre-eminent

¹ Brh., IV, iv, 20

² Brh., IV, iv, 19

³ Taitt., II, i

luminary': Here, the word 'luminary' by way of expressing luminosity in general, applies to a particular individual (luminary) by secondary implication; and the word 'pre-eminent' by way of expressing the quality of pre-eminence applies to a particular luminary by secondary implication. Here, since quality and generality are not the signification of the word 'moon', both are excluded, and only the particular luminary in which they are inherent is intimated as the signification of the word 'moon'; thus is established a single signification for the words 'pre-eminent' 'luminary' and 'moon'. Nor thus is there the futility of the two words ('pre-eminent' and 'luminary'); for the word 'luminary' is of use in excluding the non-luminous clouds etc., and the word 'pre-eminent' in excluding stars etc., which are of little luminosity. Thus, impartite sense is to be construed even for the sentence 'Truth, knowledge' etc.

XIV. It is said: since Brahman, which as an existent object is capable of (being the object of) other means of knowledge, is (yet) not known through other means of knowledge, for the Vedāntas which make that known, there is invalidity as for the sense of sight which makes known the existence of elevations and depressions (apparently) present in a picture; in respect of this, it must be asked: is it that when there is capacity for any other means of knowledge and that does not exist, the non-existence of the content is ascertained and (therefore) the illusoriness of verbal testimony is suspected? Or (is it suspected) that validity is dependent on another, as in the case of a human statement, because of having for content a thing that is associated with another means of valid knowledge? Or is it that because of having for content a thing that is capable of (being the object of) another means of valid knowledge, there is suspicion of this (testimony)

being a restatement of what is established by that (other means)? Not the first: for, if, merely because of the non-appearance of another means of knowledge, there be that character (of illusoriness for testimony), there would be undue extension everywhere. Though there be dependence on other means of knowledge in the case of statements of personal origin, that is not possible in the case of Vedic statements. Not the second, since there is not the possession (as content) of a thing that is associated with another means of knowledge. The Vedānta text in dispute has (for content) a thing associated with another means of knowledge, since it has an existent thing for content, like the statement of (the existence of) fruit on the river-bank; if this be said, no; for, being a statement of personal origin is the adjunct (of the *probans* in the alleged inference). Even if the illustration be 'like the recollection of an experienced thing', there is the adjunct 'being generated by another cognition that applied to its (recollection's) own content'. Truly, the Vedānta text was not uttered, after cognising the sense through another means of knowledge, in which case there would be pervasion of the *probans* (too, by the quality which pervades the *probandum* and is said by us to be the adjunct). Then you may think: having established of the Vedānta text that, since it has an existent thing for content, it has a thing capable of another means of knowledge, thereby is to be established its having (for content) a thing associated (with another means of knowledge); then, even for injunctive texts whereby is there prevented the possession of a sense associated (with another means of knowledge), since, as having a sense other than bare non-entity, they have for content what is capable of other means of knowledge? Nor, even because of being an injunctive text, is there the

non-existence of having a sense capable of other means of knowledge; for, in injunctive statements in ordinary experience, there is seen the possession of a sense capable of other means of knowledge. If even there the sense be what is not capable of that, then in the Veda too, because of the impossibility of apprehending the relation (of words) to what is to be done (kārya, which is trans-experiential), there would not be the apprehension of that. If, then, (it be said that) since what is to be done in accordance with the Veda has a nature transcending the three times, there is not for it the capability of (being the object of) other means of knowledge, then for Brahman too, even, because of having a nature devoid of qualities like colour, there could not be the capability of other means of knowledge. If it be said that in respect of Brahman there is another means of knowledge, called the intelligence that is its nature, no; for to that itself belongs Brahman-hood (that is itself Brahman). Even if the intelligence that is its nature should give valid knowledge of Brahman, merely because of having a sense associated with that, there is not the defect of being dependent on that; for, in the case of inference whose sphere is the self-luminous (according to the Prābhākara) cognition of another person, there is not seen the defect of dependence on that (cognition). Nor the third; for, in the case of the sense of sight which has for content a substance capable of cognition by the sense of touch, there is not seen the character of being a restatement. If it be said that this character of being a restatement exists in verbal testimony alone, even thus, how would you remedy this objection in the case of the injunctive text? 'Because, though the sense of the injunction in ordinary experience is capable of other means of knowledge, (the sense) of the Vedic (injunction) is not capable of that;' if this be

said, there is parity of that even in respect of an existent thing. Nor is it possible to lay down a restriction that the suspicion of being a restatement applies to verbal testimony alone; for it may well be said that in respect of a thing known by verbal testimony, it is only the other means of knowledge that is a restatement. Therefore, the Vedic statement, though related to an existent thing, is an independent means of valid knowledge.

XV(a). Now, everywhere, the superior elder, having cognised the sense through another means of knowledge, uses a word in respect of it; and the intermediate elder, cognising the sense from that word, is appetent in respect of that, and cognising that activity, the learner learns (the meaning of the word); and the capacity of the word to give knowledge is in accordance with the learning. Therefore, the object of valid knowledge by the word being only such sense as is associated with another means of knowledge, how can there be independent validity for words?

XV(b). There is not this defect. For, the learner, having cognised by himself, through perception etc., the bare object of knowledge, pot etc., unassociated with other means of knowledge, and being appetent in respect of it, infers on the analogy of himself, even for the intermediate elder, appetency preceded by the cognition of the pure object of knowledge unmixed with another means of knowledge, and thus understands the capacity of the word used by the superior elder to be in respect of that bare object of knowledge. Nor may it be said that though, in the case of what is to be done, it may by itself be the content of the signification of the word, in the case of an existent thing, only as associated with another means of knowledge can it be the content of that (word). Here, the words signifying existents

occurring in the statement of what is to be done, have significant capacity in respect of things not associated with other means of knowledge, since they are present in a statement of what is to be done, like the word signifying what is to be done. And thus, on the analogy of this (kārya-pada), this (conclusion) is to be established even in the case of other words signifying existents. As for the other means of knowledge which was the cause of the superior elder's cognition of the sense, that, through originating the intention to declare, is the cause of the use of the word; but it does not come within the object of knowledge by the word. And that the learner will know when he himself becomes the superior elder and uses words.

XVI(a). Here some object: this effort to demonstrate (the process of) learning is futile, since the word has no relation to sense. Indeed, no sense is validly cognised through such words as 'In the finger-tip there are hundreds of elephant-herds'. Even where in the statement of a trustworthy person that (sense) is cognised validly, there too that valid knowledge is caused by another means of knowledge, not caused by the word.

XVI(b). This objection the Prābhākara answers thus: though through statements of personal origin there is not validly cognised the relation to what is denoted, yet the particular cognition of the speaker, in the form 'Thus does this person cognise', is certainly validly cognised; for this is not inconstant even in such statements as that about the finger-tip. And this particular cognition postulates a particular object of cognition.

XVI(c). This answer is unintelligible, because of irrelevance; when the relation of word to sense is objected to, the

relation of a *probans* (the cognition of the speaker) to sense is declared (in reply); what is relevant and to which? If it be said that through the channel of the speaker's cognition there is declared the relation of word to sense, no; for, it is not possible for the speaker's cognition to be the object of valid knowledge by the word; for in statements like 'Bring the cow' there is no word to express the speaker's cognition, (and) the sentence-sense is not different from the word-senses. Even if (the sentence-sense be) different, is the speaker's cognition alone the sentence-sense or (that cognition) as qualified by the object of knowledge? On the first, in respect of an object of knowledge not known from statements in ordinary experience, there would be no empirical usage (resulting from them). And since there is no learning through those (statements in ordinary experience) there is the continuance of Vedic statements too not giving (any) knowledge. On the second let the object of knowledge be alone validly cognised from the sentence, since the speaker's cognition is otherwise explained as inferable from the *probans* consisting in the use of the word.

XVI(d). Now, even the object of knowledge is otherwise explained, for, the hearer understanding the word-senses from the words, guesses on the strength of their use in conjunction that there is certainly a relation of them (sentence-sense, the *jñeya*). If this be said, not so; for the guess itself here is a valid knowledge generated by the sentence. This guess does not come within memory, doubt or error; for there does not exist generation by residual impression, or duality of alternatives or sublation. Since, though (thus) valid knowledge, there are not such other causes (of knowledge) as perception, there remains its being generated by the sentence. Nor is it possible to postulate relation of word-senses (i. e.,

sentence-sense), because of the inferred speaker's cognition which is unintelligible in the absence of an object of knowledge (consisting in the above-said relation); for in that case since there is no speaker in respect of the Veda the valid knowledge of (the said) relation would be non-established. Therefore the cognition of the relation is only from verbal testimony.

XVI(e). As for sentences like that about the finger-tip, there is no reaching to the sense, since the relation (between word-senses) is that of an untrustworthy person. For, in the case of perception, though reaching to the thing, it is seen that, when there is a defect, there is no reaching to the thing, nacre etc. There is not possible, indeed, in the case of the revelation of non-duality, which is of non-personal origin, any defect, because of which there might be suspected non-reaching to the sense. If perception etc., which present duality, conflict therewith, then let those alone be sublated; for, in 'Indra through māyās'¹ etc., there is declared their generation by the defect called māya, (and) since though generated by a defect there results, as for dream, validity in respect of non-discord with empirical usage. Even the revelation of non-duality sublates in the case of duality, the content of perception etc., the element of reality alone, not the element of accord with empirical usage. And this being the case, just as for perception etc., though the products of māya, there is validity in regard to their respective contents, the objects of empirical usage, similarly, for the revelation of non-duality, though the product of māya, why should there not be validity in regard to its own content, non-duality? Nor may there be suspected in this case undue extension in regard to such

¹ Brh., II, v, 19

cognition as that of nacre-silver; for, even there, up to sublation, the intrinsic validity of the cognition of the merely apparent silver etc. is not avoided, as otherwise appetency (in respect of them) would be unintelligible; for, the empirical usage (i. e., designation) of the invalidity (of that cognition) is only through a consideration of the sublation which comes at the time of specific cognition (say, of the nacre as nacre). Nor of the knowledge of non-duality is there sublation at any time, in which case there might be declared (of it) this kind of invalidity.

XVI(f). Now, in the case of the visual cognition having for content elevations and depressions in a picture, invalidity is seen because of the defect, called the configuration of black and other lines, present in the picture; similarly here too, there is invalidity because of the defect called non-duality. If this be said, no; for, there too, the invalidity is only because of sublation by tactual cognition. In the case of validity consisting in knowing a thing not already known, it is not possible even to suspect the need for accord (with something else).

XVII. Nor may it be said, that, since all scripture is for the sake of ritual, there is validity for injunctive texts alone; for, there is reciprocal dependence in that if validity be established to be for injunctive texts alone, there is the establishment of all Scripture being for the sake of ritual, and when this is established there is the establishment of the other.

XVIII. Nor may it be objected 'Since there is not what is to be accomplished by appetency and desistence, viz., the attainment of the desired and the remedying of the undesired, in respect of Brahman that is (thus) not a human goal, how

can there be validity for the Vedāntas?' The world, indeed, directly seeks only the attainment of the desired and the remedying of the undesired, but not appetency and desistence, since these are of the nature of exertion. Since in attaining a village etc., not attained before, and in the remedying of a disease etc., not already remedied, there is not the accomplishment of what is desired in the absence of exertion, a person may even put up with exertion. Where, however, a person not knowing what is already attained, like the gold ornament round his neck, desires to attain it again, and desires to avoid the rope-snake etc., though (in reality) avoided, since there what is desired is accomplished by mere knowledge, why should he put up with exertion? Exertion is not indeed needed here; on the contrary, when there is knowledge, even the earlier exertion is avoided. And this being the case, in the attainment of the eternally attained Brahman and in the remedying of the eternally remedied transmigration, what is the cause is the knowledge of the truth; for the Vedāntas which generate it, whence the suspicion of their culminating in what is not a human goal? Therefore, the validity of the Vedāntas in respect of Brahman cannot be prevented by any one.

XIX. Further, if a human goal be the determinant of validity, it would be difficult to establish in the system of the Guna (Prabhākara), the validity of the texts relating to obligatory and occasioned rites. For there is no fruit there, but only exertion in the performance; in the non-performance, however, sin is manifest (as the consequence). Thus, in the case of those (texts) which are the cause of evil in both ways, how can there be the establishment of validity? Therefore for verbal testimony too, as for perception etc., the (efficient) cause of validity is only the making known of a

sense which is not already known, is unsublated and not subject to doubt. And that is common to the texts, about both what is to be done and Brahman. And this being the case, the assumption of having an injunction for purport, made with great effort, by the upholder of the *prima facie* view, for establishing the invalidity of the Vedāntas, that is a dance out of place. Therefore, the validity of the Vedāntas in regard to Brahman is established.

HERE ENDS THE EIGHTH VARNĀKA.

NINTH VARNAKA.

I. Those who even while admitting the significance of words in respect of an existent object, think that in respect of Brahman validity is not possible for the Vedantas, their view was refuted in the earlier varnaka. Those, again, who thinking that there is significance for words in respect of their own sense only as associated with what is to be accomplished (karya), say that Brahman is known from the Vedantas only as subsidiary to what is to be accomplished. their view is refuted in this varnaka.

II. These, indeed, say thus. When it is said by the superior elder 'Bring the cow', the learner who desires to learn sees the cow-bringing performed by the intermediate elder and understands 'the act of cow-bringing has been made known (to that intermediate elder) by this statement'; then, in such usages as 'Bring the horse, tie up the cow' by a process of insertion and deletion, he understands the capacity of each word in respect of its own sense as associated with what is to be accomplished. Nor is learning possible in respect of what is (merely) an instrument to the desired; for in respect of such instruments to the desired etc., as are past, there is not the activity of the intermediate elder (whence there could be learning). If it be said that there is activity in regard to such instrument of the desired as is capable of being willed, then because of non-inconstancy, what is to be accomplished would itself be the determinant of learning. If merely because of non-inconstancy, what is to be accomplished be the determinant, then

even for the worldliness present in what is to be accomplished, that being non-inconstant, there is the contingency of being the determinant of learning and thus there would not be the cognition of the *niyoga* (unseen result as urge, taught) in the Veda; if this be said, no; for if, leaving out what is to be accomplished, the determinant be admitted to be only its own sense as related, there is the contingency of possession of expectancy (i. e. incompleteness), in the form 'related to what?' Nor thus, in leaving out 'worldliness' is there sublation. Now, though for words about the existent there be possible their own sense as related to what is to be accomplished, for the word about what is to be accomplished, there is not that possibility, since there is not something else to be accomplished. If this be said, no; for even the stem-sense being what is to be accomplished, the word about what is to be accomplished (i. e., the sense of the suffix) is learnt (to have significance) in respect of the *niyoga* (unseen result) related to that (*kārya* which is the stem-sense). Though in ordinary experience there are used sentences like 'The tree has fruit', though devoid of what is to be accomplished, yet there is to be understood there the importation of what is to be accomplished, in the form 'Look at that'; for, the word, whose meaning is learnt as related to what is to be accomplished, cannot give knowledge in the absence of what is to be accomplished. Therefore, since, in the absence of a fruit to be accomplished by appetition or desistence, the use of a sentence is unintelligible, the Vedāntas are related to a *niyoga* (unseen result). Nor do we see any fruit from the mere knowledge of the truth, as in the rope-snake and the gold ornament round one's neck. Nor is this in accord with the śāstra; for, if it be so, there is the contingency of the non-injunction of reflection and contemplation subsequent to the

hearing (study). Nor may it be objected that if the entire Veda be related to injunction, there should be only one *Mīmāṃsā* in sixteen chapters; for their difference is secured through the (distinct) natures as injunction of ritual and injunction of cognition. These Vedānta texts, which declare the nature of Brahman, like 'Reality alone dear one'¹ etc., all these intimate the particular self only as subsidiary to such injunctions as 'He is to be sought',² there being the expectancy 'Who is this self (to be sought)?' Therefore, for the Vedāntas, there is not the declaration of the non-dual not subsidiary to anything else.

III(a). To this it is said (in reply). The *niyoga* and Brahman cannot both be validly known through the Vedāntas, because of the contingency of the two conflicting sets of three consequences; and this has been elaborated in the second *varṇaka* of the first aphorism. Nor is it possible to have valid knowledge of the *niyoga* alone, since there is not demonstrated what is enjoined.

III(b). Brahman-knowledge from verbal testimony is not what is enjoined; for what (knowledge) is superficial is produced even from learning by rote; and (as for) ascertainment (it) is generated by inquiry; otherwise, even for the knowledge of *agnihotra* etc., there is the contingency of non-establishment through the learning by rote of the texts relating thereto and through the inquiry about them.

III(c). Nor in respect of Brahman known by verbal testimony is there to be enjoined a continuity of recollection; for if that injunction have an unseen result for fruit, for release too, as for heaven etc., there is the contingency of

¹ *Chand.*, VI, ii, 1

² *Chand.*, VIII, vii, 1

non-eternality because of being generated by acts. Then (it may be said) just as by continuous massage of the limbs there is origination of a continuity of pleasure, so even by the continuity of recollection whose content is the desired Brahman, there may be the visible result, a continuity of happiness; then since that is established by co-presence and co-absence, there is futility of injunction. Then, let the fruit of the injunction of the continuity of recollection be the intuition of what is recollected: if this be said, even then, would the continuity of recollection originate of itself the intuition, or through the channel of an unseen result, or through the channel of another cognition? Not the first. For the continuity of mediate cognitions of the nature of recollection is not capable of generating the (immediate) intuition of the content; otherwise even continuity of inferential cognitions would generate intuition of the inferred. On the second too, the mere unseen result generated by the continuity of recollection is not capable of originating intuition, since intuition is generated by a means of valid knowledge. If the means of valid knowledge be auxiliary to the unseen result, when the intuition is originated even by the means of valid knowledge, there is futility of the unseen result. Nor the third; for there is the contingency of the defect, on such inquiry as whether that other cognition generated by the continuity of recollection is of itself the generator of intuition, or through an unseen result.

III(d). Now, then, let there be enjoined contemplation in respect of Brahman known from verbal testimony. Nor is contemplation but the continuity of recollection, since the continuity of recollection has a (real) thing for its sphere, while contemplation is possible even with an imposed content.

Nor is there absence of fruit, since the immediacy of Brahman is the fruit. It is indeed seen that because of the capacity of a high degree of repetition of contemplation, there is immediacy of the dead son etc. Nor is there the contingency of delusiveness, in the very same way, for the immediacy of Brahman; for there exists the accord with verbal testimony, a means of valid knowledge; for even in the case of the dream-intuition of objects, it is seen in the case of some that there is validity when there is accord with waking experience.

III(e). This is not sound, because of the contingency of the abandonment of intrinsic validity. And in dream, in the absence of the activity of the sense of sight etc., intuition of a thing is not possible. As for the accord with waking experience, that is intelligible because of similarity.

III(f). Then, though a stream of recollection and contemplation be not enjoined, it is enjoined that he who desires release should accomplish a super-normal cognition, which is certainly other than cognition from verbal testimony, and for which hearing, reflection etc. are the instruments, the study of the Veda etc. the *modus operandi* and the immediacy of Brahman the fruit. If this be said, not so; for, it is more in accord with parsimony to assume for the Vedāntas validity in respect of Brahman itself directly than to assume validity in respect of an enjoined cognition giving valid knowledge of Brahman. Nor is association with an injunction the cause of validity, but rather the generation of valid knowledge; otherwise the text about agnihotra etc. would relate even to the (unseen result of the) injunction of the *darsa-pūrnāmāsa*, since there is no distinction in respect of being associated with an injunction. And from texts like 'Truth, knowledge

etc.¹ valid knowledge arises in respect of Brahman alone, not in respect of injunction. Nor may it be objected that the Vedic validity associated with injunction is certainly other than validity in ordinary experience. For just as the word-senses are just the same in the Veda as in ordinary experience, similarly, validity both worldly and Vedic is (but) one. Thus therefore it is not possible to demonstrate any object of injunction in the case of the Vedāntas.

IV. Nor is the *niyoga* (urge) easy to demonstrate. In ordinary experience, indeed, in 'The teacher urges the pupil' etc., what is considered *niyoga* is a particular import, which is of the nature of the prompting of an inferior person by a superior person. And this is not possible in the case of the Veda which is of non-personal origin. Now what is called *niyoga* is an urge and the functioning of an urge is well established in that thing which is understood by a cognition of what is to be accomplished. If this be said, what is this which is called that which is to be accomplished? Is it what is associated with volition, or what is capable of being willed, or something supernormal which, while being capable of being willed, is different from an act, causal correlate or fruit? Not the first; for, volition is human appetency while what is to be accomplished is the cause of appetency; and for what is associated with appetency, causality in respect of appetency is not possible, since there would be self-dependence in part. Not the second; for in the case of instruments of misery, they too being what are to be accomplished, as capable of being willed, there is the contingency of their prompting (appetency). Not the third, since in the case of this, which is not the sphere of perception etc., and is incapable of being learnt, being declared by verbal testimony

¹Taitt., II, 1

is impossible. Nor when there is not acknowledged 'what is to be accomplished' as held by others, is there the non-existence of a prompter; for that instrument to the desired which is capable of being willed is the prompter. Because of accepting the qualification 'capable of being willed' there is no inconstancy in respect of the rise of the moon etc. (considered as instruments of the desired). Though for the fruit too which is capable of being willed there is the character of prompting, yet that which as the cause of the learner's learning is the cause of the intermediate elder's activity, consisting in bringing the cow etc., is but the instrument to the desired. And thus this learning of what is to be accomplished, which was established, with great effort, that is not unacceptable to us, since the character of what is to be accomplished is admitted only of that instrument to the desired which is capable of being willed. It is one and the same thing that as determined by volition is said to be what is to be accomplished and as determined by desire is said to be the instrument of the desired. Nor may it be objected that, just as in respect of this supernormal which is held by others to be what is to be accomplished (kārya), even in the case of what is an instrument to the desired and capable of being willed, yet has not been experienced, there is no means of valid knowledge; for, understanding instrumentality to the desired through co-presence and co-absence in the case of the past food, drink etc., that (instrumentality) is inferred in the case of those of the future too. Not thus is it possible to infer what is to be accomplished in the view of others, because of the contradiction of its being supernormal. Therefore the sense of injunction is but that instrument of the desired as is capable of being willed, but not niyoga (the unseen result or urge.)

V. And even this kind of injunction is not possible in the Vedāntas. There, what is desired is release consisting in the removal of nescience; and the instrument thereto is the knowledge of the truth, the oneness of Brahman and the self. This relationship of end and means is established in ordinary experience, since by knowledge of the truth, *nāśa*, there is seen the removal of nescience about that. Therefore, for the Vedāntas, if they have the injunction of that (knowledge) for purport, there is the contingency of being restatements. Now, since there is no learning (of word-sense) in respect of the existent, even the having of Brahman for purport is not possible; if this be said, no; for, in (sentences) like 'The madhukara drinks honey from the freshly blossomed lotus' for the person to whom the sense of the word 'madhukara' is not known, there is seen learning (of the word-sense) even in respect of an existent thing (the bee), because of proximity to (the other) known words. Nor may there be assumed the importation of what is to be accomplished, since there exists neither fruit nor evidence (therefor). Nor is this the fruit—that learning is (thus seen to be) not inconstant to what is to be accomplished; for, this (non-inconstancy) itself is not admitted up to now. Therefore, the validity of the Vedāntas is in respect of Brahman alone.

VI. Here some think (thus). There is indeed no oneness between the *jīva* and Brahman; for in 'Then, that supreme resplendent light which shines beyond this'¹ it is declared of Brahman denoted by the word 'light' that it exists outside the world (*brahmāṇḍa*, the cosmic sphere). If there be conflict with the śruti text about omnipresence, then, Brahman though present everywhere would have no contact with the *jīva* or the world, because of the śruti text 'This Person, verily, is

¹ Chānd., III, xiii, 7

unattached'.¹ As for the śruti text 'I am Brahman'² it lays down contemplation in the form of a superimposed identity; and from that contemplation release will result, like heaven from sacrifice. Nor if the Vedāntas have the injunction of contemplation for purport would there be non-establishment of the existence of Brahman; for, on the principle of the section about the (physical forms of) deities, when there is neither establishment by other means of knowledge nor conflict (with such), validity is possible (for the Vedāntas) even in respect of their own sense (i. e. the existence and nature of Brahman). Nor, if Brahman be different from the jīva, is there conflict with the śruti text of non-duality; for that text has for content Brahman who is above modifications (and is in Himself non-dual); and His oneness is admitted. Nor, if release be the fruit of a niyoga (injunction), is there non-eternity as for heaven etc.; for the inferenc is sublated by the śruti text 'He does not return'.³

VII. This is not sound; for it is impossible for release, which has neither beginning nor end, to be accomplishable by an act in the nature of contemplation. Such śruti texts as 'And being (already) released, he is released',⁴ 'Being (already) Brahman, he attains Brahman'⁵ declare the beginninglessness of release. And such (texts) as 'By knowledge, he enjoys immortality',⁶ 'He who is well established in Brahman attains immortality'⁷ declare (its) imperishability. Similarly

¹ Bṛh., IV, iii, 15

² Bṛh., I, iv, 10

³ Chānd., VIII, xv, 1

⁴ Kaṭha., 1

⁵ Bṛh., IV, iv, 6

⁶ Isa., 11

⁷ Chānd., II, xxiii, 2

there is also to be called up reasoning favourable to this (position). And if release should have a beginning, there would follow its having an end. And if it should have an end, (then) because of fresh bondage, there is the contingency of a figurative sense for the word 'release'. Similarly, if it be accomplishable by an act, then, as in the case of the fruit of prosperity, whereby can be prevented the relation to a body, senses etc., and the capacity to increase or decrease? Since there is seen diversity among fruits of karma (action), release too, which is devoid of a body etc., may be the fruit of that; if this be said, no; for being devoid of a body etc. is of the very nature (of the self). It is thus. For the self, conjunction with the body is not intelligible, since that (former) is partless; nor is inherence (intelligible), since in respect of the body there is not intimate causality (for the self) or the nature of the genus etc.; similarly is to be understood the refutation of such (relation) as *tādātmya* (identity in difference); therefore, there being no real relation, non-embodiedness is natural; being embodied, however, is the product of illusory cognition: this should be admitted. And illusory cognition is not removed by acts. Nor is it possible to say that release which is certainly non-embodied is modified in another way through acts; for, modification is impossible in the case of the immutable.

VIII. Now, even thus, merely because of being accomplishable by contemplation, how is there for release establishment of increase etc.? If this be asked, it is said (in reply). Here, for the contemplation, is there or is there not any definition by its own nature or by number or by time? If not, then, in the case of contemplation, whose particularity has not been defined, the performance would be impossible,

If there is, then it should be exhibited. It is not indeed possible to show the definition of its own nature in the form 'So much is this' like the definition of the *darśa-pūrnāmāsa* with its subsidiaries. Nor is there definition by number, since there is not seen any such rule as that a thousand or a hundred thousand cognitions are the means to release. Nor is there definition by time, since there is no evidence for a rule that there is release for one who has contemplated for one year or a hundred years or a thousand. If it be said that death alone is the limit (to contemplation), even thus, there is not obtained a uniform definition of the means, as for the *darśa-pūrnāmāsa*; for since a person may die in a year or in ten or in a hundred or in a thousand, there is the contingency of increase or decrease through difference in persons. If it be said that the immediacy of what is contemplated is the limit, even thus, since for each one there is immediacy after a particular time, the increase and decrease in respect of the means remain the same; therefore even in respect of their fruit, release, increase and decrease are difficult to avoid; for in ordinary experience and in the Veda, because of difference of degree in the act, there is seen difference of degree in its fruit too. Nor may it be objected that though there be not uniformity for contemplation, there may be uniformity of the fruit, because of the *śāstra*; for, if the *śāstra* is otherwise unintelligible, it is not possible to assume what is opposed to reason. Therefore, in conformity with such reasoning as that what is produced by an act is non-eternal, there results non-eternality etc. for release (effected by an act).

IX. As for what was said, that this reasoning is sublated by the *śruti* declaration of non-return, that is unsound. Here, which is the sublater? Is it the text 'He attains

Brahmaloka, he does not return',¹ or is it the text 'This path of the gods is itself the path of Brahmā; they who reach by this do not return to creation in the period of this Manu'?² Not the first, since that is a denial of what is not contingent. There is indeed no contingency of return (even) at the time of attaining brahma-loka. If then the sentence-sense be assumed to be 'He will not return' that is not (admissible); for, there being conflict with such texts as 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment acquired here by acts etc.',³ and with inference, it is not possible to abandon the expressed sense and assume an unexpressed sense. On the second (text), however, the qualification 'this' shows return during the period of another Manu. Now, if for the text declaring non-return in this aeon, there be purport also in regard to the declaration of return, in another aeon, there would be sentence-split; if this be said, no, since the return (in another aeon) is presumptively implied (not expressed by the text). Otherwise this objection would be difficult to answer in all statements with a qualification. Now this text applying in each aeon negates return in each; thence is presumptively established the absoluteness of non-return. If this be said, no, because of difference in him who has attained (in each aeon). For in those who have attained in this aeon, there is return in a future aeon; for those who attain in that kalpa there will be return in an aeon subsequent to that; thus should it be admitted, because of the futility otherwise of the qualification ('this').

X. Now, then, let it be that release is certainly non-eternal, since even the non-eternal, like heaven etc., is seen

¹ Chānd., VIII, xv, 1

² Maitri., VI, 30

³ Chānd., VIII, 1, 6

to be a human goal; and thus, release will be accomplishable by the act of contemplation. If this be said, is it in conformity with reasoning that it is said thus, or in conformity with śruti? Not the first; for, by all, Sāṅkhyas, Yogas, Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas etc., the very persons who have the conceit that they know reasoning, it is certainly admitted in conformity with their respective systems that, when beginningless illusory cognition is removed by knowledge of the truth, there is release, and that it is eternal. Not the second; for such śruti texts as 'He who knows thus "I am Brahman" becomes all this',¹ 'Seeing this, the Rei Vamadeva declared',² 'You are our father, you who make us cross to the other side of nescience',³ 'Again, at the end there is the removal of the nescience that is the world',⁴ 'They who know this become immortal',⁵ which exhibit imperishable release on the destruction of nescience that is certainly contemporaneous with the intuition of Brahman as the self, do not tolerate even the suspicion of the entry of any act (in the attainment of that).

XI. Now, such śāstra as 'I am Brahman' has not for purport the oneness of Brahman and the self; but, when Brahman, that is different from the jīva, and is not opposed to any other means of valid knowledge, is understood from the śāstra, that (kind of text) will have for purport one of these—imaginary identification, superimposition, kriyā-yoga and purification. Of these, what is called imaginary identification is seeing a great thing in a small thing as substrate; for example, in the mind which is small, there is, because of

¹ Brh., I, iv, 10

² Brh., I, iv, 10

³ Prāṇa., VI, 8

⁴ Śvet., I, 10

⁵ Brh., IV, iv, 14

similarity in respect of the infinitude of its psychoses, the imaginary identification with the infinite All-gods and the conquest of the infinite worlds, since there is the śruti text 'infinite indeed is the mind, infinite are the All-gods, he certainly conquers the infinite world thereby'.¹ Similarly, in the jīva, because of similarity in respect of the nature of intelligence, there is made the imaginary identification with Brahman, and Brahman is attained as the fruit. Superimposition, however, is seeing one thing in another; for example, because of the śruti text 'The sun is Brahman'² there is the vision of Brahma in the sun which is not of the nature of Brahma; similarly, here too, in the the jīva which is not of the nature of Brahma, there is the vision of Brahma. Of these (two), to treat the substrate as if non-existent and to contemplate the imagined alone as principal is imaginary identification; to contemplate the substrate itself as principal is superimposition; thus is their discrimination. Kriyā-yoga, however, is thus; just as in the text 'Vāyu verily is the devourer',³ because of the relation to the act of devouring in that it devours fire etc., there is contemplation of Vāyu as possessing the quality of devouring, similarly, in the case of the jīva, because of the relation to the sense of *br̥h* (growing) present in itself, there is contemplation as having the quality of Brahman. And just as purification results for the paddy-grains etc., the subsidiaries of ritual, by sprinkling, seeing etc., similarly, for the self, which as agent is subsidiary to ritual, purification is effected by seeing it as Brahman.

XII. This is not sound. Is it for fear of conflict with the presentation of difference between the jīva and Brahman

¹ Brh., III, 1, 9

² Chānd., III, xix, 1

³ Brh., I, iv, 7

that there is assumed for the Vedāntas purport in regard to imaginary identification etc.? Or is it because there is no purport in regard to the oneness of the jīva and Brahman? Or is it (assumed) in conformity with the fruit? Not the first; for even where there is non-difference, the presentation of difference is intelligible as between prototype and reflection. Not the second; for the oneness declared in 'I am Brahman' is justified by the arthavāda passage about entry in 'That one entered here'¹ and by the condemnation of difference in 'Then, he who worships a different god, saying "He is different, I am different", he does not know'.² Thus even in all (other) śruti texts, there are to be understood entry etc., which are marks of purport in regard to oneness. Not the third. The removal of nescience and the identification of the self with Brahman are declared by śruti to be the fruit. And that is not intelligible if the purport be imaginary identification etc., for, in the case of imaginary identification etc., which are not of things as they are and are hence invalid cognitions, it is not possible that they can remove nescience; further, there is contradiction in one being of the nature of another. Therefore, the śāstra has oneness for purport.

XIII. Here some one says (thus). The jīva is different and non-different from Brahman. And thus there come to be reconciled the eternal release of Brahman and the eternal bondage of the jīva. If, however, there be absolute non-difference, how could Brahman itself create the world for its own transmigration? And the attainment of impurity by the pure is contradictory.

¹ Chand., IV, III, 1

² Brh., I, iv, 10

XIV. To this it is said (in reply). Between the *jīva* and Brahman there does not exist the relation of the general and the particular, the relation of the quality and the possessor of the quality, the relation of the effect and cause, the relation of the qualified and the pure, or the relation of part and whole, since there is no evidence. Nor are difference and non-difference seen anywhere in the absence of that (relation of one of the above kinds). If it be said that, because of the *smṛti* 'In the world of *jīvas*, a part of me alone'¹ etc., there is the relation of part and whole, no; because of conflict with the *śruti* text 'without *kalas*'² which declares partlessness. The *śruti* text 'All beings are one quarter of him'³ does not declare the relation of part and whole, but declares the little-ness of the *jīva* in order to declare the infinitude of Brahman; otherwise in the case of Brahman with parts, there is the contingency of being created by the parts, as in the case of pot etc. Now partlessness is of its nature; having parts is caused by adjuncts like the intellect; hence there is not the said defect. If this be said, even thus real difference would not be established. Indeed, the partless ether cannot be really cut by the edge of a sword etc. If then, for the internal organ etc., there exist the capacity really to differentiate Brahman, then, how could Brahman create adjuncts for its own evil? Nor is that creation for the sake of the *jīva*, since prior to that creation the difference of *jīva* (from Brahman) is non-established. Nor do *karma*, nescience and residual impressions differentiate the *jīva*, though (themselves) non-existent prior to the origination of the internal organ; for it is acknowledged

¹ Gita., XV, 7

² Śvet., VI, 19

³ Puruṣasūkt., II, 1

only of the substance, the internal organ, that it is an adjunct of the jīva; (the others not being substances cannot be adjuncts of the jīva, itself a substance). Now, as between the blue and the yellow (objects) difference is natural, while non-difference is conditioned by such generic nature as substance-ness; if this be said, then, there would not be the apposition 'This self is Brahman';¹ for there is not the apposition 'The blue is the yellow'. Then (it may be said), difference is neither created, nor beginningless; but being merely conditioned by adjuncts it is manifest in Brahman; then, this superimposition of that on what is not that could be only a delusion. How can difference based on valid evidence be delusive? If this be asked, no; for in respect of the difference of the jīva from Brahman, perception etc. do not apply. As for revelation, that does not declare difference; on the contrary, in (the words) 'This is thy self, the internal ruler, immortal,'² it declares non-difference, and denies difference in 'Other than this there is no seer'³ etc. Nor is this the evidence for difference, viz., the unintelligibility otherwise of the distinction between being a transmigrator and not being a transmigrator; for non-difference too being accepted (by you) the non-distinction remains the same. Truly when the ether is defined by pot, and smoke etc. made to enter it, it is not possible to avoid the conjunction of ether (in general) with smoke; for the quality of ether-ness belongs to it only as including the part defined by the pot. Even if the distinction be stated in dependence on the aspect of difference, then on our view too, why should there not be distinction through the conjunction

¹Brh., II, v, 19

²Brh., III, vii, 8

³Brh., III, vii, 28

and non-conjunction of nescience etc. with Brahman? If it be said that in respect of one and the same thing the existence and non-existence of conjunction are contradictory, no; for there is admitted by you the existence and non-existence of difference in the same place. What is called non-difference is not the non-existence of difference, but another attribute called oneness; if this be said, even thus, difference and non-difference are certainly contrary, since each is what removes the other. The oneness of the body and the self, cognised in the form 'I am a man' is removed by the manifestation of difference between the body and the self in 'I am not a man, but I am Brahman', just as the difference cognised in 'There are two moons' is removed by the cognition of the oneness of the moon. Therefore, you who are afraid of conflict, how do you admit difference and non-difference? Or, if that be admitted, what is your aversion to those (the existence and non-existence of conjunction) which can easily explain those two (difference and non-difference) in Brahman through the conjunction of nescience, on the analogy of the prototype and the reflection? Nor is there for you any example of this, that while the jīva that is a part is a transmigrator, there is not that (character) for Brahman, the whole. Indeed, when a part of a cloth or a part of the body is touched by a caṇḍāla or a person in pollution, it does not come about that the whole cloth or whole body need not be washed. Therefore, on your view, there is no non-transmigratoriness for Brahman; on the contrary, being non-different from all jīvas and all the worlds, Brahman would see the entire host of defects in itself. And thus, the attainment of that kind of Brahman not being a human goal, the commencement of the sāstra etc. would be unintelligible. For, even if by knowledge,

contemplation etc., one's own adjunct be somehow resolved, it is not possible to resolve the adjuncts of all jīvas without residue, so that in Brahman all defects could be remedied. On our view, however, in Brahman there is not any defect; for in the case of the darkness etc. of the reflection no relation is seen to the prototype. And the release from all adjuncts, through knowledge of the truth, is intelligible, since of all things whatever posited in dreams, there is seen the removal on waking.

XV. All adjuncts being removed by the knowledge of the truth in the case of Śuka, Vāmadeva etc., there is the contingency of the non-cognition of transmigration now; if this be said, no, since that (objection) is common to your view too. Even if there be release for one jīva in one aeon, there having been release for infinite jīvas in the infinite prior aeons, how could transmigration be cognised? The establishment of transmigration now, on the basis of experience, is common to both (of us). The justification, however, can be stated somehow by us alone, who maintain a single self. It is thus. You who ask of me about the distinction between bondage and release, you alone, the substrate of all positing, the one homogeneous intelligence, are the self; other than you, all jīvas, who are released, being released, and to be released, are posited by your nescience, as in dreams. And the śruti, about the release of Vāmadeva etc., has the purpose of praising Brahman-knowledge, in order to interest you. And this being the case, the doubt 'for whom are there bondage and release?' does not arise in the state of transmigration or in the state of release. Thus, in the sight of each person, he alone is the self; being thus taught by the preceptor and by śūtra, doubt does not arise for any one; hence, what is unintelligible here?

XVI. Therefore, since in the view of the self as one impartite essence there is no unintelligibility, when the true nature of the self is taught by the śāstra with that purport, there being as of dreams the immediate resolution of nescience and its products in the non-dual Brahman, where is the occasion for the acts of contemplation in the form of imaginary identification etc.? Hence it is that śruti denies Brahman being an object of contemplation, in 'That which is not thought by mind, that by which, they say, the mind is thought, that alone is Brahman; know that, not this (other) which this (world) contemplates'.¹ Nor may it be thought that it may be the object even of contemplation just as it is the object of knowledge; for, by the text 'It is certainly other than the known, it is more than the unknown'² its being the object even of knowledge is denied. Though not the object of knowledge, Brahman is figuratively spoken of as the object of knowledge through śāstra, since there is the removal of nescience and its product by that psychosis of the internal organ, which is of the form of Brahman, the one impartite essence, is associated with the manifestation of intelligence, and is generated by the śāstra. Since by mere proximity it offers to this psychosis its own form consisting of the one impartite essence, there is for Brahman, as for the pot etc., which offer their respective forms, objectness consisting in being pervaded by the psychosis; with this in view, there (are) set out such śruti texts as 'By the mind alone is it to be perceived',³ 'This minute self is to be known by the mind',⁴ 'That person propounded in the Upaniṣads'⁵

¹ Kena, 5

² Kena, 8

³ Brh., IV, iv, 19

⁴ Muṇḍ., III, i, 9

⁵ Brh., III, ix, 26

etc. Since in the self-luminous Brahman there is not, as in the inert pot etc., the possibility of an excellence of manifestation effected by the means of valid knowledge, such śruti texts as 'That whence words turn back'¹ also declare non-object-ness consisting in non-existence of pervasion by the fruit (of knowledge). Nor is there absolute non-existence of fruit here; for, through the adjunct of 'being manifested by a psychosis of the internal organ', Brahman-intelligence itself is figuratively spoken of as the fruit, inasmuch as even in pot etc., this alone is spoken of as the fruit. That has been said: 'That consciousness, accepted as the fruit in external things, which are objects of knowledge, that itself is here the thing that is known, on the evidence of what is said in the Vedānta'.² Therefore, Brahman-intelligence as defined (by the psychosis) coming to have the state of fruit, in the penultimate instant, removes in the final instant the psychosis that defines it. Since, subsequent to that, there is nothing that can define, it abandons the state of fruit, and in the stage of release remains over as bare non-determinate intelligence. And this being the case, the eternally released Brahman itself, being reflected in its own nescience etc., attains the state of jīva, migrates, and by its own knowledge is liberated; this is what is said.

XVII(a). Now, thus, if the jīva itself be Brahman, by the two words in sentences like 'That thou art' there would be repetition; to remedy this, difference and non-difference should be admitted. If this be said, no; for in that case, there would not be established the removal of (elements of) transmigration like the body, senses etc., by the knowledge

¹ Taitt. II, iv, 1

² Sambandhavārtika, v. 160

of the sentence-sense. It is thus. Is it by reasoning that that removal is established, or by such revelation as 'The knot of the heart is cut'¹ etc.? Not the first; for on your view, the sense of the major texts being real difference and non-difference from Brahman even for the jīva qualified by the body etc., by the knowledge having that for sphere the removal of body etc. is impossible. Not the second; for the revelation which is a statement of the present ('is cut') is (but) an arthavāda, where there is conflict with competent non-cognition. If then the purport of the revelation be the removal of the body etc., in the stage of release, even thus, if in the stage of release the element of difference be not removed for the jīva, then, in order to maintain that (difference) there should be admitted such adjuncts as body, senses, internal organ etc.; therefore, there would be no distinction from transmigration. And, if there be removal of the element of difference, then too the removal thereof is not from knowledge of the truth, since this cannot remove its own content, inasmuch as in your view, difference too is the content of knowledge of the truth. Nor is the removal of that through karmas, because of conflict with revelation; for it is admitted of revelation that it declares difference and non-difference (co-existing) at all times. Nor on the view of difference *cum* non-difference is it easy to set forth the word-senses of 'That' and 'Thou'. Of these, which is the jīva, the sense of the word 'Thou'? Is it a whole (constituted) of the two elements—difference and non-difference, or is it the aggregate of the two elements, or is it but the two elements? Even on the first, if the element of non-difference be Brahman, then there would result Brahman's being an element of the jīva and the jīva's having parts. If then

¹Mund., II, ii, 2

the element of non-difference be not Brahman, then there would be but absolute difference. Not the second, because of the contingency of the jīva not being real; for there is not demonstrated an aggregate over and above the elements of the aggregate. Even on the third, is the element of non-difference itself the jīva? Or is it the element of difference? Or is it each of the two elements separately? Or is it the two elements reciprocally non-different? Or is it (the two) even reciprocally different - and non-different? Not the first, because of the contingency of jīva-hood for Brahman itself. Not the second, because of the contingency of absolute difference; and thus there would not be established the empirical usage about knowledge of the truth, release etc. Not the third, because of the contingency of two jīvas. Not the fourth, since then Brahman itself being the jīva, there is non-establishment of the empirical usage about bondage and release. Not the fifth, because of the contingency of the infinite regress of difference and non-difference. And for whom is there the teaching of this śāstra? The teaching is not for the element of non-difference, since, being of the nature of Brahman, it does not require the teaching. Nor is the teaching for the element of difference, because of the impossibility of the cognition 'I am Brahman'. If it be said that, because of non-difference at the stage of release, that cognition stands to reason, (no, since) for the element of difference non-difference is not possible, because of contradiction. Even such defect as nescience does not stand to reason in respect of the element of non-difference, because of (its) contingency in Brahman itself. Nor in respect of the element of difference, since there is no difference prior to the origination of the adjunct (by nescience). If then the jīva be that part or whole which is of itself different without depending

on an adjunct, even thus, since on the perishing of that element the jīva would perish, whose release could be taught, inasmuch as the element of non-difference, Brahman, is eternally released? If release too be different and non-different, then, there would be conflict with the word 'itself' in 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself'¹ and non-distinction from transmigration.

XVII(b). Nor are difference and non-difference needed for the establishment of distinctions, such as that between heaven and hell, bondage and release; for that is established somehow even through difference. Nor do the two stand to reason in one and the same; for difference is relative to a substrate and a counter-correlate and that is not possible in a single thing that is non-different. The śāstra again through destroying difference, in 'Other than that there is no seer',² etc., declares non-difference alone in 'That is thy self',³ but not difference and non-difference. If, then, between jīva and Brahman there is difference *cum* non-difference, since because of their nature there is difference while the non-difference is through such generic nature as (their) reality, substance-ness, etc., then, since their non-difference is known even through inference, there is futility of the śāstra. Thus, therefore, since the doctrine of difference *cum* non-difference is tainted with many defects, and since though the jīva is itself Brahman, two terms are used in the major texts (of the Vedānta), in order to remove the two-fold delusion of having a second and being remote (non-immediate), it is established that, when nescience is removed by the knowledge of the real, arising

¹ Muṇḍ., III, 11, 9

² Brh., III, vii, 23

³ Brh., III, vii, 8

from the text, there remains release, consisting in the eternally established identity of Brahman and the self.

XVIII(a). He, however, who, intolerant of the eternally established character of release, postulates an injunction in respect of knowledge, for the sake of (exhibiting) the accomplishability of that (release), he is to be asked 'Is knowledge enjoined, like sacrifice, etc., for the rise of an unseen fruit, inherent in the *agent*, or for an excellence of fruit in the *object-causal-correlate*?' Not the first; for it is refuted by the contingency, even in release, of increase, decrease etc., in the relation of body, organs, etc., as in the fruit of (worldly) welfare. In the second too, what is this excellence? Is it an origination, modification, attainment or purification? Not origination, because of the contingency of the impermanence of release as of pot etc.

XVIII(b). In respect of this some say thus: for release even if originated, there is not the defect of non-eternality, since there is non-eternality only for what is accomplishable by an act while for release there is accomplishability by knowledge alone. Nor is there seen non-eternality for what is accomplishable solely by knowledge; for even of the residual impression which (is apparently knowledge-originated and) originates recollection, there is admitted (its) accomplishability by the (cognitive) act (not by knowledge as such). Now, even thus, only the removal of nescience is accomplishable by knowledge, but not release, the excellence present in the object-causal-correlate; if this be said, no; for the becoming Brahman is also accomplishable thereby, inasmuch as *tādatmya* (identity-in-difference) alone is admitted to be natural (not produced). Absolute non-difference is the becoming Brahman, while *tādatmya* is non-difference in general; this is the

distinction between them. Nor is there absence of evidence in respect of the removal of nescience and the becoming Brahman being both accomplishable by knowledge; for there exist both kinds of śruti texts 'He who knows the self crosses sorrow',¹ 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself'.²

XVIII(c). To this it is said (in reply). Is release accomplished by such śāstra-generated right knowledge as has the becoming Brahman for content or by such as has for content tadātmya with Brahman? Not the first; because of the contingency of the eternal establishment of the becoming Brahman. On the second too, if the becoming Brahman be accomplished because of the removal of the tadātmya, then there would have been exhibited for that (cognition) the capacity to remove its own content. And tadātmya, because of removability by knowledge, would come to be non-real. If, however, tadātmya be not removed, becoming Brahman, characterised by absolute non-difference, does not fit in. Further, if removal of tadātmya were itself the becoming Brahman, then there would have been said (what we maintain) that the removal of nescience is itself release. If then the becoming Brahman be something other, then there should be demonstrated a removal of tadātmya, which is different both from becoming Brahman and tadātmya. Nor is this easy to demonstrate in the absence of absolute difference between the jīva and Brahman. And absolute difference is not admitted by you.³ What again is this which is said to be becoming Brahman? Is it Brahman itself or the jīva itself or

¹Chānd., VII, 1, 2

²Mund., III, 11, 2

³On the reading 'atyantābhedaś ca,' the sense would be 'And absolute non-difference is not admitted by you'. This hardly fits into the context. Nor is 'atyantābheda' more suitable in the previous sentence.

something other? Neither of the first two, because of the contingency of non-accomplishability. Not the third, because of not being demonstrated as either intelligent or non-intelligent. For, if non-intelligent, there is impossibility of becoming the intelligent Brahman; even if (that be) intelligent, how can there be the becoming that (Brahman), being (itself) absolutely different (from Brahman)? Further, if the jīva be tadātmya-qualified, then on the annihilation of this (qualification), he would be annihilated. If then he be devoid of tadātmya, then he would be only Brahman, since absolute difference is not admitted. Hereby is refuted even the view that there is difference between the jīva and Brahman. For there is no disparity between the positions of those who maintain tadātmya and (those who maintain) difference. As for the śruti text cited, about becoming Brahman, that is intelligible even as having for purport merely the manifestation of the eternally established Brahman-being. Nor is eternality possible (even) for what is accomplishable by knowledge alone, since eternality is not seen for the residual impression that is the cause of recollection. If that too were act-generated, like the residual impression of the whirling of a wheel etc., there could not be causality in respect of recollection; if it be said that though act-generated there is, for the residual impression called bhāvanā (disposition), causality in respect of recollection, even thus, generation by an act conflicts with the co-presence and co-absence of cognition (as the cause). The residual impression in dispute is act-generated, since it is generated by what is other than Brahman-knowledge, like pot etc.; if this be said, no; because of inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in the case of an act. For an act is generated not by an act, but by causal correlates, other than Brahman.

knowledge. Thus, therefore, on the view of the origination of release, non-eternality, as of pot etc., is unavoidable.

XVIII(d). Similarly even on the view of a modification. A modification like curds is indeed nowhere seen to be eternal.

XVIII(e). Even on the view of attainment, if Brahman be of the essential nature of the inner self, then an attainment preceded by an act does not fit in. Even if (it be) other than the self, if Brahman be omnipresent, the attainment is eternally established. If then (it be thought) Brahman is finite and situated outside the world, that is not (so), since there is no evidence. As for the śāstra, that exhibits only omnipresence, in the form 'all pervasive, the inner self of all beings'¹. If it be said that it (Brahman) is assumed to be thus (outside the world), to remedy the contact (otherwise) with modifications, no; for, though present in the midst of modifications, there is no contact therewith (for Brahman), because of being non-attached by nature; otherwise, through being of intermediate size, there is contingency of having parts. Now, on the strength of texts declaring attainment, like 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest,'² (there results) Brahman's existence in a remote place; if this be said, what is this attainment? It is not the becoming Brahman, since it has been condemned (by you). Nor is it another substance created by the two, jīva and Brahman, because of the contingency of the perishability of release. If, for (conserving) the eternality of release, Brahman's omnipresence be admitted, since its having parts is impossible there could not at all be the origination of another substance (by it). If it be said that attainment is the relation between

¹Śvet., VI, 11.

²Taitt., II, i, 1.

the jīva and Brahman, not so. It is not identity (in difference) since between the atom and the infinite which are contrary, that is impossible. Nor is it inherence etc., since between substances which are different no relation other than conjunction is possible, while in the case of conjunction, because of its termination by disjunction, there is established return (to transmigration). If it be said that on the strength of the *dastra* there is non-return, then, since subsequent to the attainment of Brahman there is the declaration of independent rulership in 'He becomes an independent ruler'¹ there is the contingency of a multiplicity of rulers (*Īśvaras*). Therefore the text about the attainment of Brahman has this for content that on the removal of nescience there is for the jīva the manifestation of Brahman that is its own nature.

XVIII(f). How then is there declared for release departure through the artery in the head, in 'Going up by that, he attains immortality'?² If this be asked, not so. What is (here) called immortality is not release, but abiding for a long time in the highest world; for there is *smṛti* 'Abiding till the dissolution of the elements is called immortality'; for, otherwise, there is the contingency of release even for those who contemplate symbols and go up by the artery in the head. Nor is this acceptable, since it is ascertained in one of the sections (of the *Brahma Sūtras*) that their going is only up to the world of lightning. Even then, because of the text 'He takes them to Brahma'³ some non-human person appears before them, takes hold of those who contemplate Brahman, passes the worlds of *Varuṇa*, *Indra* and

¹Chand., VII, xxv, 2,

²Chand., VIII, vi, 6

³Chand., IV, xv, 6

Prajāpati, which are above the world of lightning, and makes them reach Brahma; thus departure alone is cognised for the sake of release. If this be said, no; for that going relates to the created Brahma. Nor may it be objected that the supreme Brahman alone is to be apprehended here, because of the recurrence of the sense of brh (in that alone); for the word 'Brahma' is conventionally established in respect of the created Brahma. And conventional usage is stronger than the etymological, since it is the cause of quicker comprehension. If it be said that there is conventional usage in respect of the supreme Brahman too, even thus, since in another śruti text, in the same context, (in the words) 'He takes them to Brahma-loka'¹ there is used the word 'world (loka)' signifying a particular place of enjoyment, and since in other branches too (of the Veda) there are cognised such objects of enjoyment as tank, fig-tree, palace, door-keeper, dwelling, hall, and bed, that (Brahma) is ascertained to be but the created Brahma. Further, if for those who go by the path of light etc. there be the attainment of Nirguṇa Brahman, there would be that (attainment) even for house-holders possessing the knowledge of the five fires. Nor does it stand to reason to say that the word 'them' in 'He takes them to Brahma' relates to others than these who possess the knowledge of the five fires; for only those who possess the knowledge of the five fires belong principally to the context, and there is the contingency of no fruit being mentioned for them. Further, if the fruit be of a single form for all those who contemplate Brahman, then, the increase or decrease of contemplation through increase or decrease of the qualities (contemplated) would be futile. And thus there would be conflict with the

principle that because of the magnitude of the act there is magnitude of the fruit. If then that fruit (be admitted to) have increase and decrease, then, it is not the attainment of Brahman untouched by modification, since that (increase etc.) does not exist in that (Brahman). Further, if the fruit of the contemplation of Vaiṣṇava be admitted to be the attainment of the three worlds as the body, then, how would that be justified in respect of Brahman that is unrelated to modification? If then that (fruit) be not admitted, then there would be conflict with the śruti text 'The mode in which he contemplates it, that alone he becomes'. Further, if by the resolve (to see) the fathers etc., there be not the enjoyment (of seeing them etc.), in the Brahman that is unrelated to modification, there would be conflict with the śruti text about the resolve (to see) the father etc.; if there be (that enjoyment), Brahman not in the midst of modifications would (yet) be associated with the fathers etc. Further, since even he who has attained Brahman not in the midst of modifications would be Brahman itself, in such śruti texts as 'By the mind perceiving those objects of desire, he delights,' 'He who has attained thereby the world of the fathers rejoices'¹ there would have been shown enjoyment through means, in the case of Brahman itself; and thus would be contradicted its having all desires already realised. And creation would have been prompted for its own benefit. Then it may be said: by the resolve (to see) the fathers etc., there is not declared enjoyment in Brahman; but since all material happiness is included in Brahman-bliss a particular mode of Lordship is (here) figuratively spoken of. That is not (so), since it is not possible to assume figurativeness in the case of

¹Chand., VIII, 11, 1

numerous śruti texts; further there is the contingency of fruitlessness for the fourth chapter, which ascertains that (fruit). Further, if, for him who has attained Brahman not in the midst of modification, there be a subtle body, the śruti text about the dissolution of the *kālas* would be sublated; if there be not (a subtle body), the śruti text 'By the mind perceiving these' etc. would be sublated. Further, if the cause of the dissolution of his subtle body be knowledge alone, then there would be dissolution at the time of departure (of the gross body) because of the consumption (then) of the karma that originates the subtle body. If it (the cause) be the touch of the hand of the non-human person (who guides), even then, it (the dissolution) would be in the world of lightning. In either case, the dissolution of the subtle body is not beyond this world (Brahmāṇḍa). Further, on the view of the *jīva* as due to adjuncts, the going of the *jīva* to Brahman not in the midst of modifications is not possible; for in the case of what is partless and defined, like the pot-ether, it is not possible to raise it or carry it. And in raising it, that locality would become devoid of Brahman; and higher up there would result the increase of Brahman. Therefore, because of the motion of the adjunct, there is the delusion of motion in the self. Now, for the adjunct too, motion is not possible, since its material cause, Brahman, is devoid of motion; truly, when the clay is motionless, there is no motion for the pot. If this be said, thus, then, like the motion in dreams, the appearance of motion etc., is an expression of *māyā*. Thus, therefore, attainment too as preceded by an act is not intelligible in the case of the supreme Brahman : this is established.

XVIII(g). Even on the view of purification, purification consisting in the addition of merit is not possible in respect

of Brahman, since it is of a nature to which excellence cannot be added. Nor is (purification) consisting in the removal of defect (possible), since in the eternally pure nature there is no defect. Then you may think: just as in the mirror though flawless by nature there is through the act of rubbing the removal of impurity produced by contact with something else, similarly, in the self too, let there be through activity the removal of defect produced by nescience. Here, it must be stated (by you): is the removal of defect by an act located in the self or by one located in something else? Not the first, since activity is unintelligible in the omnipresent, partless self. Not the second: for, there being no conjunction of the inner self with other substances it is not the content of acts located in those. Then, though there be no motion and transformation in the self, there may be the removal of defect by contemplation of Īvara, like the removal of poison by the meditation on spells and deities. If this be said, no; for, if that defect be absolutely real, its removal is not possible without a modification in its locus; and of the self modification is not possible, because of the smṛti 'This is said to be unchanging'.¹ If the defect be of the nature of nescience, its removal could be by knowledge alone, not by an act. Now, by acts like bathing, and ceremonial sipping (prescribed) in the śāstra, there is declared, in respect of the self, purification consisting in the addition of merit. If this be said, no, since that is declared only of the self as qualified by the internal organ. Indeed, that fruit is not possible for the adjunctless self which does not perform dharma or its opposite. Therefore purification too is not possible in respect of the self. And thus, since it is difficult to imagine the four kinds of fruit beginning with origination, in regard to release, and

since other than these there is no fruit of activity, release is the sphere of knowledge alone, not of activity.

XIX. Now, cognition too, like contemplation is an act of the mind; if this be said, no, since because of the fruit as well as the cause there is difference between cognition and activity. For, the manifestation of the object is the fruit of cognition; and since it is of the nature of the self it is unoriginated. As for the appearance of its origination, that has for adjunct the origination of what manifests it, the psychosis of the internal organ. Not thus is the fruit of the contemplative act unoriginated; for by the contemplation of Garuḍa, deities etc., there is seen the origination even of fruit not already existent, such as the removal of poison, subjugation, and attraction. And the cause of the contemplative act is the effort preceded by human desire generated by an injunction, not the existence of the content; for, though the content does not exist, there is seen through prescription such contemplation as of the woman as fire. Cognition, however, which is originated by the means and object of valid knowledge, does not conform to human desire, since even for him who does not desire it, there is seen the cognition of evil smell etc. Though in inference, verbal testimony etc., there is no invariability of the cognition being generated by the object of knowledge, as that is impossible in the case of the cognitions of past and future objects, yet even there the cognition is dependent only on the *probans*, the word etc., and not dependent on human desire; hence it is certainly different from activity.

XX. Now, other than a succession of conjunctions and disjunctions, there is no activity at all, wherefrom the difference of cognition could be made out. For, everywhere, it is

in the hawk etc., that possess conjunction and disjunction, that there arises the cognition 'It moves'. Nor may it be said that thus there is contingency of the cognition of motion even in the post which possesses conjunction and disjunction with the hawk; for that (cognition) is admitted only in respect of conjunction and disjunction with a particular part of ether; the post, indeed, is not conjoined with or disjoined from particular parts of ether. Therefore, since there is no undue extensiveness, there is no activity other than the aggregate of conjunctions and disjunctions.

XXI(a). If this be said, not so; for in the case of the glow-worm, enveloped in intense darkness, where, the ether being invisible, conjunction and disjunction with particular parts of it are uncognised, there does exist the cognition 'It moves'. Therefore, activity, other than conjunction etc., is established by perception.

XXI(b). The Prabhākara, however, who thinks activity is always an object of inference, sets forth this syllogism. What are in dispute, viz., the original conjunction and disjunction, are generated by an excellence present in their locus and originated in the immediately preceding instant, since they are adventitious to an already existing substance, like the effect generated by conjunction and disjunction; here, that which is this excellence would itself be activity. Lest there be establishing the established, in respect of Īśvara's desire, it is said (of the excellence) 'originated'. In order to exclude the unseen potency generated by the conjunction of the self and the mind, (it is said) 'in the immediately preceding instant'. In order to exclude inconclusiveness in respect of the whiteness etc., originated (even) along with the substance, (it is said) 'in an already existing substance.'

XXI(c). (It is) not thus. Is the excellence established here of both the conjuncts or of one alone? Or is unqualified excellence alone (established)? Not the first, since it does not exist in such conjunction as that of hawk and post, that (conjunction) being generated by the activity of one of the two (not both). Not the second, because of the impossibility of the *probandum* (the excellence), in the conjunction of wrestlers, goats etc., generated by the activity of both. On the third too, this excellence called activity, is it originated only from the permanent substance? Or from another excellence? On the first, from that substance: let there be the origination even of conjunction and disjunction; what of this excellence? On the second, there is the contingency of infinite regress. Then it may be thought: the conjunction of the earth and the feet arises through an act located in the foot; and that act does not arise through another act, but through the conjunction of the foot with the self making effort; hence there is no infinite regress. Then, since it is possible to say even of the conjunction of the foot with the self making effort that it is the cause of the conjunction of the earth and the foot, activity would not be established. Therefore, activity is not an object of inference, but is certainly perceptible. Nor may it be asked how, in the case of a momentary act, there can be cognition generated by sense-contact, which abides in two instants; for, as in the case of a sound, lightning etc., there is no conflict. And therefore, the difference of cognition from activity established by perception is intelligible.

XXII(a). Now, cognition too, since it is of the nature of a modification of the internal organ, is certainly an act. True; even thus, since there is no dependence on the person, as in contemplation, there is certainly difference from activity.

capable of being enjoined. Just as the contemplation of the woman as fire, which is generated by an injunction, can, in dependence on the person's desire, be performed, not performed or performed otherwise, not thus, in the case of the well known fire, can the cognition of fire be laid down or performed according to human desire; for, even if there be desire, that cognition does not arise in the absence of the contact with fire for the sense of sight or the sense of touch, co-operating with the mind; when, however, there is that contact, cognition arises even without desire. As for performing otherwise, that is far removed. Indeed, the fire existing in front cannot even by the most skilled be cognised in the form of pillar etc. How then is there the cognition of snake in the rope? If this be asked, no, since it is an appearance of cognition. And even this appearance is not dependent on the person, since it arises even for him who does not desire it and trembles.

XXII(b). Now, in ordinary experience, when commanded by some one 'See this fire', the other too, turning towards it through his own desire, sees it; when, however, there is no desire, then, turning away from it or closing his eyes, he does not see it; similarly, because of the śāstra, he sees the āhavanīya-fire etc., as endowed with the organs etc. (of a woman). How, then, is there not for the person freedom in respect of performance, non-performance or performance otherwise in relation to cognition?

XXII(c). It is said (in reply). Turning towards and turning away are causal aggregates in respect of seeing and not seeing. That being the case, the freedom of the person is only in respect of the act that brings that (turning) about, but not in the cognition and non-cognition. Therefore when

it is said 'See' there results this meaning 'Acquire the causal aggregate'. If cognition were generated by human effort, then, there would not be the origination of the second, third and other such cognitions in a continuous stream (of cognition), since the first cognition alone is inevitably consequent on the effort. It is not indeed seen, in the case of the act of motion etc., generated by effort, that the succession (of the act) is originated even by a single effort. If then it be said that in the release of an arrow, in the whirling of a wheel etc., the succession of activity arises even from the first effort, that is not (so); for each successive activity there is generated by the residual impression called velocity. Nor is there such a residual impression in the cognitions of a continuous stream. Nor may it be said that from the residual impression generated by the first cognition, there may be generated the succession of each subsequent cognition; for in that case there is the contingency of the nature of memory (for such cognition); and if of the nature of memory, there is the contingency of sense-contact etc. not being required. Therefore because of the second, third and other cognitions being dependent on means of valid knowledge, that nature has to be predicated even of the first cognition; hence, the co-presence and co-absence of effort are intelligible as relating to the bringing about of the causal correlate of the means of valid knowledge. Thus, even memory-cognition is dependent on the calling up of residual impression, (and) not dependent on human effort; for, when by the sight of a similar or because of unseen potency a residual impression is called up, there is seen, even without effort, the memory of an undesired object. If in some particular cases of memory there be seen the need for effort, even then by effort arises only concentration of the mind known by the other name of thinking (cinta), but not

memory; and by that concentration, the residual impression is called up. That has been said; 'The (cognition of the) similar, unseen potency, thinking etc. are those which call up the *cause* of memory'.

XXII(d). As for the looking on the *śhavanīya* etc. as a body, in dependence on the *śāstra*, since there exists here the form of some deity of the *śhavanīya*, this mediate cognition relating to a particular form is not dependent on the person; for, even without effort, it arises even from the words expressing the particular form. As for the meditation of the cinders present before one as possessing that particular form, that is not cognition, since it is not of the object as it is. Nor may it be asked how if it be not of a thing as it is it could be of the nature of *śāstra*; for, the *śāstra* does not declare limbs like hands and feet in respect of the cinders, since in that case there is the contingency of conflict with perception. What then? It declares that by contemplation, though having for its sphere an object not as what it is, a particular fruit is to be accomplished. Nor is this relation of end and means illusory. Therefore though the contemplation be of an object not as what it is, there is no detriment whatever to the *śāstra*. And it is certainly admitted by us that contemplation is dependent on the person, since it is of the nature of a contemplating activity.

XXII(e). Now, contemplation too is certainly not dependent on a person, since it is of the nature of memory-cognitions in a continuous stream; if this be said, no; for, memory is impossible in respect of what has not been experienced. In the case of the woman etc., the nature of fire etc. has not indeed been experienced anywhere. Nor may it be said that because of the revelation 'The woman, verily, O Gautama,

is fire'¹ there is that experience. Is it that there arises valid knowledge from this revelation, or erroneous experience? On the first, from the text whose purport is the valid knowledge of woman as fire the injunction of contemplation would not result. If then this text has the injunction for purport, then the woman being fire could not be validly known. If both be the purport there is sentence-split and the contingency of the two contradictory sets of three (consequences). And in the valid knowledge of woman as fire there is conflict with perception. Not the second, since in the case of a revealed text free from flaws, the causality of erroneous experience is impossible. Therefore through this text it is not possible to experience the identity of the well known woman and fire. What then? Just as for bodily activity of the nature of the *darsa-purpamāsa* (sacrifice) there is instrumentality to heaven cognised from the text about it, similarly even from this text there is cognised of some mental act the instrumentality to a particular fruit. Then, the two words, woman and fire, would be futile; if this be said, no, since they offer a particular form to the mind that undergoes activity. For example, in 'Sip from the hand (cupped) in the form of a cow's ear', the word 'cow' or the word 'ear' merely intimates in respect of the hand, the subsidiary to sipping, a form similar to what is denoted by itself, but does not declare the well known sense (of either word); similarly why should not even the words 'woman' and 'fire' while certainly not teaching their own respective well known senses, offer to the mind, the subsidiary of contemplation, a form like to that (of their respective senses)? Nor may it be said that since the identity of woman and fire is absolutely non-existent, the intimation of a form similar to

¹ Chand., V, viii, 1

being a Vedic text. Nor can it be forgotten at one's will; for even in the case of one who does not desire, (e.g.) at the time of pollution, sometimes the recollection of Vedic texts cannot be helped. Therefore that is said to be memory, which is incapable of being performed or not performed or performed otherwise (at one's will), does not go beyond the thing as experienced, and is dependent only on the calling up of the residual impression of that (experience). Contemplation, however, is the unfettered assumption—which in ordinary experience is called *manorājya* (building castles in the air)—of attributes which exist or do not exist, in respect of a thing, whether experienced or not experienced. Nor in this is a person other-dependent, since there is not required any means other than one's own desire and the mind.

XXII(g). Then even untrue śāstra would in conformity with one's own desire bring about the contemplation of deities etc.; if this be said, true; whereby can that be helped? *Manorājya* cannot indeed be prevented whether by the king etc. or by śāstra. However, in the contemplation declared by śāstra, there is the particular fruit stated by śāstra, not in any other (contemplation); for in the case of what is not seen, in respect of the relation of end and means, the śāstra is the controller. Nor may it be asked how it is that even the śāstra declares a particular fruit through contemplation whose sphere is a thing not as it is. We are not indeed capable of questioning the śāstra since the might of the śāstra is unthinkable. Otherwise, where is the offering of the oblation? And where is heaven? What is the intelligibility that you see here (in the attainment of the latter by the former)? Even if, because of dullness of faith, you assume some deity of the nature of woman-fire and declare that the

contemplation thereof relates to a thing (as it is), then even in 'The stake is the sun', 'The strew is the sacrificer' etc., there would result validity in respect of their own sense, through the assumption of deities with the respective forms. As for conflict with perception etc., that applies equally to you too. Not thus is there the denial even of deities like Indra; for, in the case of the mantras and arthavādas which declare that, there is no conflict with other means of knowledge. Now in all things whatsoever, there are deities for whom there is conceit (in them), since this is accepted by the aphorist in respect of 'The earth said', 'The waters said' etc; if this be said, then, here too let there be two deities, one having conceit in fire and the other having conceit in woman. And these two deities are not here the objects of contemplation, but the identity of woman and fire. Nor is there possible a deity having conceit in the identity which is untrue; for, there would be undue extensiveness in respect of the human horn etc. Nor may it be taught that there may be some deity called woman-fire; for if it (woman-fire) be a bare name, there is futility in making the imaginary identification of the parts of woman with corresponding parts of fire. Such identification is indeed made in the śruti in 'The woman, verily, O Gautama, is fire: her genital organ itself is the fuel; her pubic hairs are the smoke; her yoni is the flame' etc. Then, the supreme Lord, who is the dispenser of the fruit of this contemplation, will Himself be the deity of this; even thus, He is not the object of contemplation here. It is not indeed appropriate to meditate on the internal ruler of all, the Lord of the world, in the form of the intensely disgusting parts of a woman. If it be said that there is no conflict, because of the supreme Lord being the self of all, then, because of the śruti text

supported by reasoning, 'In the mode in which one meditates on that, that alone one becomes' the attainment of the form of what is contemplated being understood to be the fruit, there results for the meditator the attainment of the nature of the disgusting parts of a woman or the attainment of the nature of fire; this being the case the knowledge of the five fires would have only evil fruit. If then on the strength of specific śāstra, the fruit here be the attainment of Brahma-loka, then when the fruit results even on the strength of that, even in the absence of a deity contemplated, by contemplation which (thus) does not relate to an entity, for you who consider yourself a devotee of the śāstra, there ought not to be undue attachment to the relation of contemplation to an entity (as it is).

XXII(h). Then it may be said: in the smṛti 'In case of all minor sins and (even) major sins, one is to enter on the (first) quarter of the night and practise the contemplation of Brahman,' there is understood the contemplation of an entity as it is. Here, does it relate to what is an entity from the view-point of the contemplator, or from the view-point of śāstra. Even on the first, if the contemplator knows that Brahman is the self, then, he is not eligible in respect of an expiatory act, since there is no relation of sin etc. (to him). If then he does not know (that), then, how could he, cognising the self as qualified by the internal organ, and Brahman as remote, think that the contemplation 'I am Brahman' relates to an entity (as it is)? Not the second; for the contemplator contemplates the Brahman-hood of the self qualified by the internal organ. Though here, leaving out the aspect of the internal organ, the Brahman-hood of the intelligence-aspect is in accord with śāstra, yet with that

much the contemplation does not relate to an entity (a thing as it is). Otherwise, on this principle, in the case of cognitions of nacre-silver etc., which accord in part (with experience, in respect of the this-element) and in the case of cognitions which are generated by fallacious *probans* etc., (and yet) accord by chance (with experience) there is the contingency of validity because of relating to entities (as they are). Now, since even for those who know the Brahman-hood of the self, there is seen the empirical usage 'Let us perform the contemplation of Brahman', contemplation has for content an entity (as it is); if this be said, no; for, when because of the strong residual impression of the past one slips away from the experience of the Brahman-hood of the self, in that state alone, there is such empirical usage. Those who are experiencing the Brahman-hood of the self are not indeed capable of such empirical usage. For, in the world, Devadatta, while experiencing his human nature, does not indulge in the usage 'I contemplate or shall contemplate being human'. Now in 'She whose husband is away meditates on the husband' there exists the empirical usage of meditation even as relating to an entity; if this be said, no; for, the word 'meditation' there secondarily implies recollection relating to the formerly experienced husband. Or else, let there be meditation even in the principal sense in that she who is suffering from the absence (of her lord) is building castles in the air (or indulging in flights of fancy); thereby, what is the obstacle to the free appetency of a person in respect of meditation which (thus) does not relate to an entity (as it is)?

XXII(i). Now, even by a single effort there is seen the continuance of contemplation for a whole hour; here, leaving out the first activity of the mind, for the remaining activities of the the mind there is no need for effort; hence on the

analogy of a successive stream of cognition, the non-requirement of that (effort) follows even for the first (mental activity); therefore, let us accept effort only in respect of securing the causal aggregate; and thus there would not be for contemplation a distinction from cognition, effected by the dependence (of the former) on the person.

XXII(j). If this be said, is it that there is continuance of contemplation (resulting) from a single effort, even for those who practise it now? Or only for these who are expert in practice? Not the first, because of conflict with experience. Not the second; for, in the case of the separate efforts which certainly exist for each activity of the mind, there is no conceit (of their existence), because of (being) concealed by the expertness in practice. For example, in the case of a year-old child, at the time of first practising to walk, there is manifested a separate effort for each foot-step, but there is not such manifestation of that (effort) in walking fast. Nor is it that there is no separate effort here; for it is manifested in an uneven place by uneven steps, falling etc. Thus, in conformity with the first contemplation, distinct efforts are to be understood even for him who is endowed with expertness in the practice of contemplation.

XXII(k). Or else, just as, though a crooked arrow is devoid of velocity, there is velocity for that itself when straightened, similarly, for mind, though devoid of velocity prior to the practice of contemplation, let us assume the samakara called velocity when straightened by the practice of contemplation. On this view too, there is not removed the dependence of contemplation on effort; for in the case of motion too, as in the case of the arrow, for the first activity effort is inevitable. Not thus are separate efforts capable of

being assumed in the continued stream of cognition. Just as in the first contemplation whose content has not been practised, there is between each pair of repetitions a lapse of time indicating separate effort, not thus is there that (indicator) even in the first continuous stream of cognition; for in respect of this which is generated by the relation of means of valid knowledge to the object of valid knowledge, there is seen no distinction between the child and the elder. If, then, velocity be some-how assumed for the mind, in order to explain the succession of transformations in the form of the second, third and other (such) cognitions, even thus, since the first cognition is not an immediate consequent of effort, the cognition is not dependent on the person. Truly, cognition does not arise even in immediate succession to effort; but where by that effort there has been secured the causal aggregate, viz., means of valid knowledge etc., it arises subsequently. Similarly even the removal of nescience is not what comes into being immediately after effort. What then? When by effort there has been secured the causal aggregate that is opposed (to nescience), it is removed subsequently. And thus the causal aggregates being dependent on the person, there is for disputants the delusion that cognition itself can be performed or not performed (at will) by a person. As for performance otherwise, that, it was said earlier, is not to be suspected at all, in the case of cognition. Nor is it possible to say that contemplation too is dependent on the causal aggregate secured by effort, (but) not dependent on effort, since (for that) there is no causal aggregate other than effort. Therefore, in the case of contemplation, it is easy to perform or not perform even directly without the interposition of any other. As for performance otherwise that is possible without any hindrance.

XXII(1). Thus, therefore, cognition has an unoriginated fruit, relates to an entity, and is generated by the means of valid knowledge; contemplation has an originated fruit, is not dependent on an entity, and is generated merely by a person's desire; thus, between cognition and contemplation though equal in respect of being mental, there is established great difference in respect of the fruit, the content and the cause. And this being the case, Brahman-knowledge, which not being dependent on the person is incapable of being practised, is not capable of being enjoined; hence the *tavya*-suffix in 'The self verily is to be seen'¹ should be understood to mean worthiness (to be seen).

XXIII. How then is there the injunction of sight in 'See the self in the self alone'?² If this be asked, we say that it is to be explained as an injunction of turning inwards etc., which are instrumental to the sight. And it has been explained by us, in the third *varṇaka* of the first aphorism, as having for purport the injunction of inquiry. Therefore, since by a consideration of release, a consideration of Brahman that is incapable of being originated etc., and, a consideration of knowledge, an injunction is impossible, the Vedāntas should be admitted to culminate in the true self which is not an object to be abandoned or accepted.

XXIV. Now, since the self ascertained through the cognition 'I' is subsidiary to activity, even for the Vedāntas culminating in that (self) there would be syntactical unity with the texts enjoining ritual activity; if this be said, no; for the Vedāntas culminate only in that self which is not knowable in other ways and is devoid of relation to act and

¹Brh., II, iv, 5

²Brh., IV, iv, 29

causal correlate. By the author of the smṛti 'The Vedas have agnihotra as the fruit; study has character and conduct as the fruit', the whole Veda is applied to dharma; if this be said, no; for the sense of this earlier (mentioned) smṛti should be ascertained in dependence on such śruti and smṛti texts as 'I ask you about that person propounded in the Upanisads',¹ 'That state which all Vedas declare'², 'I alone am the object of knowledge by all the Vedas'.³

XXV. Now, Jaimini, who says 'Since Scripture is for the sake of ritual, there is futility for those which are not for that purpose',⁴ thinks thus. Immediately after hearing the words uttered by the superior elder, seeing the activity of the intermediate elder, the learner infers for him (the intermediate elder) the knowledge of what is to be done (as resulting) through that (word of a superior) and thus cognises the capacity of the word in respect of its own sense only in relation to what is to be done. And thus, in the case of the word for which capacity has not been apprehended in respect of an existent thing, it is impossible for it to make that (kind of thing) known; hence, for the Vedāntas too there is not making known of the true non-dual self.

XXVI(a). Not thus. Do you say thus holding to the Bhaṭṭa view or holding to the Prabhākara view? Not the first; for the Bhaṭṭa maintains the doctrine of relation among the signified. And it is thus that he sets forth the manner of learning. When a sentence is used by the superior elder, the listener infers through the activity of the intermediate elder that the effect of the word is the cognition of a relation

¹ Brh., III, ix, 26

² Katha, II, 15

³ Gita, XV, 15

⁴ PM, I, ii, 1

(of word-senses) as (reciprocally) qualified and understands of the aggregate of words capacity in respect of a complex of senses. Here, in such usages as 'Bring the cow, tie up the cow' since through the processes of introduction and elimination, (it is seen that) though the bringing and its relation (to cow) are inconstant, the cow alone persists even in the tying, one understands the word 'cow' to be related only to the (thing) 'cow', not to 'bringing' or the relation thereto, which are inconstant. Thus, there being understood of all words capacity in respect of the nature of the word-senses alone, there is the expectancy 'By what is the knowledge of relation conditioned?'; then, through the co-presence and co-absence which are not otherwise explained, it is assumed that it is conditioned by the word-senses known from the words. Therefore, from words (arise) word-senses, and from word-senses (their) relation; thus the relation is of the signified. And this being the case, in accordance with this view, capacity for the word is not in respect of its own sense as related to what is to be done, but only in respect of its own sense. Therefore, by the word 'futility' occurring in the aphorism (of Jaimini), it is not possible to say that for words which are not for the sake of activity, there is no signification. If then there be stated the non-existence of fruit, that is not (so); for, even if it be so for texts like 'He howled',¹ it is not possible for the Vedāntas, that declare Brahman of the nature of unsurpassable bliss, to be fruitless.

XXVI(b). Now, then, let there be the second view; for, by the Prabhākara, who maintains the doctrine of signification of the related, there is not admitted as by the Bhaṭṭa the learning of unrelated word-senses. For, it is thus he sets

¹TS., I, v, 1

forth the manner of learning. Immediately after hearing the words 'Bring with the stick the white cow', seeing the activity of the hearer in respect of bringing the cow, the learner understands, in the form 'By this hearer there was understood from the words the to-be-done, that is, bringing the cow,' the capacity of the aggregate of words in respect of the to-be-accomplished which is related to an existent thing. Again, in such other usages as 'Tie up the cow', 'Bring the horse', since where the word 'cow' persists, there persists the form of cow as related to the to-be-accomplished, and when it is eliminated, there is eliminated the form of the cow only as related to the to-be-accomplished, it is assumed that for the word there is capacity in respect of the cow as related to the to-be-accomplished; for, though there is inconstancy of bringing and its relation, there is non-inconstancy of relation to the to-be-accomplished. And thus, in the doctrine of the signification of the related, there is not, as in the doctrine of the relation of the signified, the two-fold defect, viz., the denial of the primarily understood causality of words in respect of relation, and prolixity in interposing word-senses and their capacity between the sentence and the sentence-sense; on the contrary, there is parsimony, in that the words themselves declare the relation.

XXVI(c). This is not sound. Indeed, in different usages, it is not only relation to the to-be-accomplished that is invariably cognised, but also the relation to quality, substance, activity and causal correlate. It is thus: in 'Bring the white cow' there is relation of the quality to the substance associated with generality, of the substance to the (object-) causal correlate that is the sense of the (accusative) suffix, again of the substance qualified by the sense of the suffix to

the act, and of the act to what is enjoined as to-be-accomplished; thus the relation to the to-be-accomplished is remote. And this being the case, in order that there may result the acceptance of a non-remote relation, the capacity of the word should be admitted to be in respect of its own sense alone, unrelated to any other, because of parsimony; otherwise there is the contingency of (the sentence) being a repetition. If after understanding the capacity of words (to be) in respect of their own senses as related to what is to be accomplished, which (related senses) are apprehended by other evidence, there is subsequently the cognition of that much alone even from the evidence of the sentence, how could this not be a restatement? Nor is there a non-remote relation for all word-senses with what is to be accomplished, in which case there would be capacity in respect of what is related thereto. If it be said that for the to-be-accomplished there is relation to the word-senses, consisting in being subsidiary and principal, here, what is said to be the principalness of what is to be accomplished? Is it ownership or being the whole (of which the subsidiaries are parts) or accomplishability by causal-correlates, or being the supreme end? Not the first, since ownership is impossible for what is non-intelligent. Not the second, since for other word-senses there is not the relation of being parts of what is to be accomplished. Not the third, since in every case what is accomplishable by causal correlates is but the act. Not the fourth, since the supreme end is but heaven etc. Therefore in order to obtain a single determinant, constant in all (cases), capacity should be admitted in respect of what is (merely) related to another. If the capacity should be in respect of what is related to the to-be-accomplished, then, that would not result for the word signifying what is to be accomplished

(i. e., the *lit*-suffix), since there is not another to-be-accomplished. If it be said that there is another to-be-accomplished, consisting in the *stem-sense* (of the verb), no; for to the *stem-sense* there does not belong in the first instance the character of what is to be accomplished. When in order to establish of what is enjoined as to-be-accomplished that it is accomplishable, the *stem-sense* relates (to that *suffix-sense*) as its determinant (*lit*: content), subsequently there is, as having to be performed, the character of what is to be accomplished for that *stem-sense* which is expressed and is the instrument, but not at the time when the injunction relates. Nor may it be said that, for fear of inconstancy in respect of the one word whose significance is the to-be-accomplished, it does not stand to reason to abandon, what is non-inconstant in the case of numerous (other) words, viz., their signifying what is related to the to-be-accomplished; for, in that case, even of this character present in the sense, viz., being apprehended by some other means of valid knowledge, there is, because of its non-inconstancy, the contingency of being the content of the capacity of the word. Then, it may be said: '(Only) on the strength of co-presence and co-absence which are not otherwise explained should there be assumed, in every case, the being-signified-by-the-word; but the non-inconstancy of being apprehended by some other means of valid knowledge is otherwise explained as being the cause of usage; for the use of words is possible only when the sense has been apprehended by some other means of valid knowledge, not otherwise; therefore there is not the said contingency'. Then, even the non-inconstancy of what is to be accomplished is otherwise explained. For the learning of the learner results through the sight of the activity of the intermediate elder; and without the cognition of what is to be accomplished, there is

not the activity of the intermediate elder; therefore, since the non-inconstancy of what is to be accomplished, which is the cause of the cognition of the *probans*, viz., activity, is otherwise explained, what is to be accomplished is not the content of the capacity of all words. And this being the case, even by such sentences devoid of what is to be accomplished, as 'Devadatta, having eaten, has gone out', the valid knowledge of sense, that is cognised in ordinary experience, is intelligible. Nor may it be asked how there is learning where there is not what is to be accomplished; for learning is possible even through the Nighantū, Grammar and teaching. Therefore, without requiring what is to be accomplished, words signify their own senses as related to others.

XXVI(d). Now, if there be admitted the doctrine of the signification of the related, the word 'cow' would signify its own sense as in relation to several correlates like bringing and tying; and the word 'bring' (would signify) its own sense as in relation to many counter-correlates like cow and horse; and thus for the sentence 'Bring the cow' the sense would not be a fixed one. If this be said, not so. The word 'bring' fixes the particular counter-correlate related to the sense of the word 'cow'; similarly, the word 'cow' fixes the particular counter-correlate related to the sense of the word 'bring'; thus, on the strength of the two words, there results the fixation of the sentence-sense. Now, even thus, for the word 'cow', the meaning is cowness related to bringing; for the word 'bring' also (the sense is) the bringing related to cow-ness; thus since there is no extra sense, for the two words there would be synonymity; nor may it be said that because of the relation of earlier and later as between the word 'cow' and the word 'bring', there is difference of sense; for, there is contingency of difference of sense even as

between the words 'ahitagni' and 'agnyahita' (both of which mean 'he who has kindled the sacrificial fire'). If this be said, not so. For merely from the word 'cow' (in the accusative) there is not cognised the cow's relation to bringing; nor merely from the word 'bring' (is there cognised) relation to 'cow'; but mutual relatedness is cognised through the two words (together); therefore there is not the said defect. Now, when the word 'cow' is pronounced, why is there cognised only the form (ākṛtī) of cow, not everything (though) not the content of (the word's) capacity?¹ We say that it is because of non-inconstancy and the multitude of residual impressions in the case of the form of the cow, while for the others there is inconstancy. Now when cowness is signified by the word 'cow', the bringing related thereto is expressed by the other (word); similarly, when by the word 'bring' bringing is signified, the cow-ness related thereto is expressed by the word 'cow'; thus there is reciprocal dependence. If this be said, there is not this defect. At the stage of hearing the respective words, the respective senses are cognised; and after the pronunciation of the last word all the words remembered simultaneously express together the very senses previously signified, (but) as reciprocally related. And thus, whence the reciprocal dependence? This has been said by Śalikanātha: 'The entire host of heard words have senses which are recalled and unrelated; subsequently they make known the sentence-sense, the (reference to the) particular being established by reasoning'.

XXVI(e). Nor is there thus non-distinction in sense from the doctrine of the relation of the signified. For, in the

¹ The translation follows the text as it stands: *samarthyaviśayibhūtam*. It is suggested that 'viśayibhūtam' is a better reading; that would mean 'that is the content of (the word's) capacity'.

doctrine of the relation of the signified, the words are exhausted with signifying the word-senses, and from the word-senses there is the cognition of the sentence-sense. On the doctrine, however, of the signification of the related, the declaration of the sentence-sense belongs to the words themselves; this is the distinction. Therefore, since there is no defect in the doctrine of the signification of the related, since in the world there is seen a good deal of usage of such sentences devoid of what is to be accomplished, as in 'The tree is fruit-bearing', and since even in the Veda there are seen such sentences devoid of what is to be accomplished, as 'He who says *vasat* is to eat first (of the remnants of the sacrifice)', 'Therefore, *Puṣan* is he to whom belongs the well-kneaded portion' it is established that the capacity of the word is only in respect of its own sense as related to some other. Though in these Vedic texts there is imported the word 'is to be done', yet that importation is not for the establishment of the cognition of the sentence-sense, since there is cognition of that even without the importation; but that importation is dependent on the cognition of a novel (not already established) sense, a relation between a substance and a deity.

XXVII. As for what is shown by the aphorist (Jaimini) himself, who follows the empirical usage of elders (as the cause of learning), that the capacity of the word is in respect of its own sense (only) as related to what is to be accomplished, in the words "Therefore for existent things there is relation as subsidiary to rites"¹ that subsidiariness to rites is stated there as of service to the topic (on hand), since what has been begun is the inquiry into *dharma*, but not in the view of the absence of capacity in respect of existent things; for, by the commentator (Śabaraśvamin) himself there is

shown the syntactical relation for quality, the possessor of the quality etc., as in the relation of qualification, the substrate of qualification, etc. Should the aporism of Jaimini be assumed to have for purport the non-existence of capacity in the word in respect of an existent thing, (only) then, there would be conflict with the aphorisms of Bādarāyana, which declare the harmonious relation of the Vedāntas to Brahman, the one impartite essence.

XXVIII. Now, in such Vedāntas as 'Truth, knowledge, etc.,¹ though for the stem-senses there may be syntactical relation as having the homogeneous Brahman for purport, (yet) for the sense of the first case suffix, there being the syntactical relation as causal correlate, how is there the establishment of the one impartite homogeneity? If this be asked, no; for by Pāṇini, the first case suffix is laid down in respect of the bare stem-sense (as also in respect of gender and number). Though gender, number etc. are (also) cognised here by implication, (yet) because of conflict with such śruti texts as 'a mere mass of consciousness'² they (gender, number etc.) come to be indeterminable (and illusory).

XXIX. Now Kātyāyana lays down the importation of the act of existence in the usages of the first case suffix; and thus when there is the importation 'Brahman that is truth knowledge, infinitude exists' the impartiteness would suffer. If this be said, not so. In such usages as 'These trees are fruit-bearing', 'This man is the King's', which culminate merely in (stating) a relation, since there is no use for the importation of the act of existence, there is not the importation; similarly is it to be understood even in the case of the Vedāntas which culminate in the impartite sense.

¹ Taitt., II, 1

² Mund., 6

XXX(a). Further, even by him who is absolutely devoted to action, syntactical relation in respect of an existent thing should be stated in such sentences as 'A brahmin is not to be killed;' for, an action is here impossible (as the sense), since the non-existence of killing consists in desistance from an act which is established (as possible). Nor does the nature of activity belong to desistance; for, it is of the nature of indifference.

XXX(b). Here, the Prabhākara says (thus). The word 'not' expressing negation does not relate to the brahmin, since it is not possible to deny the brahmin that is perceived. Nor to the killing which is the stem-sense; for, as appetent in the mind of the killer, the non-existence of killing is impossible. Nor is the sense of the *tavya*-suffix, (understood) whether as the desire for the fruit, or the cause of appetency or the cognition of what is to be accomplished; for what is here perceived in any of the three senses of the suffix is not capable of being denied. Therefore, just as in 'Look not at the rising sun', there is enjoined the act of resolving not to see, which is opposed to the seeing, similarly here too is enjoined the act of resolving not to kill, which is opposed to the killing established by passion.

XXX(c). This is not sound, since, for the word 'not', non-existence is the principal (sense). Nor is non-existence but another existent; for, in that case there is the contingency of non-existence not being dependent on counter-correlates. Now even what is different from that and what is opposed to that are the senses of the word 'not' (and these are not dependent on counter-correlates); this has been said:¹ 'But the word *not* is not a negater at all, when conjoined with

¹ *Slokavārtika*, p. 575

nouns and the stem-sense (of verbs); (the words) *non-brahmin* and *non-dharma* signify merely what is different and what is opposed'. Not so; for there is secondary implication here, for the word 'not', as otherwise there is the contingency of what is illegitimate, the possession of many senses. But in 'Look not', since the topic is the Prajāpati vow, in order to obtain a vow that can be performed, there is admitted in conformity with that (topic), even a secondarily implied sense for the injunction. There is not here any such cause for abandoning the principal sense and adopting a secondarily implied sense. Nor may it be said that the non-existence of killing is itself what is to be performed, since this is impossible in the case of antecedent non-existence, which is beginningless. Otherwise there would not be established the empirical usage in the world of a distinction between prescription and prohibition.

XXX(d). Now, if the sense of the word 'not' relate to the stem-sense, then, indeed, the sense here would be the antecedent non-existence of killing; but that syntactical relation is not easy, since the sense of the stem is supplementary; therefore, for the sense of 'not' there should be stated syntactical relation with the principal, the sense of the suffix. If this be said, even thus, there is not removed here the purport of denial for the word 'not'. For the *tavya*-suffix states an injunction. What is called an injunction is what is instrumental to the desired. And thence, that instrumentality to the desired which is established for killing in the view of the ignorant and is the prompter of a person, that itself is restated by the *tavya*-suffix and denied in the form 'killing a brahmin is not instrumental to the desired'. Nor may it be said that instrumentality to the desired is perceived;

for, the meaning of 'the desired' is that seen fruit which is not in conflict with the unseen fruit, while for killing there is conflict with the unseen fruit. Now, in the midst of the world, there is no human goal, which is devoid of evil whether here or hereafter; therefore, let even that be the desired, which is in conflict with an unseen result. If this be said, true it is that every-where good is conjoined with evil; yet that which is more good is a human goal, while what is more evil is not a human goal; thus is their distinction. And thus, killing a brahmin, which because of excess of evil is not a human goal, is expressly prohibited. As for (this sense) that there should be performed the destruction of the cause which calls up passion etc., the causes of appetency in killing, that is cognised by implication. Nor is it possible to enjoin an implied sense, since it is not knowledge from verbal testimony, on the principle 'And that, which is the sense by implication, is not the sense of an injunction'. Therefore, when this much is taught by the śāstra, that killing is not desirable, but undesirable, it is understood even through co-presence and co-absence that the delusion of desirability, which is the cause of the passion for killing, should be destroyed.

XXX(e). Now, even thus, since, by the *tavya*-suffix, an unseen result is declared here, this text has certainly a performance for purport. If this be said, no; for in respect of the unseen result, not known from other evidence, there is no apprehension of relation (of the word thereto). If the unseen result be known from revelation itself and then the relation (of the word) thereto be apprehended, that would be the attempt to catch a crane (by putting butter on its head). If it be said that there is the knowledge of that (unseen

result) because of the unintelligibility otherwise of the momentarily perishing sacrifice being instrumental to (long delayed enjoyment in) heaven, as declared in śruti, then the unseen result would not be the meaning of the word (being what is got at by presumption); for there is the rule that that is the meaning of the word which is not otherwise obtained. Otherwise, because of (enjoyment in) heaven not being established in the absence of relation to a body, senses, objects etc., there is the contingency of even the body etc. being the sense of the (tavya) suffix. Thus, therefore, even by him who is attached (to the view) that the capacity of the word is in respect of its own sense only as related to what is to-be-accomplished, there has to be admitted of (negative) sentences syntactical relation to existent things; what is the fault of the Vedāntas (that there should not be this admission in their case)?

XXXI(a). Nor may it be doubted that even though Brahman be known through the Vedāntas, there would be no fruit in the absence of an injunction: for when by the knowledge of the truth nescience is removed, the removal of relation to the body etc., produced by that (nescience), is the fruit.

XXXI(b). If it be said that relation to the body is the product of karma, not the product of nescience, is karma natural to the self, or is it the product of the body? Not the first, since intelligence is devoid of activity. Not the second, because of the contingency of reciprocal dependence as between karma and the body. If it be said that, because of the admission of a succession of particular karmas and bodies, there is no reciprocal dependence, there would result a blind succession. If it be said that, as in the case of the seed and

sprout, there is no conflict, even thus, if like the relation to son etc., the relation to the body had karma alone for the cause, there is the contingency of figurativeness for the conceit of 'I' even in the body, as in son etc.; and that does not stand to reason, since there is no well-known difference between the self and the body, as between the lion and Devadatta (who is spoken of as a lion); otherwise, there is the contingency of the absence of cognisership even through one's own body, as through the body of a son etc. Therefore, the relation to body etc. has not karma for cause, but is the product of nescience. And it is removable by knowledge of the truth. Hence it is that in the case of him who has seen the truth, śruti excludes transmigratoriness as (it existed) before, in 'Having the sense of sight, but not having the sense of sight, as it were, having the sense of hearing, but not having the sense of hearing, as it were' and so on.

XXXII(a). Then, when there is knowledge of the truth, there should be immediately the decease of the body; if this be said, no; for, by the śruti text 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not released (from the body), then he attains',¹ there is understood the persistence (of the body) until the fruition of the residue of prārabdha karma. As for the text 'His karmas are consumed',² that relates to karma which has not commenced (to take effect) on the principle that, leaving out the content of exceptions, (the text) applies to what is general. Though knowledge of the truth removes nescience that is the material cause of all karma without exception, yet it is not the removal of prārabdha karma, since it is itself the fruit of that (karma). That has

¹ Chāṇḍ., VI, xiv, 8

² Muṇḍ., II, ii, 8

been said by the Preceptor: 'These two—enjoyment and knowledge—are the fruit of the karma that has commenced (to take effect); non-conflict between them stands to reason; in the case of the other (karma), however, there is difference.' Nor may it be thought that thus there is, for the jīvan-mukta, the contingency of the co-existence of the two contraries, the experience of the oneness of the self and the perception of duality. We do not, indeed, declare their simultaneity, but their origination and suppression in sequence. Nor is it that prior to the decease of the body there is not at all any immediate knowledge of the truth; for from the Purāṇas, knowledge of the truth is understood (to exist) for Vyāsa etc., who are certainly embodied.

XXXII(b). Now just as even for him who has intuited the truth there is sometimes perception of duality, similarly, let there also be the performance of rites like the *īyotiṣṭoma*. If this be said, no; for, performance is dependent on the cognition of specifically regulated place, time, eligibility and agent; in the case, however, of him who has intuited the truth, there being no regulation of place or time for the defect¹ caused by the karma which has commenced (to take effect), the persistence of that (defect), till the completion of the performance commenced, is not possible. If it be said that there may be performance as (and when) possible, no; for, when by repeated knowledge of the truth there is sublation of the performed rites, there is no fruit for the performance. If it be said that the fruit is the removal of the sin accumulating every day, no; for, in the case of him who knows, relation to future sin etc. is impossible; or (even) if it be possible, it would be removed even by the daily intuition of the truth; for there is the *smṛti*: 'Even if

¹Perception of duality

you be the doer of the worst sin of all/sins, you will cross all sins even with the raft of knowledge.¹

XXXII(c.) If for him who has intuited the truth there can be no regulation by śāstra, there would be action as he wills. If this be said, no; for, action is caused by the desire for the attainment or avoidance of what is good or bad; in the case, however, of the jīvanmukta, who directly experiences even in his own self unsurpassable bliss and the removal of all evil without residue, since there is no desire for a human goal that is to be accomplished, there is no action at all; whence the contingency of action as he wills? As for activity like begging, that is based on the defect (consequent on) karma that has commenced (to take effect). Nor may it be said that in the same way, even merit and demerit might be caused by karma which has commenced (to take effect); for karma which has commenced (to take effect) is the cause in respect of fruit alone; of merit and demerit, however, the cause consists of nescience, attachment etc; and that (cause) is removed by knowledge of the truth. Nor is there to be apprehended a counter-argument (prati-bandhī) in the case of reflection and contemplation; for these too being instrumental, like hearing (study), are to be performed only prior to the intuition of the truth.

XXXIII. Now since both difference and non-difference are real, the perception of duality is not sublated by the perception of the non-dual, in which case (alone) there would not be possible the engaging in action; nor may there be suspected intermixture (and confusion) of all in that, by him who maintains the doctrine of difference *cum* non-difference, it is not possible to state what defines the *prima facie* view, the final view etc.; for, that is common

¹Gla, IV, 26

even to the doctrine of non-dualism. Not so; for in the doctrine of non-dualism, for the world posited by māyā, existence is settled as different, even as perceived. Brahman alone being non-dual. On your view, however, intermixture is difficult to remedy. Nor may it be said that, though there be intermixture in empirical usage, release is unaffected; for, if the world be not removed by intuition of the truth, even the body-being-the-self, happiness, misery etc., being unsublated, there is the contingency of non-release. If it be said that there are difference and non-difference, the body being-the-self, etc., only in the stage of transmigration, even thus, how could there be remedied the reciprocal opposition between difference and non-difference? If it be said that there is no opposition, because of (both) being based on evidence, no. What is the evidence for it? Is it only the single perception 'The cow is khaṇḍa'? Or is it (so) in conjunction with a second cognition 'The cow is munda'?¹ Or is it (so) in conjunction with a third cognition 'This is that same cow'? Not the first, since in this cognition 'The cow is khaṇḍa' there is not the presentation of (its) being different and non-different. Though there be not the verbal designation of difference and non-difference, there certainly exists the cognition of them; if this be said, no; for in the case of those two, each of which is of the nature of the destruction of the other, presentation together is impossible. Now, between the genus and the particular, difference is certainly admitted; because of each being of the nature of the other, non-difference too is admitted. If this be said, no; for there is no admitted example in respect of differentials being each of the nature of the other.

¹ For the expressions 'khaṇḍa' and 'munda' compare the analogous English terms 'short-horn' and 'bald-head'.

Not the second; for, the character of valid knowledge does not belong to the two cognitions taken together 'The cow is khaṇḍa' and 'The cow is munda'. Even then, that cow-ness wherein khaṇḍa nature was apprehended by the first cognition, in that same cow-ness, khaṇḍa-ness is refuted and munda-ness apprehended by the second cognition; hence by implication is established difference *cum* non-difference. If this be said, no; for, in the absence of the recognition 'This is that same cow' there is not established the relation of one cow-ness to both cognitions. Not the third, since it is not possible for three cognitions to be valid in respect of one thing. Nor is this the evidence, the unintelligibility otherwise of the three cognitions; for, in the case of the three cognitions 'The letter A is short', 'The letter A is long', 'This is that same letter A', in the absence of difference and non-difference there is intelligibility even in dependence on shortness, length etc., due to adjuncts.

XXXIV. Now, though difference and non-difference be thus impossible, they may still exist in the self; if this be said, no, since therein difference is not established. For oneness is inferred thus: the particular bodies, immovable and movable, which are in dispute, are ensouled by the very self belonging to the particular body of the disputant, since (each) is a particular body, like the particular body of the disputant. Now, the selves are different, because of being simultaneously the loci of contrary attributes like birth and death, in the same way as fire, water, etc. (are different). If this be said, no; for, birth etc., being located in the body, there is non-establishment of the *probans*. Nor if the self be one is there the contingency of the intermixture of happiness, misery etc.; for, in reflections, though there is oneness, there is not seen intermixture of colours (pertaining to the

reflections of the same object in differently coloured media). The non-recollection by one of what has happened to another, this too is intelligible even because of bodily difference; for, in the case of even a single self there is not seen recollection in respect of past bodies etc. Nor may it be thought that though there be no reciprocal difference among the jīvas, there may be difference between the jīva and Brahman. Perception does not apply here, since both the jīva and Brahman are supersensuous. Nor is it capable of being established by such *probans* as being the locus of contrary attributes; for, there is inconclusiveness (of the *probans*) in the case of a prototype and reflections. Nor is the capacity of what is expressly declared, viz., being (related as) ruler and ruled etc., the evidence in respect of difference; for that capacity (*liṅga*) is sublated by such śruti (express statement) as 'Other than that there is no seer, other than that there is no hearer'¹ etc., which directly denies difference. Nor is there the establishment of difference through the śruti text 'Two birds'² etc., because of conflict with such śruti declarations of oneness as in 'He who is in this puruṣa and he who is in the sun, he is one'³ etc.; (also) because the śruti declaration of duality is intelligible even as a restatement of the duality delusively established. Therefore difference and non-difference are not (both real); hence is established the sublation of the perception of duality by the perception of non-duality.

XXXV. And thence, since the fruit results even from the intuition of Brahman, there is not to be suspected even a trace of injunction in the Vedānta. If there were, then there would result only one inquiry into dharma in sixteen

¹Brh., III, vii, 23

²Śvet., IV, 6

³Taitt., II, viii, 1

chapters. And thus, the separate commencement 'Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman' would not be intelligible. The different injunctions to be accomplished by the body and the senses have been set forth in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*; here, however, the injunction to be accomplished by the mind is set forth; hence the separate commencement. If this be said, then, it would be commenced only in the form 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into what remains of dharma'; but it is not so commenced. Therefore, only because of the difference between dharma and Brahman is there difference between the inquiries into the two. Thus, therefore, there being not even a suspicion of injunction, the harmonious relation of the Vedāntas to Brahman is extremely auspicious without any exception.

The *Vivaraṇa* together with many (other) works has been compendiously treated; without the trouble of (studying) the *Tīkā*,¹ let men disport themselves (with this) at their convenience.

Though incapable of knowing the heart of the great (one), this work has been written with great devotion; may Prakāśātman² be pleased (therewith).

Since no other service is pleasing to the preceptor, Vidyātīrtha, let this (work) filled with devotion be the service (rendered) to the feet of Śrī Vidyātīrtha.

¹ I. e., the *Pañcaspādika*, without a study of which, the *Vivaraṇa*, which is a commentary thereon, will be unintelligible.

² Author of the *Vivaraṇa*.

HERE ENDS THE NINTH VARṆAKA

END OF THE FOURTH APHORISM

AND HERE ENDS THE VIVARAṆAPRAMĒYASANGRAHA.

CORRECTIONS

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
38	32	removes	removes
42	22	silver	nacre
44	27	the	the
52	21	there by	there be
53	2	sāstra	sāstra
57	31	becasuse	because
59	4	valid cognition	evidential cognition
„	13	of the conceit	of the failure of the [conciest
65	26	determinative	determinative
68	24	establised	established
70	15	this is this	this is the
80	29	truble	trouble
83	1	thesixth	the sixth
84	1	contracteristic	characteristic
85	13	though	through
87	29	do.	do.
88	13	elewhere	elsewhere
95	15	filawless	flawless
101	28	intelligence	intelligence
120	29	can be	can he
125	21	inconclusiveness	inconclusiveness
126	12	reflected	reflected
147	28	tranformation	transformation
„	30	do.	do.
156	1	conflict	conflict
193	5	occurring	occurring
199	25	refined	referred
208	32	Brh., III, ix, 26	³ Brh., III, ix, 26
213	30	nisprapañcam	nisprapañcam
225	11	Brhasptisava	Brhaspatisava
226	30	occurring	occurring
229	2	accomplishment	establishment

229	25	suffix	suffix
252	1	were	be
280	16	easily asked	easily be asked
281	12	occurring	occurring
283	5	there opinion	their opinion
285	11	tbe	the
290	2	atterence	utterance
"	12	would	would
294	27	śruti	smṛti
296	12	auxiliaries	auxiliaries
296	23	Vedantine	Vedantins
301	14	Aryas	Aryas
303	31	transformation	transformation
309	11	oneslf	oneself
310	18	sacrifice	sacrifice
318	10	content	context
322	7	pompted	prompted
339	28	of of	of
341	10	can be	can he
343	24	knowledge of rites	knowledge and rites
345	16	since 'He	since in 'He
"	19-20	even...fruit	there is no fruit accom- plishable even by know- of the [ledge=
346	26	in the	
355	22	prakarana	prakaraṇa
362	6	these	those
364	15	knoweldge	knowledge
382	23	aggreate	aggregate
405	23	contingenee	contingence
414	10	Nor may	XIX. Nor may
438	23	sphorism	aphorism
447	17	brauches	branches
"	25	the the	the
451	16	squence	sequence
451	29	Not the	(2) Not the

452	6	of of	of
462	29	valdity	validity
466	15	these	there
„	19	the initial	the harmony of initial
„	27	sacifice have same	sacrifice have the same
512	20	would have same	would have the same
„	24	than these	than those
515	15	transformation	transformation
548	1	second	second



INDEX

- Adharma**, 145
Adhikara-vidhi (injunction of eligibility), 224
Adhyayana, 6, 435
Adṛṣṭa, 6, 103, 240, 286, 416
Āitareya Upaniṣad 94, 424
Ājñāna, 45, 97 (See also nescience)
Akhyāti (non-apprehension), 55-70, 78, 86, 87, 89, 455
Amṛtānanda, 472
Anubandhas, 12, 14
Anuvyavasāya, 113
Anyathā-khyāti (apprehension otherwise), 50 *fn.*, 70, 72, 81, 89
Apūrva, 6, 7, 17, 215, 237, 240, 243, 244, 258, 269, 270, 303
Argumentation, 434, 436, 439
Ārṇata (See Baudha)
Artha-bhāvanā, 263, 266, 284, 350
Ātmakhyāti, 72, 81, 89
Badarāyana, 9, 12, 539
Baudha, 66, 72, 115, 119, 198, 204, 261, 362, 375, 383, 387
Bhagavad Gītā, 6 *fn.*, 47, 104, 128, 408, 424, 498, 515, 581, 546
Bhāmati, 414 *fn.*
Bhāskara, 102, 341, 346, 349, 355, 392
Bhāṭṭapāda, 207, 263, 427, 470
Bhāṭṭa, 35, 112, 115, 118, 173, 181, 224, 268, 344, 362, 412, 531, 532
Bhāvanā, 263, 266, 316, 509
Bliss, 194, 236
Bondage, 15, 17, 34
Brahman-knowledge (or Intuition) 4, 6, 7, 13, 17, 31, 43, 45, 47, 96, 177, 178, 193, 194, 202, 203, 207, 209, 210, 215, 240, 247, 248, 281, 282, 328, 330, 331, 333, 335, 342, 344, 346, 347, 356, 358, 364, 368, 369, 399, 410, 433, 485, 501, 530
Brahmasiddhi, 458
Brahma-sūtra, 1, 6 *fn.*, 9, 12, 139, 182, 185, 326, 327, 360, 392, 399, 400, 446, 457, 464
Brahma-yajña, 256, 320
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 2, 8, 12, 13, 51, 92, 95, 139, 186, 188, 195, 200, 223, 231, 236, 249, 251, 253, 254, 306, 333, 335, 343, 351, 374, 390, 395, 443, 452, 464, 467, 470, 472, 479, 491, 495, 497, 499, 502, 506, 512, 530, 531, 549
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Bhāṣya, 10 *fn.*
Bṛhad-Vārtika, 120, 186
Causality, 165, 167, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 411, 418, 424,

- 425, 427, 428, 432, 441, 446, 447, 458, 502
- Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 46, 86, 95, 127, 136, 141, 193, 195, 197, 229, 238, 243, 307, 309, 345, 351, 385, 394, 405, 410, 411, 414, 435, 438, 443, 468, 485, 490, 491, 494, 496, 497, 508, 511, 513, 522, 544
- Contemplation, 209, 210, 235, 236, 238, 249, 250, 252, 254, 255, 463, 464, 486, 487, 491, 493, 495, 512, 513, 515, 516, 518, 519, 521, 530
- Creation, illusoriness of, 407, 411
- Creation, the view of (absolute), 84
- Darkness, the nature of, 22, 24
- Darśapūrnāmāsa, 9, 213, 214, 218, 220, 225, 250, 331, 348, 368, 437, 487, 493, 522
- Dharma, 6, 7, 11, 16, 38, 145, 150, 158, 223, 229, 232, 254, 255, 257, 260, 263, 265, 268, 270, 274, 276, 282, 322, 323, 325, 328, 341, 342, 346, 350, 355, 359, 360, 431, 435, 436, 450, 452, 463, 515, 531, 549, 550
- Difference *cum* non-difference, 30, 47, 49, 71, 444, 470, 472, 508, 504, 506, 546, 548
- Dream-cognition, 83, 86
- Gautama, 380
- Hearing, 10, 13, 209, 210
- Hiranyagarbha, 328, 330, 360, 428, 452
- Immediacy, 167-170
- Implication, Secondary, 13, 15, 272, 274, 468
- Indeterminability, theory of, 27 -
- Injunction, varieties of, 180, 182, 242
- Inquiry, 14, 107
- Internal organ, 129, 130, 146, 151, 188
- Invalidity, 204, 207, 453
- Īśa Upaniṣad* 342, 397, 491
- Īṣṭa-siddhi*, 103, 458
- Īśvara (or Lord) 392, 394, 396, 430, 432, 433, 448, 462, 515, 517
- Upaniṣad*, 337, 339, 341
- Jaimini, 182, 255, 261, 460, 531, 532, 538, 539
- Jaina, 173, 362, 412
- Jijñāsa, 278, 279, 359, 361, 399
- Jīva, 31, 45, 47, 48, 90, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101, 103, 127, 129, 133, 136, 138, 141, 148, 151, 194, 195, 198, 202, 208, 254, 324, 356, 359, 372, 389, 391, 393, 414, 430, 439, 451, 456, 462, 470, 472, 490, 491, 495, 501, 503, 506, 508, 511, 514, 549
- Jīvan-mukta, 545, 546
- Jyotiṣṭoma, 14, 17, 180, 181, 221, 259, 329, 342, 352, 487, 545

- Kaivalya Upaniṣad*, 396
 Karma, 12, 14, 46, 47, 96, 175, 379, 431, 433, 504, 514, 543, 546
Kātha Upaniṣad, 200, 391, 491, 531
Kauṣṭaki Upaniṣad, 186
 Kātyāyana, 539
Kena Upaniṣad, 502
 Learning, 476, 477, 483, 484, 489, 490, 531, 536, 538
 Logician (Naiyāyika), 32, 36, 54, 92, 111, 113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 129, 143, 204, 362, 375, 379, 387, 388, 391, 392, 413, 422, 433
 Lokāyata, (also Laukayatika) 191, 362, 375, 380, 383, 388, 451
 Madhyamika, 377
Mahānārāyaṇa, 336, 344
Maitri Upaniṣad, 494
 Manas, nature of, 388
Mānavopapurāṇa, 3 *fn.*, 5 *fn.*
 Maṇḍanācārya, 264
Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 539
Manu Smṛti, 7, 273, 294, 298, 300, 301, 305, 329, 336, 339
 Maya, 77, 81, 97, 104, 137, 194, 408, 416, 417, 423, 424, 425, 426, 458, 479, 514, 547
 Mīmāṃsaka (see Pūrva-mīmāṃsā)
 Momentariness, doctrine of, (kṣaṇikavāda), 152, 154, 156, 158, 159, 164, 165
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 192, 195, 250, 343, 344, 384, 417, 471, 502, 504, 506, 508, 544
Naishkarmyasiddhi, 105, 126, 333
 Nescience, 4, 5, 15, 20, 23, 28, 31, 44, 47, 49, 52, 75, 80, 83, 84, 91, 93, 95, 96, 100, 105, 109, 120, 123, 126, 128, 133, 138, 140, 141, 145, 147, 149, 150, 151, 170, 173, 178, 185, 193, 193, 195, 200, 202, 211, 212, 213, 234, 345, 394, 404, 472, 490, 495, 497, 498, 500, 503, 505, 507, 508, 511, 515, 529, 543, 544
 Niyoga, 215, 216, 218, 219, 237, 296, 297, 300, 308, 316, 317, 467, 484, 485, 488, 489, 491
 Non-attachment, 12
 Non-cognition (sixth pramāṇa), 34, 35
 Non-existence, 35 *fn.*, 540, 541
 Not-self, 19, 21, 25, 27, 29, 39, 40, 42, 50, 103, 109, 110, 173, 175, 181, 190, 192, 234
Nṛsiṃhottaratāpaniṣya, 52, 196 87. 90
 Padmapāda, 1
Pañcīrahasya-brāhmaṇa, 396
Pañcīpāṭikā, 1, 26 *fn.*, 550
Pāṇini-sūtra, 293, 539
Parāśaropapurāṇa, 4
 Parthasārathi Miśra, 218
 Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, 1

- Prabhakara, 9, 19, 20, 22, 97, 111, 115, 118, 132, 156, 158, 181, 199, 224, 262, 268, 270, 290, 291, 293, 296, 344, 362, 391, 413, 461, 475, 477, 481, 517, 531, 532, 540
 Practical efficiency, 159, 160
 Pradhāna, 128, 392, 393, 400, 401, 412, 415, 428, 429, 430
 Prajñāna, 94
 Prakāśatman, 1, 550
 Prakṛti, 104
 Pramāṇa, 36, 37, 40, 42, 51, 85, 104, 106, 107, 109, 114, 115, 142, 145, 176, 245, 248, 251, 252, 253, 254, 257, 268, 279
 Prarabdha karma, 212, 213
Praśna Upaniṣad, 128, 396, 495
 Pratitya-samutpāda, 72
 Prayoga-vidhi (procedural injunction), 224, 252
 Pretāgnihotra, 8, 9
 Purport, 465, 466
 Puruṣa, 104, 549
 Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, 223, 260, 302, 327, 383, 391, 406
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra: 182, 183, 229, 242, 243, 255, 262, 267, 268, 280, 314, 352, 360, 437, 460, 531, 538, 550
Puruṣasūkta, 498
 Recognition, 154, 158, 468, 469
 Reflection, 132, 141, 435
 Renunciation, 387 *et seq*
- Śābara-bhāṣya*, 242, 321
 Śābaraśvāmin, 538
 Śabda-bhāvaṇa, 263, 266, 284
 Sādhanā-catustaya, 14
 Śaiva, 412, 428, 429
 Śalikanātha, 537
Sambandhavārtika, 282, 337, 503
Sāmbopapurāṇa, 7
 Sampratti rite, 306, 307
 Śaṅkara (Commentator), 185, 277
 Sāṅkhya, 111, 118, 128, 129, 142, 204, 362, 375, 384, 391, 413, 428, 433
Sāstra-dīpikā, 256, 267
 Saugata, see Bauddha
 Sautrāntika, 112
 Self-luminosity, 92, 171, 173
 Senses, nature of, 383 *et seq*
- Sleep-experience, 121, 128, 151
Śloka-vārtika, 66, 263, 540
 Sublation, 82, 83
 Superimposition, 18, 19, 26, 33, 38, 43, 50, 55, 79, 86, 96, 109, 110, 137, 142, 146, 151, 170, 173, 174, 180, 183, 187, 190, 195, 200, 203, 210, 211, 345, 378, 379, 496, 499
Sureśvara-Vārtika, see Brhad-Vārtika
 Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa, 83 *fn*
- Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 79, 80, 104, 129, 194, 408, 423, 424, 425, 444, 452, 495, 498, 510, 549

- Tadatmya, 507, 509
Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 194, 332,
 351, 372, 373, 395, 396, 401,
 402, 411, 419, 425, 433, 440,
 443, 457, 472, 488, 503, 510,
 539, 549
Tantravārtika, 264, 313
 Tārkaika, see Logician
 Tatastha-lakṣaṇa, 83 *fn.*
 Transfiguration, 411
 Transformation, the view of,
 94, 405, 406, 419, 422
 Utpatti-vidhi (originative in-
 junction), 224
 Uttaramīmāṃsā, see Vedānta
 Vaiśeṣika, 362, 379, 391, 392,
 213, 215, 221, 223, 228, 229,
 232, 233, 235, 236, 239, 241,
 247, 251, 255, 266, 268, 270,
 271, 276, 277, 323, 327, 340,
 350, 364, 367, 369, 396, 434,
 438, 439, 440, 460, 462, 463,
 464, 465, 467, 473, 474, 481,
 491, 497, 503, 506, 530, 532,
 539, 543, 549, 550
 Vedāntin, 19, 21, 32, 93, 117,
 129, 142, 145, 151, 204, 236,
 344, 362, 404, 413, 443, 461
 Vedic rites, 12, 180, 193 *fn.*,
 225, 227, 230, 231, 246, 247,
 257, 331, 333, 335, 336, 340,
 343
 Vidyatīrtha, 550
 Vijñānavādin, 73, 113, 151, 376
 Vimuktātman, 103
 Viniyoga-vidhi (applicatory in-
 junction), 224
Viṣṇu Purāṇa, 103
 Viśvarūpācārya, 103, 186
Vivaraṇa, 1, 196 *fn.*, 400, 550
 Vṛttikāra; 359, 360
 Words, as recallers of things,
 66, 68
 Words, significance of, 278,
 279
 World, nature of, 412 *et seq.*
Yajñavalkya-smṛti, 301
 Yoga, 15, 18, 115, 167, 173, 174,
 176, 182, 183, 194, 202, 208,
 368, 391, 392, 428, 429,
 433

II. TELUGU and SANSKRIT

(a) CATALOGUES

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